Facts:

On or about December 22, 2007, the Lender Banks sanctioned and extended various loans, advances, and facilities to the corporate debtor-respondent no.1. The respondent no.1 defaulted in payment, and its account was classified as a Non-Performing Asset on July 8, 2011. Recovery proceedings were initiated against the corporate debtor by the consortium of lenders before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993.

On or about March 21, 2018, the respondent no.2, as the financial creditor and assignee of the loans and advances disbursed to the corporate debtor, filed an application under Section 7 of the Code before the Adjudicating Authority seeking initiation of CIRP against respondent no.1. The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) admitted the application and initiated CIRP under Section 7 of the Code. The appellant, the director of the respondent no.1 company, contended before the Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) that the claim was barred by time. However, the appeal was dismissed by the NCLAT.

Issues:

Whether the application under Section 7 of the Code is barred by limitation?

Whether Section 18 of the Limitation Act can be applied to the present case?

Held:

The period of limitation for an application seeking initiation of CIRP under Section 7 of the Code is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, which is three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. In this case, the application was filed in March 2018, much later than three years from the date of default (stated as July 8, 2011) in the application. Therefore, the application filed by the respondent no.2 is clearly barred by limitation. [Para 38]

The NCLT failed to examine the question of limitation, and the NCLAT decided the question of limitation on entirely irrelevant considerations. The NCLAT's assumption that the right to apply under Section 7 of the Code accrued on December 1, 2016 (when the Code came into force) and the application is within limitation, lacks any foundation or basis. There is nothing in the Code or the Limitation Act to support such an assumption. The reasoning of the NCLAT regarding the period of limitation for mortgaged property (12 years) is also erroneous and not in line with the Supreme Court's decision. [Para 36, 37]

In view of the above, this appeal is allowed to the extent indicated and with the observations foregoing.

Facts:

Prashant Bhushan, an advocate, posted two tweets on Twitter, which were the subject of the contempt proceedings. The first tweet criticized the Chief Justice of India (CJI) as an individual, while the second tweet made an adverse statement against the Supreme Court and the last four Chief Justices regarding the state of democracy in India. The Supreme Court initiated suo motu contempt proceedings based on these tweets.

Issues:

Whether the tweets made by the advocate amount to fair criticism or criminal contempt of the judiciary and the CJI.

Whether the Supreme Court's suo motu initiation of contempt proceedings without the Attorney General's consent is valid.

Held:

The power of the Supreme Court to initiate contempt proceedings is derived from Article 129 of the Constitution, and it is not limited by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Court can initiate suo motu proceedings based on information received and is not required to seek the consent of the Attorney General for such proceedings. The procedure must be just, fair, and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. (Para 18)

While citizens have the right to make fair criticism of judges, the judiciary, and its functioning under Article 19(1) of the Constitution, there are limits to this right. If the criticism exceeds those limits and tends to scandalize the judges, undermine the dignity and authority of the court, or shake public confidence in the judicial institutions, it may be considered 'criminal contempt.' (Para 57)

Criticism against an individual judge is not contempt, but when criticism is directed against a judge as a judge and adversely affects the administration of justice, the contempt jurisdiction can be invoked. (Para 58)

Constructive criticism for systemic correction in the system is permissible, but malicious, scurrilous, or calculated attacks on the judiciary's foundation cannot be condoned. (Para 59)

The first tweet, which criticized the CJI as an individual, could not be considered contempt. However, the second part of the tweet, which criticized the CJI as the head of the judiciary during the COVID-19 lockdown, was false, malicious, and scandalous. (Para 62-64)

The second tweet, which made adverse statements against the Supreme Court and the last four Chief Justices, created an impression that the judiciary played a substantial role in the destruction of democracy in the last six years. This attack on the Supreme Court and the CJIs cannot be overlooked and amounts to criminal contempt. (Para 67-68)

The Indian judiciary's trust, faith, and confidence are essential for a healthy democracy. Attacks on the judiciary's foundation must be dealt with firmly, and the Court's summary jurisdiction is required to protect the majesty of the law and the administration of justice. (Para 72-73)

Facts:

The land in question was categorized as 'banjar' land with 'shora,' and the Gram Panchayat sought to lease it to make it fit for cultivation by removing the 'shora.' The respondents claimed to be lessees of the land, and the revenue records indicated their possession and cultivation. The appellants alleged that the respondents obtained the lease in collusion with the ex-Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha.

Issues:

Whether the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court were obtained by fraud.

Whether the respondents obtained the lease in collusion with the ex-Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha.

Held:

The judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court on September 28, 1989, in the reference proceedings under Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, became final and was not challenged in any appeal. The subsequent separate suit filed by the appellants, alleging fraud in obtaining the decree, lacked sufficient evidence and particulars of fraud, and hence, the fraud was not established. Therefore, the High Court's decision to set aside the decree was unwarranted. (Para 11)

The plea of collusion between the respondents and the ex-Pradhan was vague, and there were no specific particulars of how the fraud was played. Fraud needs to be pleaded and proved with cogent evidence. As there was no credible evidence to establish the alleged collusion, the High Court's decision to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the Civil Court was not justified. (Para 12)

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the judgment of the Civil Court, holding the respondents entitled to compensation for the land in question. The Court also rejected the appellants' claim that the decree was obtained by fraud due to lack of substantial evidence. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 53A, was discussed in the context of the defense raised under it. (Para 12)

Facts:

The present writ petition was filed in 1985 and raised various issues related to the environment in Delhi, misuse of premises for unauthorized/commercial purposes, and the shifting of heavy industries. In 2006, the Supreme Court appointed a Monitoring Committee to restrain the misuse of residential premises for commercial purposes in Delhi. Subsequently, the Monitoring Committee also addressed encroachments and unauthorized colonies on public land.

Issues:

whether the Monitoring Committee had the authority to act against residential premises not being used for commercial purposes on private land.

Held:

The Court clarified that the Monitoring Committee was appointed and empowered within the strict confines of the powers conferred on it by the Court. The Committee's powers were limited to checking the misuse of residential properties for commercial purposes and addressing encroachments on public land. The Court, through various orders, never authorized the Committee to act against purely residential premises on private land not used for commercial purposes.

The Court emphasized that the Monitoring Committee was not authorized to take action against residential premises not being used for commercial purposes on private land. If there was unauthorized construction or deviation, the requisite provisions were under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Committee's power to seal properties carried civil consequences, and a person could only be deprived of their property following the procedure prescribed by law.

Article 300A of the Constitution of India provides protection against deprivation of property and right of residence except as prescribed by law. The Court held that the Committee's actions were beyond its authorized scope and violated the due process protection provided by law. The Committee's action in sealing residential premises not misused for commercial purposes was deemed invalid.

The Court observed that the Monitoring Committee had never sealed any residential premises used solely for residential purposes on private land before and could not order their demolition. The Court reemphasized that the Committee's purpose was limited to specific issues, and its actions were confined to the misuse of residential properties for commercial purposes and encroachments on public land.

The Court quashed Report No.149 and other reports submitted subsequently, along with the entire action of sealing properties pursuant to the said report. The Court also quashed notices directing demolitions where the Monitoring Committee had no power to take action. The Court ordered the properties sealed as per Report No.149 to be de-sealed and possession restored to the owners.

Facts:

The appellant-accused was convicted for offenses under Section 498A, Section 304B, Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 3 and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and additional sentences of 5 years and 3 years. During the appeal's pendency before the High Court, the appellant sought bail under Section 389 of the CrPC. The High Court granted bail without recording any specific reasons, which was challenged in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to grant bail without recording reasons was appropriate.

Whether there were compelling reasons justifying the grant of bail, given the conviction and sentences imposed.

Held:

Section 389 of the CrPC allows for the suspension of execution of a sentence and granting of bail during the pendency of an appeal. In the present case, the offenses were not bailable, and the sentences included life imprisonment, making the bail application more critical.( Para 26)

The appellate court should exercise its discretion judiciously while considering bail applications under Section 389. It must assess whether there are substantial doubts about the conviction's validity and whether there is a risk of unreasonable delay in the appeal's disposal.( Para 27)

While the detailed examination of the merits of the case may not be required, the court must exercise its jurisdiction based on well-established principles and not as a matter of course.( Para 32)

The court highlights the distinction between pre-trial bail and post-conviction bail. Post-conviction bail requires strong and compelling reasons to justify it, and such reasons must be recorded in the order granting bail under Section 389(1) of the CrPC.( Para 36)

In considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, the appellate court should not re-assess the evidence considered by the trial court and take a different view.( Para 39)

The High Court's casual grant of bail without recording any reasons was inappropriate, as it ignored the evidence relied upon by the trial court.( Para 41)

The court upholds the evidence presented in the trial court, supporting the cruelty and harassment related to dowry, and finds no apparent infirmity in the judgment.( Para 42)

Facts:

The judgment does not provide specific facts of the case. Instead, it discusses the interpretation and application of relevant sections and provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Issues:

• Whether the amended provisions of Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, confer the status of a coparcener on daughters, born before or after the amendment, in the same manner as sons, with equal rights and liabilities.
• Whether the right of a daughter to claim coparcenary is retroactive or operates only from the date of the amendment.
• Whether a plea of oral partition can be accepted to claim rights under Section 6(5) of the Act.
• Whether the enlargement of a daughter's rights affects the rights of other relatives under Section 6(1) of the Act.
• Whether the provisions of Section 6(5) recognize partitions effected through a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908, or by a decree of a court.

Held:

The amended provisions of Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, confer the status of a coparcener on the daughter born before or after the amendment, in the same manner as a son, with equal rights and liabilities.

The right of a daughter to claim coparcenary is retroactive, and the provisions are deemed to have been in force from the date of the amendment, i.e., 09.09.2005. However, any disposition, alienation, or partition that took place before 20.12.2004 shall not be invalidated.

A plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as a statutory recognized mode of partition. It must be supported by public documents and partition must be conclusively evinced, similar to a decree of a court, to be accepted.

The amendments to Section 6(1) do not affect the rights of other relatives mentioned in the proviso to Section 6 as it stood before the amendment.

The provisions of Section 6(5) recognize partitions only if they are effected by a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908, or by a decree of a court. Other forms of partition, including oral partition, are not recognized under the Explanation to Section 6(5).

Facts:

The judgment does not provide specific facts of the case. Instead, it discusses the interpretation and application of relevant sections and provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Issues:

Whether the amended provisions of Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, confer the status of a coparcener on daughters, born before or after the amendment, in the same manner as sons, with equal rights and liabilities.

Whether the right of a daughter to claim coparcenary is retroactive or operates only from the date of the amendment.

Whether a plea of oral partition can be accepted to claim rights under Section 6(5) of the Act.

Whether the enlargement of a daughter's rights affects the rights of other relatives under Section 6(1) of the Act.

Whether the provisions of Section 6(5) recognize partitions effected through a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908, or by a decree of a court.

Held:

The amended provisions of Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, confer the status of a coparcener on the daughter born before or after the amendment, in the same manner as a son, with equal rights and liabilities.

The right of a daughter to claim coparcenary is retroactive, and the provisions are deemed to have been in force from the date of the amendment, i.e., 09.09.2005. However, any disposition, alienation, or partition that took place before 20.12.2004 shall not be invalidated.

A plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as a statutory recognized mode of partition. It must be supported by public documents and partition must be conclusively evinced, similar to a decree of a court, to be accepted.

The amendments to Section 6(1) do not affect the rights of other relatives mentioned in the proviso to Section 6 as it stood before the amendment.

The provisions of Section 6(5) recognize partitions only if they are effected by a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908, or by a decree of a court. Other forms of partition, including oral partition, are not recognized under the Explanation to Section 6(5).

Facts:

The case involves employees working in various groups at the Department of Space (SDSC SHAR), including drivers, technical attendants, nursing attendants, technicians, office attendants, and more. The Department of Space has its own service rules that classify civil posts into four groups - 'A,' 'B,' 'C,' and 'D,' based on pay scale and job description.

Issues:

• Whether the 1993 Rules apply to the Government servants covered by the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, and whether the classification of posts based on job description is permissible for the purpose of forming service associations.

Held:

The Court held that the 1993 Rules are applicable to Government servants to whom the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 are applicable. The classification of posts in groups 'A,' 'B,' 'C,' and 'D' under the Department of Space's service rules is considered a 'distinct category.' Further sub-classification based on job description is not permissible under recruitment and conduct rules, as it would defeat the purpose of the 1993 Rules. Allowing distinct service associations for each job description would lead to groupism and disrupt the functioning of the Joint Consultative Machinery (JCM).

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal and upheld that the ISRO Drivers Association or any other group based on job description cannot claim recognition as a distinct category for forming a service association under the 1993 Rules.

Facts:

The case involves employees working in various groups at the Department of Space (SDSC SHAR), including drivers, technical attendants, nursing attendants, technicians, office attendants, and more. The Department of Space has its own service rules that classify civil posts into four groups - 'A,' 'B,' 'C,' and 'D,' based on pay scale and job description.

Issues:

Whether the 1993 Rules apply to the Government servants covered by the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, and whether the classification of posts based on job description is permissible for the purpose of forming service associations.

Held:

The Court held that the 1993 Rules are applicable to Government servants to whom the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 are applicable. The classification of posts in groups 'A,' 'B,' 'C,' and 'D' under the Department of Space's service rules is considered a 'distinct category.' Further sub-classification based on job description is not permissible under recruitment and conduct rules, as it would defeat the purpose of the 1993 Rules. Allowing distinct service associations for each job description would lead to groupism and disrupt the functioning of the Joint Consultative Machinery (JCM).

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal and upheld that the ISRO Drivers Association or any other group based on job description cannot claim recognition as a distinct category for forming a service association under the 1993 Rules.