Facts:

The appellant, Shoda Devi, suffered medical negligence at Deen Dayal Upadhyay Hospital in Shimla, leading to the amputation of her right arm. She sought enhancement of compensation, alleging negligence on the part of the hospital staff.

Issues:

Whether there was medical negligence on the part of the respondents.

Whether the awarded compensation was just and reasonable.

Whether the appellant is entitled to enhancement of compensation.

Held:

The National Commission found medical negligence but awarded a meager compensation of Rs. 2,00,000.( Para 2)

The Court observed that findings on medical negligence are sound, but there is a clear case for enhancing the compensation.( Para 13)

Referred to previous cases (Alfred Benddict v. Manipal Hospital and Nizam's Institute of Medical Sciences v. Prashanth S. Dhananka) where compensation was enhanced due to medical negligence causing severe harm.( Para 15)

The Court emphasized the need for just and reasonable compensation, considering pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.( Para 16.1)

The appellant, a poor woman from a rural background, was awarded a total compensation of Rs. 4,93,526.( Para 16.2)

Professionals must treat all consumers with equal respect; the Court criticized the insensitive remarks made during the appellant's pain.( Para 16.3)

Considering the appellant's reduced contribution to her family due to disability, an additional compensation of Rs. 10,00,000 was awarded.( Para 16.4)

The appeal was allowed, and the respondents were given three months to make the payment; otherwise, interest would be applicable.( Para 17)

Facts:

The appellant, M/S Anjaneya Jewellery, filed a complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The Commission dismissed the complaint in limine without issuing notice to the respondent.

Issues:

• Whether the Commission was justified in dismissing the appellant's complaint in limine.

• Interpretation of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Held:

The Division Bench opined that the complaint deserved admission for its disposal on merits after giving notice to the respondents. The jurisdiction to dismiss a complaint in limine exists but must be exercised considering the facts of each case. The amendment in Section 13 allows such dismissal, but it should be appropriate.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the appellant's complaint was admitted under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The respondents were granted one month to file their reply.

Facts:

Appellant (husband) and respondent (wife) involved in a disputed marriage.

Respondent filed for maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code for herself and her minor daughter.

Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate (SDJM) partly allowed the application, granting maintenance for the minor daughter but rejecting it for the respondent-wife.

High Court set aside the SDJM's order and remanded the case for a fresh inquiry.

Issues:

Legality of the marriage between the appellant and respondent.

Appropriate maintenance for the respondent-wife.

Held:

High Court erred in remanding the case, having already established the respondent-wife as the legally wedded wife of the appellant.

Remand unnecessary when all material for fixing maintenance is on record.

Maintenance fixed at Rs. 8,000 per month, in addition to the Rs. 2,000 already awarded for the minor daughter.

Appellant directed to pay a total of Rs. 10,000 monthly, starting from 01.03.2019.

Modification of the impugned order in favor of the respondent-wife.

The appeal stands disposed of.

Facts:

The age of superannuation was initially raised from 58 to 60 years by a Government Order on 05.08.2015.

A subsequent Resolution dated 18.06.2016 kept this decision in abeyance.

A Government Order on 28.06.2016 addressed issues related to the interregnum period or gap period for re-inducted employees.

Government Order on 27.06.2017 gave in-principle approval for the enhanced retirement age.

Government Order on 08.08.2017 amended the previous order, stating its retrospective effect from 02.06.2014.

Supreme Court, on 09.08.2017, ordered protection for employees superannuating after 02.06.2014, up to 60 years.

Issues:

The interpretation of "consequential benefits" and whether it included back wages for the period not actively worked.

Held:

The amendment to Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment Act occurred post the bifurcation, addressing the situation of employees allocated to the new State.

The policy decision on 05.08.2015 was kept in abeyance, and subsequent orders dealt with the interregnum period for re-inducted employees. The Government Order on 08.08.2017 modified the earlier decision, making it retrospective from 02.06.2014 but did not alter the principles regarding the interregnum period.

The benefits emanated from policy documents, and the extent of benefits was outlined in those government-issued instruments.

Mere expression "consequential benefits" doesn't entitle employees to more than what was contemplated in the policy documents.

Decision: The contempt petitions were dismissed. The court found no violation of the Supreme Court's orders, stating that employees were entitled to benefits as per the policy documents, but not for the period they had not actively worked.

Referred:

B. Prabhakar Rao and ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1985 (Supp) SCC 432

D.S. Nakara vs. Union of India - (1983) 1 SCC 305

G. Rama Mohan Rao and Anr. vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. etc., 2017(3)ALT 1; 2017(6) ALD 103; (2017) 11 LLJ 535 AP

Sureshchandra Singh and others v. Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. and others, (2004) 1 SCC 592

Facts:

The appellant filed a civil suit in the High Court at Calcutta seeking a declaration, damages, and injunction. The respondents raised a plea of territorial jurisdiction, arguing that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in revoking the leave granted to the appellant based on the respondents' plea of territorial jurisdiction.

Held:

The respondents did not file a written statement but instead raised the plea of territorial jurisdiction through an application for revocation of leave.

The Court emphasized that the issue of territorial jurisdiction is a mixed question of law and fact, and such matters should be raised in the written statement as part of the defense.

The Court referred to the precedent set in Secretary of State v. Golabrai Paliram and Indian Mineral & Chemicals Co. v. Deutsche Bank, asserting that questions of difficulty and importance should not be dealt with by revoking leave but should be part of the written statement.

The Court held that the respondents should be allowed to raise the plea of territorial jurisdiction in the written statement to enable a thorough examination of the issue on its merits.

The application for revocation of leave was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Single Judge for a fresh decision on the issue in accordance with law.

The Court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the controversy but directed the Single Judge to decide the issue strictly in accordance with the law.

FACTS:

Birla Institute of Technology (BIT) is the appellant.

The State of Jharkhand and others are respondents.

The appeal involves the entitlement of teachers to gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

The court initially relied on the decision in Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association, allowing the appeal.

Later, the court realized that the Parliament had amended the definition of "employee" in the Payment of Gratuity Act in response to the Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association case.

The amendment had retrospective effect from 03.04.1997.

ISSUES:

Whether teachers are entitled to gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act.

The impact of the amendment made by Act No. 47 of 2009 on the Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association case.

HELD:

The court acknowledged the error in its initial judgment due to not considering the amendment to the Payment of Gratuity Act.

The amendment widened the definition of "employee," including teachers, with retrospective effect from 03.04.1997.

The reliance on Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association by the appellant was misplaced in light of the amendment.

The court recalled its previous order and restored the appeal for disposal on its merits.

Pendency of a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of Act No. 47 of 2009 does not affect the right of teachers to claim gratuity.

DECISION: The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was directed to pay costs to the teacher.

REFERRED CASES:

Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association vs. Administrative Officer and Others (2004) 1 SCC 755

Facts:

The case pertains to the succession of an interest in agricultural lands in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The matter involves the application of Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and the relevance of the deleted Section 4(2) in the context of devolution of tenancy rights concerning agricultural holdings.

Issues:

Applicability of Section 22 to agricultural land in Himachal Pradesh.

Impact of the deletion of Section 4(2) on the applicability of Section 22.

Whether devolution of tenancy rights in agricultural holdings is exempt from Section 22.

Held:

The court notes that there is no conflicting State legislation in Himachal Pradesh regarding succession to agricultural lands. Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act exclusively occupies this field in the state, and the High Court was correct in affirming its applicability to agricultural lands.

The court observes that, before its deletion, Section 4(2) of the Act explicitly exempted the applicability of the Act in cases of devolution of tenancy rights concerning agricultural holdings. The High Court's conclusion on the inapplicability of Section 22 in such cases was accurate. However, the deletion of Section 4(2) removes this exception, making Section 22 universally applicable.

The court explores the exclusive competence of State legislatures over matters related to land, land tenures, etc. It emphasizes that the preferential rights under Section 22 are linked to the principles of succession. Three illustrations are provided to clarify scenarios involving joint purchase, joint purchase by siblings, and inherited agricultural holdings.

The court delves into the historical context, stating that preferential rights were introduced to prevent outsiders from easily acquiring family properties. This objective supports the conferment of preferential rights upon heirs under Section 22, even in the case of agricultural land.

The court conclusively affirms that the preferential right under Section 22 applies to heirs of Hindus, even when the property in question is agricultural land. The High Court's decision upholding the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge is validated.

FACTS:

Appellant obtained a life insurance policy in 1993 with a term of 25 years and a sum insured of Rs 75,000.

Appellant stopped premium payments in 2001 and sought surrender value.

Respondent computed surrender value, deducting a loan amount and outstanding interest.

Appellant disputed the computation, claiming entitlement to the full bonus amount.

ISSUES:

Interpretation of Section 113 of the Insurance Act, 1938, and Condition 7 of the policy document.

Calculation method of surrender value for bonus.

HELD:

The dispute revolves around Section 113 of the Insurance Act, 1938, and Clause 7 of the policy document. The appellant contends for the entirety of the bonus, challenging the computation method used by the respondent.

Section 113(1) stipulates the acquisition of surrender value after a certain period, with the surrender value of any subsisting bonus to be added. The first proviso allows for calculation methods including bonus surrender value. The second and third provisos specify policy display requirements and their effective period.

Regulation 18(2) of the Life Insurance Corporation Regulations 1959 empowers the Executive Committee to accept surrender on terms it deems fit.

Condition 7 of the policy document specifies surrender value computation, involving 30% of total premiums paid, excluding certain premiums.

The computation method, as per the provided formula, includes the paid-up value and vested bonus, with a surrender value factor of 32.92%.

The appellant's contention that the surrender value should include the entire bonus is rejected. The surrender value is correctly calculated based on the approved formula.

The dispute stems from a misconception about the nature of surrender value in life insurance. The concept of 'reserve' is explained, emphasizing the proportional return based on the law of averages and actuarial tables.

Citing Charles C. Burlingham v Charles M. Crouse (1913), the Court distinguishes between insurance policies with and without surrender value.

The computation, as per the approved formula and regulations, aligns with the legal provisions and policy conditions.

The appeal is dismissed, finding no merit in the appellant's claim. No costs are awarded.

REFERRED CASES:

Branch Manager, LIC of India vs A Paulraj, (1996) 2 CPJ 69.

Charles C. Burlingham v Charles M. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459(1913)

In re McKinney, 15 Fed. Rep. 535

FACTS:

The appellant, a Forest Range Officer, along with a co-accused, was charged under various sections including murder for firing a gun shot at the deceased party during an encounter in a forest. The appellant claimed self-defence, alleging the deceased party was smuggling sandalwood.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellant's use of force was justified under self-defence?

Validity of the appellant's conviction under Section 203 IPC.

HELD:

The prosecution failed to prove the incident due to hostile witnesses. The appellant's version, supported by the FIR, indicated he acted in self-defence against an aggressive deceased party suspected of smuggling sandalwood. The Court held the appellant was entitled to acquittal from all charges.( Paragraph 22-29)

Examining the right of private defence, the Court referred to legal principles (Amjad Khan and Darshan Singh cases) and found the appellant's apprehension of danger reasonable. The use of force, including firing a gun shot, was considered justified in the circumstances.( Paragraph 30-35)

The conviction under Section 203 IPC was deemed unsustainable due to lack of evidence. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's order, and the appellant was acquitted from all charges.( Paragraph 36-49)

REFERRED CASES:

Amjad Khan vs. Haji Mohammad Khan, AIR 1952 SC 165

Darshan Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (2010) 2 SCC 333