Civil Law – Execution of Compromise Decree – Guideline Value Determination – High Court Exceeds Supervisory Jurisdiction under Article 227 – N.I.C.E. having failed to convey Schedule 'B' land to Decree Holder No. 2 as agreed under the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10.08.2007, became liable under Clause (xiii) thereof to pay the guideline value of the Schedule 'AA' land (3 acres 6 guntas in Sy. No. 122/272/2, Kengeri Village, Bengaluru) as prevailing on the date of compromise – Executing Court determined the value at Rs. 1,000/- per sq. ft. by applying the Karnataka Government Notification dated 17.04.2007 (base rate of Rs. 800/- per sq. ft. for converted sites within BBMP/municipal limits, enhanced by 25% for abutting State Highway) – High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, impleaded the State of Karnataka, accepted its spot inspection report, and reduced the value to Rs. 500/- per sq. ft. by applying Instruction No. 6 of the Notification – Held: High Court exceeded the limits of its supervisory jurisdiction; the interpretation adopted by the Executing Court was plausible and reasonable and not perverse; High Court in effect acted as an Appellate Court [Paras 30–37].

Article 227 – Scope of Supervisory Jurisdiction – Power Not to Be Exercised as Appellate Court – The power of superintendence under Article 227 does not permit the High Court to reappreciate evidence or substitute its own view merely because an alternative interpretation is possible – Supervisory jurisdiction is limited to cases of unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, gross abuse of jurisdiction, unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction, or findings so perverse that no reasonable person could arrive at them – Held: High Court's impleadment of the State at a belated stage during a private lis, and acceptance of the State's self-serving interpretation of its own notification to influence the outcome, was impermissible [Paras 31–36].

Guideline Value – Karnataka Notification dated 17.04.2007 – Application of Special Instructions – Instruction No. 6 Inapplicable – The schedule land, bearing Sy. No. 122, falls within the jurisdiction of BBMP/Kengeri City Municipal Council and is expressly covered under Column 6 of the Notification attracting a base rate of Rs. 800/- per sq. ft. – Adding 25% under Instruction No. 2 for abutting a State Highway yields Rs. 1,000/- per sq. ft. – Instruction No. 6, which fixes industrial land at 50% of the residential site rate, operates only as a residual provision where no specific guideline value is prescribed; since a specific rate is prescribed under Column 6, the exclusionary phrase in Instruction No. 6 ("excluding these areas") squarely applies and the fallback 50% reduction never gets triggered – Applying Instruction No. 6 in the present facts would yield an anomalous result of valuing converted urban land lower than agricultural land [Para 37].

Compromise Decree – N.I.C.E.'s Contention Rejected – Judgment Debtors Cannot Approbate and Reprobate – N.I.C.E. consistently contended that the land, having been converted for industrial use in 2004 but remaining undeveloped, should be valued as agricultural land at approximately Rs. 350/- per sq. ft. – Held: Having agreed under the compromise that compensation would be payable at the guideline value prevailing on the date of settlement, and being fully aware that the schedule land stood converted for industrial use, N.I.C.E. cannot be permitted to resile from that position and seek valuation on an agricultural basis – Reliance on K.S. Shivadevamma (1996) 2 SCC 62 — a land acquisition case — held misplaced, as guideline value is a statutory benchmark not dependent on developmental potential [Paras 39–39.2].

Interest – Entitlement of Decree Holders – Interest at 6% p.a. Upheld – Compromise decree does not contain a specific interest clause; however, the order of this Court dated 09.04.2012 directed N.I.C.E. to pay the amount determined within eight weeks of determination by the Executing Court – N.I.C.E. deposited only the admitted amount and not the full amount determined – High Court in W.P. No. 25158 of 2012 (order dated 11.06.2013) separately allowed interest at 6% per annum from 20.08.2007 till payment – Held: That determination is binding and the direction for interest shall be subject to the outcome of any proceedings challenging that order [Para 39.3].

Decision: Civil Appeal No. 1388 of 2013 (filed by N.I.C.E.) dismissed – Civil Appeal No. 1354 of 2013 (filed by Decree Holders) allowed – Impugned judgment and order dated 12.09.2012 of the High Court of Karnataka in W.P. No. 21068 of 2012 set aside – Order of the V Additional City Civil Judge, Bengaluru (Executing Court) restored – Schedule 'AA' land valued at Rs. 1,000/- per sq. ft., total Rs. 13,72,14,000/- – N.I.C.E. directed to pay balance of Rs. 8,79,95,250/- with interest at 6% p.a. as ordered in W.P. No. 25158 of 2012 – Parties to bear their own costs.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – NCLT – Systemic Delay in Approval of Resolution Plans – Suo Motu Cognizance – Court took suo motu cognizance of gross delays in approval of Resolution Plans pending before various Benches of the NCLT — As per report of the Registrar, NCLT Principal Bench, 363 applications awaiting approval with delays ranging from 48 days to 738 days and in some cases up to four years — Delays attributed to lack of adequate infrastructure, half-day sittings, interchange of bench combinations, large pendency of objections, and acute shortage of judicial and technical members — Held: In the prevailing state of affairs, the objective of time-bound resolution under the IBC is impossible to achieve — matter directed to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for further orders [Paras 1–13].

NCLT – Membership Strength – Shortage – Statutory sanctioned strength of NCLT is 63 members (1 President, 31 Judicial Members and 31 Technical Members) — As on 28.04.2026, only 28 Judicial Members and 26 Technical Members are posted across various NCLT Benches — acute shortage of ten members severely affecting efficiency and timely disposal of cases [Para 3].

NCLT – Infrastructure and Staffing – Contractual Appointments – Systemic Failures – Post of Registrar (barring few Benches) filled on contractual basis — none of the Benches have full-time permanent employees — staff including Secretary, Court Master, Stenographers and legal assistants appointed on contractual basis with services intermittently terminated — instances of non-payment of salaries leading to strike by NCLT Mumbai staff — Held: Such systemic deficiencies must be addressed on a war footing to prevent frustration of the very purpose and object of the IBC [Paras 7, 12].

IBC, 2016 – Section 31(2A) – Amendment – Thirty-Day Disposal Requirement – Amendment inserting Section 31(2A) requiring disposal of plan approval applications within thirty days has been enacted but not yet brought into force — Court expressed serious doubt whether true effect could be given to this amendment in light of the infrastructural and staffing deficiencies highlighted [Para 9].

Suggestions – Amicus Curiae – The Court recorded suggestions of Amicus Curiae including: recruitment of permanent staff for all NCLT Benches; filling of vacancies within defined timelines; ensuring full court hours; holding regular workshops; sequential disposal of issues (eligibility under Section 29A, challenge to claims, constitution of CoC) before plan approval; mandatory impleadment of key parties at the initial stage; de-linking of avoidance applications from plan approval under Section 26 of the IBC; and day-to-day hearing of plan approval applications after the initial stage [Para 8].

Decision: Suo motu cognizance taken — matter directed to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for further orders — merits of the appeals to await further directions — Amicus Curiae and Resolution Professional's counsel placed on record with gratitude for their assistance.

Constitutional Law – Hate Speech – Legislative Competence – Judicial Restraint – Separation of Powers – Batch of writ petitions seeking directions to the Union of India to examine international laws on hate speech and rumour-mongering, implement Law Commission Report No. 267, and enact specific legislation; petitioners contended that failure to act has caused a legislative vacuum — Held: Courts cannot create or expand criminal offences in the absence of legislative action; the doctrine of separation of powers reserves law-making to Parliament and State Legislatures; a writ of mandamus cannot be issued directing the Legislature to enact a particular law; the Court may, at best, record its opinion or recommendation on the desirability of legislative reform [Paras 18–36, 98.1].

Criminal Law – Hate Speech – Legislative Occupancy of Field – Existing Statutory Framework – Petitioners contended that the field of hate speech is legislatively unoccupied — Held: The contention is misconceived; the existing framework under IPC (Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 124A, 298, 504, 505) and corresponding BNS provisions adequately addresses acts promoting enmity, outraging religious sentiments, and disturbing public tranquillity; the real problem is not absence of law but deficit in enforcement; such enforcement lapses cannot justify the Court assuming legislative functions — Law Commission's 267th Report on Hate Speech noted [Paras 37–45, 98.2].

Criminal Procedure – Registration of FIR – Mandatory Duty – Non-registration – Remedies – Section 154 CrPC (Section 173 BNSS) casts a mandatory duty upon the police to register an FIR upon disclosure of a cognizable offence; no preliminary inquiry is permissible as a matter of course before such registration — Held: The statutory scheme provides a comprehensive and layered remedy: aggrieved person may approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC (Section 173(4) BNSS), thereafter invoke Magistrate's jurisdiction under Section 156(3) CrPC (Section 175 BNSS), or file a complaint under Section 200 CrPC (Section 223 BNSS); this constitutes a complete statutory architecture — as settled in Lalita Kumari [Paras 47–65, 98.3].

Criminal Procedure – Section 156(3) CrPC – Prior Sanction – Cognizance – Stage of Applicability – Criminal Appeal partly allowed – The High Court of Delhi held that a Magistrate cannot direct registration of FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC in absence of prior sanction under Sections 196 and 197 CrPC — Held: This view is incorrect; an order directing investigation under Section 156(3) does not amount to "taking cognizance" within the meaning of Section 190 CrPC; the requirement of prior sanction under Sections 196 and 197 operates exclusively at the stage of cognizance and not at the pre-cognizance investigative stage; an order under Section 156(3) directing registration of FIR falls at the pre-cognizance stage; the High Court's impugned judgment set aside to that extent; on facts, no cognizable offence is made out from the speeches in question and the ultimate conclusion of the High Court is affirmed [Paras 100–138].

Constitutional Law – Continuing Mandamus – Judicial Oversight – Writ Petitions seeking continuing mandamus for judicial monitoring of hate speech incidents — Held: In the absence of any legislative vacuum or systemic failure of such magnitude as would warrant continuous judicial oversight, a continuing mandamus is neither justified nor consistent with the principle of judicial restraint; such a course would amount to micro-management of matters within the executive domain — National Federation of Indian Women (supra) followed [Paras 70–76, 98.4, 98.5].

Constitutional Values – Fraternity – Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam – The Court, in its epilogue, observed that hate speech is fundamentally antithetical to the constitutional value of fraternity enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution; every citizen bears a constitutional duty under Article 51A to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood; the ancient maxim of vasudhaiva kutumbakam (the world is one family) reflects India's civilisational ethos of inclusivity; public discourse carries a corresponding duty of restraint and responsibility — Court observed that issues of hate speech and rumour-mongering bear directly upon preservation of fraternity and it would be open to Parliament to consider whether further legislative or policy measures are warranted in light of the Law Commission's 267th Report [Paras 77–97, X].

Contempt Petitions – Compliance – Most contempt petitions either found to have been complied with or no case of contempt made out; certain contempt petitions directed to be listed separately for consideration on 19th May, 2026 after respondent-authorities file their response [Paras 141–164, 167–168].

Decision: All Writ Petitions and Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 6913 of 2021 dismissed — Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 5107 of 2023 partly allowed; impugned judgment of Delhi High Court set aside to the limited extent it holds that a Magistrate exercising power under Section 156(3) CrPC cannot direct registration of FIR in absence of prior sanction — Certain contempt petitions closed; remaining contempt petitions listed for 19th May, 2026 — Registry directed to transmit copy of judgment to all High Courts.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Limitation — Section 7 Application — Date of Default — Computation — NPA Classification — The corporate debtors' loan accounts were declared NPA on 06.12.2016, constituting the date of default from which the three-year limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 began to run — Limitation would have expired on 06.12.2019 — After excluding the period of DHFL's CIRP (03.12.2019 to 07.06.2021), the Covid-19 suo motu extension (15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022, plus 90 days), and the moratorium during the first CIRP of the corporate debtor (23.12.2021 to 29.07.2024) under Section 60(6) of the Code, only three days of limitation remained, expiring on 01.08.2024 — Petition under Section 7 filed on 23.09.2024 was therefore beyond limitation — Held: Application was time-barred [Paras 13-15].

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Interim Resolution Professional — Admission of Claim — Not an Acknowledgment under Section 18, Limitation Act, 1963 — The IRP/RP's admission of a secured financial creditor's claim in the first CIRP is a purely administrative and clerical function under Section 18 of the Code, involving collation and induction of claims — The IRP has no adjudicatory powers — Such admission does not evince a conscious and unequivocal intention to admit a subsisting jural relationship or existing liability — It is akin to a mere recital or reference to a debt and does not constitute an acknowledgment capable of extending limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 — Further, even if it were an acknowledgment, it must be made within the subsisting period of limitation to extend it, which was not the case here — Held: IRP's admission of claim on 02.05.2022 does not amount to acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and does not enure to the benefit of the secured financial creditor [Paras 16-17].

Decision: Appeals allowed — Impugned judgment dated 15.10.2025 of NCLAT and order dated 22.01.2025 of NCLT quashed and set aside — No order as to costs.

Service Law — Curtailment of Tenure — ICAR — Whistleblower Allegation — Appeals Dismissed — Appellant, appointed as ADG-ARIS at ICAR for a period of five years or until further orders, was reverted to the post of Senior Scientist on the basis of unsatisfactory Annual Assessment Reports for 1998-99 and 1999-2000 — Appellant alleged retaliatory motive on account of his complaints regarding financial irregularities in procurement contracts worth Rs. 200 crores and anomalies in the Rs. 1000 crore NATP — CAT and High Court upheld the reversion — Supreme Court affirmed — Held: Allegations of mala fides and colourability must be supported by clear, cogent and specific material and cannot be inferred merely from the sequence of events or surrounding circumstances — Appeals dismissed [Paras 1, 3, 16, 21].

Article 311 — Applicability — Autonomous Body — ICAR not a Civil Post — Appellant's claim of protection under Article 311(2) on the ground that he could not be reduced in rank without a formal enquiry — Held: Article 311 applies only to civil servants holding a civil post under the Union or State — ICAR functions as an autonomous Society governed by its own rules and bye-laws — Article 311 is not attracted in the present case [Para 9].

Tenure Post — No Enforceable Right to Complete Full Term — Reversion Not Punitive — At the time of appointment, the competent authority had expressly reserved the power to curtail tenure before the completion of five years — Appellant contended that as ADG-ARIS was a Research Management Position under the ARS Rules, reversion to Senior Scientist (two ranks below) was punitive in effect — Held: The ARS Rules contemplate transfer to a matching position in research work only on completion of tenure and depending on ICAR's needs — Since tenure was curtailed and not completed, the said provisions were inapplicable — Reversion to Senior Scientist was not shown to be a non-matching position in research work [Paras 10, 11, 12].

Stigma — Annual Assessment Reports — Language of Order — The reversion order characterised appellant's performance as "unsatisfactory" and "below average" — Appellant contended the AARs were antedated, did not reflect actual performance, and were communicated belatedly — Held: Following Pavanendra Narayan Verma, use of language such as "unsatisfactory work and conduct" in a service order does not amount to stigma — The order in the present case did not cast any stigma beyond an unexceptional assessment of unsuitability — Appellant was afforded opportunity to represent against the AARs and the same were duly considered before reversion [Paras 13, 14, 16].

Judicial Review — Scope — Administrative Discretion — Transfer and Reversion — Held: Judicial review is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself — Courts cannot sit in appeal over orders of transfer or reversion — Interference is warranted only where the action is arbitrary, irrational, tainted by mala fides, or colourable, or imposes penal and stigmatic consequences without following due process — No such threshold met in the present case [Para 10].

Enquiry Report — Exoneration — No Bar to Tenure Curtailment — An enquiry was instituted against the appellant for alleged misconduct including approaching the press — The Enquiry Officer exonerated the appellant of all thirty-three charges describing them as "baseless and motivated" — Held: The enquiry pertained to specific charges of misconduct and could not stand in the way of curtailment of tenure based on overall performance assessment — The two proceedings operate independently [Para 18].

Decision: Civil Appeals dismissed — No interference with concurrent findings of CAT and High Court — Pending applications disposed of.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Corporate Guarantee — Financial Debt — Financial Creditor — SBI Consortium extended rupee loans to RCOM and RTL, secured by corporate guarantees executed by the Corporate Debtor (RITL) on 03.03.2017 — NCLT rejected claim holding guarantees unverified and undocumented — NCLAT affirmed, doubting timing, disclosure, and stamping of guarantees — On appeal, Supreme Court finds concurrent findings perverse — Held: Corporate guarantee constitutes "financial debt" under Section 5(8) of the Code; appellants entitled to recognition as financial creditors; impugned orders quashed; Resolution Professional directed to reconstitute Committee of Creditors [Paras 22, 31–32].

Financial Debt — Corporate Guarantee — Section 5(8), IBC — Liability under Corporate Guarantee — Essential ingredient of financial debt is disbursal against consideration for the time value of money — Liability arising from a corporate guarantee squarely falls within the ambit of "financial debt" under Section 5(8) — Amount of any liability in respect of guarantees for money borrowed against payment of interest qualifies as financial debt — Guarantor incurs coextensive liability with that of the principal borrower, enforceable in law [Para 22].

Corporate Guarantee — Timing of Execution — NPA Classification — Corporate Debtor's account declared NPA on 22.08.2016, subsequently restructured, whereafter CD executed corporate guarantees on 03.03.2017 — Per RBI Master Circular dated 01.07.2015 (Clause 17.2.6), asset classification of restructured NPA reckoned from the date it first became NPA — Account declared NPA w.e.f. 26.08.2016 — Held: Guarantees were executed before NPA declaration took effect on account of restructuring; timing and manner of corporate guarantees cannot be questioned on the ground that CD and holding company were already in default [Paras 24].

Disclosure in Financial Statements — Non-Disclosure — Effect — Corporate Debtor's counsel acknowledged disclosures in financial statements on an ongoing basis — Even if guarantees were not reflected in financial statements for FY 2016-17 and 2017-18, such non-disclosure cannot deprive the consortium lenders of their right to claim — Held: Non-disclosure, at best, amounts to a default by the Corporate Debtor and does not invalidate the guarantee or defeat the claim [Para 25].

Verification of Claims — Regulation 13, IBBI Regulations, 2016 — IRP/RP may call for evidence or clarification to substantiate claims — CD's counsel admitted execution of guarantees — Security Trustee confirmed possession of executed and stamped guarantees — RP verified guarantees by visiting Security Trustee's office in New Delhi — Held: Finding of NCLAT that there was no pleading on record establishing verification by IRP/RP is perverse [Para 26].

Documents — Admissibility — Production at Appellate Stage — Appeal is a continuation of original proceedings — Documents relevant to the lis can be produced at appellate stage — Corporate guarantees were produced before NCLAT — Held: Mere non-production before NCLT cannot lead to adverse inference regarding genuineness of corporate guarantees [Para 27].

Stamp Duty — Insufficiently Stamped Document — Effect — Corporate guarantees executed in New Delhi office of Security Trustee; stamp duty paid as per New Delhi rates — Production before NCLAT Principal Bench at New Delhi does not attract Maharashtra Stamp Duty Act, 1958 — Defect of insufficient stamping is curable and does not render instrument void or unenforceable — Non-stamping or improper stamping does not result in instrument becoming invalid; non-payment of stamp duty is a curable defect — Stamp Act is a fiscal measure and cannot be used as a weapon to defeat a party's cause — Held: Contention regarding non-payment of stamp duty under Maharashtra Stamp Duty Act is without substance [Para 28].

Perversity — Concurrent Findings — Interference by Supreme Court — This Court would ordinarily not re-appreciate facts when concurrent findings of NCLT and NCLAT exist — Exception arises where findings are perverse — NCLT had already rejected respondents' plea regarding preferential transactions and fraud under Sections 43 and 66 — Non-filing of guarantees with Form-C not sufficient to negate claim — Held: Perversity of tribunals' findings glaring and manifest; interference warranted under Section 62 of the Code [Para 30].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Orders dated 14.10.2022 (NCLAT) and 02.03.2021 (NCLT) quashed and set aside — Appellants recognised as "financial creditors" of the Corporate Debtor — Resolution Professional directed to reconstitute Committee of Creditors by including appellants and proceed with CIRP in accordance with law — No order as to costs [Paras 32–33].

Right to Education — Neighbourhood School — Obligation to Admit RTE Students — SLP Dismissed — Petitioner school refused admission to a student duly selected and forwarded by the State Government under the RTE Act, 2009 and UP RTE Rules, 2011 citing uncertainty about eligibility — High Court directed immediate admission holding that schools cannot sit in appeal over the State's selection decision — Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's order — Held: Once the State Government completes the selection process and forwards the list to the school, the school is mandatorily bound to grant admission without waiting for the outcome of any representation it may make to the concerned authority — SLP dismissed [Paras 2, 14, 15].

Constitutional Mandate — Article 21A — Right to Free and Compulsory Education — Transformative Purpose of Section 12, RTE Act — Section 12 of the RTE Act, 2009 mandates that neighbourhood schools admit not less than twenty-five percent of entry-level class strength from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups — This legislative choice is a deliberate constitutional strategy to operationalise equality of status, dignity, and social integration among children in their formative years — Held: The neighbourhood school concept is designed to break down entrenched barriers of caste, class, and gender and to advance substantive social justice — Earnest implementation is a national mission binding on all duty bearers [Paras 8, 9, 11, 12].

Duty Bearers — Five Categories Identified — RTE Framework — Drawing from Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, the Court reiterated five categories of duty bearers under the RTE Act: (i) the appropriate Government, obligated under Sections 6 and 8 to establish neighbourhood schools; (ii) the local authority, obligated under Section 9 to maintain records and monitor admissions; (iii) the neighbourhood school, bound under Section 12(1)(c) to provide free and compulsory education to at least twenty-five percent of class strength; (iv) parents/guardians, duty now constitutionally recognised under Article 51A(k); and (v) elementary school teachers, who bear the most important role in nation-building — Held: Courts must also walk the extra mile to provide effective and expeditious relief to parents complaining of denial of the right [Paras 10–10.5, 12].

School's Limited Role — No Power to Sit in Appeal over State's Selection — Accountability and Transparency — Rule 8 of the UP RTE Rules, 2011 mandates that the admission process be totally transparent — Schools are bound to follow the State Government's prescribed process and must inform in writing with reasons any child not admitted — The school's window to reconsider the Government's decision is consciously limited by the State to avoid delays — Held: Schools disagreeing with the selection may make a representation to the concerned authority but must grant admission in the interregnum — This immediacy is essential to actualise the promise of Article 21A [Paras 7, 13, 14].

Decision: Special Leave Petition dismissed — High Court's direction to grant admission affirmed — No orders as to costs.

Criminal Law — Murder — Mass Conviction — Acquittal — Sixteen persons charge-sheeted for brutal assault on deceased on 08.07.2008, causing death with cutting weapons and severing his left hand — Twelve accused convicted by trial court under Sections 147, 341, 326, 307, 323, and 302 read with Section 149 IPC — High Court upheld convictions — On appeal, Supreme Court finds eyewitnesses unreliable, injuries of alleged injured witnesses unproved, FIR delayed and suspect, investigation procedurally deficient, and seizure documents doubtful — Held: Prosecution failed to prove case beyond reasonable doubt — All appeals allowed, convictions set aside, appellants acquitted [Paras 2, 23].

FIR — GD Entry — First Information — Delayed Registration — Police reached the place of occurrence on 08.07.2008 at 9.30 P.M. on the basis of a GD entry made on telephone information from VDP Secretary — Neither the informant nor the recording Inspector examined — FIR registered only on 10.07.2008 on written complaint of PW1 naming 13 accused — PW1 not an eyewitness — High Court erroneously treated GD entry as FIR — Held: GD entry cannot constitute FIR as neither the informant nor the recording officer was examined; delay in registration of FIR renders the arraignment of accused suspect as it was made after due deliberation [Paras 8–9, 20].

Eyewitness Testimony — Credibility — Related Witnesses — Five eyewitnesses (PW2, PW7, PW13, PW14, PW15) all close relatives of the deceased — Incident on a public road; their collective presence not natural — PW18 (IO) does not speak of the presence of eyewitnesses at place of occurrence or recording of any statement from them — Eyewitnesses claimed to have been questioned by police at the spot, not corroborated by PW18 — No Section 161 CrPC statements recorded from any eyewitness promptly — Statements under Section 164 CrPC recorded nine days after incident — Held: Presence of eyewitnesses at place of occurrence highly improbable and not unequivocally established; testimonies not credible [Paras 10–12, 16–19].

Injured Eyewitness — Proof of Injury — Evidentiary Value — PW14, alleged injured eyewitness, spoke of injuries to hand, legs, wrist, and waist — No wound certificate from Solace Hospital or GMCH produced — PW18 examined PW14 on 22.07.2008, long after FIR — PW14 stated he regained consciousness at hospital on 09.07.2008 and was referred to GMCH, contradicting PW18's statement — No intimation to police from hospital — PW6 likewise disbelieved by trial court and High Court — Held: Injuries of alleged injured witnesses not proved; their testimonies cannot be accorded higher credibility of injured eyewitnesses; very presence at place of occurrence rendered doubtful [Paras 13–16].

Seizure — Motorbikes — Weapons — Forensic Analysis — Seizure list (Annexure P4) purportedly detailed ownership and riders of four motorbikes at place of occurrence — No documents produced to prove vehicle ownership — Bikes never produced before court or confronted to witnesses — Weapons seized (beki dao, lathi, spike) neither sent for forensic analysis nor confronted to eyewitnesses or the doctor conducting postmortem — No blood collected from scene for matching — Held: Seizure documents doubtful in genesis; prosecution story of five witnesses travelling with deceased on four bikes not substantiated by credible evidence [Paras 17–18, 21].

Investigation — Failure of Due Procedure — Scripted Enquiry — IO (PW18) reached spot at 9.30 P.M. on the night of the incident, conducted inquest, yet failed to register FIR or record statements from eyewitnesses present at spot — GD entry informant and recording officer not examined — Eyewitnesses present at spot not named in any FIR promptly — FIR filed two days later after deliberation — Held: Whether ignorance, inefficiency, or malicious motivation, due procedure under CrPC was not followed, leaving the crime unresolved and resulting in wrongful prosecution of sixteen persons — State urged to better equip investigating officers [Paras 8, 10, 22].

Decision: All appeals allowed — Convictions and sentences under Sections 147, 341, 326, 307, 323, and 302 read with Section 149 IPC set aside — Appellants acquitted — Bail bonds of accused on bail cancelled — Pending applications disposed of [Paras 23–24].

Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Murder Conviction — Acquittal of Accomplices — Appellants, accused nos. 2 and 4 in the trial, were convicted along with two co-accused for the abduction and murder of the deceased Bebakka and destruction of her body by burning in Mullur forest — Prosecution's case rested on: motive attributable to accused no. 1 (financial disputes with deceased); last seen together testimony of PW-7; discovery of incriminating articles and places at the instance of accused; DNA identification of skeletal remains — High Court dismissed appeals and affirmed conviction and life imprisonment — Held: Prosecution failed to prove case against appellants beyond reasonable doubt — Both appeals allowed, conviction set aside, appellants acquitted [Paras 3, 18, 69–71].

Circumstantial Evidence — Standard of Proof — "May be" vs "Must be" — Five Conditions in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda — The entire prosecution case rested on circumstantial evidence — Law requires that: (i) circumstances must be fully established; (ii) consistent only with hypothesis of guilt; (iii) of conclusive nature; (iv) excluding every other hypothesis; and (v) forming a complete chain leaving no reasonable ground consistent with innocence — Prosecution's case against appellants "may be true" but cannot be said to be "must be true" — Long distance between "may be" and "must be" cannot be ignored in a murder trial [Paras 25, 30, 31, 69].

Last Seen Together — Insufficient Sole Basis for Conviction — PW-7 deposed that at approximately 5:30 PM on the day of the incident, he saw the deceased in accused no. 1's silver Maruti 800 car at Ranna Circle, Mudhol, and the appellants along with accused no. 3 got into the said car which then proceeded towards Lokapur — Last seen theory requires corroboration; it does not by itself lead to inference of guilt — Where no discovery at the instance of appellants is established, it would be too risky to affirm conviction for a serious offence like murder solely on the circumstance of last seen together [Paras 40–44, 69].

Section 27, Evidence Act — Discovery Evidence — Joint Disclosure Statements — Admissibility and Reliability — Conditions Explained — Discovery panchanama was not drawn in accordance with law — PW-4, the panch witness, deposed nothing as to the exact statement made by the appellants in his presence — All discoveries including the spot of murder, place of burning, car, wire rope, plastic can and gold ornaments were at the instance of accused no. 1-Kalappa, who has not appealed — No distinct fact was discovered at the instance of the appellants — Joint discovery of the same facts from the same places by all four accused simultaneously makes it impossible to identify which accused's statement distinctly relates to which discovery — In absence of safeguards contemplated by Section 27, discovery evidence cannot be utilised against the appellants [Paras 45–68].

Section 27, Evidence Act — Joint and Simultaneous Disclosure Statements — Not Per Se Inadmissible — However, Credibility Subject to Evaluation — Joint or simultaneous disclosures are not per se inadmissible under Section 27 — However, they are of limited evidentiary value when it is impossible to depose which accused uttered which words and in what sequence — Where the discovery of different facts from different places by different accused provides a guarantee of truthfulness, reliance may be placed — In the present case, all accused pointed to the same spots and same articles, with no distinct discovery referable to the appellants, and Section 27 therefore provides no assistance to the prosecution [Paras 57–68].

Accomplice — Role and Criminal Liability — The appellants had no personal motive against the deceased — They could at best be characterised as accomplices to the principal offender i.e., accused no. 1-Kalappa — An accomplice is one who voluntarily and knowingly participates in the commission of crime with the principal offender — Even for establishing the guilt of an accomplice, cogent and reliable evidence is required — No independent evidence connecting the appellants with the crime was established [Paras 32–37].

Section 27, Evidence Act — Contents of Panchanama Not Substantive Evidence — What Is Admissible — Contents of a panchanama are not substantive evidence — Only what has been stated by the panchas or concerned persons in the witness box constitutes substantive evidence — Confessional statements of accused hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act could not have been exhibited — Reading out contents of panchanama or confessional statements at the appellate stage as evidence is impermissible in law [Para 67].

Decision: Both appeals allowed — Impugned judgment and order of the High Court of Karnataka set aside — Appellants acquitted of all charges — Appellants directed to be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case — Pending applications including applications for intervention disposed of [Paras 71–72].