Facts:

The parties entered into an agreement with a clause (Clause 16B) conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the Court at Delhi for any dispute related to the franchise agreement.

The plaintiff presented the suit at Gurgaon, which was not a court having jurisdiction according to the exclusive jurisdiction clause.

The defendant raised the objection regarding territorial jurisdiction based on the exclusionary clause in the agreement but was rejected initially.

Issues:

Whether the suit should proceed de novo or continue from the stage where it was pending at the time of the return of the plaint.

Whether the objection regarding exclusionary jurisdiction should be upheld.

Held:

The parties, by agreement, can confer exclusive jurisdiction on one court among multiple courts having jurisdiction over a dispute. Clause 16B of the agreement clearly indicates exclusive jurisdiction for disputes concerning the franchise agreement lies with the court at Delhi.

The High Court, in its revision order, intended the return of the plaint under Order VII Rules 10 and 10A CPC, and not continuation of the suit at Gurgaon. The suit should proceed de novo.

The law laid down in the *Modern Construction case, which allows de novo trial, is not in contradiction with **Joginder Tuli case.

Order VII Rule 10-A was introduced to avoid serving summonses on defendants when the plaint is returned after the defendant's appearance in the suit. The proceeding commences de novo under Order VII Rule 10 and Rule 10-A.

In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the appellant's failure to raise the objection initially and the completion of pleadings and evidence, led the Court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 and Article 142 of the Constitution and not set aside the impugned order.

Decision: The Court held that the suit shall proceed de novo due to the existence of an exclusionary jurisdiction clause in the agreement between the parties. The objection raised by the defendant is upheld, and the impugned order of the High Court is not set aside to ensure substantial justice between the parties. The appeal stands disposed of.

FACTS:

The appellant, Gangadhar alias Gangaram, was convicted under the NDPS Act for the recovery of 48 Kgs 200 gms of cannabis (ganja) and sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment.

The lower courts held the appellant to be the owner of the house from where the contraband was recovered, rejecting his defense that he had sold the house to a co-accused.

The appellant produced a sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) for the property in question promptly after the recovery of the contraband.

The police investigation was flawed, defective, and incomplete, leading to confusion regarding ownership and possession of the house.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellant's claim of selling the house to the co-accused was genuine and whether the prosecution had proven his conscious possession of the house where the contraband was recovered.

HELD:

The police investigation was flawed, and the appellant's defense seemed plausible. It was questionable why the appellant, residing in his new house for 15 years, would identify his own erstwhile house as belonging to the accused and implicate himself.

The appellant promptly produced a sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) for the property, but the police failed to investigate its genuineness or verify the panchayat records, which could have established ownership and possession of the house accurately.

The appellant's conviction was based on his name being recorded as the owner of the house in the voters' list of 2008, ignoring the subsequent sale agreement (Exhibit P.28) executed on 12.06.2009. The prosecution did not prove that the sale agreement was a fabricated document.

The nature of the evidence did not establish the appellant's conscious possession of the house as required by the NDPS Act to attribute presumption against him regarding the recovery of the contraband. The appeal is allowed.

REFFERED CASES:

Gopal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002) 9 SCC 595

Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417

Facts:

The case pertains to Writ Petition (Civil) No. 55 of 2019 filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petition challenges the Constitutional (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, which introduced Clause (6) in Articles 15 and 16, enabling reservation for economically weaker sections. The petitioners contend that this amendment violates the basic structure of the Constitution and is contrary to the principles laid down in the Indra Sawhney case.

Issues:

whether the amendment to Articles 15 and 16 is ultra vires the Constitution and whether it affects the basic structure of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court observed that the questions raised in this case involve substantial questions of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. Therefore, in accordance with Article 145(3) of the Constitution and Order XXXVIII of Supreme Court Rules, the matter is to be heard by a Constitution Bench comprising five judges.

Decision: The Court referred the matter to a Constitution Bench of five judges to determine the constitutionality of the amendment to Articles 15 and 16 and its impact on the basic structure of the Constitution.

Facts:

The court had previously issued directions in SLP(Crl) no. 2302 of 2017, instructing the Administrators of the Union Territory, State Governments, and other Central Agencies to effectively implement the use of photography and videography at crime scenes. Compliance Affidavits and Action Taken Reports were filed by 14 States, but they failed to provide precise information about the position of CCTV cameras at each Police Station, lacking relevant details.

Issues:

• Implementation of photography and videography at crime scenes.
• Lack of disclosure of CCTV camera position in Police Stations.
• Constitution of Oversight Committees at State and District Levels.
• Allocation of funds for Oversight Committees.
• Installation of CCTV cameras in all Police Stations.
• Specification of CCTV systems.
• Establishment of Human Rights Courts in each District for redressal of complaints related to police actions.
• Updates on the constitution and workings of the Central Oversight body.
• Installation of CCTV cameras in the offices of investigative/enforcement agencies.

Held:

The court directed the concerned authorities to submit Compliance Affidavits and Action Taken Reports within six weeks, specifying details regarding the position of CCTV cameras in each Police Station as mentioned in paragraph 8 of the order. Oversight Committees were to be constituted at both State and District Levels, with the respective State/Union Territories Finance Departments allocating funds for this purpose at the earliest. The duty and responsibility for the working, maintenance, and recording of CCTVs in Police Stations were assigned to the SHO of the concerned station. All State and Union Territories were ordered to ensure the installation of CCTV cameras in every Police Station within their jurisdiction.

Additionally, the court directed the establishment of Human Rights Courts in each District to address complaints of excessive force used at Police Stations resulting in serious injury and/or custodial deaths. The Union of India was instructed to provide an affidavit with updates on the constitution and workings of the Central Oversight body. Furthermore, the Union of India was directed to install CCTV cameras and recording equipment in the offices of investigative/enforcement agencies. The court emphasized the need for the prompt and complete implementation of the order.

Decision: The court passed the above directions and mandates, urging the Executive/Administrative/Police Authorities to implement the order in both letter and spirit as soon as possible.

Facts:

The predecessor of the appellants claimed ownership and possession of the suit land, which was later disputed by his two brothers. To settle the dispute, a memorandum of family settlement was executed between the parties on March 10, 1988. However, the brothers later raised new issues and refused to abide by the settlement. The plaintiff, predecessor of the appellants, filed a suit seeking a declaration of exclusive ownership of the suit land. The trial court partially decreed the suit, but the first appellate court declared the plaintiff as the owner of the suit land, stating that the document dated 10.03.1988 was a memorandum of family settlement and did not require registration. The High Court, in the second appeal, held that the document creating a new right in favor of the plaintiff required registration.

Issues:

Whether the document dated 10.03.1988 is a memorandum of family settlement and whether it requires registration?

Whether the plaintiff had a pre-existing right to the suit property?

Held:

The first appellate court rightly held that the parties had acted upon the family settlement, and they were estopped from resiling from the same. The possession of the plaintiff was admitted, and the settlement was acted upon, to the prejudice of the other party. The High Court overlooked this crucial aspect and disposed of the second appeal in a casual manner.( Para 15)

The settled legal position is that a family settlement, made to resolve disputes among family members and bring harmony, is governed by a special equity peculiar to them. If such an arrangement is honestly made, it ought to be enforced. The first appellate court's conclusion that the document dated 10.03.1988 was a memorandum of family settlement is upheld.( Para 16)

The High Court erred in reversing the well-considered decision of the first appellate court, which held that the document did not require registration. The plaintiff's relief as granted by the first appellate court should not have been interfered with.( Para 19)

Facts:

Sukh Sagar Medical College & Hospital was granted an Essentiality Certificate in 2014 to establish a medical college.

The Conditional Letter of Permission was granted for the academic year 2016-17.

However, renewal permissions were not issued by the Medical Council of India (MCI) for three successive academic sessions due to significant deficiencies.

As a result, the Essentiality Certificate was cancelled by the State Government, which the appellant challenged.

Issues:

Whether the State Government had the power to revoke or cancel the Essentiality Certificate.

Whether the appellant misrepresented the State Government and played a constructive fraud by failing to meet the minimum benchmark of standards specified by the MCI.

Held:

The Court agreed that issuing an Essentiality Certificate is a quasi-judicial function and that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked to revoke or cancel the Certificate without express provisions in the IMC Act or 1999 Regulations.

However, the State Government has the authority to revoke the Certificate in exceptional cases, such as when there is fraud, loss of substratum, or other valid grounds.

In this case, the appellant failed to fulfill its commitments and misrepresented the State Government, which amounted to constructive fraud.

The Court upheld the High Court's decision to reject the appellant's appeal and allowed the State to withdraw the Certificate.

The term "established" was discussed, and it was clarified that the appellant was not a well-established and running medical college, just at the threshold stage.

The duty of the State Government under Article 47 of the Constitution is to ensure good public health and create conditions for proper access to medical colleges and hospitals.

FACTS:

The arbitral award was made on 16.09.2009 in favor of B.B.M Enterprises for a total sum.

The respondent challenged the award through a Section 34 petition after the execution of the award was delayed.

The first round of litigation resulted in the dismissal of the Section 34 petition by the learned District Judge.

The Division Bench set aside the District Judge's judgment and remanded the matter for a fresh hearing.

In the second round of litigation, the District Judge found no valid grounds to challenge the award under Section 34.

The respondent appealed the District Judge's decision to the High Court, claiming inadequate reasoning in the judgment.

The High Court remanded the matter again and directed the District Judge to dispose of the petition within six months.

ISSUES:

Whether the High Court was correct in remanding the matter due to alleged inadequate reasoning in the District Judge's judgment.

Whether there were valid grounds to challenge the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

HELD:

The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's reasoning and found that the District Judge's order contained sufficient and adequate reasons to dispose of the Section 34 petition. The High Court's order was set aside, and the District Judge's judgment was affirmed.( Para 4)

The appellant's appeal to reduce the rate of interest imposed after the expiry of four months from the date of the award was granted. The interest rate was reduced from 18% to 15% to serve the interest of justice. Additionally, the respondent was allowed three months to pay the balance amount under the award.( Para 9)

The appeals are disposed of.

REFERRED CASES:

Narayan Prasad Lohia vs. N. Kunj Kumar Lohia reported in (2002) 3 SCC 572

Union of India vs. Kalinga Construction Company, reported in AIR 1971 SC 646

Facts:

The appellant, Shree Choudhary Transport Company, had contracted with a consignor company to transport goods (cement). To fulfill this contract, the appellant engaged truck operators and paid them for their services. The Revenue disallowed the deduction of payments made to truck operators exceeding Rs. 20,000/- without TDS (tax deducted at source) under s. 40(a)(ia) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Appellate Authority, Appellate Tribunal, and High Court upheld the disallowance.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's case falls within the scope of s. 194C, obliging them to deduct tax at source while making payments to truck operators?

Whether disallowance under s. 40(a)(ia) is limited only to outstanding amounts or also applies to amounts already incurred and paid by the assessee?

Held:

The appellant's contract with the consignor company for transporting goods necessitated a contract with the truck operators. Thus, the truck operators can be considered "sub-contractors" under s. 194(2), making s. 194C applicable to the appellant. Therefore, they were obliged to deduct tax at source.

Disallowance under s. 40(a)(ia) is not limited to outstanding amounts but applies equally to amounts already incurred and paid by the assessee. The provision is intended to ensure strict compliance with TDS requirements.

The amendment to s. 40(a)(ia) by Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 made it applicable from and for the assessment year 2005-2006. The provision was not limited to the financial year 2005-2006.

The appellant's attempt to seek relief under the amendment of s. 40(a)(ia) by Finance (No.2) Act, 2014 was baseless, as the amendment was specifically applicable only from the assessment year 2015-2016.

Decision: The payments made by the appellant to truck operators without deducting tax at source were rightly disallowed while computing the total income of the appellant.

Facts:

The four appellants in the case were the original applicants before the Kerala Administrative Tribunal. They belonged to the Hindu Nadar community, which was included in the Other Backward Classes (OBC) in Kerala. The Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958, provided 1% reservation to the Hindu Nadar Community with retrospective effect from November 21, 2009. The Kerala Public Service Commission issued a notification inviting applications for the post of Medical Officer (Homeo) on December 15, 2012. A rank list was published on August 3, 2015, where the names of the appellants appeared at Sl. Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 in the list of Hindu Nadar community.

Issues:

whether the vacancies arising after the provision of reservation for the Hindu Nadar community on November 21, 2009, should be filled from the succeeding rank list or not.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the circular and explanation issued by the Commission only applied to the shortfall of vacancies occurring between November 21, 2009, and the date of the amendment of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958. It did not mean that the vacancies arising after the amendment should not be filled as per the merit in the succeeding rank list. The court found that the posts available for the Hindu Nadar community after November 21, 2009, were required to be provided to them. The Commission had not considered vacancies arising after that date while making appointments from the rank list published on August 3, 2015.

The appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court's order and reinstating the Tribunal's order. The Kerala Public Service Commission was directed to fill up the shortfall in the vacancies reserved for the Hindu Nadar Community from the succeeding rank list issued on August 3, 2015.