Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 34 - Common Intention - Vicarious Liability - Prior Concert - Appellant was convicted for murder with the aid of Section 34 IPC - Evidence suggested Appellant arrived at the spot from a different direction after the commencement of the incident and after the fatal shot was fired - Held, Section 34 requires proof of a pre-arranged plan or prior meeting of minds, even if formed on the spur of the moment; mere presence at the scene without proof of active participation, facilitation, or shared intent to commit murder is insufficient for conviction; vicarious liability cannot be attracted in the absence of discernible material showing prior concert. [Paras 14-25].

Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 302 and 307 - Murder vs Attempt to Murder - Alteration of Offence - Appellant was present armed with a firearm - Testimony of injured witness (PW-6) revealed that he intervened and lifted the barrel of the Appellant's gun, directing it upwards - Held, while common intention for murder was not established, the Appellant's presence with a weapon and awareness of the serious nature of the incident justifies conviction under Section 307 IPC; where intention to cause death is not established but the act is done with knowledge of likely consequences, the offence falls under Section 307 IPC; conviction altered from Section 302/34 to Section 307. [Paras 26-28].

Sentence - Period undergone - Appellant already incarcerated for approximately 9 years and 9 months - Held, given the passage of time since the 1999 incident and the nature of the altered offence, the ends of justice are met by limiting the sentence to the period already undergone. [Para 29].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC set aside – Appellant convicted under Section 307 IPC and sentenced to the period already undergone – Appellant not required to surrender.

Civil Law - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of Plaint - Clever Drafting - Duty of the Court - Held, while considering an application for rejection of plaint, the Court must not be confined to a formal or superficial reading but must undertake a meaningful and substantive examination of the averments. Clever drafting cannot be permitted to create an illusion of a cause of action to veil a legal bar. If the suit is manifestly vexatious, meritless, or barred by law, it must be nipped in the bud. [Paras 8-10.7].

Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, Sections 3, 4 and 2(9) - Benami Transactions - Retrospective Operation of 2016 Amendment - Held, the 2016 amendments, insofar as they are declaratory, procedural, and machinery-oriented, operate retrospectively. Procedural provisions intended to make the Act workable apply to earlier transactions. The Court is duty-bound to pierce the veil of form to ascertain the real nature of the transaction. [Paras 12-22.15].

Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, Section 2(9)(A)(ii) - Fiduciary Capacity - Scope of Exception - Held, the expression fiduciary capacity must receive a restricted construction. An ordinary employer-employee relationship or a commercial contractual arrangement supported by consideration does not constitute a fiduciary relationship for the purpose of statutory exemption. [Paras 23-24.8].

Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 25 - Disqualification of Murderer - Intestate and Testamentary Succession - Held, the bar under Section 25, founded on public policy that no person can profit from their own wrong (nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria), applies equally to both intestate and testamentary succession. A person accused of murdering the testator is disentitled from asserting rights under a Will, and such an issue can be decided as a preliminary point in civil proceedings based on preponderance of probabilities. [Paras 25-25.13].

Indian Contract Act, 1872, Section 23 - Unlawful Object - Circumvention of Statute - Held, any contract or MOU entered into for the purpose of defeating the provisions of a law, such as the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, is founded on an unlawful object and is void. No rights can arise from such illegal arrangements. [Paras 26-26.3].

Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, Sections 5 and 27 - Confiscation - Consequences of Judicial Determination - Held, once a transaction is declared benami in judicial proceedings and attains finality, the property is liable to confiscation by the Central Government. The Adjudicating Authority need not follow the standard procedure under Sections 24 to 26 if a competent court has already made a final determination on the benami nature of the transaction. [Paras 28-31].

Decision: Appeal allowed - Judgment of the High Court set aside - Plaint in O.S. No. 246 of 2020 rejected - Central Government directed to appoint an Administrator to take over the suit properties within eight weeks - No order as to costs.

Constitution of India, Article 226 - Judicial Review - Scope in Disciplinary Proceedings - High Court Division Bench set aside the dismissal of Respondent No. 1 by reappreciating evidence and holding it was a case of "no evidence" - Held, the power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. High Courts should not venture into reappreciation of evidence or substitute their own findings for those of the disciplinary authority unless the findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or suffer from patent error. The Division Bench transgressed these settled limits. [Paras 19-21].

Service Law - Departmental Enquiry - Standard of Proof - Preponderance of Probabilities - Respondent No. 1 accused of securing two simultaneous police appointments under different identities using forged documents - Division Bench set aside dismissal as Bihar witnesses were not examined - Held, technical rules of the Indian Evidence Act do not apply to departmental proceedings. The standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities. The available material, reinforced by subsequent forensic findings during the appeal, reasonably supported the charge of fraud. [Paras 4.5, 6.5, 12.3, 18].

Service Law - Misconduct - Fraud in Public Employment - Constable in Jharkhand Police found holding a second appointment in Bihar Police as "Santosh Kumar" through impersonation and forged credentials - Held, fraud at the threshold of entry into service strikes at the very root of public employment. A member of a disciplined force is expected to maintain the highest degree of integrity. The order of dismissal was a proportionate and justified administrative measure. [Paras 17, 22-24].

Constitution of India, Article 142 - Complete Justice - Quashing of Fraudulent Appointment - Forensic reports confirmed that "Ranjan Kumar" (Jharkhand Police) and "Santosh Kumar" (Bihar Police) were the same individual - While restoring the dismissal from Jharkhand Police, the Court exercised jurisdiction under Article 142 to quash the appointment order in Bihar Police to prevent the individual from benefiting from his deceitful conduct. [Para 27.1].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of the Division Bench set aside – Order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority restored – Appointment in Bihar Police quashed under Article 142 – DGPs of Bihar and Jharkhand directed to ensure initiation of criminal proceedings for fraud and forgery.

Civil Law - Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 28 - Specific Performance - Extension of time for deposit of purchase money - Power of Court after decree - Held, a decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree and the Court does not become functus officio after passing it. The power to rescind the contract or extend the time for payment under Section 28 is discretionary. There is no automatic rescission of the contract upon default unless the decree specifically provides for rescission or dismissal of the suit as a consequence of non-payment. The Court must adopt a justice-oriented approach, balancing equities and considering whether the delay signifies a positive refusal or willful negligence to perform the contract. [Paras 19, 24-27, 33, 40].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 2(2) - Doctrine of Merger - Adjudication on merits - Dismissal for non-prosecution - Held, the doctrine of merger applies only when a higher forum passes an order on merits, whether it set aside, modifies, or confirms the lower court's decree. Since Section 2(2)(b) CPC specifically excludes an order of dismissal for default from the definition of a 'decree', the dismissal of a first appeal for non-prosecution does not result in the merger of the trial court's decree with the appellate order. [Paras 21-22].

Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 28 - Procedure for applications - Maintainability before Execution Court - Held, an application for rescission of contract or extension of time must be decided as an application in the original suit. Even if filed in execution proceedings, if the Execution Court is the Court of first instance, it must transfer the application to the file of the suit and number it as an interlocutory application. A prayer for extension of time may be made even orally or treated as such when seeking permission to deposit the defaulted amount. [Paras 23, 28-31, 33].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order XX Rule 12A - Specific Performance Decree - Duty of Appellate Court - Reasonable time for deposit - Held, the Appellate Court, while disposing of an appeal on merits, owes a duty to specify the time period for deposit of the balance consideration. If no time limit is fixed by the superior court, the decree-holder is expected to make the deposit within a reasonable period based on the facts of the case. [Paras 32-33, 50].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Orders of the High Court and the Execution Court set aside – Execution Application and related applications restored to the Court of first instance for fresh consideration in accordance with the principles laid down – Applications to be treated and numbered as applications in the original suit.

Arbitration – Non-Signatory to Contract – Collaborator as Veritable Party – Appointment of Arbitrator under Section 11(6) – Appellant/Collaborator collaborated with the Contractor to satisfy eligibility criteria for a Coal Handling Plant project and executed a Deed of Joint Undertaking (DJU) in favour of the Employer – On the Contractor going into liquidation, the Employer called upon the Collaborator to fulfil joint and several obligations under the DJU – Collaborator's request for arbitration declined by the High Court on the ground of no privity of contract – Held: The DJU was an inextricable part of the contract between the Contractor and the Employer; the Collaborator bore joint and several liability and was a veritable party to the contract entitled to invoke the arbitration clause – High Court erred in rejecting the petition under Section 11(6) – Appeal allowed – Sole Arbitrator appointed [Paras 2–12].

Non-Signatory – Arbitration Clause – Inextricable Connection – Deed of Joint Undertaking – The bid document required the Contractor to demonstrate experience through collaboration, and the Collaborator executed DJUs as mandated – The tripartite agreement dated 05.04.2016 between the Employer, Contractor and Collaborator affirmed the Collaborator's responsibilities and provided for direct payments to the Collaborator – Subsequent communications by the Employer invoking the DJU and threatening execution of balance work at the Collaborator's risk and cost reaffirmed the Collaborator's inextricable role – Held: The tripartite agreement did not extinguish the earlier contract but was a measure to ensure performance in the wake of the Contractor's inability – Collaborator's consent sought in its notice dated 02.07.2022 was for the forum (Delhi International Arbitration Centre), not for the existence of arbitration as a mode of dispute resolution [Paras 3–11].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of the High Court set aside – Petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 allowed – Justice (Retd.) Chakradhari Sharan Singh, former Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, appointed as Sole Arbitrator – All contentions left open – Arbitrator directed to make declaration under Section 12 within 15 days of receipt of judgment – Arbitrator's fees to be governed by the Fourth Schedule to the Act [Paras 12–15].

Criminal Law - Constitution of India, Article 142 - Condonation of Delay - Jail Appeals - High Court dismissed a criminal appeal involving a life sentence on the ground of a 3157-day delay - Held, the High Court ought to have taken a practical and sympathetic view considering the appeal was filed through jail and the petitioner had already undergone significant incarceration. Given that the petitioner has now completed 22 years of sentence with satisfactory conduct and no prior release on parole, remanding the matter for a merit hearing would be a futile exercise. Exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 as an exceptional case to grant bail. [Paras 1-13].

Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 302 and 201 - Life Imprisonment - Remission of Sentence - Petitioner convicted in 2006 and incarcerated since 2004 - Conduct certificate from Senior Superintendent, Circle Jail, Koraput confirmed satisfactory behavior and work in the jail laundry - Held, Petitioner directed to be released on bail on a personal bond of Rs. 10,000. District Legal Services Authority (DLSA), Koraput directed to assist the petitioner in filing a representation for remission of sentence under the prevailing or most beneficial policy. [Paras 11-15].

Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 - Condonation of Delay - Criminal Appeal - Significant delay of 9 years - High Court’s refusal to condone delay in a jail appeal described as "disturbing" by the Supreme Court - Held, the fact that a convict is undergoing a long sentence and filing through jail is sufficient reason for a practical approach towards delay condonation to ensure an opportunity to argue the appeal on merits. [Paras 1-7].

Decision: Bail granted – Petitioner to be released on executing a personal bond of Rs. 10,000 to the satisfaction of the Jail Superintendent – DLSA directed to assist in remission representation – Compliance to be reported on 28-05-2026.

Service Law – Para-Teachers – Regularisation – Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan – Right to Education – Articles 14, 16, 309 of the Constitution of India – Appellants engaged as para-teachers under the SSA in Jharkhand on contractual basis since 2002 – Filed writ petitions before the High Court seeking regularisation as Assistant Teachers, pay parity, and quashing of the 2012 Rules – High Court dismissed writ petitions holding that contractual engagement did not confer any right of regularisation, appointments were not against sanctioned State posts, and no due process comparable to Assistant Teacher selection was followed – Supreme Court upheld the High Court's view that blanket regularisation by mandamus contrary to statutory rules is impermissible – Held: Para-teachers have a right to participation and consideration under the extant statutory rules, but not a right to regularisation; however, the State is directed to periodically activate and implement the 50 per cent reservation mechanism for para-teachers under the 2012 and 2022 Rules [Paras 5, 8, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26].

Service Law – Regularisation – Distinction between Scheme Posts and Cadre Posts – Para-teachers appointed under the SSA occupy scheme posts jointly funded by the Union and the State and governed by SSA guidelines – A prayer for regularisation is in effect a prayer for direct absorption from a scheme post to a State cadre post governed by Article 309 of the Constitution of India – Such direct leap bypassing statutory rules would create a new and impermissible mode of recruitment – Regularisation of scheme-based para-teachers as Assistant Teachers by a court order under Articles 226 or 142 would alter the very source of appointment, which is prohibited by the binding precedent in Umadevi [Paras 17, 19, 23].

Service Law – Equal Pay for Equal Work – Para-Teachers – Pay Parity with Assistant Teachers – Equal pay is not an automatic entitlement; claimant must demonstrate that duties, responsibilities, qualifications, accountability, and conditions of service are qualitatively identical to those of regular employees – Para-teachers, though performing similar classroom functions, are not assigned the full range of responsibilities of an Assistant Teacher – Claim of pay parity with Assistant Teachers is distinct from a mere revision of honorarium – Held: Claim for pay parity as prayed not sustainable [Para 20].

Service Law – State's Statutory Obligation – Moulding of Relief – State cannot resist regularisation on one hand while simultaneously failing to implement its own statutory framework providing 50 per cent reservation for para-teachers – State of Jharkhand directed to issue notification exclusively for para-teachers for 50 per cent of marked vacancies for Assistant Teachers/Sahayak Acharyas – Detailed immediate and annual recurring schedules laid down for conduct of recruitment process to ensure periodic implementation of the statutory mechanism and eliminate ad hocism in public employment [Paras 22, 23, 24].

Decision: Civil appeals disposed of in terms of directions issued – State of Jharkhand directed to determine and notify vacancies within 4 weeks, issue advertisement exclusively for para-teachers within 2 weeks thereafter, and complete entire recruitment process within 10 weeks of advertisement – Annual recurring calendar for future academic years also prescribed – Pending applications disposed of accordingly.

Service Law – Recruitment – Appointment – Adverse Inference – Non-Preservation of Records – Appellants issued an advertisement for 90 posts of Plant Attendant (later increased to 200), conducted a written examination through an independent agency in which 29,459 candidates appeared, and appointed 194 candidates – Respondents filed writ petitions seeking disclosure of marks and restraint on appointment orders – Tribunal directed appointment of respondents on the ground that records were not preserved and respondents were not shown to have failed – High Court affirmed – Held: Neither the recruitment rules nor the advertisement required publication of marks of all examinees or prescribed a period for preservation of records; mere non-production of records does not justify drawing an inference that the respondents had passed the written examination; respondents had not pleaded or established that they had passed the examination – Direction for appointment set aside [Paras 13–16].

Service Law – Selection List – No Indefeasible Right to Appointment – Revised Qualifications – It is well settled that a candidate whose name appears in the select list does not acquire any indefeasible right to appointment in the absence of a specific rule entitling such appointment – Further, qualifications for the post of Plant Attendant were revised in 2008, rendering a direction for appointment at this stage impermissible – Respondents in their writ petitions had not even sought appointment for themselves but only production of results of selected candidates, providing an additional ground to deny the relief [Paras 13, 16].

Decision: Appeals disposed of – Orders of the Tribunal and the High Court directing appointment of respondents to the post of Plant Attendant set aside – Appellants directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) to Respondent No. 1 within two months – No order as to costs [Paras 17–19].

Electricity Law – Tariff Determination – Depreciation – Recovery of Capital Cost – Consumer Interest – Rithala Combined Cycle Power Plant – Section 61(d) of the Electricity Act, 2003 – Regulation 6.32 of DERC (Terms and Conditions for Determination of Generation Tariff) Regulations, 2011 – TPDDL established a 108-MW gas-based power plant at Rithala, Delhi as a short-term measure for a limited operational period of 5 to 6 years – Commission by order dated 31.08.2017 fixed capital cost at Rs.197.70 crores, determined technical useful life at 15 years, but restricted operational and recovery period to six years up to March 2018 under the PPA – Said order attained finality as it was not challenged by TPDDL – Commission by order dated 11.11.2019 allowed depreciation only for six years amounting to Rs.83.34 crores – APTEL set aside the Commission's order directing depreciation over entire 15-year useful life – Supreme Court allowed appeal, restored Commission's order, and answered all three substantial questions of law in favour of the Commission [Paras 1, 19, 23, 24].

Electricity Law – Depreciation – Useful Life vs. Regulatory Recovery Period – Distinction – Whether depreciation must be allowed over entire technical useful life irrespective of period of actual supply – Plant ceased to supply electricity after March 2018 – Consumers cannot be required to pay for a service they no longer received – TPDDL had obligation to supply electricity only for six years under the PPA – Commission had clarified that TPDDL was free to sell power as a merchant generator or sell the Plant itself after March 2018 – No legal impediment existed to such sale – Held: Depreciation cannot be allowed beyond the regulatory recovery period; first substantial question of law answered in the negative [Para 20].

Electricity Law – Regulation 6.32 of 2011 Regulations – Harmonious Construction – Absolute Right to Recover Depreciation – No provision can be read in isolation – Regulation 6.32 prescribing depreciation over useful life must be construed harmoniously with Regulation 4.1 which confines tariff entitlement to the period approved under the PPA – 2011 Regulations must be read in conjunction with Section 61(d) of the 2003 Act which places consumer interest at the centre of tariff regulation – Regulation 6.32 does not confer an absolute and unconditional right to recover depreciation from consumers even for a period when the asset is free to supply electricity but is not doing so – Held: Second substantial question of law answered in the negative [Para 21].

Electricity Law – APTEL – True-Up Proceedings – Regulatory Framework – Finality of Orders – Distinction between technical useful life of 15 years and regulatory recovery period of 6 years is not merely semantic but is clearly drawn by the tariff framework – True-up proceedings are intended to give effect to the tariff framework and not to reopen or reconfigure it – APTEL erred in disregarding the regulatory framework and approval conditions which had attained finality – Held: Third substantial question of law answered in the affirmative [Para 22].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment dated 10.02.2025 of APTEL set aside – Order dated 11.11.2019 of the Commission restored – No order as to costs.