Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the appellant, a single lady with a young boy as her tenant, attempted to entice a minor girl (the prosecutrix) into engaging in illicit intercourse with the tenant boy. The appellant allegedly pushed the prosecutrix into the room occupied by the tenant boy and locked it from outside. After five minutes, the door was unlocked with the prosecutrix's father standing outside, and the boy escaped. The matter was reported only after the appellant threatened to harm the prosecutrix's brother if anyone was informed.

Issues:

The significance of the five-day delay in registering the FIR considering the prosecutrix's father was an eyewitness to a part of the occurrence.

The credibility of the prosecution's case, given the contradictions in the testimonies of key witnesses, particularly between the prosecutrix (PW1) and her father (PW2).

The validity of the alternate version provided by the appellant during her examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein she claimed that there was no male tenant and that she was falsely implicated.

Held:

The Court highlighted the importance of considering the five-day delay in registering the FIR. It expressed difficulty in understanding why the prosecutrix's father would wait for a second incident before reporting the matter to the authorities. The Court emphasized that sweeping assumptions concerning delays in FIR registration for sexual offenses send problematic signals to society and may create opportunities for abuse by miscreants. It urged courts to analyze the facts and parties' behavior in each individual case before drawing conclusions about the reason and effect of delay in FIR registration.( Para 11)

The Court acknowledged that ordinarily, it should not re-appreciate evidence. However, in exceptional circumstances where the lower courts have dealt with the material-on-record in a cavalier or mechanical manner likely to cause gross injustice, re-appraisal of evidence may be justifiable. The Court observed that numerous contradictions existed between the testimonies of the two star witnesses (PW1 and PW2), which were fatal to the prosecution's case. Important links of the story were missing, such as what happened during the crucial five minutes when the girl was locked inside the room or how the male tenant reacted.( Para 16)

The Court noted that once a plausible version is put forth in defense at the Section 313 CrPC examination stage, it is for the prosecution to negate such defense plea. The appellant's alternate version that there was no male tenant at all and no one except her child and mother lived with her, and that she was falsely implicated as vengeance for filing a previous rape complaint, could not be lightly brushed aside. The trial Court's analysis of the appellant's defense ought to have been deeper before concluding it as false or untrustworthy.( Para 21)

Given the doubts surrounding the common testimony of PW1 on both charges, the Court found it unwise to rely solely on it to convict the appellant for criminal intimidation without any other corroboration. The prosecution failed to prove the appellant's guilt under sections 366A and 506 beyond reasonable doubt.( Para 25)

Facts:

The case involves a Show Cause Notice issued to a Company and its Directors for alleged contravention of Sections 8(3) read with 8(4) and 68 of FERA, 1973. One of the Directors, the appellant in this case, claimed to be a part-time, non-executive Director and stated that he was not responsible for the conduct of the Company's business during the relevant time.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's plea in his reply was an afterthought and deserved to be considered by the authorities.

Whether the penalty imposed on the appellant-Director was justified.

Whether the appellant can be held liable for contravention of the provisions of FERA, 1973.

Held :

The High Court erred in considering the appellant's plea as an afterthought since the reply was given only by the Company Secretary, not by any of the Directors. The appellant's representation during the personal hearing required due consideration, as it did not contradict the earlier reply.( Para 16)

The affidavit of the Company Secretary, stating the appellant's role as a part-time, non-executive Director, was on record and should have been considered. The High Court wrongly ignored this material.( Para 17-20 & 22)

The penalty was imposed on the appellant without establishing that he was responsible for the contravention of Sections 8(3), 8(4), and 68 of FERA, 1973. The Appellate Tribunal's general observation that Directors are held guilty for the management of the Company is not sufficient to justify the penalty.( Para 25-26)

Section 68 of FERA, 1973 creates a legal fiction of guilt, but for proceeding against a Director, the necessary ingredient is that the Director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the Company's business during the relevant time.( Para 37-38)

In proceedings under Section 51 of FERA, 1973, the person to be proceeded with must be made aware of the allegations constituting the offence to enable them to make an effective representation.( Para 39)

An earlier order had accepted the appellant's status as a part-time, non-executive Director. The adjudicating officer's contradictory view in the present order required justification.( Para 42)

The penalty imposed on the appellant was erroneous and was wrongly affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court.( Para 43)

Facts:

The appellant was a passenger on a bus owned by the respondent-State Corporation. The bus collided with a stationary lorry, causing injuries to multiple passengers, including the appellant. The appellant suffered grievous injuries, resulting in a disability of 31.1% of the whole body. She filed a claim petition under s. 166 of the MV Act r/w. 3(1) of the Rules, 1989 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT). The MACT found that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the bus driver and quantified the compensation at Rs. 35,24,288/- along with interest at 7.5% p.a. payable by the respondent State Corporation. The High Court later reduced the compensation to Rs. 25,00,000/-, primarily disputing the application of the multiplier method for loss of earning power.

Issues:

Whether the multiplier of '17' applied by the MACT was incorrect and should have been '18' based on the appellant's age?

Whether future prospects on advancement in life and career should be considered while applying the multiplier method for compensation calculation?

What should be the appropriate interest rate for the awarded compensation?

Held:

The Court examined the application of the multiplier and held that in the age group of 15-25 years, the correct multiplier should be '18', considering the extent of disability. This was in line with the judgment in National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others (Para 7(a)).

The Court further observed that future prospects on advancement in life and career should be taken into consideration when applying the multiplier method. In the appellant's case, with a permanent disability of 31.1%, the quantification of loss of earning capacity should be 50% of the actual salary, based on the principles mentioned in National Insurance Co. Ltd. case (Para 7(b)).

The appellant claimed an interest rate of 12%, but during the course of the hearing, the claim was limited to 9% in line with judicial pronouncements. The Court accepted the 9% interest rate for the awarded compensation (Para 7(c)).

Decision: The appellant was entitled to enhanced compensation of Rs. 41,69,831/- along with simple interest at the rate of 9% p.a. from the date of application till the date of payment (Para 8).

Facts:

Various individuals working as Record Clerks and Office Assistants in Erode District sought promotion to the post of Junior Bailiff without insisting on the educational qualification of passing SSLC. They relied on a previous High Court order dated 22.07.2009 and the fact that vacancies arose before the enactment of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016.

Issues:

Whether the previous High Court judgment from 2009 remains relevant after the enactment of the 2016 Act.

Whether the petitioners can claim promotion without fulfilling the prescribed essential qualification.

The impact of Section 68 of the 2016 Act on the applicability of Special Rules.

Held:

The Court noted that after the implementation of the Shetty Commission and the Tamil Nadu V Pay Commission recommendations, claiming promotion to the post of Junior Bailiff without the prescribed qualifications was not permissible (Para 13).

The petitioners could not rely on the government's failure to amend Statutory Rules or the previous High Court judgment of 2009. Changes in nomenclature and pay scales had occurred since the judgment, and these changes could not be ignored (Para 14).

The argument that vacancies arose in 2015, before the enactment of the 2016 Act, was not relevant. The 2016 Act replaces the General Rules for the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Services but does not override Special Rules. Section 68 of the Act clarifies that Special Rules prevail if inconsistent with the Act (Para 18).

The Court pointed out that both the petitioners and the High Court overlooked Section 68. The reliance on Section 20(2) of the 2016 Act was not fully correct, as it merely explains the concept of "minimum general educational qualification" in Special Rules (Para 19).

FACTS:

The appeal arises from an order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) dated 7 October 2016. The Union of India, through the Secretary in the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, and Safdarjung Hospital challenged the order of the NCDRC. The complaint alleged medical negligence against Sarvodaya Hospital and Safdarjung Hospital.

ISSUES:

Whether Safdarjung Hospital's treatment falls within the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Whether NCDRC has the authority to reverse the finding on maintainability.

Whether Safdarjung Hospital was negligent in its treatment of the complainant's child.

HELD:

The Court emphasized that whether a hospital's services are truly "free of charge" under the Consumer Protection Act requires a factual foundation. Safdarjung Hospital did not adequately challenge the factual basis of the finding in the lower courts regarding its liability.( Paras 9-12)

The Court questioned whether NCDRC can exercise certain powers in revisional proceedings that are normally reserved for appellate courts.( Para 13)

The Court upheld the NCDRC's judgment due to the relatively small compensation amount but clarified that the judgment should not be treated as precedent for future cases involving Safdarjung Hospital. The question of Safdarjung Hospital's "free of charge" status is left open for an appropriate case.( Para 14)

DECISION: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the NCDRC's judgment. The payment of Rs 2 lakhs in compliance with the NCDRC's order shall be made to the original complainant within two months from the date of this order.

REFERRED CASES:

Indian Medical Association vs. V P Shantha, (1995) 6 SCC 651.

Facts:

The appellant was the Chairman and Managing Director of a company (CDBL) which was transferred to a group (SWC) under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The appellant received a non-competition fee of Rs. 6.6 crores through a Deed of Covenant for refraining from manufacturing or marketing activities related to Indian Made Foreign Liquor. The Assessing Officer considered this a tax evasion scheme.

Issues:

Whether the non-competition fee is taxable under Section 28(ii)(a) of the Income Tax Act?

Whether the fee should be considered part of the sale consideration for transfer of shares?

Held:

The High Court's substantial question of law did not address taxability of the non-compete fee under provisions other than Section 28(ii)(a). The High Court's finding that the amount was part of the sale consideration contradicted Section 260-A(4) and the principle of commercial expediency.( Para 14)

The Court affirmed that commercial expediency must be judged from the assessee's viewpoint, and the Income Tax Department cannot question amounts agreed upon between parties at arm's length.( Para 15)

The non-compete fee was paid only to the appellant due to his expertise in the liquor business. The amount was determined through negotiations. The restrictive covenant for 10 years was aimed at preventing competition.( Para 17)

The reasons given by the Assessing Officer and the minority judgment of the Appellate Tribunal contradicted established judgments, emphasizing that revenue should not question commercial decisions.( Para 18)

The Court referred to various cases including Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, Biswanath Ghosh v. Gobinda Ghosh, CIT v. Walchand & Co., J.K. Woollen Manufacturers v. CIT, CIT v. Panipat Woollen & General Mills Co. Ltd., Shahzada Nand & Sons v. CIT, S.A. Builders Ltd. v. CIT, Hero Cycles (P) Ltd. v. CIT, and Guffic Chem (P) Ltd. v. CIT to support the principle of commercial expediency.( Para 19)

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the taxability of income earned by Samsung Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. (the Respondent), a South Korean company, through its Project Office in Mumbai, India. The income tax authorities attributed a portion of the company's revenues earned outside India as taxable income, leading to a legal challenge.

Issues:

whether the Mumbai Project Office qualified as a PE under Article 5 of the DTAA.

The court also addressed the burden of proof and the applicability of relevant judgments.

Held:

In considering the applicability of Article 5(1) of the India-Korea DTAA, the court emphasizes that for a fixed place to qualify as a PE, it must be an establishment "through which the business of an enterprise" is wholly or partly carried on. Furthermore, only profits attributable to a PE can be taxed. The court concludes that the Mumbai Project Office does not meet the criteria of a PE under Article 5(1) of the DTAA. Instead, it falls under Article 5(4)(e) as a solely auxiliary office, acting as a liaison between the company and its client.

The court criticizes the lower tribunal's findings that the Mumbai office was involved in core project execution and rejects their argument that the mere mode of maintaining accounts cannot determine the character of a permanent establishment. The court also rejects the assertion that the onus of proving the Project Office's status as a PE rests on the company, citing precedent.

Therefore, the court dismisses the appeal and upholds the High Court's decision that the Mumbai Project Office is not a Permanent Establishment under the India-Korea DTAA, rendering the attributed income not subject to taxation in India.

Facts:

An advertisement was issued for various posts in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, including the position of Labour Welfare Superintendent. The essential qualifications required were a recognized university degree and a post-graduate degree/diploma in fields like Social Work, Labour Welfare, Industrial Relations, Personnel Management, or any other allied subject.

Issues:

Whether the first respondent, who held an MBA degree, fulfilled the eligibility criteria for the post of Labour Welfare Superintendent based on the subjects studied during the MBA program.

Held:

The Court held that the MBA degree held by the first respondent did not align with the specified disciplines or qualify as an allied subject. Studying certain subjects within the MBA program did not automatically fulfill the eligibility requirements. The Tribunal and the High Court erred in affirming the first respondent's eligibility. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgments, and dismissed the first respondent's application before the Central Administrative Tribunal.

Facts:

The appellant company sought a customized incentive package for establishing a cement plant. A Pre-Board of Infrastructure Development and Investment Institution (BIDI) meeting recommended applying the cement package and the 2003 Scheme to the company. However, before the company's request could be decided, the State Government deleted certain clauses from the Scheme. The company requested the withdrawal of the deletion, and the State responded that the company would be eligible for concessions as per the 2003 Scheme. The company also entered into an MOU with the State, established the cement plant, and obtained an Entitlement Certificate for subsidy. Later, doubts arose about the subsidy decision, and the State revised the subsidy and demanded repayment.

Issues:

Whether the company was entitled to 75% subsidy under the 2003 Scheme?

Whether the Doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio applies in this case?

Whether the Principle of Promissory Estoppel is applicable?

Held:

The application of the company was considered before certain clauses were deleted from the Scheme. The company's claim for 75% subsidy was based on the deleted clauses, but the policy changed after those deletions. As the policy of granting 75% subsidy was not in existence when the company's application was considered, it was entitled only to 50% subsidy. The excess 25% subsidy had to be refunded by the company.

The Doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio is not applicable in this case, as the contemporaneous understanding of a provision cannot be followed if it is clearly erroneous.

The Principle of Promissory Estoppel is not applicable because no conscious decision was taken to extend 75% subsidy to the company, and the revisions were made due to erroneous decisions.

Decision: The company is liable to refund the excess subsidy of 25% with interest at 12% per annum.