Hindu Succession Act – Sections 14(1) and 14(2) – Scope and Application – Property given to a Hindu widow in lieu of maintenance can become her absolute property under Section 14(1) unless a restrictive estate is explicitly prescribed under Section 14(2) – Held: Absolute rights were granted to Smt. Veerabhadramma for 2.09 acres of land, while a life interest was created in 3.55 acres, as explicitly mentioned in the partition deed – Section 14(1) was applicable to the former, but not the latter [Paras 3.6, 4, 9.1–9.4, 11–12].

Property Rights – Interpretation of Partition Deed – A 1933 partition deed granted life interest to Smt. Veerabhadramma in 3.55 acres of land, which would devolve equally to both branches of the family upon her death – Held: No absolute rights were created for this portion of the property, and her rights remained limited as per the deed [Paras 3.2–3.4, 4].

Hindu Widow’s Right to Maintenance – Pre-Existing Rights and Statutory Protection – Right to maintenance under Shastric law, recognized by statutes like the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, can elevate property given in lieu of maintenance into absolute ownership – However, rights created by explicit life interest clauses are not transformed under Section 14(1) – Held: Life interest in the disputed land remained as per the 1933 partition deed, and subsequent bequeathing by Will was invalid [Paras 9.2–9.4, 11].

Concurrent Findings of Courts Below – Appellate Court and Trial Court consistently upheld the limited nature of rights granted under the partition deed – The Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings [Paras 3.8, 5, 13].

Limitations of Section 14(1), Hindu Succession Act – Section 14(1) operates to remove restrictions where possession is traceable to a lawful pre-existing right – In this case, life interest created in 3.55 acres was not rooted in such a right but in a new and restricted grant – Held: Section 14(2) applies, upholding the limited estate [Paras 7, 9.1–10].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Findings of the Trial Court and Appellate Court affirmed – Pending applications disposed of [Para 13].
 

Limitation Law - Condonation of Delay – Litigant's Responsibility – Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – Condonation Denied - The Court emphasized the litigant’s duty to vigilantly monitor proceedings initiated by them. The excuse of advocate negligence was deemed insufficient to justify a delay of 534 days – Held: The delay cannot be condoned solely on allegations of advocate negligence, as litigants are expected to actively protect their rights [Paras 10-12].

Limitation Principles – Vigilance Required – The Court reiterated the principle of “vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt,” underlining that limitation statutes aim to ensure timely action, prevent stale claims, and preserve the efficacy of evidence – Held: Delay of such magnitude without sufficient justification is untenable [Para 12].

Ex Parte Decree – Misrepresentation and Non-disclosure – The petitioners were found to have suppressed material facts regarding their knowledge of the counterclaim – Held: Courts cannot exercise discretion to condone delay when the litigant approaches without clean hands [Para 9].

Dismissal of Petitions – Absence of Error in High Court’s Decision – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's refusal to condone delay, finding no error in law warranting interference under Article 136 of the Constitution – Held: Special Leave Petitions dismissed [Para 13].

Specific Performance – Subsequent Purchaser – Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act – The plaintiff sought specific performance of an oral agreement of sale for property subsequently sold to appellants – High Court held that appellants were not bona fide purchasers as they failed to inquire into the rights of the plaintiff, who was in possession – Supreme Court affirmed High Court's findings, emphasizing the obligation of a subsequent purchaser to conduct due diligence under Section 19(b) – Appeal dismissed [Paras 10-12, 16-19].

Good Faith – Due Diligence and Bona Fide Purchasers – Good faith requires honesty and due care – Subsequent purchasers must inquire about the rights of individuals in possession at the time of purchase – Wilful abstention from inquiry constitutes constructive notice – Supreme Court applied principles from R.K. Mohammed Ubaidullah v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab and Ram Niwas v. Bano to hold that appellants failed to establish good faith in their purchase [Paras 11, 13-18].

Possession as Notice – Explanation II to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act – Actual possession of a person is deemed constructive notice of their rights – Subsequent purchasers were bound to inquire into the plaintiff's possession – Failure to do so negates claims of bona fide purchase [Para 16].

Standard for Good Faith – Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita and General Clauses Act – Definitions of "good faith" emphasize honesty and due care – Supreme Court reiterated that negligence or dishonesty precludes claims of good faith in property transactions [Paras 13-15].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Plaintiff entitled to execute the decree for specific performance – No error of law in High Court's findings regarding the lack of bona fide purchase by appellants [Paras 20-22].

Property Law - Marumakkathayam Law – Partition and Property Nature – Tharwad or Individual Ownership – Appeal Dismissed – The appellants contended that properties partitioned under Marumakkathayam law ceased to be joint tharwad property and became individually owned. Held: The properties inherited by a thavazhi remain tharwad property, jointly held by its members. The Court upheld the High Court's decision affirming the Trial Court’s preliminary decree dividing the properties among members of the Andippillil Tharwad [Paras 22, 50-55].

Partition – Effect on Property Nature – Dissenting View Accepted – Prospective Application – The Court resolved the doctrinal difference in Mary Cheriyan v. Bhargavi Pillai Bhasura Devi (Full Bench of Kerala High Court), holding that property obtained by a single female on partition ceases to be tharwad property. However, this interpretation applies prospectively, not affecting past or ongoing transactions [Paras 38-48].

Concurrent Findings – Non-Interference Principle – High Court and Trial Court Findings Affirmed – Findings on itemized properties were concurrent across courts. The appellants failed to meet the exceptional circumstances warranting Supreme Court interference under Article 136 [Paras 51-55].

Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The Court upheld the preliminary decree of the Trial Court as affirmed by the High Court, concluding that the disputed properties are tharwad properties held jointly by the thavazhi of Parukutty Amma. The Trial Court was directed to proceed with final decree proceedings as per law. No costs were imposed.

Civil Law - U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act – Claim of Co-Tenancy – Disputed Land – Appellant challenged the High Court’s decision restoring the order of the Consolidation Officer, which dismissed the claim of Smt. Gulabi to co-tenancy over the disputed land – High Court found the Appellate and Revisional Authorities acted perversely, reversing findings supported by evidence – Held: High Court rightly upheld the Consolidation Officer’s order, rejecting Gulabi’s claim as unsupported by credible evidence – Appeal dismissed [Paras 1, 3, 11, 21].

Evidence – Burden of Proof – Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act – Burden to prove paternity and co-tenancy rights was on Smt. Gulabi – Consolidation Officer and High Court found her evidence insufficient and contradictory – Birth register, the primary documentary evidence, lacked credibility and corroboration – No testimony from relatives or credible witnesses was provided to substantiate her claim [Paras 5, 12–15].
Revisional Powers – Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act – Scope of Review – Deputy Director of Consolidation can interfere with findings of fact only when they are perverse, unsupported by evidence, or contrary to law – High Court correctly found the Revisional Authority exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating evidence de novo instead of examining procedural regularity or legal propriety [Paras 7–10, 21].

Delay and Laches – Unexplained Delay in Challenging Mutation Order – Mutation was ordered in 1959, but no challenge was made until 1973 – High Court noted the 14-year delay as unexplained and suggestive of laches – Such delay impacted the credibility of the claim [Paras 19–20].

Findings of Fact – Testimonies and Documentary Evidence – Witnesses presented by Smt. Gulabi were found unreliable, offering contradictory statements – High Court and Consolidation Officer noted discrepancies in the birth register and lack of corroborative evidence – Voter lists were deemed self-serving and insufficient to establish her claim [Paras 12–14].

Jurisdiction – High Court’s Supervisory Role – High Court exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 to correct errors of law and procedural irregularities by the Appellate and Revisional Authorities – Held: High Court acted within its authority by setting aside findings based on inadmissible evidence and misappreciation of facts [Paras 16–17].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – High Court’s judgment restoring the Consolidation Officer’s order upheld – Pending applications disposed of [Para 21].

Order: Findings of the Consolidation Officer affirmed, and Smt. Gulabi's claim to co-tenancy rights rejected.
 

CENVAT Credit – Definition of Capital Goods – Whether Mobile Towers and Prefabricated Buildings (PFBs) Qualify – Bombay vs. Delhi High Court Divergence – Reconciliation by Supreme Court – The Bombay High Court held that mobile towers and PFBs are immovable property and therefore ineligible for CENVAT credit under Rule 2(a)(A) or Rule 2(k) – The Delhi High Court opined that towers and PFBs are movable, marketable, and integral to telecom operations, qualifying as "capital goods" under Rule 2(a)(A)(iii) or as "inputs" under Rule 2(k) – Supreme Court reconciled the conflict by emphasizing mobility, dismantling capability, and their functional role in service provision – Held: Towers and PFBs are movable properties, thus qualifying as "capital goods" or "inputs" under CENVAT Rules [Paras 11.1–11.6].

Attachment to Earth – Movability vs. Immovability – Supreme Court Reiterates Principles – The Court considered tests for movability, permanency, marketability, and intended use of towers/PFBs – Applying judgments such as Solid and Correct Engineering Works and Triveni Engineering, it was held that the temporary attachment of towers to the earth for stability did not render them immovable – Held: Towers and PFBs are movable and marketable properties as they can be dismantled without substantial damage and relocated [Paras 11.7–11.9.6].

Definition of Inputs and Accessories – Nexus Between Towers, PFBs, and Telecom Equipment – The Supreme Court held that towers and PFBs enhance the functionality of antennas and BTS equipment and therefore qualify as accessories under Rule 2(a)(A)(iii) – Furthermore, as goods used for providing mobile telecom services, these also satisfy the definition of "inputs" under Rule 2(k) – Held: MSPs are entitled to CENVAT credit for towers and PFBs [Paras 11.10–11.12.6].

Circulars Issued by Revenue – Not Binding on Courts – The Revenue circular categorically excluding towers and PFBs from excisable goods was declared unenforceable to the extent it conflicted with statutory provisions and judicial interpretation – Held: Revenue cannot rely on circulars contrary to the law declared by the Court [Paras 11.9.20–11.9.22].

Outcome – Delhi High Court Judgment Upheld – Bombay High Court Judgment Set Aside – The Supreme Court upheld the Delhi High Court’s judgment in Vodafone Mobile Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 118, and overruled the Bombay High Court’s judgment in Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 10409 – Held: MSPs can claim CENVAT credit on excise duties paid for towers and PFBs under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 [Paras 11.13–11.14].

Decision: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of mobile service providers, granting them the right to claim CENVAT credit on excise duties paid for mobile towers and prefabricated buildings. By holding that these items qualify as "capital goods" under Rule 2(a)(A) and as "inputs" under Rule 2(k), the Court dismissed the appeals challenging the Delhi High Court’s pro-MSP decision and allowed appeals against the Bombay High Court’s ruling.

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR – Section 482 CrPC – FIR alleging rape under Section 376(2)(n) and criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC – High Court refused to quash FIR citing lack of consent by the complainant – Supreme Court holds FIR and statements do not substantiate essential ingredients of offences under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 IPC – Relationship between the appellant and complainant was consensual, and prosecution would amount to abuse of the legal process – FIR and trial quashed [Paras 2, 17-19, 21].

Consent in Sexual Relationships – Promise to Marry – Complainant alleged physical relationship based on false promise of marriage – Supreme Court observes that no promise of marriage was established at the outset of the relationship – Relationship continued voluntarily despite the appellant's subsequent marriage – Held: Consensual relationships cannot be criminalized due to breakup or unfulfilled marital intentions [Paras 17-19, 22].

Abuse of Process – Continuation of Prosecution – Appellant and complainant are now married to different individuals – Continuation of trial would be futile and cause injustice – High Court erred in failing to exercise powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings – Held: Quashing warranted to prevent abuse of court process [Paras 20-21].

Relevant Case Law – Principles of Consent – Reiterated principles from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 – False promise of marriage must be shown to have been made in bad faith to constitute rape – Active consent of complainant evident from facts [Paras 11, 22].

Decision – Appeal allowed – FIR No. 272 of 2019 and related proceedings quashed – Held: Ingredients of Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 IPC not made out – Prosecution would amount to abuse of process [Paras 23].

Invocation of Section 319 CrPC – Evidentiary Threshold – Test for Prima Facie Case – Power under Section 319 CrPC must be exercised only when evidence meets the standard of more than prima facie that would lead to conviction if unchallenged – Allegations in examination-in-chief, contradicted during cross-examination, do not satisfy this threshold – Held: High Court erred in summoning appellant based on incomplete evidence [Paras 7–10].

Contradictions and Omissions – Section 162 Explanation – Effect on Prima Facie Case – Witnesses alleged in examination-in-chief that appellant inflicted fatal injuries on the deceased – Cross-examination revealed significant omissions amounting to contradictions under Section 162 CrPC – Such evidence cannot substantiate a prima facie case under Section 319 CrPC – Invocation of power held unjustified [Paras 9–12].

Timing of Section 319 CrPC Applications – Cross-Examination Consideration – Application filed post cross-examination necessitates consideration of entire evidence, including inconsistencies – Ignoring cross-examination in such circumstances undermines judicial fairness – Held: Court must evaluate cross-examination before summoning additional accused [Paras 13–14].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court's order summoning appellant under Section 319 CrPC set aside – Criminal Revision Petition No. 375 of 2015 dismissed – Clarified that the decision is confined to the issue of invocation of Section 319 CrPC and does not impact the merits of the trial [Para 15].

Criminal Law – Conviction for Murder – Section 302 IPC – Altered to Section 304 Part I IPC – Appellant convicted of murder for assaulting the deceased with a bamboo stick – Supreme Court found no evidence of premeditation or motive to commit murder – Assault occurred in a sudden quarrel during a heated moment – Conviction altered to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Part I of Section 304 IPC [Paras 12-19].

Sudden Provocation and Lack of Premeditation – Evidence revealed no prior intent or preparation by the appellant to commit the act – Weapon used was a bamboo stick, commonly available in villages, and not carried with intent – Altercation arose from a heated argument, indicating sudden provocation – Conviction under Section 302 IPC not sustainable [Paras 16-18].

Benefit of Doubt – Nature of injuries and circumstances of the assault indicated absence of cruelty or undue advantage – Appellant entitled to benefit of doubt, leading to reduction in conviction [Paras 17-19].

Sentence Already Undergone – Appellant had served more than 9 years of actual imprisonment and over 12 years with remission – Sentence modified to period already undergone, considering justice served [Para 21(iii)].

Decision – Appeal partly allowed – Conviction under Section 302 IPC altered to Section 304 Part I IPC – Sentence reduced to period already undergone – Bail bonds discharged [Paras 20-21].