Facts:

Ghanshyam Upadhyay, the petitioner, relied on a newspaper report to make allegations against two members of the Commission of Inquiry constituted to investigate the 'Vikas Dubey' encounter case. He contended that the Chairman and a Member of the Commission had held high Constitutional positions and had relatives involved with the party in power and law enforcement agencies.

Issues:

Whether the allegations of 'conflict of interest' and 'bias' against the two members of the Commission, based solely on a newspaper report, are substantiated.

Whether the petitioner's apprehensions about the fairness of the inquiry process hold merit.

Held:

The Court noted that the entire basis for the petitioner's allegations was a newspaper article, which, without further proof, lacked evidentiary value. It emphasized that relying solely on newspaper reports was insufficient for making such serious allegations.( Para 6)

The Court further examined the petitioner's specific claims regarding the relatives of the Chairman and the Member of the Commission. It held that the mere fact that the Chairman's brother was a legislator supporting the party in power and the Member was related to a high-ranking police officer did not automatically lead to bias or conflict of interest. The Court found no evidence of any dominant influence by these relatives.( Para 8-9)

The Court clarified that the Commission of Inquiry constituted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 was not meant for an inter se determination of legal issues but for a fact-finding exercise. The recommendations of such commissions were not enforceable proprio vigore, and the proceedings were conducted in the public domain.( Para 10)

The Court observed that the petitioner was a lawyer practicing in Mumbai and had no direct connection to the incident under inquiry in Uttar Pradesh. The allegations of bias made solely on the basis of newspaper reports and nothing more were rejected outright.( Para 14)

The Court concluded that the petitioner's repeated applications and unnecessary apprehensions were hampering the inquiry process. It emphasized that sufficient safeguards were in place for ensuring a fair inquiry, and the report of the inquiry would be filed before the Court in the relevant petitions. For all the aforestated reasons we are of the opinion that the instant petition/application is without any merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. ( Para 15 ,16)

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the victim-complainant was accosted by three boys armed with weapons, who extorted Rs. 30,000/- from him.

The police apprehended all three accused, and they confessed to committing the robbery.

The Trial Court found all three accused guilty of robbery with an attempt to cause grievous hurt and sentenced them accordingly.

The High Court dismissed the charge under Section 397 of IPC and instead convicted the appellant under Section 394 of IPC with a reduced sentence.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's claim of being a juvenile at the time of the incident and undergoing treatment for a mental disorder is valid.

Whether the testimonies of the witnesses and the evidence establish the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Held:

The testimonies of the witnesses are credible and consistent with each other, establishing the crime of robbery with hurt. The complainant had no motive to falsely implicate the appellant.

The appellant's refusal to participate in the Test Identification Parade (TIP) indicates his guilty conscience and should be given substantial weight.

Claims of unsoundness of mind or mitigating circumstances like juvenility of age should be raised during the trial, and the appellant's belated claims are not genuine.

The appellant failed to provide evidence to support his claim of being a juvenile at the time of the incident, and the statement recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) indicates he was above 18 years of age.

The plea of mental disorder remains unsubstantiated, as no witness testified to it, and the appellant's conduct shows an elevated level of mental intellect.

The High Court's reasons for disbelieving the appellant's defences are well-reasoned and valid.

The appeal is dismissed, the appellant's bail bonds are cancelled, and the respondent-State is directed to take the appellant into custody to serve the remainder of his sentence.

Facts:

The petitioners filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking directions to the Union of India to prepare, notify, and implement a separate National Disaster Management Plan specifically for the COVID-19 pandemic. They also sought guidelines for minimum standards of relief to be provided to persons affected by COVID-19, and questioned the utilization of the National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) and the PM CARES Fund.

Issues:

• Whether a separate National Disaster Management Plan for COVID-19 was required despite the existence of the National Plan, 2019?
• Whether fresh guidelines for minimum standards of relief for COVID-19 were necessary in addition to the existing guidelines under Section 12 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005?
• Whether the NDRF could be used for providing assistance in the fight against COVID-19, and whether contributions should be credited to the NDRF or the PM CARES Fund?
• Whether all funds collected in the PM CARES Fund should be transferred to the NDRF?

Held:

The court examined whether a separate National Disaster Management Plan for COVID-19 was necessary. It held that the National Plan, 2019, which was framed and notified in November 2019, already covered Biological and Public Health Emergencies, including epidemics like COVID-19. The court observed that the Disaster Management Act, 2005, contained sufficient powers and measures to address such emergencies, and thus, there was no need for a separate plan for COVID-19. (Para 36, 38, 39, 42)

The court addressed the issue of guidelines for minimum standards of relief for COVID-19. It held that the guidelines issued under Section 12 of the Act, which were in place before the COVID-19 pandemic, already covered the minimum standards of relief for all disasters, including COVID-19. There was no requirement to issue fresh guidelines specifically for the pandemic. (Para 45, 46)

The court examined whether the NDRF could be utilized for providing assistance in the fight against COVID-19 and whether contributions should be credited to the NDRF or the PM CARES Fund. The court ruled that the NDRF could indeed be utilized for providing assistance for COVID-19. It clarified that any person or institution could still make contributions to the NDRF as per Section 46(1)(b) of the Act. The court also noted that the PM CARES Fund and the NDRF served different purposes, and contributions to the PM CARES Fund were voluntary. (Para 61, 64, 65)

The court addressed the issue of transferring funds collected in the PM CARES Fund to the NDRF. It held that the PM CARES Fund and the NDRF were separate funds with different objectives. The funds collected in the PM CARES Fund were meant for a public charitable trust and need not be transferred to the NDRF. (Para 72)

Facts:

The petitioners filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking directions to the Union of India to prepare, notify, and implement a separate National Disaster Management Plan specifically for the COVID-19 pandemic. They also sought guidelines for minimum standards of relief to be provided to persons affected by COVID-19, and questioned the utilization of the National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) and the PM CARES Fund.

Issues:

Whether a separate National Disaster Management Plan for COVID-19 was required despite the existence of the National Plan, 2019?

Whether fresh guidelines for minimum standards of relief for COVID-19 were necessary in addition to the existing guidelines under Section 12 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005?

Whether the NDRF could be used for providing assistance in the fight against COVID-19, and whether contributions should be credited to the NDRF or the PM CARES Fund?

Whether all funds collected in the PM CARES Fund should be transferred to the NDRF?

Held:

The court examined whether a separate National Disaster Management Plan for COVID-19 was necessary. It held that the National Plan, 2019, which was framed and notified in November 2019, already covered Biological and Public Health Emergencies, including epidemics like COVID-19. The court observed that the Disaster Management Act, 2005, contained sufficient powers and measures to address such emergencies, and thus, there was no need for a separate plan for COVID-19. (Para 36, 38, 39, 42)

The court addressed the issue of guidelines for minimum standards of relief for COVID-19. It held that the guidelines issued under Section 12 of the Act, which were in place before the COVID-19 pandemic, already covered the minimum standards of relief for all disasters, including COVID-19. There was no requirement to issue fresh guidelines specifically for the pandemic. (Para 45, 46)

The court examined whether the NDRF could be utilized for providing assistance in the fight against COVID-19 and whether contributions should be credited to the NDRF or the PM CARES Fund. The court ruled that the NDRF could indeed be utilized for providing assistance for COVID-19. It clarified that any person or institution could still make contributions to the NDRF as per Section 46(1)(b) of the Act. The court also noted that the PM CARES Fund and the NDRF served different purposes, and contributions to the PM CARES Fund were voluntary. (Para 61, 64, 65)

The court addressed the issue of transferring funds collected in the PM CARES Fund to the NDRF. It held that the PM CARES Fund and the NDRF were separate funds with different objectives. The funds collected in the PM CARES Fund were meant for a public charitable trust and need not be transferred to the NDRF. (Para 72)

Facts:

On or about December 22, 2007, the Lender Banks sanctioned and extended various loans, advances, and facilities to the corporate debtor-respondent no.1. The respondent no.1 defaulted in payment, and its account was classified as a Non-Performing Asset on July 8, 2011. Recovery proceedings were initiated against the corporate debtor by the consortium of lenders before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993.

On or about March 21, 2018, the respondent no.2, as the financial creditor and assignee of the loans and advances disbursed to the corporate debtor, filed an application under Section 7 of the Code before the Adjudicating Authority seeking initiation of CIRP against respondent no.1. The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) admitted the application and initiated CIRP under Section 7 of the Code. The appellant, the director of the respondent no.1 company, contended before the Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) that the claim was barred by time. However, the appeal was dismissed by the NCLAT.

Issues:

• Whether the application under Section 7 of the Code is barred by limitation?
• Whether Section 18 of the Limitation Act can be applied to the present case?

Held:

The period of limitation for an application seeking initiation of CIRP under Section 7 of the Code is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, which is three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. In this case, the application was filed in March 2018, much later than three years from the date of default (stated as July 8, 2011) in the application. Therefore, the application filed by the respondent no.2 is clearly barred by limitation. [Para 38]

The NCLT failed to examine the question of limitation, and the NCLAT decided the question of limitation on entirely irrelevant considerations. The NCLAT's assumption that the right to apply under Section 7 of the Code accrued on December 1, 2016 (when the Code came into force) and the application is within limitation, lacks any foundation or basis. There is nothing in the Code or the Limitation Act to support such an assumption. The reasoning of the NCLAT regarding the period of limitation for mortgaged property (12 years) is also erroneous and not in line with the Supreme Court's decision. [Para 36, 37]

In view of the above, this appeal is allowed to the extent indicated and with the observations foregoing.

Facts:

Prashant Bhushan, an advocate, posted two tweets on Twitter, which were the subject of the contempt proceedings. The first tweet criticized the Chief Justice of India (CJI) as an individual, while the second tweet made an adverse statement against the Supreme Court and the last four Chief Justices regarding the state of democracy in India. The Supreme Court initiated suo motu contempt proceedings based on these tweets.

Issues:

• Whether the tweets made by the advocate amount to fair criticism or criminal contempt of the judiciary and the CJI.
• Whether the Supreme Court's suo motu initiation of contempt proceedings without the Attorney General's consent is valid.

Held:

The power of the Supreme Court to initiate contempt proceedings is derived from Article 129 of the Constitution, and it is not limited by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Court can initiate suo motu proceedings based on information received and is not required to seek the consent of the Attorney General for such proceedings. The procedure must be just, fair, and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. (Para 18)

While citizens have the right to make fair criticism of judges, the judiciary, and its functioning under Article 19(1) of the Constitution, there are limits to this right. If the criticism exceeds those limits and tends to scandalize the judges, undermine the dignity and authority of the court, or shake public confidence in the judicial institutions, it may be considered 'criminal contempt.' (Para 57)

Criticism against an individual judge is not contempt, but when criticism is directed against a judge as a judge and adversely affects the administration of justice, the contempt jurisdiction can be invoked. (Para 58)

Constructive criticism for systemic correction in the system is permissible, but malicious, scurrilous, or calculated attacks on the judiciary's foundation cannot be condoned. (Para 59)

The first tweet, which criticized the CJI as an individual, could not be considered contempt. However, the second part of the tweet, which criticized the CJI as the head of the judiciary during the COVID-19 lockdown, was false, malicious, and scandalous. (Para 62-64)

The second tweet, which made adverse statements against the Supreme Court and the last four Chief Justices, created an impression that the judiciary played a substantial role in the destruction of democracy in the last six years. This attack on the Supreme Court and the CJIs cannot be overlooked and amounts to criminal contempt. (Para 67-68)

The Indian judiciary's trust, faith, and confidence are essential for a healthy democracy. Attacks on the judiciary's foundation must be dealt with firmly, and the Court's summary jurisdiction is required to protect the majesty of the law and the administration of justice. (Para 72-73)

Facts:

The present writ petition was filed in 1985 and raised various issues related to the environment in Delhi, misuse of premises for unauthorized/commercial purposes, and the shifting of heavy industries. In 2006, the Supreme Court appointed a Monitoring Committee to restrain the misuse of residential premises for commercial purposes in Delhi. Subsequently, the Monitoring Committee also addressed encroachments and unauthorized colonies on public land.

Issues:

• whether the Monitoring Committee had the authority to act against residential premises not being used for commercial purposes on private land.

Held:

The Court clarified that the Monitoring Committee was appointed and empowered within the strict confines of the powers conferred on it by the Court. The Committee's powers were limited to checking the misuse of residential properties for commercial purposes and addressing encroachments on public land. The Court, through various orders, never authorized the Committee to act against purely residential premises on private land not used for commercial purposes.

The Court emphasized that the Monitoring Committee was not authorized to take action against residential premises not being used for commercial purposes on private land. If there was unauthorized construction or deviation, the requisite provisions were under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Committee's power to seal properties carried civil consequences, and a person could only be deprived of their property following the procedure prescribed by law.

Article 300A of the Constitution of India provides protection against deprivation of property and right of residence except as prescribed by law. The Court held that the Committee's actions were beyond its authorized scope and violated the due process protection provided by law. The Committee's action in sealing residential premises not misused for commercial purposes was deemed invalid.

The Court observed that the Monitoring Committee had never sealed any residential premises used solely for residential purposes on private land before and could not order their demolition. The Court reemphasized that the Committee's purpose was limited to specific issues, and its actions were confined to the misuse of residential properties for commercial purposes and encroachments on public land.

The Court quashed Report No.149 and other reports submitted subsequently, along with the entire action of sealing properties pursuant to the said report. The Court also quashed notices directing demolitions where the Monitoring Committee had no power to take action. The Court ordered the properties sealed as per Report No.149 to be de-sealed and possession restored to the owners.

Facts:

The appellant-accused was convicted for offenses under Section 498A, Section 304B, Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 3 and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and additional sentences of 5 years and 3 years. During the appeal's pendency before the High Court, the appellant sought bail under Section 389 of the CrPC. The High Court granted bail without recording any specific reasons, which was challenged in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

• Whether the High Court's decision to grant bail without recording reasons was appropriate.
• Whether there were compelling reasons justifying the grant of bail, given the conviction and sentences imposed.

Held:

Section 389 of the CrPC allows for the suspension of execution of a sentence and granting of bail during the pendency of an appeal. In the present case, the offenses were not bailable, and the sentences included life imprisonment, making the bail application more critical.( Para 26)

The appellate court should exercise its discretion judiciously while considering bail applications under Section 389. It must assess whether there are substantial doubts about the conviction's validity and whether there is a risk of unreasonable delay in the appeal's disposal.( Para 27)

While the detailed examination of the merits of the case may not be required, the court must exercise its jurisdiction based on well-established principles and not as a matter of course.( Para 32)

The court highlights the distinction between pre-trial bail and post-conviction bail. Post-conviction bail requires strong and compelling reasons to justify it, and such reasons must be recorded in the order granting bail under Section 389(1) of the CrPC.( Para 36)

In considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, the appellate court should not re-assess the evidence considered by the trial court and take a different view.( Para 39)

The High Court's casual grant of bail without recording any reasons was inappropriate, as it ignored the evidence relied upon by the trial court.( Para 41)

The court upholds the evidence presented in the trial court, supporting the cruelty and harassment related to dowry, and finds no apparent infirmity in the judgment.( Para 42)

Facts:

The land in question was categorized as 'banjar' land with 'shora,' and the Gram Panchayat sought to lease it to make it fit for cultivation by removing the 'shora.' The respondents claimed to be lessees of the land, and the revenue records indicated their possession and cultivation. The appellants alleged that the respondents obtained the lease in collusion with the ex-Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha.

Issues:

• Whether the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court were obtained by fraud.
• Whether the respondents obtained the lease in collusion with the ex-Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha.

Held:

The judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court on September 28, 1989, in the reference proceedings under Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, became final and was not challenged in any appeal. The subsequent separate suit filed by the appellants, alleging fraud in obtaining the decree, lacked sufficient evidence and particulars of fraud, and hence, the fraud was not established. Therefore, the High Court's decision to set aside the decree was unwarranted. (Para 11)

The plea of collusion between the respondents and the ex-Pradhan was vague, and there were no specific particulars of how the fraud was played. Fraud needs to be pleaded and proved with cogent evidence. As there was no credible evidence to establish the alleged collusion, the High Court's decision to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the Civil Court was not justified. (Para 12)

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the judgment of the Civil Court, holding the respondents entitled to compensation for the land in question. The Court also rejected the appellants' claim that the decree was obtained by fraud due to lack of substantial evidence. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 53A, was discussed in the context of the defense raised under it. (Para 12)