Civil Law - Succession - Indian Succession Act 1925 - Sections 33, 35, 38 - Joint Property - Intestacy - Property purchased by husband (MA) in names of his two wives (Filomina and Shyam Bai) - Dispute over shares among children of Filomina (Plaintiffs) and children of Shyam Bai (Defendants) after both wives and husband died intestate - Trial Court decreed sale by defendants invalid and plaintiffs entitled to 1/4th share - First Appellate Court set aside trial court decree holding each wife had half share and defendants' sale was valid - High Court held wives collectively entitled to 1/3rd and plaintiffs entitled to 2/3rd as lineal descendants of MA, applying Section 33 ISA and excluding John Anthony (son of MA and Shyam Bai) as lineal descendant based on lawful marriage - Supreme Court held High Court erred in applying Section 33 to property not directly owned by MA but by his wives - Property legally held by wives, not MA - Section 35 ISA applicable to Filomina's half share as she predeceased MA - MA inherits 1/3rd of Filomina's half, and Filomina's children (Plaintiffs) inherit 2/3rd of her half - MA's 1/3rd share then devolves upon his children from both wives (Plaintiffs and John Anthony) - Shyam Bai's half share devolves solely to her children (John Anthony and Shakuntala) as tenants-in-common, governed by Section 38 ISA if applicable - Held - High Court's application of Section 33 was misplaced as property was in wives' names - Appeal allowed, judgments of courts below set aside - [Paras 2-12].

Civil Law - Property Law - Indian Succession Act 1925 - Section 33 - Scope and Application - Property purchased by an individual in the names of his two wives - High Court applied Section 33 of ISA, assuming the property was of the deceased husband for succession purposes - Supreme Court clarified that Section 33 applies to the property of the intestate male, not property legally held by his wives - Held - Application of Section 33 by High Court was erroneous as the property was not of the husband but of the wives - [Paras 9-10].

Civil Law - Inheritance - Indian Succession Act 1925 - Sections 35, 38 - Devolution of Wives' Property - Filomina (first wife) predeceased MA - Section 35 ISA governs devolution of her property, granting MA same rights as a widow to her husband's property, hence MA receives 1/3rd of Filomina's half share and her lineal descendants receive 2/3rd - Shyam Bai (second wife) died intestate - Her half share devolves to her children as tenants-in-common under ISA principles - Held - Property devolves as per Sections 35 and 38 ISA, accounting for individual ownership by wives and their respective heirs - [Paras 10-12].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of the Courts below is set aside – All consequences to follow – Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of – No costs.

Civil Law - Income Tax - Income Tax Act 1961 - Sections 44B and 195 - Presumptive Taxation - Applicability to Cruise Services - Non-resident entity (Superstar Libra Ltd. - SLL) operated cruise services in India through an agent (Assessee) - Revenue collected from cruise packages and shore excursions - Assessee claimed SLL's income to be assessed under Section 44B at 7.5% of gross receipts for TDS purposes - Assessing Officer (AO) rejected this, contending cruise services, involving hospitality and entertainment, were not 'carriage' and restricted 'carriage' to simple point A to point B transportation - AO estimated deemed income at 25% - CIT(A) allowed appeal, affirming 7.5% - ITAT dismissed Revenue's appeal, holding round-trip voyage constitutes 'carriage' and ancillary entertainment is incidental - ITAT also referred to CBDT Circulars No. 763 and 169 clarifying Section 44B's intent for foreign shipping enterprises - High Court dismissed Revenue's appeal, upholding ITAT's decision - Supreme Court affirmed concurrent findings of CIT(A), ITAT, and High Court - Held - AO's interpretation of 'carriage' was unduly restrictive - activities of SLL fall within the expression of 'carriage' as per Section 44B - providing ancillary services on a voyage does not take away from the meaning of 'carriage' - no interference warranted with the concurrent findings that Section 44B is attracted to the estimated income of SLL at 7.5% - [Paras 1-17].

Civil Law - Income Tax - Income Tax Act 1961 - Section 44B - Interpretation of 'carriage' - Assessment of non-resident shipping business - Supreme Court upheld High Court's decision that cruise services involving round trips and ancillary entertainment are primarily 'carriage' under Section 44B - Revenue's argument that such services are predominantly hospitality and entertainment, justifying a 25% deemed income, was rejected - Held - the meaning of 'carriage' should not be confined to mere point-to-point transportation, and ancillary services do not alter the fundamental nature of the activity as carriage for presumptive tax purposes - [Paras 12-16].

Decision: Civil Appeals dismissed – Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Civil Law - Motor Accident Compensation - Motor Vehicles Act - Sections 2(10), 3, 5 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 61, 64, 65 - Insurer Liability - Validity of Driving License - Primary vs. Secondary Evidence - 'Pay and Recover' Principle - The accident occurred on 14th October, 2009 - The Tribunal found that the driver, Om Prakash, did not possess a valid driving license at the time of the accident and held the owner and driver liable, exempting the appellant-insurer - Compensation quantified at Rs. 86,95,947/- with interest - The High Court reversed this finding, holding that the driver had a valid license based on the testimony of RW3 (Motor Licensing Officer) and a communication (Ex.RW3/B) that cited a technical data loss but affirmed license validity - The High Court therefore fastened liability on the insurer, increasing compensation to Rs. 1,08,08,909/- with 8% interest - The Supreme Court noted that the Tribunal had identified contradictions between RW3's oral statement and documentary evidence (Ex.RW3/A) and the payment of a penalty for license renewal for the intervening period (21.06.2007 to 25.08.2010), which strongly indicated a lapse in validity - The High Court, however, relied on Ex.RW3/B which merely stated a data gap and presumed validity, without any official record corroborating the data loss or the steps taken to recover it - The Supreme Court emphasized that proving official documents like a driving license requires primary evidence or a strong factual foundation for secondary evidence as per IEA Sections 61, 64, 65 - The Court found that RW3's oral testimony was contradictory to his own produced document and there was no credible official evidence for the alleged data gap - The owner also failed to testify about taking steps to ensure license renewal - The Court reiterated the owner's responsibility to ensure a valid and renewed driving license, citing Beli Ram v. Rajinder Kumar (2022) 15 SCC 572 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hem Raj (2011 SCC OnLine HP 4735) - Held - The driver Om Prakash did not possess a valid driving license at the time of the accident - The High Court erred in its assessment of evidence by relying on contradictory and insufficient secondary evidence without the requisite foundational proof - The appellant-insurer cannot be held liable, and the 'pay and recover' principle is applicable - [Paras 2-5, 10-18].

Evidence Law - Documentary Evidence - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 61, 64, 65 - Primary Evidence - Secondary Evidence - Admissibility - Foundation for Secondary Evidence - The Court reiterated that facts must be established by primary evidence, which is the rule - Secondary evidence is an exception and admissible only in the absence of primary evidence, provided a factual foundation is laid by proving the original document existed and valid reasons for its non-furnishing are established as per Section 65 IEA - Mere admission or marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with the requirement of proving its contents - Held - The High Court's reliance on oral testimony and a communication regarding a data gap without corresponding official records to substantiate the loss of data or the validity of the driving license during the disputed period did not meet the conditions for admitting and relying on secondary evidence - [Paras 10, 11, 12, 15].

Civil Law - Motor Vehicles Act - Section 5 - Insurer's Liability - Owner's Responsibility - Driving License Validity - 'Pay and Recover' Principle - An owner or employer has a fundamental duty to ensure that the driver possesses and maintains a valid and effective driving license, including its timely renewal - Failure to do so constitutes a breach of policy conditions and gross negligence - Held - Given the driver's non-possession of a valid license due to a lapse in renewal, the insurer's liability abates - The owner and driver are jointly and severally liable, and the 'pay and recover' principle applies, allowing the insurer to recover the compensation amount from them - [Paras 8, 17, 18].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Appellant-insurer not liable to make good the award – Final burden to be on the owner and driver – 'Pay and recover' principle applicable – Amount already released to claimants by interim order to be recovered by insurer from owner and driver – All pending applications disposed of.

Criminal Law - Quashing of FIR - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 482 - Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 - Sections 7(a), 13(1)(a), 13(2) - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 384, 34 - State of Karnataka appealed against High Court orders quashing six FIRs registered against police officers including an Assistant Commissioner of Police and a Police Inspector - FIRs alleged corruption and extortion related offences - High Court quashed FIRs primarily on grounds of lack of prima facie material- unexplained delay- allegations of malafides- and certain FIRs being second FIRs for the same offence - Supreme Court held that High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC by traversing beyond the contours of inquiry at the FIR stage and conducting a mini-trial to evaluate veracity of evidence - Absence of proof as to demand of illegal gratification and recovery thereof while potentially a ground for discharge or acquittal in trial cannot be a ground for quashing FIR - Delay in lodging FIR cannot be the sole basis for interdicting criminal investigation as its plausibility must be decided at trial - Registration of second FIRs is permissible if it refers to a larger incident or has a wider scope of investigation - Held - High Court's impugned orders cannot be sustained in law and are hereby set aside - [Paras 2-19].

Criminal Law - Quashing of FIR - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 482 - Scope of High Court's power - High Court while considering a petition for quashing an FIR must exercise its extraordinary and discretionary power sparingly and with great circumspection - Court is not required to examine merits of allegations or evaluate evidence at trial stage - sole and limited inquiry at threshold stage is whether allegations set out in FIR prima facie disclose commission of cognizable offence - conducting a mini-trial by sifting through evidence- assessing probabilities- or weighing credibility of witnesses is impermissible - Held - High Court in present case traversed beyond permissible limits of S. 482 CrPC - [Paras 11-12, 17].

Criminal Law - Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 - Section 7 - Demand and acceptance - Ingredients of offence - Mere demand or solicitation by a public servant may amount to commission of an offence under Section 7 PC Act - actual exchange of a bribe is not an essential requirement - attempt to obtain undue advantage whether for oneself or for another- directly or through intermediaries is equally culpable under Section 7 read with Explanation 2 - Held - absence of proof of demand of illegal gratification and recovery thereof may be a ground for discharge and/or ultimate acquittal in trial- but cannot be grounds for quashing FIR - [Paras 6b, 8, 12, 14, 27 of State v. K. Rangayya cited].

Criminal Law - First Information Report - Delay in lodging - Delay in registration of FIR for offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years - cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation - delay assumes importance only when complainant fails to give plausible explanation - whether explanation is plausible or not must be decided by Trial Court after recording evidence - Held - High Court's observation that delay in lodging of FIR was not properly explained was an insufficient ground to quash FIR - [Paras 6a, 12, 15].

Criminal Law - First Information Report - Second FIR - Legality - Registration of multiple FIRs for the same offence - permissible if the subsequent FIR pertains to a larger incident of widespread corruption and has a broader scope than the earlier FIR - Held - High Court's reasoning that certain FIRs amounted to second FIRs for the same offence was not accepted given the potentially different scope - [Paras 6c, 16].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Common judgment and orders dated 08/09/2021 passed by the High Court of Karnataka set aside – Respondents are free to exercise their remedies in accordance with law uninfluenced by the observations made in the High Court orders.

Civil Law - Service Law - Promotion - Chhattisgarh District Cooperative Central Bank Employee Service (Employment, Terms and their Working Conditions) Rules, 1982 - Rule 5(3)(a) - Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 - Sections 55(1) and 95(3) - General Clauses Act, 1897 - Section 21 - Appellant, an Assistant Engineer, was promoted to Additional Manager in 2010 - Respondent No. 5 challenged this promotion, contending that Rule 5(3)(a) of the Rules, 1982, barred promotion of technical staff to non-technical posts - The Registrar, Cooperative Societies, had issued an order/circular in 2005 and 2010 deleting Rule 5(3)(a) - The Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court quashed the appellant's promotion, holding that the rule was not validly amended by an executive order and that non-compliance with Section 95(3) (laying rules before the Legislative Assembly) invalidated the amendment - Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Registrar possessed the statutory power under Section 55(1) to amend/delete rules, which is reinforced by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 - The requirement under Section 95(3) to lay rules before the Legislative Assembly was held to be directory, not mandatory, due to the absence of any prescribed consequence for non-compliance - The Court further held that mere nomenclature (e.g., 'circular' instead of 'order') or a wrong reference to power does not vitiate an action taken under a validly existing statutory power - Given that the promotion was effected in 2010 and challenged immediately but judicially delayed for 13 years, the appellant was entitled to sit back and not have his promotion disturbed - Held - The High Court's judgments were erroneous and set aside - Appellant's promotion was based on a valid exercise of power - [Paras 2-4, 10-16].

Civil Law - Statutory Power - Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 - Section 55(1) - General Clauses Act, 1897 - Section 21 - Registrar's power to amend/delete rules - Section 55(1) grants the Registrar the power to frame rules governing terms and conditions of employment in cooperative societies - This power implicitly includes the authority to amend, alter, or delete existing rules, as clarified by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 - The exercise of this power by an Additional Registrar, when explicitly stated to be 'ordered by Registrar' and undisputed by the State, is valid - Held - The Registrar had the requisite power to delete Rule 5(3)(a) of the Rules, 1982, and the communication of this deletion was a valid exercise of that power - [Paras 10-10].

Civil Law - Statutory Interpretation - Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 - Section 95(3) - Mandatory vs. Directory Provisions - Laying rules before Legislative Assembly - The use of the word 'shall' in a statute does not automatically render a provision mandatory; its interpretation depends on legislative intent, the nature and design of the statute, and the consequences of non-compliance - Where a statute requires rules to be laid before the Legislative Assembly but prescribes no consequence for non-compliance, the provision is deemed directory, not mandatory - Held - The laying procedure under Section 95(3) of the Act, 1960, being directory, its non-compliance does not defeat the valid exercise of power by the Registrar in amending/deleting rules - [Paras 11-14].

Civil Law - Administrative Law - Validity of Action - Wrong reference/nomenclature - An action taken by a competent authority under an existing statutory power is not vitiated merely because of incorrect nomenclature (e.g., being termed a 'circular' instead of an 'order') or a wrong reference to the enabling power - The focus is on the existence and lawful exercise of the power itself - Held - The notification/circular issued by the Registrar deleting Rule 5(3)(a) was a valid exercise of statutory power under Section 55(1) of the Act, 1960, despite its terminology - [Para 15].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The judgments of the High Court's Single Judge and Division Bench are set aside – The appellant shall be placed in the position and status from which he was removed – His seniority shall be protected – He is entitled to all benefits of promotion that may have fallen due as per law – He shall also be entitled to 50% back wages payable within two months with 6% interest per annum if not paid within time.

Criminal Law - Sentencing - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 45 and 53 - Constitutionality of imprisonment for remainder of natural life - Petitioners convicted of capital offences and sentenced to death - High Courts or President of India via mercy petitions under Article 72 commuting death sentences to imprisonment for remainder of natural life - Petitioners arguing that IPC prescribes only death or life imprisonment and remainder of natural life sentence is unconstitutional - Supreme Court holding that a five-judge Bench in V Sriharan and a three-judge Bench in Swamy Shraddananda have authoritatively settled that life imprisonment means imprisonment for the rest of the life of the convict and that courts can create a special category of sentence beyond ordinary remission to avoid awarding the death penalty - Held - imprisonment for remainder of natural life is constitutional and valid - writ petitions dismissed - [Paras 1-18].

Constitutional Law - Clemency Powers - Constitution of India - Articles 72 and 161 - Judicial review of presidential pardon and remission - Petitioners seeking independent modification or judicial review of sentences already commuted by the President of India - Supreme Court holding that executive clemency powers are wide and independent and judicial review is strictly limited to narrow grounds such as mala fides or arbitrariness - Held - court cannot sit as an appellate authority over executive exercise of clemency powers - writ petitions dismissed - [Paras 3-7].

Constitutional Law - Fundamental Rights - Constitution of India - Article 32 - Maintainability of writ petition - Convicts challenging sentence and seeking direct recourse under Article 32 without approaching appropriate statutory or executive authorities for remission - Supreme Court holding that Article 32 cannot be used as a shortcut to circumvent established statutory and constitutional procedures - Held - petitions not maintainable where convicts have failed to invoke available statutory remedies or where executive powers have been validly exercised - [Paras 4-6].

Decision: Writ petitions dismissed - Pending applications disposed of - [Paras 1-18].

Civil Law - Consumer Law - Elevator Accident - Deficiency in Service - Compensation - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 304A - Bombay Lift Rules 1958 - Rule 6(xiii) - Joint and Several Liability - Manufacturer - Operator - Premises Owner - Heightened Duty of Care - Apportionment of Liability - Deceased, an officer, was crushed to death in a lift installed and maintained by M/S OTIS Elevator Co. (India) Ltd. (OTIS) at the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) office premises maintained by Military Engineering Service (MES) - the lift stopped abruptly between floors, and while the deceased was being rescued by manual opening of doors and switching off main supply, the lift suddenly moved downward - FIR was filed under Section 304A IPC - Technical Investigation Report attributed the immediate cause to manual release of brakes in the Machine Room - National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) found OTIS, RAW, and MES jointly and severally liable for deficiency in service, apportioning liability as 70% to OTIS, 25% to MES, and 5% to RAW - appeals by RAW and MES were dismissed by Supreme Court at admission stage - OTIS challenged its 70% liability - complainant filed execution petition which NCDRC dismissed as premature awaiting OTIS's appeal - Supreme Court considered OTIS's appeal in detail - noting OTIS, as manufacturer and comprehensive maintenance contractor, had a heightened duty of care - OTIS was repeatedly notified of persistent malfunctioning of the lift and was aware of voltage fluctuation as a cause, even recommending a stabiliser but failed to ensure its implementation or render the lift safe - OTIS failed to produce attendance records of its mechanic as contractually obligated and failed to train personnel for rescue procedures - while the technical report indicated manual brake release as the cause of accident, this event arose from the underlying and unrectified electrical malfunction - the Court affirmed the NCDRC's finding that OTIS was principally deficient in service due to its unique knowledge and control, and failure to fulfill its contractual obligations - RAW and MES had more limited liability for oversight and operational lapses like leaving the Machine Room accessible and not maintaining attendance records - Held - NCDRC's order apportioning liability affirmed - OTIS's appeal dismissed - execution petition allowed with direction to NCDRC to proceed in accordance with law - [Paras 1-36].

Civil Law - Consumer Law - Elevators - Public Places - Common Carrier - Heightened Duty of Care - Passenger Vulnerability - Elevators in modern urban societies are a mode of vertical transportation where passengers have no control and entirely rely on automation - it is a legal necessity to impose a heightened duty of care, akin to that of common carriers, due to intrinsic passenger vulnerability - manufacturer, operator, and owner of premises are duty bearers and jointly and severally liable to safeguard users - Held - an elevator must be construed as a common carrier, and duty bearers shall jointly and severally be liable to safeguard users - [Paras 1-3].

Civil Law - Contract Law - Consumer Law - Maintenance Contract - Comprehensive Maintenance - Manufacturer's Responsibility - Duty to Prevent Accidents - Failure to Rectify Defects - OTIS, as the manufacturer and comprehensive maintenance contractor, was responsible under Clause 3.1 of the contract to keep lifts in sound condition to avoid risk of accident - it was repeatedly notified of persistent malfunctioning of the lift and its own letter dated 04/07/2002 established awareness of voltage fluctuation as a cause and formally recommended a voltage stabiliser - OTIS failed to follow up on this recommendation, decline to certify the lift as safe, or escalate the matter despite continuing breakdowns - Held - OTIS was deficient in service by failing to uphold its contractual duty and ensure the safety of the lift despite being aware of and having identified the remedy for its defects - [Paras 19-27, 32].

Civil Law - Torts Law - Consumer Law - Composite Negligence - Apportionment of Liability - Joint Tortfeasors - Inter Se Liabilities - Duty of Court - The principle of composite negligence entitles a claimant to sue joint tortfeasors and recover damages - the burden of identifying inter se liabilities of joint tortfeasors should not rest on consumers seeking compensation - courts should first recognise the injury and assess compensation, then examine inter se contractual relationships and other circumstances for apportionment of liability - Held - apportionment of 70% liability to OTIS, 25% to MES, and 5% to RAW properly reflected the differential degree of knowledge, control, and responsibility for the accident - [Paras 3, 33-34].

Evidence Law - Criminal Law - Technical Report - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 304A - Cause of Accident vs. Cause of Action - Deficiency of Service - Proximate Cause - Prof. C.M. Bhatia's Technical Report concluded that the "only cause of accident" was the manual release of mechanical brakes through the Brake Release Key - this conclusion must be seen in the context of determining "deficiency of service" and the "cause of action" which is different from the immediate "cause of accident" - the manual release of brakes was necessitated by the persistent and unrectified electrical malfunction of the lift itself, which OTIS was responsible for rectifying - Held - a technical report identifying the immediate cause of an accident does not absolve the manufacturer/maintenance contractor of liability for underlying deficiencies in service that necessitated the emergency action - [Paras 7, 24-28].

Civil Law - Consumer Law - Execution of Decree - Pendency of Appeal - Stay on Execution - The NCDRC dismissed an execution petition as premature, recording that OTIS's challenge to the main order was pending before the Supreme Court - an executing court cannot go behind a decree and is bound to execute it as it stands - the pendency of an appeal is immaterial to execution proceedings unless there is a specific stay on the decree - Held - the executing court erred in dismissing the execution petition as premature merely due to the pendency of an appeal, especially when other appeals against the same order had already been dismissed - [Paras 13-14, 36].

Decision: Civil Appeal No. 4081 of 2014 dismissed – Civil Appeal No. 1602 of 2020 allowed – Order of NCDRC dated 21/01/2014 apportioning liability affirmed – NCDRC directed to proceed with Execution Petition in accordance with law.

Civil Law - Motor Vehicles Act - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Sections 2(28), 2(34) and 39 - Reach Stacker and Public Place - Appellant Corporation appealed against High Court judgment setting aside Tribunal order which had rejected compensation claim under Section 166 MVA holding a Reach Stacker is not a motor vehicle and an Inland Container Depot is not a public place - Supreme Court held that a Reach Stacker weighing over 70 metric tonnes exceeding permitted weights and adapted for use only in enclosed premises falls under the exclusionary second part of Section 2(28) MVA and that a custom-bonded Inland Container Depot with restricted access is not a public place under Section 2(34) MVA - Held - High Court judgment set aside and Tribunal findings restored - [Paras 1-18].

Civil Law - Definition of Motor Vehicle - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 2(28) - Exclusionary Clause - Special type of vehicle adapted for use only in a factory or other enclosed premises - Heavy machinery and Reach Stackers - Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the first part of Section 2(28), special purpose vehicles designed for heavy material handling in enclosed premises stand excluded from the definition - [Paras 8-9, 13.3-13.5].

Civil Law - Public Place - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 2(34) - Right of access - Inland Container Depot as custom-bonded area - Supreme Court held that an area with controlled ingress and egress where public has no right of access does not constitute a public place - [Paras 10-11].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of the High Court dated 5th September 2019 set aside – Findings of the Tribunal restored – No order as to costs.

Headnotes:

Service Law - Consequential benefits - Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules 2010 - Rules 49 and 50 - Judicial Officer wrongfully discharged from service - Reinstated with continuity of service and seniority pursuant to Supreme Court judgment - Denied Selection Scale and Super Time Scale by High Court on administrative side due to absence of requisite Annual Confidential Reports for six of the preceding seven years - Supreme Court held that employer cannot take advantage of its own wrong of wrongfully dismissing an employee to deny service benefits - Non-availability of Annual Confidential Reports being solely attributable to the wrongful discharge - Entitlement to be assessed on the basis of available valid Annual Confidential Reports - Held - Judicial Officer entitled to Selection Scale w.e.f. 16.07.2018 and Super Time Scale w.e.f. 16.07.2021 along with 50% back wages - Miscellaneous application disposed of with directions - [Paras 1-46].

Service Law - Annual Confidential Reports - Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules 2010 - Rules 45 and 46 - Consideration for higher pay scales - Uncommunicated and post-discharge Annual Confidential Reports cannot be used to the prejudice of the employee - Valid Annual Confidential Reports for preceding years showing very good and good remarks to be considered - Held - High Court unjustified in denying scale on ground of short availability of entries - [Paras 25-42].

Decision: Miscellaneous application disposed of – Clarified that consequential benefits include grant of Selection Scale w.e.f. 16.07.2018 and Super Time Scale w.e.f. 16.07.2021 – Applicant directed to re-fix pay, revise consequential benefits, and disburse arrears factoring 50% back wages within three months – Registry to forward copy of judgment to all High Courts.