Facts:

The case pertains to the validity of a testamentary disposition of agricultural land in favor of the appellant, who was not an agriculturist. The land had been under the cultivating possession of a tenant who had acquired deemed purchaser status under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The appellant, a non-agriculturist, inherited the land through a will. The question revolved around whether such a disposition was valid under the Act, specifically under sections 43 and 63, given the legislative intent to prevent absentee landlordism and protect cultivating tenants.

Issues:

Whether the term "assignment" in sections 14, 27, and 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act includes testamentary disposition.

Whether the legislative scheme of granting statutory purchase rights to cultivating tenants and preventing assignment applies to testamentary dispositions, even when there is no consideration involved.

Held:

The Court examined the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, the legislative intent, and relevant precedents. The following conclusions were reached:

The term "assignment" used in sections 14, 27, and 43 must include testamentary disposition. The Court relied on Bhavarlal Labhchand Shah v. Kanaiyalal Nathalal Intawala (1986) 1 SCC 571 to establish that a tenancy governed by a statute prohibiting assignment cannot be willed away to a total stranger.

The legislative scheme aims to protect disadvantaged categories, confer ownership on cultivating tenants, and establish a direct relationship between the tiller and the land. The prohibition on transfers without prior sanction aims to ensure that the transferee fulfills obligations, cultivates the land, and doesn't breach ceiling limits.

The Court held that the Division Bench's interpretation that testamentary disposition falls under the term "assignment" in section 43 is correct. The prohibition against assignment, even without consideration, aligns with the legislative scheme's intent and safeguards against potential misuse.

The Court rejected the argument that a testamentary disposition would bypass the legislative scheme's objectives and render them otiose. The focus is on protecting disadvantaged categories and cultivating tenants, even in the context of testamentary dispositions.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal against certain directions issued by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (Inspector General of Registration) under the Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules, 1968. The directions required the Deputy Inspector General of Registration, or another officer, to conduct a site inspection in connection with certain instruments.

Issues:

Whether the directions issued by the appellate authority for a site inspection amounted to delegation of functions and violated Rule 11-A of the Rules.

Whether Rule 7 of the Rules, which prescribes a three-month timeline for the Collector to pass an order determining market value and duty payable, is mandatory or directory.

Whether the appellate authority has the power to enhance the market value of the property while deciding an appeal under Section 47-A.

Held:

The Court held that Rule 11-A empowers the appellate authority to call for information or records and examine statements from public offices or authorities. Calling for information does not constitute delegation of essential functions, as long as the authority retains the duty of considering factors and making informed decisions. Ancillary tasks can be delegated, provided the essential decision-making function is preserved. (Para 15)

The Court determined that Rule 7's stipulation of a three-month timeline for passing an order is directory, not mandatory. The rule's purpose is to expedite proceedings but does not create a right for those who may have suppressed the correct value, prejudicing public interest.(Paras 25-26)

The Court clarified that the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority has the power, under Section 47-A, to enhance the market value of property while deciding an appeal. The exercise of this power is subject to certain limitations, such as the absence of pending appeals or expiration of a five-year period. In the present case, the authority had adequately followed the procedures and limitations, making the exercise of power valid. (Paras 30-36)

After careful consideration and resolution of all raised questions, we find these appeals deserving of approval. Accordingly, we reverse the appealed High Court decisions, reinstating the appellate authority's orders. No costs involved. (Para 37)

FACTS

The appeal stems from a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The deceased, S.T. Devaraju, lost his life in an accident attributed to negligent driving. The appellants, his family members, sought compensation, alleging a loss of dependency and future prospects due to his untimely death.

ISSUES

Determination of the compensation amount in a case of accidental death caused by negligent driving.

Applicability of future prospects based on the age of the deceased.

HELD The Tribunal found the accident resulted from the driver's negligent driving and determined compensation. The compensation was calculated using a multiplier of 13 and 30% for future prospects.

The High Court maintained the multiplier but reduced future prospects to 15% solely due to the deceased's age of 50 years 3 months. This reduction was found unjustified as the age group was 40 to 50 years.

DECISION: The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court's adjustments and found them erroneous. The future prospects reduction was not supported by the applicable age group. The Supreme Court restored the Tribunal's compensation award.

REFERRED CASES:

Sarla Verma & Ors. vs. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr., (2009) 6 SCC 121

National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors., (2017) 16 SCC 680

Facts:

The writ petitions were filed by various employers and employer associations challenging the validity of orders issued under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. These orders directed employers to make wage payments to their workers during the lockdown period caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The petitioners contended that these orders were arbitrary and violated their rights under Article 14, Article 19(1)(g), and Article 21 of the Constitution.

Issues:

The legality and constitutionality of the orders issued under the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

Whether Section 10(2)(l) of the Disaster Management Act, 2005, could be interpreted as conferring authority on the Central Government to direct private employers to pay full wages to employees during lockdown.

The implications of the orders on employers' financial capacity and the balance between employers' interests and employees' interests.

The authority of the Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, to impose financial obligations on the private sector through these orders.

Held:

The court examined the arguments presented by both the petitioners and the respondents. The court observed that the orders dated 29.03.2020, issued under Section 10(2)(l) of the Disaster Management Act, 2005, were withdrawn by a subsequent order dated 17.05.2020. However, the court held that the issues regarding the legality of the orders and the obligations of employers during the period when the orders were in force remained to be addressed.

The court recognized the adverse impact of the lockdown on both employers and employees. It emphasized the need to strike a balance between their interests and recommended negotiation and settlement processes between employers and workers. The court directed private establishments to engage in negotiations with workers' associations and submit settlement proposals to labor authorities, with these settlements being without prejudice to ongoing legal proceedings.

Facts:

Bihar Staff Selection Commission issued Advertisement No.704 of 2004 for appointing 1510 Sub-Inspectors in Bihar. Selection process included physical and written tests.

Legal challenges and controversies arose over the years regarding model answers, results, and appointments.

In a separate selection for 299 posts, candidates were to undergo physical standards, examination, and written examination.

Issues:

Whether the petitioners, who did not participate in or failed the physical test, were entitled to the same exemption from physical test as the 133 candidates granted under a specific order of the Supreme Court?

Held:

The Supreme Court acknowledged that an exemption from the physical test was granted to 133 candidates in a unique context, and this exemption should not be treated as a precedent.

The Court recognized that the petitioners were not able to satisfy why they should be given appointment as Sub-Inspectors when they did not undertake the physical test or failed it.

The Court considered the counter affidavit filed by the Commission, indicating the number of candidates who participated in the selection process and the physical test results.

The Court emphasized that directing appointment of candidates who did not participate in or failed the physical test would create an unending process.

The Court referred to its previous orders, including the one dated 24.10.2018, which clarified that the exemption for 133 candidates was unique and should not lead to further proceedings.

Concluding that the petitioners were not entitled to the exemption sought, the Court dismissed all the writ petitions.

Facts:

The appellant was involved in a motor accident caused by rash and negligent driving of a bus operated by the respondent K.S.R.T.C. This accident resulted in severe injuries, leading to the amputation of the appellant's left leg.

Issues:

The adequacy of compensation awarded to the appellant for his injuries, permanent disability, loss of future earnings, medical expenses, and other related losses.

Held :

The Supreme Court noted that the appellant's physical functional disability was assessed at 75% of the left leg and 37.5% of the whole body. The Court emphasized that the appellant's earning capacity was permanently negated due to the disability, preventing him from pursuing his vocation as a painter or engaging in manual work.

The Court disagreed with the High Court's assessment of the appellant's physical disability at 25% of the whole body. It stated that compensation for loss of future earnings should be calculated based on the impact of the disability on the appellant's ability to earn a livelihood, rather than equating it directly to the percentage of physical disability.

Referring to relevant legal principles, the Court highlighted the need to consider the effect of permanent disability on the appellant's occupation, profession, and age, along with his ability to perform specific tasks. It stated that compensation should be determined based on the reduction in earning capacity caused by the disability, while also considering the nature of the work he was engaged in before the accident.

Based on these principles, the Court recalculated and enhanced the compensation awarded to the appellant. The revised compensation amount included various elements such as pain and suffering, medical expenses, attendant charges, loss of earnings during treatment, loss of future earnings, future medical expenses, and loss of amenities.

Facts:

The State and Union Territories claimed to be following various measures, orders, and guidelines issued by the Central Government and relevant authorities. However, there were lapses and shortcomings in implementing these schemes and policies, as highlighted by intervenors.

Issues:

The implementation of circulars, policies, and schemes by the States and Union Territories.

Instances of excess in dealing with migrant laborers by authorities.

The transportation of stranded workers to their native places.

Identification and registration of migrant workers.

Care for migrant workers who returned to their native places.

Prosecution and complaints against migrant laborers for lockdown-related violations.

Held :

Implementation of Policies and Schemes The Court emphasized the importance of efficient and correct implementation of circulars, policies, and schemes. States and Union Territories were directed to streamline vigilance and supervision, taking appropriate action where required (Para 26).

Excess with Regard to Migrant Laborers While acknowledging commendable efforts by police and authorities, the Court highlighted instances of excess with respect to migrant laborers. The concerned Director General of Police/Police Commissioner were directed to issue necessary directions to address this (Para 26).

Transportation of Stranded Workers States/Union Territories were ordered to transport all stranded workers within 15 days through train, bus, or other means (Para 28).

Identification and Registration States/Union Territories were directed to complete the identification and registration of migrant workers, simplifying the process and publicizing information regarding their journey (Para 30).

Care for Returned Migrant Workers States were instructed to maintain detailed records of returned migrant workers and set up counseling centers at block and district levels to provide information about government schemes and employment avenues (Para 31).

Prosecution and Complaints Considering the circumstances, the Court suggested that the State may consider withdrawing prosecutions and complaints lodged against migrant laborers for lockdown-related violations (Para 33).

Additional directions were issued to ameliorate the conditions of migrant workers pending consideration of other issues (Para 34).

FACTS:

On 18.03.2004, an accident occurred resulting in the death of the claimant's son, who was allegedly a pillion rider on a motor vehicle driven by respondent No. 2. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) concluded that the accident was due to respondent No. 2's rash and negligent driving. The MACT determined compensation, and an appeal was filed before the High Court of Uttarakhand. The High Court set aside the MACT's judgment based on lack of eyewitness testimony and absence of evidence regarding a valid driving license for the deceased.

ISSUES:

Whether negligence needs to be proven under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act?

Validity of the deceased's driving license.

Appropriate multiplier for calculating compensation.

HELD:

The Supreme Court clarified that Section 163A does not require the claimant to prove negligence or default by the owner or any other person. Eyewitness status is not a prerequisite.

The High Court erred in using the absence of a valid driving license as a ground to disentitle the claimant, even though this point was given up by the insurance company before the MACT.

The Court noted a calculation error in the multiplier used for compensation and corrected it from 8 to 17 based on the victim's age.

The argument regarding maximum liability of Rs. 1 lakh was not entertained as it was raised for the first time in the Supreme Court.

DECISION: The appeal was allowed, and the insurance company was directed to pay the revised compensation amount to the claimant within three months.

Facts:

The appellant, a tenant, occupied two shop rooms - one on the ground floor and the other on the first floor, for textile business. The landlord filed eviction petitions based on arrears of rent, bonafide requirement, and material damage under relevant sections of the Kerala Rent Control Act. The trial court decreed eviction on the bonafide requirement ground. The Rent Control Appellate Authority reversed this decision. A revision petition was filed in the High Court, which interfered with the Appellate Authority's findings.

Issues:

Scope of enquiry under Section 11(8) of the Act

Effect of the availability of vacant rooms in other buildings owned by the landlord on the landlord's claim under Section 11(8) of the Act

Held:

The Appellate Authority found vacant rooms in the building owned by the landlord and in other buildings, indicating the tenant's lack of bonafide requirement. This finding of fact was not perverse.

The Appellate Authority's reliance on the Building Tax Assessment Register, which indicated vacant rooms owned by the landlord, is a factual finding that cannot be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction.

The tenant's possession of a room leased by the mother-in-law was temporary and lacked bonafide possession, a valid finding by the Appellate Authority.

The comparative hardship analysis by the Appellate Authority was a factual finding that cannot be interfered with, as it was not shown to be perverse.

The High Court's interference with the factual findings made by the Appellate Authority exceeded its revisional jurisdiction and was incorrect.