Criminal Law - Unlawful Assembly – Mere Presence at Scene – Reversal of Acquittal Set Aside – Accused Appellants Not Proven to Be Part of Mob – The appellants were named in the FIR and arrested at the spot during a riot involving over 1000 people – The High Court reversed their acquittal based solely on presence at the crime scene – Held: Mere presence, without overt act or incriminating material, does not establish membership of an unlawful assembly – Acquittal restored [Paras 11, 15, 16]. 
 
Standard of Proof – Reversal of Acquittal – Caution in Appeal Against Acquittal – No New Evidence or Infirmity in Trial Court’s View – The Trial Court found prosecution evidence perfunctory and acquitted all accused – High Court’s interference was unjustified as there was no compelling reason to overturn a plausible acquittal finding – Held: High Court erred in reversing acquittal without concrete evidence [Paras 11, 12, 17]. 
 
Evidentiary Value – Testimony of Prosecution Witnesses Discarded – PW-2 and PW-4 Found Unreliable – The High Court itself discarded the only eye-witnesses for lack of credibility – No identification parade was held – Accused named after 2 years – Held: Conviction cannot rest on such testimony [Paras 5, 6, 15]. 
 
Innocent Bystander Doctrine – No Evidence of Overt Act or Common Object – Appellants Were Residents of the Village – Without Prohibitory Orders, Presence Not Incriminating – Held: Accused cannot be convicted merely for being present at the riot scene unless active participation is proved [Paras 13-15]. 
 
Judgment – Appeals Allowed – High Court Judgment Reversed – Trial Court Acquittal Restored – Supreme Court held that the appellants were wrongfully convicted by the High Court and reinstated their acquittal as recorded by the Trial Court – Appeals allowed [Paras 17-18]. 
 

Criminal Law - Murder – Alteration of Conviction – Sudden Fight Without Premeditation – Conviction Altered to Section 304 Part I – The appellant was convicted under Section 302 IPC for assaulting the deceased with a stick while his co-accused used the blunt side of an axe – Held: The incident occurred in a sudden fight without premeditation, and the nature of weapons and injuries did not suggest intent to kill – Exception IV to Section 300 IPC attracted – Conviction altered to Section 304 Part I and sentence reduced to period already undergone [Paras 12–14]. 
 
Appreciation of Evidence – Related and Interested Witnesses – Credibility Not Rejected Merely Due to Relationship – The appellant contended that the eye-witnesses were related to the deceased – Held: Relationship does not disqualify testimony; evidence of interested witnesses must be scrutinized cautiously, but cannot be discarded solely for that reason [Paras 8–9]. 
 
Nature of Weapons – Use of Stick and Blunt Side of Axe – No Undue Advantage or Cruelty – The Court noted that if the accused intended to kill, the sharp side of the axe could have been used – Use of agricultural tools and nature of assault indicated absence of cruelty or intent to cause death [Paras 12–13]. 
 
Sentencing – Period Already Undergone – Appellant Served 6 Years 10 
Months – Considering reduction of conviction to Section 304 Part I, the Court directed release based on sentence already served [Paras 14–15]. 
 
Judgment – Appeal Partly Allowed – Conviction Modified – The conviction under Section 302 IPC was set aside and altered to Section 304 Part I – Appellant sentenced to period already undergone and ordered to be released forthwith [Paras 15]. 
 

Criminal Law - Appeal against acquittal - Confessional Statements under TADA – Voluntariness and Procedural Safeguards – Rejection Upheld – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that strict compliance with Section 15 of TADA and Rule 15 of TADA Rules is essential to admit confessions – The confessional statements of three accused recorded by a single officer were held inadmissible due to failure to give reflection time, lack of questions and answers, absence of production details, and recording in custodial military settings – Held: Procedural violations rendered confessions inadmissible [Paras 22–26].

Issue Estoppel – Prior Acquittal in Separate Case – Confession Already Rejected – Confessional statement of Mohd. Salim Zargar had been previously rejected in an earlier trial and became final – The Court held that the principle of issue estoppel barred the prosecution from relying on the same confession in a fresh trial – Held: Statement rightly rejected by Special Court; its admission would disturb final finding of fact [Paras 22.3–24].

Evidence – Lack of Corroboration – Eyewitnesses Non-Identifying – Weapon Not Recovered – The eyewitnesses failed to identify the accused and the AK-47 rifle used in the murders was not recovered – Confessions being inadmissible, no independent evidence remained to support conviction – Held: Acquittal justified as prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 9–11, 28].

Decision – Appeals Dismissed – Acquittal Upheld – The Supreme Court upheld the Special Court's decision acquitting the accused – It held that confessions were improperly recorded and inadmissible, and prosecution failed to establish guilt through independent evidence – No case made out to reverse the order of acquittal – Held: Criminal Appeals 1681 and 1770 of 2009 dismissed [Paras 27–33].
 

Administrative Law – Nature of Control – Deep and Pervasive Control Not Established – Court held that ICSSR’s control over CRRID is limited to funding and regulatory oversight under Grant-in-Aid Rules – Presence of nominees on CRRID's Governing Body does not amount to deep and pervasive control – Held: CRRID is an autonomous private society, not a ‘State’ under Article 12; High Court erred in holding otherwise [Paras 13–17].

Grant-in-Aid – Withholding of Grants for Rule Violations – ICSSR Action Justified – Following audit findings of irregular appointments, fake degrees, and misuse of funds, ICSSR withheld grants as per Rule 6 of Grant-in-Aid Rules – Court held ICSSR was justified in its decision to suspend disbursement from April 2021 to March 2023 – Held: Grant-in-aid is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a right; institutions must comply with prescribed conditions [Paras 18–22].

Employment Law – No Master-Servant Relationship Between ICSSR and CRRID Employees – Court ruled that respondents were employees of CRRID, not ICSSR – There was no privity of contract between them and ICSSR – Held: Employees cannot claim salaries directly from ICSSR; responsibility lies with CRRID [Paras 24–26].

Judicial Review – Compassionate View vs. Legal Liability – High Court Orders Set Aside – Court observed that although the High Court took a compassionate view, legal responsibility for paying salaries lies with CRRID – Held: Orders of Single Judge and Division Bench directing ICSSR to release funds are unsustainable in law [Paras 13, 26–28].

Decision – Appeals Allowed – High Court Orders Set Aside – Supreme Court directed CRRID to pay salaries from its own resources for April 2021 to March 2023 – ICSSR permitted to withhold future grants if compliance is not shown – Amount deposited by ICSSR in court to be returned – Held: ICSSR not liable to fund CRRID salaries under law [Paras 28–30].

Service Law - Pensionary Benefits – Parity with Regular Government Employees – The respondents, appointed under a temporary scheme, sought pension benefits equivalent to permanent government employees – The State contended that they were governed by the Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) Scheme and were not eligible for pensions – Held: The employees were entitled to pension since their service conditions were aligned with those of regular employees, and the government had made a conscious decision to grant retiral benefits [Paras 14-16].

Government Policy Decisions – No Discrimination Among Similarly Placed Employees – The respondents relied on government communications from 1997 and 1998, which stated that their service conditions were to be governed by rules applicable to the Cane Development Department – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s view that once a policy decision had been taken to extend benefits, selective denial was impermissible – Held: Employees cannot be denied pension when similarly placed employees have already been granted the benefit [Paras 12-14].

Limitation on Arrears – Doctrine of Continuing Wrong – The State argued that the claim was delayed, and employees had already withdrawn their CPF dues – The Supreme Court applied the principle of a continuing wrong, holding that pension rights do not lapse due to delay, but limited arrears to three years before the filing of the writ petition – Held: Pension granted, but arrears restricted to three years prior to the petition date [Para 19].

Contributory Provident Fund Withdrawal – Deduction from Pension Arrears – The respondents had withdrawn CPF amounts upon retirement, leading the State to argue that they were estopped from claiming pension – The Court ruled that CPF withdrawals must be deducted from pension arrears but did not bar pension entitlement – Held: The amount received under CPF to be adjusted against arrears before pension payments commence [Paras 20-21].

Decision: Appeal dismissed, except for restricting pension arrears to three years before the writ petition filing date and permitting deduction of CPF withdrawals from arrears. Pension benefits to be implemented within one month.

Land Acquisition – Sovereign Power of Eminent Domain – Private Settlement Impermissible – The appellant, a statutory board, challenged an arbitral award enforcing a private agreement that returned part of the acquired land to the original owner – The Supreme Court held that once land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it vests absolutely in the Government and cannot be returned through a private settlement – Held: A statutory beneficiary of land acquisition cannot override the sovereign power of eminent domain by entering into a private contract to reverse the acquisition process [Paras 16-18].

Arbitral Award Against Public Policy – Contravention of Fundamental Principles of Law – The Court found that the arbitral award, which upheld the private settlement, was in clear violation of statutory provisions governing public acquisitions – Under Section 34(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, an arbitral award that contradicts the fundamental policy of Indian law can be set aside – Held: The award, which sought to nullify a lawful public acquisition through an illegal private agreement, was contrary to public policy and had to be set aside [Paras 15-17].

Land Vested in Government – No Right to Reverse Acquisition – The land was acquired in 1963 and possession was taken in 1986 – The Delhi Agricultural Marketing Board, as the beneficiary, attempted to return part of the land to the original owner through an agreement in 1988 – The Court held that once possession is taken, the land vests in the Government absolutely under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Held: Even the Government itself could not withdraw from the acquisition after possession was taken, making the Board’s agreement legally untenable [Paras 13-14].

Fraudulent Transaction – Lack of Authority in Chairman’s Actions – The agreement was executed one day before the Chairman’s tenure ended, without proper approval from higher authorities – The Court noted that the preparation of the agreement, including the purchase of stamp papers, took place before the Board even discussed the matter – Held: The transaction was conducted in undue haste, raising serious doubts about its legality and propriety [Paras 17-18].

Judicial Oversight in Arbitration – Failure to Apply Public Policy Test – The Court found that neither the Delhi High Court’s single judge (under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act) nor the Division Bench (under Section 37) properly examined whether the arbitral award violated public policy – Held: Courts must scrutinize arbitral awards to ensure they do not contravene statutory provisions or the fundamental legal framework of the country [Paras 18-19].

Decision: Appeal allowed. The judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in FAO (OS) No. 436 of 2013, the judgment of the Single Judge in OMP No. 561 of 2007, and the arbitral award dated 10.07.2007 were set aside. Pending applications were disposed of, and parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Civil Law – Injunction against ASI - Prohibited Area – Restriction on Use of Appellant’s Land – Section 20A of 1958 Act – The appellant’s land located within 100 meters of the Taj Mahal declared as prohibited area under Section 20A(1) – Court held that statutory restriction validly imposed under the Ancient Monuments Act – Appellant cannot claim injunction against ASI's maintenance of green belt [Paras 2-5].

Entitlement to Compensation – Sections 27 and 28 of 1958 Act – Recognized – Court held that though acquisition is not mandatory, the appellant is entitled to compensation for loss, damage, or diminution of profits arising due to the restrictions – ASI and Union of India bound to pay compensation as per Sections 27 and 28 [Paras 6-9].

Calculation of Compensation – Applicability of Land Acquisition Principles – Court directed that compensation be assessed as per the mechanism laid down under Section 28 read with provisions of the Land Acquisition Act – Appellant is permitted to urge applicability of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 during compensation proceedings [Paras 9-12].

Decision – Appeal Partly Allowed – Injunction Denied – Compensation Ordered – Court declined to grant injunction against ASI but directed Union of India to determine and pay compensation to the appellant within six months – Appellant to be heard by competent authority while determining compensation [Paras 10-12].

Service Law – Eligibility Criteria – Interpretation of 'Degree' under FSS Act and UGC Act – Postgraduate Degree Acceptable – The term ‘degree’ used in Rule 2.1.3 of the FSS 2011 Rules includes Bachelor’s, Master’s, or Doctorate degrees – Held: A candidate possessing a Master’s degree in the specified subjects (except Chemistry, which specifically requires a Master’s) is eligible – Exclusion of Master's degree holders was arbitrary and contrary to statutory provisions [Paras 22-34].

Recruitment Process – State Government’s Limited Role – Qualifications Governed by Central Rules – The Court clarified that only the Central Government has the authority to prescribe qualifications for Food Safety Officers under Sections 37 and 91 of the FSS Act – Held: The State Government cannot restrict eligibility contrary to centrally prescribed rules [Paras 23-27].

Statutory Interpretation – Literal and Harmonious Construction – Rule 2.1.3 of FSS 2011 Rules – Interpreted to Include Master’s and Doctorate Degrees – The Court applied the golden rule of interpretation to conclude that excluding higher degrees from eligibility was unconstitutional and illogical – Held: Master’s degree in specified subjects is sufficient [Paras 29-32].

Relief – Supernumerary Appointments – No Back Wages – Seniority Below Original Appointees – The Court set aside High Court rulings and allowed appellants to rejoin the 2016 recruitment process from the interview stage – Directed creation of supernumerary posts if necessary – Appointments to be without back wages but with notional seniority below existing appointees [Paras 35(i)-(iv)].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court Judgments Set Aside – The Supreme Court held that the appellants, possessing Master’s degrees in eligible subjects, were fully qualified under the applicable rules – It quashed the orders of the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court – Directed that appellants be allowed to participate in the selection process from the interview stage with notional benefits and no back wages [Paras 34-35].

Taxation Law - Corporate Insolvency – Resolution Plan and Tax Demands – Binding Effect under Section 31 of IB Code – Tax Demands Set Aside - The Supreme Court held that once a resolution plan is approved by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT), all claims not part of the plan stand extinguished – Income tax demands for AYs 2012-13 and 2013-14, which were not submitted prior to approval and were not part of the resolution plan, were thus invalid – Held: Demands raised by the Income Tax Department post-approval are extinguished and unenforceable under Section 31(1) of the IB Code as interpreted in Ghanashyam Mishra [Paras 5-9].

Binding Nature of Resolution Plan – Extinguishment of Undisclosed Claims – Fresh Start Doctrine – Tax Claims Invalid - Court reinforced that successful resolution applicants are entitled to a “fresh slate” – The inclusion of belated or undisclosed claims would undermine certainty and business revival under the IB Code – Held: All statutory dues not claimed before CIRP and not part of the approved plan are extinguished [Paras 7-13].

Failure of NCLT and NCLAT – Ignorance of Binding Precedent – Orders Set Aside - The NCLAT erroneously refused to consider binding precedent from the Supreme Court merely because it was not cited before the NCLT – Supreme Court rebuked this approach as perverse and unjustified – Held: Orders of both NCLT and NCLAT set aside; costs imposed by NCLT also quashed [Paras 9-10, 14].