Facts:

The Assessing Officer issued a show cause notice to the respondent-assessee, questioning the genuineness of money received through share capital and premium from various companies. The assessee claimed that the entire share capital was received through normal banking channels, supported by account payee cheques/demand drafts. The AO conducted independent inquiries in Mumbai, Kolkata, and Guwahati, revealing discrepancies in the identity and credit-worthiness of investor companies.

Issues:

Whether the assessee fulfilled the legal obligation to prove the genuineness of the transaction, identity of creditors, and credit-worthiness of investors.

Whether the independent inquiries conducted by the Assessing Officer were justified in doubting the authenticity of the transactions.

Held:

The court interprets Section 68 broadly, emphasizing the initial onus on the assessee to prove by credible evidence the genuineness of the transaction, identity of creditors, and credit-worthiness of investors.

The Assessing Officer's independent and detailed enquiry justified skepticism, revealing non-existent investor companies and lack of credit-worthiness. The court upholds the AO's decision to add back the amounts to the assessee's income.

Decision: The court allows the appeal, affirming the Assessing Officer's decision to add back the amounts to the assessee's income. The judgment reinforces the importance of meeting the burden of proof under Section 68.

Facts:

Banjara Magasvargiya Shikshan Prasarak Mandal ran a Primary Ashram School named Prabodhankar Thakare Prathmik Ashram Shala.

Due to irregularities, the school's recognition was withdrawn, and students were directed to be absorbed in nearby Ashram Schools.

A Resolution dated 02.01.2012 was passed, transferring the closed Ashram School to Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Sanstha, Islampur, 400 kms away.

Issues:

Legality of the transfer of a closed Ashram School.

Compliance with government guidelines and procedures for such transfers.

Violation of distance limitations for transfer specified in Government Resolution dated 01.08.2007.

Held:

The High Court rightly quashed the Resolution dated 02.01.2012, noting the transfer lacked proper procedure and violated guidelines.

The government treated Ashram School recognition as a business license, and the transfer lacked transparency.

The High Court's criticism of the State Government's handling of the transfer was justified.

The appeals were dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision.

Facts:

The FIR, which implicated the accused in offenses under Sections 307 and 34 and other related sections, was quashed by the High Court based on a compromise between the complainant and the accused.

The High Court's decision to quash the FIR did not take into account the non-compoundable nature of the alleged offenses, as per Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The seriousness of the charges, their social impact, and the antecedents of the accused were not adequately considered.

Issues:

The High Court's quashing of the FIR solely on the basis of a compromise raised concerns about the sustainability of such a decision.

The relevance and applicability of the decision in Shiji's case were questioned, as the High Court seemed to have misapplied the precedent to the facts of the current case.

Held:

The power under Section 482 of the Code to quash criminal proceedings for non-compoundable offenses can only be exercised when the offenses overwhelmingly have a civil character, such as those arising from commercial transactions or matrimonial disputes. However, this power should not be invoked in cases involving heinous and serious offenses with a significant impact on society.

Offenses under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act were categorized as heinous and serious, not private in nature, and impacting society at large. The quashing of criminal proceedings for such offenses solely based on a compromise was deemed inappropriate.

The High Court failed to consider the gravity of the offenses and the conduct of the accused while mechanically quashing the FIR based on a settlement. The antecedents of the accused were also overlooked.

Decision: The judgment and order of the High Court, quashing the criminal proceedings for offenses under Sections 307 and 34 IPC, were deemed unsustainable. The FIR, investigation, and criminal proceedings against the accused were directed to proceed.

In a separate Criminal Appeal (No. 350/2019), where the High Court quashed proceedings for offenses under Sections 323, 294, 308, and 34 IPC, the decision was similarly set aside. The FIR, investigation, and criminal proceedings against the accused were directed to continue.

Facts:

Appellant (open category) and first respondent (Scheduled Caste) selected for the post of Town Planner on July 1, 1992.

Appellant promoted as Deputy Director of Town Planning (DDTP) on November 1, 2003.

First respondent promoted as DDTP on August 3, 2006.

Dispute arises in the promotional cadre of Joint Director of Town Planning (JDTP).

Issues:

Appellant claims 'catch-up' rule should govern, giving him seniority over the first respondent.

First respondent promoted as Director of Town Planning (DTP) on April 30, 2016.

Challenge to the applicability of Government Resolutions (GR) dated October 20, 1997, and March 20, 2003.

Held:

Preliminary objection rejected; the challenge to the Supreme Court not barred after the High Court's review decision.

GR dated October 20, 1997, and March 20, 2003, govern seniority between backward class and non-backward class candidates.

GR dated March 20, 2003, not abrogated by the 2004 Act; legislative intent not to override consequential seniority.

Challenge to the GR not entertained at this stage; lack of specific challenge before the Tribunal.

Eligibility must be considered on the vacancy occurrence date; appellant did not fulfill eligibility for DTP post on April 30, 2016.

Seniority and eligibility are distinct concepts; seniority cannot prevail if a senior lacks eligibility for promotion.

Appellant failed to challenge the first respondent's JDTP appointment; cannot challenge based on subsequent circular invalidation.

Judgment of the High Court does not warrant interference.

Decision: Civil Appeal Nos 2468-2470 of 2019 dismissed. Civil Appeal Nos 2471-2473 of 2019 also dismissed. Miscellaneous Applications (MAs) 2983-2985 of 2019 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 33086-33088 of 2017 disposed of in terms of the lead appeals.

Facts:

An altercation ensued between the parties. Accused No. 1 and Accused No. 2 left the scene but returned after 10 minutes armed with a deadly weapon, a knife with a 15.5 cm blade. The victim was subsequently stabbed to death. Accused No. 1 stabbed the victim, while Accused No. 2 held the victim's neck.

Issues:

The appeal by Accused No. 2 challenges the High Court's conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34, arguing a lack of evidence for pre-planned murder.

Held:

The accused, after the initial incident, returned with a deadly weapon, demonstrating clear intention. The post-mortem confirmed that the inflicted injury was sufficient to cause death. Accused No. 1's conviction under Section 302 was upheld, and there was no reason to differ with the High Court's view that both accused were liable for conviction under Section 302.

The appellant contended that there could be no conviction under Section 34, citing a lack of evidence for pre-planned murder. However, all three eye-witnesses confirmed that Accused No. 2 held the neck of the victim, supporting the finding of common intention.

Examining the evidence, the common intention of Accused Nos. 1 and 2 was fully established. After an altercation, they returned armed, indicating a meeting of minds. Accused No. 2 held the victim's neck while Accused No. 1 stabbed him, confirming their common intention. The High Court's conviction of Accused No. 2 under Section 302 read with Section 34 was deemed appropriate.

Decision: The appeals by the accused were dismissed by the court.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the accused committed dacoity with murder and rape. The case relied heavily on the deposition of two eyewitnesses, PW1 and PW8, and the identification of the accused in TI parades and court. The accused were initially sentenced to death, but the High Court altered the sentence for some and acquitted others.

Issues:

The reliability of witness statements, identification procedures, delays in investigations, and the fairness of the trial. The court also addressed the suppression of material facts by the investigating agency and the prosecution.

Held:

Identification and Witness Statements (Para 9.3-9.11): The court expressed serious doubts regarding the identification of the accused by PW1 and PW8 in TI parades and court. Major omissions and contradictions in their statements raised reasonable doubt about their trustworthiness. The court found flaws in the identification process and concluded it unsafe to convict solely based on these identifications.

Fair Investigation (Para 10-10.2): The judgment emphasized the importance of fair and truthful investigations for a just trial. It condemned the deliberate suppression of material facts by the investigating agency, noting that such lapses violated fundamental rights under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution.

Further Investigation (Para 9.12, 11, 11.1, 15): The court highlighted the failure to investigate four persons identified by PW8 immediately after the incident. It directed the prosecution to conduct further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC regarding these individuals.

Acquittal and Compensation (Para 12, 15, 16): Due to the lapses in the investigation and unfair trial, the court acquitted all accused. Acknowledging their prolonged imprisonment and the stress of facing death penalty, the court, under Article 142, directed the State of Maharashtra to compensate each accused with Rs. 5,00,000.

Action Against Erring Officers (Para 15): The Chief Secretary, Home Department, State of Maharashtra, was tasked with identifying and taking departmental action against officers responsible for the failure of the prosecution case.

Facts:

The Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) were dismissed in limine without reasons. The issue at hand revolves around the maintainability of the review petitions filed subsequently. There was a perceived conflict in the views expressed in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm case and Kunhayammed case, prompting a referral to a larger bench.

Issues:

The conflicting views in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm case and Kunhayammed case.

The maintainability of review petitions after the dismissal of SLPs without reasons.

Held:

The Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm case was explained in the judgment in Kunhayammed case, and there is no conflict between the two. Kunhayammed case lays down the correct law and does not necessitate a reference to a larger bench. (Para 25)

The conclusions in Kunhayammed case are affirmed and reiterated, clarifying that an order refusing special leave to appeal does not attract the doctrine of merger. It does not substitute the order under challenge, and findings in the order bind the parties and subsequent proceedings by way of judicial discipline. (Para 27)

Following Kunhayammed case, the timing of filing a review petition (before or after the dismissal of SLP) does not affect its maintainability. (Para 27)

Civil Appeal No. 2432 of 2019, dismissed without reasons, should have had the review petition decided on merits. The order of November 12, 2008, is set aside, and the matter is remanded back to the High Court. (Para 28)

Civil Appeal No. 2433 of 2019, dismissed without a speaking order, allows the review petition filed after the dismissal of SLP. The matter is referred to the regular Board to decide on the merits. (Para 28)

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the selection of two Lieutenant Generals as Army Commanders. The appellants contested that the appointments were solely based on seniority, without a comparative evaluation of officers fulfilling the eligibility criteria.

Issues:

Whether the appointments of the third and fourth respondents as Army Commanders were based exclusively on seniority, in violation of the norms governing selection posts.

Held:

The judgment emphasizes that while seniority is a relevant consideration, the post of Army Commander remains a selection post. The appointing authority is not restricted to considering seniority alone but can take into account a range of relevant factors.

The submission that the appointments were based solely on seniority is refuted. The rejection of the statutory complaint does not imply a disregard for merit or a comparative evaluation.

The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) considered the service profile of seven officers and recommended the appointments, adhering to the prescribed criteria. The Defence Minister was informed of officers fulfilling eligibility conditions.

The appointments were duly approved by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC), and there was no violation of norms governing selection posts.

No breach of the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961, occurred. The ACC was apprised of material facts before approval.

The policy decision of 1992, indicating the suggestion of two senior eligible officers for each Army Commander vacancy, was deemed directory and did not prejudice the appellant.

The appellant and the third and fourth respondents have retired, rendering the appeal moot. The grievance is addressed on merits with no substance found.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the validity of the appointments of the third and fourth respondents as Army Commanders.

Facts:

Gurbaran Singh, the Respondent, was appointed as a pharmacist in the pay-scale of Rs. 140-6-1030 on a regular basis on 05.09.1975.

Singh tendered his resignation while posted at Ferozepur on 27.06.1986, and it was accepted by the Civil Surgeon, Civil Hospital, Muktsar, Punjab.

Singh claimed entitlement to pension and service benefits but was granted only gratuity and General Provident Fund.

The Civil Suit No. 74 of 2009 was filed by Singh, seeking pensionary benefits, which was decreed in his favor by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bathinda.

Issues:

Whether Singh, upon resignation, is entitled to pension and service benefits as per Rule 7.5(1) of the Rules.

Held:

The court refers to Rule 7.5(1) of the Rules, which stipulates that resignation from service entails forfeiture of past service unless covered by specific exceptions in sub-rule (2).( Para 7)

The court cites Union of India and others vs. Braj Nandan Singh (2005) 8 SCC 325, emphasizing the mandatory nature of Rule 7.5(1) and the forfeiture of past service upon resignation unless falling under the exceptions.( Para 8)

The court concludes that since Singh's case doesn't fall under the exceptions, his past service stands forfeited, leading to the exclusion of the qualifying period for pension entitlement.( Para 9)

The submission by Ms. Uttara Babbar, advocate for the Appellant, is acknowledged for its alignment with the scope and interpretation of Rule 7.5(1), as supported by the decision in Union of India and others vs. Braj Nandan Singh.( Para 10)

The court allows the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and dismissing Civil Suit No. 74 of 2009 filed by the Respondent. The amount paid in May 2018 need not be recovered, but no further payments shall be released to the Respondent.( Para 11)