Facts:

The respondent filed a civil suit against the appellants (HUDA) claiming a decree for declaration with consequential relief.

The trial court decreed the suit, and the first appellate court affirmed the judgment.

HUDA filed a second appeal in the High Court, which was barred by 1942 days, leading to an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay.

The High Court rejected the application, holding the cause pleaded by HUDA insufficient, resulting in the dismissal of the second appeal.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the second appeal was justifiable.

Whether the grounds presented for condonation constituted a sufficient cause.

Held:

The delay of 1942 days was inordinate, not properly explained, and the grounds under Section 5 of the Limitation Act were deemed insufficient.The appellant-HUDA, being a statutory authority with a legal department, was expected to handle legal matters diligently.The duty of the officers-in-charge of the legal cell to promptly file the appeal was emphasized.( Para 14-15)

The appellant-HUDA failed to discharge its duty with due diligence despite having all facilities and infrastructure.Officers-in-charge should be held accountable for the lapse, making good the loss suffered by HUDA.The delay could not be justified by the alleged inaction of the lawyer, and the duty to ensure timely filing rested with HUDA.( Para 16-20)

The delay of 1942 days was deemed wholly inordinate, and the explanation provided did not constitute a sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.The High Court's decision to not condone the delay was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed.( Para 21-22)

Facts:

The State of U.P. referred an industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal to decide the legality and correctness of the termination order of the appellant (workman).

The Industrial Tribunal awarded in favor of the appellant, directing reinstatement with back wages.

The employer filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the award.

The High Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the Industrial Tribunal's award.

The appellant filed a review petition, which was also dismissed by the High Court.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's orders.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal, specifically regarding the continuous service of the appellant with the employer.

Held:

The Court found no merit in the appeals.

The main question was whether the appellant was in continuous service for one year with the employer, as required under Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.

The Court held that it cannot examine this factual question de novo, as it was a finding of fact already determined by the High Court.

The decision in Sriram Industrial Enterprises Ltd. vs. Mahak Singh & Ors. was cited but deemed distinguishable on facts.

The High Court's order to not recover the substantial amount already paid to the appellant during the litigation was upheld.

The Court affirmed that proceedings under Section 17-B of the ID Act are independent and not dependent on the final order in the main proceedings.

The employer, even if successful in upholding the termination, cannot recover the amount paid during the proceedings.

The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The appeals arise from the judgment of the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, dated 09.03.2012, concerning the implementation of Rule 5(g) and Annexure-III, item(ii) of TNRSS Rules. The issue pertains to the preference given to Direct recruit Assistants over Promotee non-graduate Assistants in the promotion process.

Issues:

The interpretation and implementation of the amended rule, considering the judgment in M. Rathinaswami, which upheld the amendment while reading it down to exclude Promotee graduate Assistants.

Held:

The Court framed the question around the implementation of the amended rule and the judgment in M. Rathinaswami.( Para 10)

The Court examined the State's issuance of G.O. Nos. 884 and 133, retrospectively amending Rule 5(g) and Annexure-III, item(ii), and the subsequent challenges in courts.( Para 11)

The Court highlighted the Supreme Court's decision in Rathinaswami, which upheld the amendment but limited its application to Promotee non-graduate Assistants.( Para 12)

The Court discussed the absence of specific directions in Rathinaswami regarding the mode of implementation and the subsequent confusion in the orders issued by District Collectors.( Para 13)

The Court noted the State's letter (MS) No. 392 dated 30.12.2011, accepting the recommendation to dispense with the graduation requirement for the post of Deputy Tahsildar.( Para 14)

The Court criticized the High Court's reliance on the letter dated 30.12.2011 and highlighted the error in directing the State to treat all categories as one group for promotion, which contradicted the Supreme Court's judgment.( Para 15)

The Court discussed the State's stand not to disturb the promotions of Direct recruit Assistants made between 1995 and 2009, in compliance with the amended rule.( Para 16)

The Court emphasized the potential confusion and prejudice to Direct recruit Assistants if the implementation is made retrospective from 04.12.1978.( Para 17)

The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and provided specific directions for the prospective implementation of the judgment in Rathinaswami.( Para 18)

Facts:

Respondent enrolled in the Indian Army as a Sepoy in the Army Service Corps on 25 April 1996.

Dispatched on a permanent posting to 874 ASC Battalion in Jammu and Kashmir on 11 November 2007.

Declared absent without leave on 22 November 2007, leading to a Court of Inquiry under Section 106 of the Army Act 1950.

Respondent reported to ASC Centre (North) at Gaya on 18 September 2008 after 302 days of unauthorized absence.

Summary Court Martial held on 12 November 2008, where respondent pleaded guilty to unauthorized absence and loss of equipment.

Tribunal's order on 21 August 2015 affirmed the finding but considered the dismissal as disproportionate, directing a notional service till pension eligibility.

Issues:

Whether the punishment of dismissal from service is disproportionate under the circumstances.

Interpretation of Section 39 of the Army Act regarding punishment for overstaying leave.

Held:

The Tribunal erred in finding the dismissal disproportionate, considering the respondent's 302 days of unauthorized absence and previous disciplinary action.

Section 39 of the Army Act does not mandate imprisonment for overstaying leave; Section 71(e) allows dismissal as a valid punishment.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the Tribunal's order, and the respondent's Original Application stands dismissed.

No order as to costs.

FACTS:

Respondents had been working through an outsourcing agency since 2010 for the Appellant-Corporation.

They passed ITI and completed National Apprenticeship Certificate in the Appellant-Corporation.

Appellant issued a recruitment notification with an upper age limit of 28 years.

Age relaxation up to 40 years was provided for those directly employed with ITI qualification plus NAC or ITI qualification plus experience of tenure based contract.

ISSUES:

Whether the Respondents, working through an outsourcing agency, were entitled to age relaxation.

The challenge to the rejection of their request for age relaxation.

HELD:

The Single Judge rightly rejected the challenge as it was raised after the application period was over.

The Division Bench's assessment was incorrect; the Respondents, engaged through outsourcing, were not entitled to age relaxation.

The appeal is allowed, the judgment under appeal is set aside, and the Single Judge's order is restored.

Facts:

The appeal challenges the order dated 08.02.2019, passed by NCLAT, setting aside the NCLT's order dated 10.10.2018 and directing the admission of the application against the appellant under Section 7, IBC.

Appellant contends a violation of audi alteram partem, asserting that no notice was served as required by NCLAT Rules, specifically Rule 48.

Respondent No. 1 argues that an advance copy of the appeal paper book was sent to the appellant, indicating an intent to challenge the NCLT's order.

Issues:

Whether the NCLAT proceedings violated the appellant's right to be heard and adhered to the procedural rules, especially Rule 48 of the NCLAT Rules.

Held:

The NCLAT, despite issuing notice on the appeal, failed to comply with Rule 48, which mandates service of notice along with the appeal papers on the other party.

Rule 52 necessitates the record of service details in the order sheet, which is not reflected in the materials presented.

The appellant's right to be heard, a fundamental principle of natural justice, has been violated.

The NCLAT order is set aside, and the matter is remanded back to the NCLAT for fresh consideration, emphasizing adherence to procedural rules.

The appellant and respondents are directed to approach the NCLAT for early listing on March 13, 2019, without the need for fresh notice to the appellant.

The court refrains from expressing any opinion on the case's merits, leaving it to the NCLAT's independent adjudication.

The appeal stands disposed of

Facts:

The case involved a Sirdar who filed an application for Bhumidar rights in respect of three plots, accompanied by a deposit of 20 times the land revenue. Subsequently, a sale deed for these plots was executed the next day.

Issues:

The application for Bhumidar rights was rejected for two plots, leading to a revision application by the Sirdar. The subsequent grant of Bhumidar Sanad in respect of one plot, post the Sirdar's demise, triggered legal proceedings initiated by the purchaser based on the sale deed.

Held:

Under Section 134 read with Section 137, a Sirdar could obtain Bhumidhari Sanad after depositing 20 times the land revenue and making an application. Sections 130 and 131 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, were substituted by U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977.

Section 73(1) of the U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977, stated that all proceedings for acquiring bhumidhari rights under sections 134 and 135, pending on or before 28.01.1977, shall abate. The Sirdar's revision, pending against the rejection of Bhumidhari Sanad, abated by virtue of the ordinance. Section 73(2) required a refund of the deposited amount in case of abatement.

By statutory provision, Section 73 abated all pending applications and proceedings. The benefit of the provision applied to Sirdars as of the date when the ordinance was enforced. As the Sirdar was already deceased on 28.01.1977, his legal heirs couldn't avail the benefits of the ordinance to validate the sale deed for two plots.

Conclusion: The High Court erred in allowing the writ petition and decreeing the suit based on the retrospective benefits of Ordinance No.1 of 1977.

Facts:

The case involved the delayed payment of Commuted Value of Pension (CVP) to an employee who received provisional pension during the pendency of a vigilance/disciplinary case. The employee applied for CVP more than three years after retirement, seeking interest from the date of retirement.

Issues:

Whether the employee was entitled to interest on the CVP due to the delayed payment and the acceptance of provisional pension.

Held:

The court held that there is no provision in the Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981, contemplating the payment of interest on delayed CVP. The Office Memorandum dated 05.10.1999 did not explicitly preclude interest but did not mandate it either. (Para 20)

Pension is a legal and fundamental right, and interest can be ordered for belated pension payments. CVP is linked to pension and is a part of the employee's right to receive pension. Commutation is optional and governed by specific rules. (Paras 21, 22, and 23)

Rule 13(3) of Commutation Rules allows an employee to apply for CVP within three months of retirement. In the present case, the employee could not apply under Rule 13(1) as he was receiving provisional pension. However, he was not precluded from applying under Rule 13(3). (Paras 29 and 30)

The employee applied for CVP on 01.11.2012, seeking commutation without a medical examination, showing his retirement date as 31.07.2008. CVP was sanctioned in December 2012 based on this application. (Para 37)

Three situations were identified: immediate pension finalization, provisional pension with commutation, and provisional pension during disciplinary proceedings. The applicant fell into the third category, precluding commutation during provisional pension under Rule 4 of Commutation Rules. (Para 35)

The court emphasized the legal rights conferred by Rule 13(3) and the necessity to apply within the prescribed time. Interest cannot be claimed from the date of retirement in cases falling under Rule 13(1). (Para 45)

The applicant failed to make an application within three months of retirement, which would have been under Rule 13(3). Acceptance of provisional pension under Rule 69 precluded him from applying under Rule 13(1), and interest from the date of retirement was not warranted. (Para 46)