Facts:

The Court issued a notice on 12.06.2020 in a Suo Motu writ petition to address deficiencies in patient care for COVID-19 in hospitals across Delhi and other states.

Union of India, Delhi Government, and other states filed affidavits in response to the notice.

Various applications for intervention were submitted highlighting different aspects of the issue.

Remedial steps were taken by Union of India as mentioned in its affidavit, including a high-level meeting held on 14.06.2020.

Certain decisions were taken in the meeting, including the constitution of expert teams of doctors to inspect hospitals, increase testing, and regulate rates of COVID-related facilities/tests.

Affidavits from Union of India and Delhi Government outlined guidelines for COVID patient treatment and handling of dead bodies.

Affidavit from LNJP hospital, Delhi, mentioned the installation of CCTV cameras in wards.

The need for proper supervision and monitoring of hospitals' functioning was emphasized.

Issues:

Deficiencies and lapses in patient care for COVID-19 in hospitals.

Ensuring proper supervision, monitoring, and adherence to guidelines for COVID patient care.

Held:

The Court directed the Union of India to constitute Expert Committees consisting of doctors from various hospitals to inspect and supervise COVID facilities.

These committees were mandated to visit hospitals weekly, conduct surprise visits, and issue instructions for improvements.

All states were instructed to form similar expert teams for supervision and guidance of COVID facilities, reporting to the government.

Hospitals were required to install CCTV cameras, and footage should be available for inspection.

COVID-dedicated hospitals were mandated to permit one attendant per patient and establish helpdesks for patient inquiries.

States and Union Territories were directed to uniformly follow the revised discharge policy for COVID-19 patients.

Guidelines for reasonable rates of COVID-related facilities/tests were to be issued, ensuring uniform implementation across states.

Facts:

The Gujarat Maritime Board filed a complaint alleging various financial irregularities against Aatash Norcontrol Limited (ANL), including inflation of costs, non-execution of works, creation of shell companies, siphoning of funds, etc.

Disputes arose between the parties regarding capital costs incurred by ANL, leading to an expert committee's assessment and subsequent arbitration proceedings.

Meanwhile, the Gujarat Maritime Board lodged a complaint against ANL, accusing it of criminal breach of trust and financial misconduct.

Issues:

Whether the criminal charges against the appellant were of a purely civil nature.

Whether the potential threat to national security was a valid ground for denial of bail.

The impact of ongoing arbitration proceedings on the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the release of the appellant on bail. The Court observed that:

The alleged offences, despite their gravity, appeared to stem from financial matters and did not inherently pose a threat to national security.

The ongoing arbitration proceedings, including interim measures, indicated that the state's economic interests were being safeguarded. Therefore, the national security argument did not hold ground.

The Court considered the age and health conditions of the appellant, along with the fact that the trial had not commenced despite the passage of time.

Facts:

The appellant-accused was arrested under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Subsequently, the accused remained in judicial custody for over 73 days without the filing of a charge sheet by the police. The appellant invoked Section 167(2) of the CrPC and applied for default bail before the High Court. The High Court, relying on a Supreme Court order dated 23.03.2020 issued in Suo Moto W.P.(C) No. 3 of 2020, extended the period for filing a charge sheet prescribed under Section 167(2) of the CrPC, due to the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court's order dated 23.03.2020 extended the period for filing a charge sheet by the police under Section 167(2) of the CrPC.

Whether the lockdown imposed during the pandemic is akin to a proclamation of Emergency, affecting an accused's right to default bail.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that its order dated 23.03.2020 was intended to protect litigants and lawyers unable to file proceedings due to the pandemic, but it did not intend to extend the period for filing a charge sheet by the police under Section 167(2) of the CrPC. The investigating officer could have submitted the charge sheet before the Magistrate even during the lockdown.( Para 17)

The Court emphasized that the right of prosecution to file a charge sheet after the stipulated period is not barred. However, the prosecution cannot detain an accused beyond the prescribed period if a charge sheet is not filed, and the accused seeks default bail. The right of prosecution to submit a charge sheet is distinct from an accused's right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution and Section 167 of the CrPC.( Para 18)

The Court rejected the notion that the lockdown is equivalent to a proclamation of Emergency. The Single Judge's view that lockdown restrictions curtail an accused's right to default bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC was erroneous and not in accordance with law.( Para 25)

The Court concluded that its order dated 23.03.2020 did not eclipse the time prescribed under Section 167(2) of the CrPC. The lockdown restrictions did not restrict an accused's right to default bail under Section 167(2).( Para 26)

Facts:

The insured vehicle was involved in a road accident. An FIR was lodged, and a spot survey was conducted by a Surveyor and Loss Assessor appointed by the insurer. The insurer repudiated the insurance claim, citing reasons such as the alleged sale of the insured vehicle, delayed police complaint filing, and accident reporting. The claimant argued that although a sale agreement was made, the vehicle's transfer was pending due to the lack of a "No Objection" from the financier bank for the transfer.

Issues:

whether the ownership of the insured vehicle was transferred, the relevance of the definition of "owner" under Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, and the applicability of various sections of the Act to the case.

Held:

The Court emphasized that the transfer of ownership is contingent upon removing impediments and compliance with legal requirements. An unconditional transfer was not possible due to the pending "No Objection" from the financier bank. (Para 31-34, 53-G-H; 54-A-C)

The Court referred to Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which defines "owner" as the registered person. The change in definition reflects legislative intent. (Para 35, 36; 54-D-G)

The Court noted that various sections like 39 to 41, 50, 51, etc., were overlooked by the National Commission. The appellant's payment of insurance premium and absence of "No Objection" from the financier bank were not duly examined. (Para 37, 39; 54-G, 59-B)

The Court rejected the National Commission's view that registration was inconsequential, stating that ownership would have transferred immediately if intended. The purpose of insurance and permits supports this conclusion. (Para 40; 59-B-C)

The Court questioned why an alleged transferor would continue to pay insurance premiums and bear ownership obligations. This contradicts a genuine transfer of ownership. (Para 41-42; 59-D-F)

The Court highlighted Section 157, indicating that the transfer of ownership also transfers insurance policy and certificate. (Para 43; 59-G-H, 60-A)

The Court questioned why the appellant would take out insurance coverage in their name if ownership was transferred. (Para 45; 60-D)

The Court noted that insurance policies cover third-party risks as well. The insurer's repudiation was inconsistent. (Para 50; 61-G, 62-A)

The Court found reasonable the minor delays in lodging FIR and claim, given the accident's severity. The National Commission erred in reversing concurrent findings. (Para 51; 62-B-C)

The Court set aside the National Commission's order, restored District Forum's order, and directed the insurer to pay the appellant the determined sum with interest and additional compensation for costs and mental agony. (Para 57; 63-D-F)

Facts:

The prosecution's case revolved around the appellant and another accused riding a motorbike and shooting the victim, who was in his car, resulting in injuries. The victim's statement was recorded, and both accused were arrested. The Trial Court convicted them under relevant sections and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment.

Issues:

The Court included the identification of the appellant, the credibility of witnesses, the sufficiency of evidence, and the validity of the conviction.

Held:

The Trial Court had established beyond doubt the occurrence of the incident and the severity of injuries sustained by the victim. The defense's argument regarding the severity of injuries was rejected based on medical expert testimony. The Forensic Science Laboratory's evidence confirmed the offense under Section 307 of the IPC.

The recovery of the weapon and its connection to the appellant were proven beyond reasonable doubt. Minor irregularities in the investigation did not undermine the prosecution's case.

The appellant's identification by the victim, complainant, and pancha witness, both in the Test Identification Parade and in court, was deemed reliable. The Court held that the victim's testimony alone was sufficient for conviction.

The motorbike's pillion rider, the first accused, was identified by witnesses as the person handling the weapon. The appellant's involvement in driving the motorbike was confirmed by both eye-witnesses.

The evidence presented, including the ballistic report and FSL expert testimony, linked the bullet to the recovered weapon and thus established the appellant's connection to the crime.

The Sessions Court's finding that the prosecution had failed to establish the appellant's involvement in a larger conspiracy targeting prominent leaders was upheld.

Facts:

The complainant alleged police excesses during custody in connection with an investigation. The appellant (police officer) sought the quashing of the proceedings through an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Issues:

whether the alleged acts of the police officer required sanction under Section 197 r/w Section 170 and if an application under Section 482 was maintainable to quash proceedings based on the lack of sanction.

Held:

The purpose of prosecution sanction under Section 197 and Section 170 is to protect public servants/police officers from frivolous criminal proceedings.

Sanction from the government is imperative to protect police officers from vindictive retaliation when discharging official duties.

The protection under these sections is not absolute and applies only when the act is reasonably connected to official duty.

An act entirely outside the scope of duty does not require sanction, but an act reasonably connected to official duty does, even if it's in excess of duty.

The language of these sections makes it clear that sanction is required for acts done under color of duty or authority.

The test for sanction necessity is whether the act is reasonably connected to official duty.

Section 482 allows quashing proceedings that are ex facie bad for want of sanction or are frivolous.

In this case, the complaint pertains to an act under color of duty, thus requiring sanction.

Decision: The High Court erred in not exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 to quash the complaint. Instead of remitting the case for discharge, the High Court should have quashed the complaint based on the legal requirement of sanction. The appeal was allowed.

Facts:

Appellant no.1 and respondent were married as per Muslim rites. Appellant no.2, a son, was born out of the wedlock. Alleging cruelty against appellant no.1, the appellants filed a petition under section 125 of the Cr.P.C. The Family Court treated it as an application under section 3 of the 1986 Act and directed the respondent to pay maintenance. The High Court set aside the order converting the petition.

Issues:

whether the Family Court had jurisdiction to convert the petition under section 125 of the Cr.P.C. into an application under section 3 of the 1986 Act and decide the matter.

Held:

R. Banumathi, J.:

The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 does not deviate from the purpose of maintenance provisions under the Cr.P.C. The Act provides remedies beneficial to divorced Muslim women, including maintenance, reasonable and fair provision, recovery of dower, and return of marital gifts.

Section 3 of the 1986 Act confers rights notwithstanding other laws. Section 5 of the Act provides an option for divorced couples to be governed by provisions of the Cr.P.C.

The Family Court lacks jurisdiction under the Family Courts Act and the 1986 Act to entertain applications under sections 3 and 4 of the 1986 Act. The Act does not refer to the Family Court's jurisdiction.

The application under section 3(2) of the 1986 Act must be filed before the competent Magistrate. The Family Court cannot convert the maintenance petition.

Indira Banerjee, J. (Dissenting):

The Family Courts Act applies to matters irrespective of religion. Family Courts have jurisdiction over maintenance claims, including those by divorced Muslim women.

The Family Court, established under section 3 of the Family Courts Act, has jurisdiction and powers similar to a District Court or Civil Court. The 1986 Act should not deprive divorced Muslim women of Family Court access.

The Family Court can entertain applications under sections 3 and 4 of the 1986 Act. The Act is civil in nature, and the Family Court has jurisdiction under the Family Courts Act.

A strict interpretation to exclude divorced Muslim women from Family Court access violates Article 14. The Family Court can convert the maintenance petition.

Facts:

The case involved a motor vehicle accident where a bus hit a horse cart, leading to the death of individuals including a housewife and her daughter. The claimants sought compensation for their loss.

Issues:

The court included the assessment of compensation for the deceased, considerations of contributory negligence, future prospects, and other relevant factors.

Held:

The court found that the deduction on account of contributory negligence was unjustified and unsustainable. The court also determined the notional income and potential future prospects for both the deceased housewife and the deceased child.

In assessing the compensation for the deceased housewife, the court referred to previous cases that recognized the multifarious services rendered by housewives and held that her notional income should be considered at Rs.5000 per month at the time of death. With a deduction of 1/4th towards personal expenses and a multiplier of 17, the court assessed the compensation at Rs.7,65,000. The court further allowed for future prospects at the rate of 40% in addition to the loss of consortium and future expenses.

Regarding the deceased child, the court emphasized the emotional impact of her premature death and granted compensation for loss of prospective happiness and future prospects. The court did not find it necessary to enhance the compensation further under the separate head of "future prospects."

Decision: The court allowed the appeals and adjusted the compensation based on its assessments and conclusions regarding notional income, contributory negligence, loss of consortium, future prospects, and other factors.

Facts:

The appellant was the landlord of a shop leased to the respondent for running a hair-cutting and dressing business. The rent note mentioned a monthly rent of Rs. 2,000, along with clauses specifying payment terms, eviction conditions, and an annual increase of rent by 10%. An eviction application was filed by the landlord due to non-payment of rent and house tax.

Issues:

Whether the rent note required compulsory registration under Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act.

Whether the Appellate Court's decision to set aside the eviction decree was justified.

Held:

The court analyzed the rent note's clauses to determine its nature and applicability under Section 17(1)(d). It was established that the rent note created a monthly tenancy, as it required rent payment before the 5th of each month and allowed eviction in case of non-payment or notice of one month. The clause about an annual increase of rent by 10% was considered contingent on tenancy continuation beyond a year and did not make it a yearly or more-than-one-year tenancy. Consequently, the rent note was not subject to compulsory registration under Section 17(1)(d).

Additionally, the court noted that the Appellate Court failed to address the tenant's default in payment and the adequacy of the amount deposited to prevent eviction. Thus, the Appellate Court's decision to set aside the eviction decree lacked proper analysis and findings.

The appeal was allowed, and the judgment and decree of the Rent Controller, directing eviction, were restored.