Facts:

Appellant institution, Dayal Nursing College, Gwalior, claimed to be running B.Sc (Nursing) since 2006.

Recognition for B.Sc (Nursing) and M.Sc (Nursing) courses for the academic session 2018-19 denied by Madhya Pradesh Nurses Registration Council (SNRC).

Writ Petition filed, disposed of on 13.11.2018, directing SNRC inspection and recognition decision by 20th November 2018.

Appeal filed challenging the order, seeking recognition for academic session 2018-19.

Issues:

Did the appellant institution apply to SNRC within the last date (22nd December 2018) for recognition?

If applied, was the application complete in all respects?

Did the appellant institution provide necessary documents along with the application form?

Did the institution have its own Parent Hospital, a prerequisite for recognition?

Was the appeal seeking recognition for B.Sc (Nursing) or M.Sc (Nursing) or both?

Held:

The appellant failed to prove the completion of the online application form with required particulars.

No proof provided that necessary documents were filed along with the application form.

The affiliation certificate for M.Sc (Nursing) granted on 02.02.2019, after the last date for application submission.

Lack of affiliation certificate at the time of application submission makes the institution ineligible.

The institution did not have its own Parent Hospital, violating the Indian Nursing Council's communication dated 16.04.2018.

The appeal is devoid of merit; the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court stands.

Facts:

The case revolves around a dispute over the construction of a common wall between two houses. The appellant, Nandlal Baviskar, was convicted under Section 302 IPC for murdering Lakhichand, the deceased. The altercation arose from frequent quarrels between the appellant and Dilip Waman Baviskar, due to expenses related to the construction of the common wall.

Issues:

Whether the act falls under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, indicating a sudden fight in the heat of passion, justifying modification of the appellant's conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC.

Held:

To fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, the act must be without premeditation, in a sudden fight, without the offender taking undue advantage, and not acting in a cruel or unusual manner. Disproportionate retaliation or undue advantage would disqualify the application of this exception.( Para 12)

The scope of Exception 4 was reiterated, emphasizing the need for the act to be committed in a sudden fight without premeditation and without undue advantage. The fight must be with the person killed.( Para 13)

The court analyzed the facts, emphasizing the proximity of the two incidents, the exchange of abuse, and the subsequent stick blow by the deceased's brother. The court concluded that the act was part of the same sudden quarrel, falling within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.( Para 14)

Despite the use of a dangerous weapon (gupti), the appellant inflicted a single injury in the heat of passion. The court held that the case falls under Exception 4, and the conviction under Section 302 IPC is liable to be modified under Section 304 Part II IPC.( Para 15)

The appeal was partly allowed, modifying the appellant's conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC, and the appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for twelve years.( Para 16)

Facts:

The dispute involves a 4/5th share in the land measuring 643 Bighas and 4 Biswas in village Umedpura.

The land was subjected to ceiling proceedings under the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972, and the Prescribed Authority passed an order on 17.10.1978.

Two civil suits (C.S. No. 24-C/1979 and C.S. No. 62-C/1979) were filed by different sets of persons claiming interest in the land.

The plaintiffs in both suits challenged the order dated 17.10.1978, seeking a declaration that it is null and void.

Issues:

Whether the civil suits challenging the order of the Prescribed Authority under the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972, are barred by Section 26(b) of the Act?

Held:

The High Court was justified in holding that both civil suits were barred by Section 26 of the Act. Section 26(a) and (b) expressly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain suits related to the transfer of land affecting the government's right to surplus area and to settle matters under the Act. (Para 17)

Section 26(b) specifically bars filing a civil suit to examine the legality of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority under the Act. The Civil Court's jurisdiction is expressly taken away, and the remedy for the plaintiffs lies in filing appeal/revision under Section 18 of the Act. (Para 20)

The High Court's decision to dismiss the suits as barred by Section 26 of the Act is affirmed. The appeals lack merit and are accordingly dismissed.( Para 21)

FACTS:

A First Information Report (FIR) was lodged regarding the fatal assault on the cousin of the Informant on 23.02.1997.

The trial involved 17 accused persons, including the present appellants, charged with offences under various sections of the IPC.

The prosecution witnesses provided inconsistent testimonies, and the appellants were not named in the initial reporting by PW-2.

The Trial Court found all accused guilty, leading to an appeal in the High Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the appellants were named in the initial reporting and subsequent testimonies.

HELD:

The judgement highlights the statements of prosecution witnesses, including PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4, presenting their accounts of the incident.( Para 5)

The Court acknowledges the principle of vicarious liability but emphasizes the need for clarity in establishing a person's membership in an unlawful assembly.( Para 10)

Noting the absence of the appellants storming inside the house, the Court questions the sufficiency of evidence to establish their involvement in the crime.( Para 11)

The Court observes the lack of naming appellants in the FIR by PW-2 and the absence of attributing specific overt acts to them in his subsequent testimony. PW-3 and PW-4 did not name the appellants, raising doubts about their involvement.Considering the factual aspects, the Court concludes that guilt is not established beyond reasonable doubt, granting the benefit of doubt to the appellants.The appeals are allowed, and the appellants are acquitted of all charges. They are to be set at liberty unless required for any other offence. ( Para 12)

Facts:

Appellants and two others were prosecuted for offenses under Sections 323, 324, 452, 504, and 506 IPC.

Acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate, Mathura, but the State appealed.

Appellate Court convicted appellants, sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment and fines.

Appellants filed a criminal revision before the High Court, which was dismissed ex parte.

Issues:

Validity of High Court's dismissal of the revision without assigning reasons.

Held:

The High Court failed to apply its judicial mind while dismissing the revision, lacking justification for interference. (Para 11)

The expectation was for the High Court to consider factual and legal aspects before passing appropriate orders, which was not fulfilled. (Para 12)

The impugned order lacked reasoning, making it improper for disposal in such manner. (Para 12)

Decision:

The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration of the revision petition within six months. (Para 14)

Facts:

The appellant filed a petition for divorce and child custody in the United States. Despite an interim order from the U.S. Court, the appellant returned to India and filed a custody petition in the Family Court, concealing her U.S. petition. The U.S. Court granted temporary custody to the wife/mother. The husband/father objected to the jurisdiction of the Family Court, leading to a High Court appeal and a writ petition seeking Habeas Corpus.

Issues:

Whether the Family Court in India had jurisdiction over the custody matter.

What factors should be considered in determining the best interest of the minor children.

Whether the High Court's decision favoring the return of the children to the U.S. was justified.

Held:

The High Court rightly rejected the application for custody filed in India, as the children were not ordinary residents of India as per Section 9(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The U.S. Court's orders must be respected, and the appellant must participate in those proceedings.

The best interest of the child is paramount, considering factors such as maturity, mental stability, education, moral character, financial sufficiency, and the parent-child relationship. The children, being U.S. citizens, should return to the U.S. for their welfare, as decided by the U.S. Court.

The principles of comity of courts, orders of foreign courts, citizenship, and the welfare of the children favor the husband/father. The High Court's decision directing the return of the children to the U.S. is justified, ensuring it does not harm the children physically, mentally, or psychologically.

The judicial resolution of custody disputes may permanently affect legal relationships, but negotiated resolutions are preferable, especially considering the potential for reconciliation between the parties. The appellant is directed to return to the U.S. with the children within six weeks.

Facts:

The appellants leased their property to the Government, which was requisitioned, derequisitioned, and again requisitioned. The Estate Officer issued an eviction notice under ss. 4(1) and 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Public Premises Act, treating the appellants as unauthorized occupants. The High Court upheld the notice.

Issues:

Whether there is a bona fide dispute on the ownership of the property, and if so, does the Estate Officer have jurisdiction to invoke eviction powers under the Public Premises Act?

Held:

The appellants raised a bona fide dispute on ownership. The Estate Officer lacks jurisdiction to use summary eviction powers when a genuine dispute exists. Union of India admitted the dispute and initially expressed intent to pursue dispossession through a civil suit.

Quashing the resumption notice by the High Court meant Union of India couldn't resort to any summary remedy for eviction. The Civil Court is the proper venue for deciding ownership disputes, not summary proceedings under the Public Premises Act.

The principle of merger doesn't apply as the superior court didn't delve into the merits decided by the subordinate court. The order of the subordinate court holds unless the superior court specifically addresses the merits.

The court referred to Express Newspapers case, holding that A.P. Sen J.'s view is the majority view, binding under Art. 141. The appellants genuinely disputed ownership, and the Estate Officer lacked jurisdiction under the Public Premises Act.

Facts:

The State acquired land for the construction of Satluz-Yamuna canal under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The appellant, a landowner, contested the compensation determined by the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO).

The Civil Court, on appeal, enhanced the compensation.

The High Court, in a lead appeal (Hari Singh's case), partly allowed appeals by landowners, enhancing compensation for lands in 9 villages, including Bhago Majra.

The appellant challenged this decision, seeking further enhancement.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is entitled to claim additional compensation for the land acquired.

Whether the High Court erred in determining the market value of the land in question.

Held:

The appellant failed to demonstrate that Courts below overlooked crucial evidence or that the High Court committed fundamental errors.

The High Court considered all aspects, including location, distance from Chandigarh, and land quality, in determining compensation rates for each village.

The appellant's argument for additional compensation for Bhago Majra was dismissed.

The High Court's approach, examining each village's potential from various angles, was deemed just and proper.

No grounds were found to further enhance compensation beyond the High Court's decision.

The appeal was dismissed.