Labour Law - Labour and Regularisation - Constitution of India - Articles 14 and 16 - Appellants engaged as workmen through private contractors and PWD Labour Supply Society since between 1967 and 2003 - State constituted PWD Labour Supply Society to prevent exploitation - Cabinet and Chief Minister approved temporary status and pay parity on 04.12.2013 and formal order issued on 07.02.2014 granting temporary status and absorption entitlement - State later denied regularisation in writ proceedings citing lack of formal government concurrence and Umadevi precedent - High Court dismissed writ petitions - Supreme Court held that State having granted temporary status and taken labour for decades cannot defeat legitimate claims on internal file technicalities and that case falls within one-time measure under paragraph 53 of Umadevi - Held - appeal allowed and regularisation directed with consequential benefits - [Paras 1-37].

Constitutional Law - Executive Action and Estoppel - Constitution of India - Article 166 - Order dated 07.02.2014 granting temporary status placed before High Court in 2006 proceedings on statements of Advocate General - State availed services and acted upon order for years - Held - State cannot rely on internal file infirmity or lack of concurrence at belated stage to defeat legitimate expectations - [Paras 31-33].

Decision: Appeal allowed - Judgment and final order dated 28.07.2023 passed by High Court of Bombay at Goa set aside - Appellants held entitled to regularisation in PWD from 09.02.2021 with consequential benefits including seniority and pensionary benefits - Respondent-State directed to frame scheme within four months and create supernumerary posts if necessary - [Paras 36-37].

Civil Law - Motor Accident Claims - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 166 - Compensation for Owner-Passenger - The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) denied compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased owner-passenger, Mr. T. Ramu, citing that no extra premium was paid to cover the personal risk of the owner's vehicle - The High Court allowed the appeal, awarding compensation along with 7.5% interest, reasoning that the policy in question was a comprehensive policy and would cover the owner of the vehicle as well, who was travelling as a passenger, further noting that a hyper-technical approach should not be adopted in motor accident claims - The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing that in accordance with the IRDA circular dated 16.11.2009, insurance companies are liable to compensate for any occupant in the vehicle under a comprehensive/package policy - Held - The High Court's reasoning is sound and the insurance company is liable; the present Civil Appeal is dismissed to that extent - [Paras 26-34].

Civil Law - Motor Vehicle Insurance - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 146 - Uninsured Vehicles - Despite the statutory mandate of Section 146 MVA, nearly 56% of vehicles ply uninsured in India, leading to victims running from pillar to post for compensation - Supreme Court noted a stark gap between the statutory mandate and enforcement mechanisms, observing that this defeats the object of mandatory insurance to ensure timely victim compensation - Court issued comprehensive directions for enhanced enforcement - Held - ANPR cameras deployed on highways and roads are to be integrated with data from the Insurance Information Bureau and the VAHAN portal for automatic e-challans; State Police to be provided with handheld devices or downloadable apps linked to insurance data for real-time verification and challans; strict compliance with the amended Section 196 MVA imposing progressive enhanced fines for uninsured vehicles to be ensured upon notification; a pilot project is to be deliberated and evolved by IRDA and MoRTH to link fuel for vehicles with valid insurance status, refusing fuel to uninsured vehicles - [Paras 1, 16-18, 23.1-23.3, 23.10].

Civil Law - Motor Vehicle Insurance - IRDA Act 1999 - Section 14(2)(b) - Uniform Policy Structure and Consumer Choice - Supreme Court mandated a broad four-layer insurance structure for private vehicles to bring clarity and enable informed choices for vehicle owners - The structure comprises: I. Third Party Only Policy (base policy, mandatory under Section 146 MVA); II. Additional Optional Cover for occupant(s)/pillion rider (other than owner, driver, and family of insured); III. Personal Accident Cover for the owner, driver, and any occupant(s)/pillion rider; IV. Own Damage Cover - Held - A 'customer option form' must be made mandatory, whether offline or online, at the time of purchase, allowing customers to 'opt in' to add-on options; a consumer-friendly information sheet outlining the four-layered structure and coverage details must also be provided; IRDA, in consultation with the General Insurance Council and insurance companies, shall formulate uniform policy wordings for the optional covers - [Paras 1, 23.4, 23.6].

Civil Law - Motor Vehicle Insurance - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 146 - Long-Term Third-Party Insurance - Pursuant to S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 447, directions were issued mandating long-term third-party insurance (3 years for new cars, 5 years for new two-wheelers) bundled with a one-year Own Damage cover at the time of vehicle registration - Despite eight years, a large number of vehicles remain uninsured - Held - The period for mandatory third-party insurance for new cars is enhanced to four years, and for new two-wheelers to six years; IRDA is directed to immediately issue necessary directions in this regard - [Para 23.7].

Writ Law - Right to Life - Constitution of India - Article 21 - Road Safety - Supreme Court, in In Re: Phalodi Accident v. National Highways Authority of India and Ors. 2026 SCC OnLine SC 646, recognized the intrinsic linkage between Article 21 of the Constitution and road safety of a commuter, observing that the 'Right to Life' under Article 21 is a positive mandate upon the State to ensure a safe environment where human life is preserved and valued - Similarly, the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Abhijeet Kumar Pandey v. State of Bihar 2023 SCC OnLine Pat 279, held that a right to safe travel is inherent to the right to free movement under Article 19(1)(d) and the right to life and liberty under Article 21 - Held - Ensuring the safety of commuters is an integral facet of the right to live with dignity and a constitutional obligation of the State - [Paras 20-21].

Civil Law - Motor Accident Claims - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Sections 159, 166 - Speedy Disposal of MACT Cases - Supreme Court noted the average pendency of MACT cases, with over 50% pending for more than four years, and acknowledged non-compliance with earlier directions for speedy disposal of claims within 90/120 days of the accident - Court reiterated the police's duty to complete investigations and submit a Detailed Accident Report (DAR) to the MACT within 30 days, and for insurance companies to compute compensation within 30 days of DAR - Held - State Police directed to promptly file DAR along with relevant documents (FIR, MLC, post-mortem report, insurance policy, permit) before the concerned MACT for pending cases related to accidents prior to 31.03.2022; State Police also to assist with prompt service and production of relevant witnesses before the MACT to ensure speedy disposal of these cases - [Paras 15, 24.1-24.2].

Decision: Appeal stands disposed of – The Civil Appeal (National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Thungala Dhana Laxmi & Ors.) is dismissed to the extent of challenging the High Court's reasoning on liability – All stakeholders are directed to comply with the directions issued and file responses before 14.08.2026 – For perusal of affidavits of compliance, list on 18.08.2026 at 2 PM.

Civil Law - Procedural Law - Code of Civil Procedure 1908 - Order XVIII Rule 17 - Recalling Witness and Reopening Evidence - Scope and Limitations - Plaintiffs-respondents filed interim applications (I.A. No. 716/2022, I.A. No. 717/2022, I.A. No. 718/2022) to recall PW-1 for marking documents, reopen evidence, and receive documents under Order VII Rule 14 CPC, after the issues were settled, evidence closed, and final arguments had substantially progressed - The Trial Court allowed these applications, observing no prejudice to the respondents - The High Court disposed of revision petitions by modifying the Trial Court's orders, directing the Trial Court to complete the exercise of recalling PW-1, reopen evidence, and mark documents within stipulated time, also directing the appellant-defendant to complete cross-examination of PW-1 - Supreme Court reviewed the scope of Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC, emphasizing that this power is discretionary, primarily for the court to clarify doubts, not for parties to fill omissions or adduce additional evidence, especially after the deletion of Rule 17A - Noted that the "no prejudice" argument is not a valid yardstick for invoking Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC - Cited previous judgments like Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar, K.K. Velusamy, Bagai Construction, Shubhkaran Singh, Gayathri, and Ram Rati to reiterate that this provision is not a tool to embellish evidence or prolong litigation - Also found the High Court's direction for a party to cross-examine PW-1 to be beyond the scope of Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC, which allows the court to question a witness - Held - The applications were a delaying tactic and the orders of the Trial Court and High Court were unsustainable as they permitted reopening of evidence to fill lacunae, contrary to established legal principles governing Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC - [Paras 2, 2.1, 2.2, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 5, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 6, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 7, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.3.1, 7.4, 7.5, 8, 9].

Civil Law - Procedural Law - Code of Civil Procedure 1908 - Order XVIII Rule 17 - Reopening evidence and recalling witness - Discretionary power - Not for routine use - The power under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is a power-cum-discretion vested in the court to aid the adjudicating process, but it is not meant for routine exercise nor can it be invoked by a party merely to fill up gaps, omissions, or lacunae in the evidence already led - Held - It is not a tool to embellish or refine evidence at a later stage, nor is the absence of prejudice a valid ground for its invocation - [Paras 5.5, 5.7, 5.8, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 7.5].

Civil Law - Procedural Law - Code of Civil Procedure 1908 - Order XVIII Rule 17 - Cross-examination by party - Beyond scope - Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC empowers the court to recall and examine a witness, but it does not permit a party to cross-examine a recalled witness, particularly without the court's leave - Held - High Court's direction to allow a party to complete cross-examination of PW-1 within this provision was beyond its scope and unsustainable in law - [Paras 5.1, 7.3, 7.3.1].

Civil Law - Procedural Law - Code of Civil Procedure 1908 - Order VII Rule 14 - Production of documents - Section 151 - Inherent powers - Filing of applications to reopen evidence and produce documents at advanced stage of trial - The plaintiffs sought to introduce documents and recall a witness after evidence closure and during final arguments - This was deemed an attempt to cure lacunae in previously led evidence - Held - Such actions are not permissible as they amount to delaying tactics and defeat the purpose of expediting the trial, offering undue advantage to dishonest litigants - [Paras 3.5, 5.7, 7.4].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned common order dated 15.09.2023 passed by the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in Civil Revision Petition Nos. 458 of 2023, 496 of 2023 and 621 of 2023 set aside – Interlocutory applications, if any, shall not survive.

Criminal Law - Murder - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 302 - Delay in Appeal - Access to Justice - Appeal against conviction for murder resulting in life imprisonment - High Court dismissed 'Jail Memo of Appeal' due to 3157 days delay, despite convict having served 12 years at that time and a total of 22 years currently - Supreme Court expressed deep dismay at High Court's lack of liberal and pro-active approach in condoning delay for marginalized and imprisoned convicts - Coordinate Bench had previously condoned a delay of 3703 days in the Special Leave Petition - Court examined the merits and found a 'pall of incredulity' in the evidence - Eyewitness (PW3) testimony was shaky, highly improbable, and suffered from serious discrepancies, not being recorded under Section 161 CrPC in crucial aspects - Contradictions existed regarding the presence of other bodies and the sequence of events - Investigating Officer (PW13) failed to prepare a scene of crime sketch for three bodies, offered no explanation for accused's arrest, and relied on a confession extracted using "third-degree methods" which is inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act - Recovery of alleged weapons (stones and brick) by I.O. was rejected by the trial court due to absence of bloodstains and negative FSL report, further contradicted by mahazar witnesses (PW1, PW3, PW8, PW9) who stated items were found in plain view near bodies - No examination of deceased's relatives/co-inhabitants - Post-mortem revealed blunt object injuries - Prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt - Held - The judgment of the trial court is set aside, and the accused is acquitted - [Paras 2-18].

Criminal Law - Access to Justice - Condonation of Delay - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 379 - Appeal against conviction - High Court dismissed 'Jail Memo of Appeal' due to a delay of 3157 days, for a convict who had already undergone 12 years of sentence at the time of impugned order and a total of 22 years - Supreme Court emphasized that Constitutional Courts must adopt a liberal and pro-active approach to condone delay, however large, when a convict challenges an order of conviction and sentence that deprives them of liberty - Delay occasioned in filing an appeal by marginalized sections must be viewed sympathetically - Held - Access to justice must not elude marginalized sections, especially convicted and imprisoned persons - [Paras 2-4].

Evidence Law - Eyewitness Testimony - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 3 - Reliability of testimony - Sole eyewitness (PW3) testimony for murder conviction found shaky, highly improbable, and contradictory - Key details mentioned in deposition (e.g., accused screaming 'to kill somebody', taking a pot, witnessing one murder) were not recorded in her statement under Section 161 CrPC - Discrepancies regarding informing others, immediate report of incident, and seeing other dead bodies - Other 'res gestae' witnesses (PW1, 2, 4, 7, 9) had different versions of hearing PW3's account - Held - Eyewitness testimony, though capable of sustaining conviction alone, must be believable, credible, consistent, and inspire confidence, not when serious discrepancies raise reasonable doubt - [Paras 10, 14-15, 17].

Evidence Law - Confession - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 25, 27 - Admissibility and reliability - Investigating Officer (PW13) spoke of a confession made by the accused after arrest - Witness (PW8) stated police beat the accused to extract confession - Recovery of alleged weapons (stones, brick) from accused found unreliable as trial court rejected it due to lack of bloodstains and negative FSL report - Mahazar witnesses (PW1, PW3, PW8, PW9) contradicted I.O. on the location of recovered items, stating they were in plain view near bodies, not pointed out by accused - Held - Confession to police is inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act; recovery under Section 27 cannot be relied upon if extracted through "third-degree methods" and lacking corroboration - [Paras 12-13].

Criminal Law - Remission Policy - Premature release - Appellant's application for remission rejected six times, with the last rejection on 19.09.2025, after 22 years of actual imprisonment - Both Policy for 2000 and current Policy (2022) were beneficial for his premature release - Deputy I.G. of Prisons noted that reconsideration by State Sentencing Review Board (SSRB) would only be after one year from the last consideration - Prior rejections cited apprehension of law and order situation - Held - Apprehension of law and order cannot, in every circumstance, be a cause not to judiciously exercise the power of remission - [Paras 6-7].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of the trial court set aside, and the accused is acquitted – The personal bond on which the accused was released stands cancelled – District Legal Services Authority, Koraput, State of Odisha, directed to attempt rehabilitation or resettlement for the appellant, with assistance from the District Administration headed by the District Collector.

Civil Law - Education Law - T.M.A. Pai Foundation Principles - Subvention Scheme - Unconstitutionality and Retrospective Application - The Single Bench and Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka had quashed a Central Government communication denying subvention for academic year 2002-03 onwards and directed payment of subvention amounts to the respondent medical college for students admitted up to academic year 2002-03 for the entire 5-year course or till course completion - The High Court based its decision on the subvention scheme floated pursuant to an interim order in TMA Pai Foundation case (1995) which aimed to eliminate capitation fee and promote merit and a clarificatory decision (2003) which it interpreted as giving prospective effect to the final TMA Pai Foundation judgment (2002) - The Supreme Court observed that the 11-Judge Bench in TMA Pai Foundation (2002) had implicitly declared the subvention scheme unconstitutional and overruled Unni Krishnan's case - Such schemes were explicitly made subject to the final outcome of the case - The Supreme Court reiterated that unless expressly stated otherwise, its decisions have retrospective application, and the clarificatory order only addressed statutory enactments needing conformity, not executive schemes - The subvention scheme, being based on executive instructions, ceased to exist upon the pronouncement of the final judgment in TMA Pai Foundation on 31.10.2002 - The obligation for subvention payment was annual, not a lump sum for the entire course - Furthermore, the respondent college failed to provide any pleadings or data to substantiate whether its revenue from tuition fees and other sources was insufficient to cover its expenses after academic year 2002-03 - Held - The orders of the Single Bench and Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka are set aside to the extent they directed payment of the subvention amount for the entire course of 5 years for students admitted in 2002-03 - The payment of subvention amount beyond the academic year 2002-03 is denied - [Paras 1-4, 8-13.1, 14, A].

Civil Law - Judicial Precedent - Retrospective Application of Supreme Court Judgments - The Single Bench and Division Bench of the High Court held that the Supreme Court's 11-Judge Bench decision in TMA Pai Foundation (2002), which implicitly declared a subvention scheme unconstitutional and overruled earlier precedent, was prospective based on a subsequent clarificatory order (2003) - Held - A decision of the Apex Court, unless it expressly provides its application to be prospective, is settled law to be retrospective in application - The clarificatory decision only required statutory enactments to conform to the final judgment, not executive schemes - The subvention scheme, being an executive instruction, stood nullified from the date of the TMA Pai Foundation judgment - [Paras 9-12.3].

Civil Law - Writ Law - Pleading and Proof - Bharat Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. (1988) 4 SCC 534 - Necessity of Factual Substantiation in Writ Petitions - The respondent-college sought payment of subvention amounts but failed to provide any data or pleadings regarding its financial position, specifically whether its revenues covered its expenditures for the relevant academic years - Held - When a point, even if ostensibly a point of law, requires factual substantiation, the party raising it in a writ petition or counter-affidavit must plead not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts - In the absence of such pleadings, the court cannot adjudicate on the financial need for the subvention and is unable to subscribe to the view of payment beyond the scheme's constitutional validity - [Paras 5, 6-6.2, 7, 13.1].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – The orders of the Single Bench and Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka are set aside to the extent they directed payment of the subvention amount for the entire course of 5 years for students admitted in 2002-03 – Payment of subvention amount beyond academic year 2002-03 denied – Leave granted in Civil Appeal No.... of 2026 (arising out of SLP (C) No.9079 of 2011), and its disposal shall be governed mutatis mutandis by this order.

Civil Law - Service Law - Constitution of India - Article 311 - Probation of Offenders Act 1958 - Section 12 - Termination of Service - Discharge based on pendency of criminal case - Conviction under Section 324 IPC - Release on probation - Effect on public employment - Appellant, a Special Police Officer/Constable, was discharged from service on 14th January, 2003, solely on the ground of pendency of a criminal case (FIR No. 159 dated 20th July, 2001, under Sections 324/326/34 IPC) - He was later convicted under Section 324 IPC (conviction under Section 326 IPC set aside) on 21st April, 2006, but released on probation for good conduct under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 - The Additional Sessions Judge, while releasing him on probation, observed that his conviction "shall not affect his service career" - This observation was based on Jaswant Singh v. The State of Punjab (1989) which the Supreme Court held to be incorrect law, being contrary to a catena of decisions of this Court - The appellant's suit for declaration that his discharge was illegal and for mandatory injunction for reinstatement with consequential benefits was decreed by the trial court - However, the first appellate court set aside the decree and dismissed the suit, which was affirmed by the High Court in second appeal - The Supreme Court noted that the discharge from service based merely on the pendency of a criminal case, without giving an opportunity of raising defence, was illegal and arbitrary - Despite the appellant's conviction and release on probation, Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, does not obliterate the conviction and does not prevent a disciplinary authority from terminating public employment for conduct leading to conviction, especially in view of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India - The word "law" in Section 12 refers to general or special laws, not to the Constitution itself - While reinstatement at such a distance of time was not appropriate, considering the illegal and arbitrary discharge, the Court invoked its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to award compensation for wrongful termination of service - Held - The discharge from service was illegal and arbitrary - The observation of the Additional Sessions Judge regarding non-affectation of service career was erroneous - Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, does not bar termination of service in public employment based on conviction - Appellant awarded compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- for wrongful termination - [Paras 1-12, 15-22, 24-27].

Service Law - Probation of Offenders Act 1958 - Section 12 - Disqualification attaching to conviction - Effect on public employment - The Supreme Court reiterated that release of a convict on probation under Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, does not wash away the conviction and the convicted person can be removed from service solely based on his conviction - The word "disqualification" in Section 12 refers to disqualifications provided in other statutes, and an employee cannot claim a right to continue in service merely on the ground that benefit of probation was given - Held - Section 12 of the 1958 Act does not come to the rescue of a convict-employee regarding affectation of his service career, as it does not exclude the operation of constitutional provisions like Article 311 - [Paras 18-22].

Civil Law - Constitutional Law - Code of Civil Procedure 1908 - Specific Relief Act 1963 - Section 14 - Constitution of India - Article 142 - Civil Court powers - Suit for reinstatement - Defective prayers - Doing complete justice - The Supreme Court observed that the civil court's powers are not as wide as a writ court's, and relief of reinstatement in service could not have been granted by a civil court in view of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Despite the appellant's defective prayers and failure to challenge the original discharge order, the Court found the discharge to be illegal and arbitrary - Exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court awarded compensation to do complete justice, considering reinstatement was not appropriate at that distance of time - Held - Civil courts cannot ordinarily grant reinstatement - Article 142 can be invoked to award compensation for illegal and arbitrary termination to do complete justice - [Paras 24-27].

Decision: Civil Appeal disposed of – Respondents directed to pay compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakh) to the appellant within 3 (three) months from date.

Civil Law - Employer-Employee Relations - Delhi Technological University Act 2009 - Section 23(2)(ix) - Resignation - Withdrawal of Resignation - Ratification - Doctrine of Ratification - Respondent tendered resignation from Delhi Technological University DTU requesting early relieving which was accepted by an officer holding additional charge of Vice-Chancellor and not the competent authority- respondent was relieved and accepted all benefits- four months later respondent sought withdrawal of resignation- contending non-acceptance by competent authority and non-ratification by Board of Management BOM- competent authority for appointment and resignation acceptance- BOM subsequently ratified acceptance of resignation and rejected withdrawal request- High Court of Delhi allowed reinstatement but denied back wages- DTU appealed against reinstatement while respondent appealed against denial of back wages- Supreme Court examined the doctrine of ratification holding that a subsequent ratification relates back to the date of original unauthorized act and cures the defect of authority- further the respondent's conduct of voluntarily seeking advanced relieving accepting benefits and subsequently taking up gainful employment at NITC based on DTU's experience certificate constituted a consummation of resignation- precluding him from later challenging its technical infirmity- Held- the ratification by BOM validated the resignation acceptance retrospectively from the date of the Vice-Chancellor's acceptance- the respondent's withdrawal request made after the effective date of resignation was untenable- High Court of Delhi's direction for reinstatement was erroneous- [Paras 1-25].

Civil Law - Doctrine of Ratification - General Principles - A previously invalid act can be made valid by subsequent approval of a competent authority- operating retrospectively- making the act valid from its inception- the maxim ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur denotes that subsequent ratification is equivalent to prior command- and omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur emphasizes the principle of relation-back- Held- ratification cures defects of authority but not acts inherently illegal or beyond the power of the authority- [Paras 17-19].

Civil Law - Employer-Employee Relations - Resignation - Consummation by Conduct - An employee's resignation- even if initially accepted by an unauthorized person- becomes a consummated and irrevocable transaction where both parties by their conduct treat it as final- the employee is precluded by the principle against approbation and reprobation from impugning the transaction if they have already taken full benefit from it- Held- an employee who initiates resignation- requests early relieving- accepts consequential benefits and utilizes them for new employment cannot later treat the resignation as a nullity on technical grounds- [Paras 20-24].

Civil Law - Employer-Employee Relations - National Institute of Technology First Statutes 2009 - Statute 30 - Resignation - Effectiveness - Withdrawal - The proviso to Statute 30 specifies that resignation takes effect on the date of acceptance by the appointing authority- not contingent upon notice period expiry or communication of acceptance- Office Memorandum dated 11.02.1988 permits withdrawal of accepted resignation before actual relieving but grants discretion to competent authority to refuse for recorded reasons- Held- the acceptance of resignation by NITC on 22.11.2018 made it effective in law- respondent's withdrawal request made after this effective date was not permissible- NITC's refusal to permit withdrawal citing opportunistic intent (to join EDMC) was plausible and rational- not warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India- [Paras 26-29].

Decision: Civil Appeal No. 9308 of 2024 allowed- judgment of High Court of Delhi insofar as it directs reinstatement of the respondent set aside- W.P. (C) No. 2611 of 2019 dismissed- Civil Appeal No. 9309 of 2024 dismissed- Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 625-626 of 2021 dismissed – No order as to costs.

Civil Law - Village Common Lands - Punjab Village Common Lands Regulation Act 1953 and Punjab Common Lands Regulation Act 1961 - Sections 2(g) and 4 - Land in uninhibited village Haiderpur mutated in favour of Gram Panchayat Wazirabad in 1955 - Plaintiffs filing representative suit under Section 13A in 1985 claiming ownership of 436 bighas 18 biswas under various pattis - Assistant Collector decreeing suit partly and High Court eventually allowing writ petitions holding land was not shamilat deh and not used for common purposes - Supreme Court reversing High Court judgment and holding that the land was recorded as shamilat deh in revenue records and Wajib-ul-arz - Held - unpartitioned shamilat deh automatically vests in gram panchayat under Section 2(g)(1) and Section 4 of the 1961 Act without needing proof of common user - appeal allowed - [Paras 1-113].

Property Law - Shamilat Deh versus Shamilat Patti - Customary Law - Distinction between common land for entire village community and land set apart for specific patti - Expression makbuja malkan denoting joint possession of proprietors without individual cultivating possession - Held - unless land was partitioned and brought under cultivation by individual co-sharers before 26/01/1950 in terms of Section 2(g)(iii) of the 1961 Act the character of shamilat deh remains unaltered and vests in the panchayat - [Paras 3-111].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned common judgment of the High Court dated 24/08/2007 set aside – Mutation dated 13/09/1955 in favour of Gram Panchayat Wazirabad confirmed and to enure to the benefit of its successor-in-interest the Municipal Corporation Gurgaon (now Gurugram) – Pending intervention and impleadment applications dismissed.

Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 168 - Compensation - Injury case - Minor claimant aged six months at the time of accident suffering severe spinal cord and neurological injuries diagnosed as post-trauma myelopathy with paraplegia resulting in 90 percent physical disability - Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 30,12,960.00 - High Court enhanced compensation to Rs. 45,40,800.00 - Supreme Court noted that child victims suffering catastrophic permanent disability cannot be equated with non-earning adults and must be awarded just compensation based on skilled worker minimum wages, 100 percent functional disability, appropriate multiplier of 18, and enhanced amounts for future medical expenses, attendant charges, pain, suffering, and loss of amenities - Held - High Court judgment modified and total compensation enhanced to Rs. 83,38,360.00 with 9 percent interest - appeal allowed - [Paras 1-78].

Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 168 - Multiplier - Application of multiplier of 18 for child victim - Motor Accident Claims Tribunal applied multiplier of 18 but High Court reduced it to 15 - Supreme Court held that following recent trends in child disability cases, multiplier of 18 should be adopted to ensure just compensation - Held - High Court erred in altering multiplier from 18 to 15 - [Paras 43-47].

Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 168 - Functional disability - Distinction between physical and functional disability - Medical board certified 90 percent physical disability but functional disability assessed at 100 percent given the total inability of the infant to earn a livelihood or perform basic bodily functions throughout her life - Held - disability for future earnings computed at 100 percent - [Paras 48-53].

Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 168 - Notional income - Minor child victim - Minimum wages for a skilled worker prevailing in the State on the date of accident applied instead of unskilled labourer wages - [Paras 54-57].

Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 168 - Attendant charges - Calculation using multiplier method - Cost of two attendants for twenty-four hour care determined using multiplier of 18 - Compensation enhanced to Rs. 25,92,000.00 - [Paras 58-64].

Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 168 - Pain, suffering, and loss of amenities - Combined heads for catastrophic disability in childhood - Compensation enhanced to Rs. 25,00,000.00 to account for lifelong deprivation of normal life and marriage prospects - [Paras 65-69].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment of the High Court modified – Total compensation enhanced from Rs. 45,40,800.00 to Rs. 83,38,360.00 with interest at 9 percent per annum – Respondent No. 2 Insurance Company directed to deposit the amount within six weeks.