Labour and Service Law – Gratuity – Applicability of Government Notified Ceiling – Regulation 107 – Interpretation – Respondents retired between 2018–2019 from AFC – Gratuity paid with ceiling of ₹7 lakhs as per 2012 Office Order – Held: Regulation 107 of the 2007 Staff Regulations specifically provides gratuity to be paid as per internal formula or “as notified by the Government of Assam from time to time” – State Government had increased gratuity limit to ₹15 lakhs in 2017 – AFC’s failure to adopt higher ceiling does not defeat right of employees – Higher limit notified by State is applicable by operation of the regulation itself [Paras 12–18]

Service Law – Delay in Adoption of Enhanced Benefits by Public Sector Corporation – Equitable Treatment – Lethargy of Corporation – Consequences – Though AFC deferred proposal to enhance ceiling in 2022, Court held that employees who retired prior to formal decision are also entitled to enhanced limit – Observed: Inequitable to deny benefit due to AFC’s inaction – Regulation already incorporated dynamic link with State's notification – Gratuity must be paid as per State-notified ceiling of ₹15 lakhs [Paras 16–19]

Labour Law – Gratuity Act – Non-obstante Clause in Section 14 – No Finding on Statutory Applicability – Though High Court granted relief relying on Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, Supreme Court refrained from expressing conclusive view on Act’s applicability to AFC – Held: Since benefit flowed directly from Regulation 107, no need to determine whether AFC is covered under the Act – Statutory question left open [Para 20]

Interpretation of Service Regulations – Liberal Construction in Favour of Employees – Court held that Regulation 107 must be interpreted benevolently – Restriction of benefit solely based on Board approval is untenable when regulation already mandates alignment with government notification – Notification by Government of Assam to prevail [Paras 16–18]

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Judgment of Gauhati High Court affirmed – Employees of Assam Financial Corporation held entitled to gratuity up to ₹15 lakhs as per Government of Assam notification – Gratuity to be recalculated and paid within six months – Pending applications also disposed of.

Criminal Law – Kidnapping and Rape of Minor – POCSO – SC/ST Act s.3(2)(v) – Conviction Upheld – Victim’s testimony held trustworthy and consistent with statement under Section 164 CrPC – Her version that accused took her to forest and forcibly committed intercourse found reliable – Minor contradictions and omissions immaterial – Age proved through school register entry (Section 35 Evidence Act) showing DOB as 15.09.2004 – On date of incident (14.05.2018) victim was below 18 years – Medical evidence corroborated allegations – Doctor (PW-10) found hymenal tear, and FSL report confirmed presence of semen on victim’s vaginal slide and underwear of both victim and accused – Chain of custody proved – Hostile witnesses’ testimony partly relied on for corroboration – Court found no ground to interfere with concurrent conviction – Appeal dismissed [Paras 4, 7, 16-20, 21-25, 26].

Witnesses – Hostile Witnesses – Discretion under Section 154 Evidence Act / Section 157 BSA, 2023 – Judicial Restraint in Declaring Hostile – Court cautions that permission to treat a witness as hostile cannot be granted mechanically or as a matter of routine – It is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly when witness’s testimony is inconsistent, evasive, or indicates deliberate suppression of truth – Minor inconsistencies or non-recollection do not justify declaration of hostility – Reliance placed on Sri Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa and Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana – Trial Court must record reasons for such declaration [Paras 9-12].

Proof of Age – Evidentiary Value of School Register – Section 35 Evidence Act – School admission register produced and proved by headmaster/teacher (PW-9) as official record of birth – Entries made contemporaneously, maintained in ordinary course of school’s functions – No suspicion regarding authenticity – Therefore admissible under Section 35 and sufficient to determine age of prosecutrix – Birth certificate or ossification test not mandatory where reliable school record exists – Followed State of Chhattisgarh v. Lekhram [Paras 16-18].

Victim’s Testimony – Credibility – Sole Testimony of Victim in Sexual Offences – Court reiterates that conviction can rest on sole testimony of victim if it inspires confidence and is found reliable – Prosecutrix consistently narrated sequence of abduction and sexual assault – Statement under Section 164 CrPC corroborates deposition before Court – Absence of external injuries not fatal, as delay in medical examination explained – Defence cross-examination failed to shake core version – Held: Victim’s testimony forms the substantive basis of conviction [Para 7].

Medical & Forensic Corroboration – Reliability of FSL Evidence – Doctor (PW-10) observed hymenal tear and prepared slides; FSL report confirmed human semen on slides and on victim’s and accused’s clothes – Seizure of exhibits proved by investigating officer (PW-12) – Chain of custody established beyond reasonable doubt – Forensic findings corroborate ocular testimony and exclude hypothesis of false implication [Para 20].

SC/ST Act – Section 3(2)(v) (Post-2016 Amendment) – Knowledge Standard – Presumption under Section 8(c) – Court notes legislative shift post-2016 amendment replacing “on the ground that such person is a member of SC/ST” with “knowing that such person belongs to SC/ST” – Requirement of specific motive based on caste no longer applicable – Once accused is shown to have known victim’s caste, presumption arises under Section 8(c) – In present case, accused was resident of same village and acquainted with family; thus, presumption stands unrebutted – Offence under Section 3(2)(v) made out – Followed Patan Jamal Vali v. State of A.P. [Paras 21-24].

Concurrent Findings – Scope of Appellate Interference under Article 136 – Supreme Court reiterates that where Trial Court and High Court have recorded concurrent findings based on credible evidence, interference is warranted only if perversity or gross misappreciation is shown – In absence of such infirmity, conviction under IPC, POCSO and SC/ST Act sustained – Appeal dismissed [Paras 25-26].

Result – Appeal Dismissed – Conviction under Sections 363, 366, 376, 506 IPC, Section 4 POCSO Act and Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act affirmed – Sentences including life imprisonment under SC/ST Act to run concurrently – Accused to continue serving sentence as awarded [Paras 2, 26].

Criminal Law – Voice Sample – Magistrate’s Power – High Court order setting aside Magistrate’s direction to obtain voice sample of a witness reversed – Supreme Court held Magistrate is empowered to order voice sample despite absence of explicit provision in Cr.P.C. – Held: Judgment in Ritesh Sinha (2019) 8 SCC 1 applies – Use of term “person” includes both accused and witness – Rule against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) not violated by furnishing voice sample – Appeal allowed, Magistrate’s order restored [Paras 1, 3-10]

Self-Incrimination – Article 20(3) – Voice Sample Not Testimonial – Court reiterated principle from Kathi Kalu Oghad [AIR 1961 SC 1808] – Specimen signature, handwriting, fingerprints or voice sample do not amount to testimonial compulsion – Sample by itself is innocuous unless compared with incriminating material discovered during investigation – Furnishing such samples not protected under Article 20(3) [Paras 7-9]

Criminal Procedure – BNSS vs CrPC – Supreme Court held that it is immaterial whether Cr.P.C. or BNSS applies – Even under Cr.P.C., Magistrate is empowered by virtue of Ritesh Sinha judgment – Under BNSS, Section 349 now provides explicit statutory backing – Both paths support legality of Magistrate’s direction [Paras 8-9]

Judicial Discipline – Binding Precedent – High Court erred in disregarding binding precedent on the ground of pending reference – Supreme Court noted that the reference to Larger Bench in Ritesh Sinha had been closed – High Courts must follow binding decisions unless expressly overruled [Para 2, 4]

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court order set aside – Order of Magistrate restored – Respondent directed to comply with voice sample order. [Para 11]

Criminal Law – Crowd Crush Incident – CBI Investigation Ordered – 41 people died and over 100 injured in stampede during political rally held by Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) on 27.09.2025 – FIR No. 855/2025 registered under BNS and TNPP Act – Conflicting High Court orders on formation of SIT and refusal of CBI probe led to multiplicity of proceedings – Supreme Court held that public confidence in fairness of investigation is paramount – Interim direction issued to transfer probe to CBI for impartiality [Paras 1, 7-9, 17, 21-22, 31-32]

High Court Practice – Jurisdictional Conflict – Madurai Bench (Division Bench) refused CBI probe, while Main Seat (Single Judge) ordered formation of SIT without pleadings or parties present – Supreme Court criticised lack of judicial propriety – Held: Matters affecting public at large like SOP for rallies and disaster protocols should be treated as PIL and heard by Division Bench, not single judge [Paras 13-20, 22, 24]

Public Safety – SOP for Political Rallies – Supreme Court directed that pending writ on framing of safety guidelines (W.P. Crl. No. 884/2025) be transferred to Division Bench of High Court – All other related writs dismissed or harmonised to avoid forum shopping and duplication [Paras 14, 22, 39]

Judicial Oversight – Supervisory Committee Appointed – In addition to transferring investigation to CBI, Supreme Court constituted a three-member Supervisory Committee headed by Justice Ajay Rastogi (Retd.) – Committee to monitor CBI probe, suggest directions, and review progress – State to provide logistics and comply with recommendations [Paras 33-34]

Fair Investigation – Allegations of Bias – Senior police officials made press statements exonerating their subordinates before probe concluded – Court held this could erode public faith – Directed that only a neutral, independent investigation could restore justice for victims and their families [Paras 27-30, 32]

Decision: Investigation of FIR 855/2025 transferred to CBI – SIT and Enquiry Commission suspended – Supervisory Committee constituted – CBI to file monthly reports – Related SOP writ to be placed before Division Bench – Interim directions subject to final hearing [Paras 31-40]

Land Acquisition – Restitution of Acquired Land – Industrial Entity Not Entitled – Respondent, a private ceramic manufacturer, sought restoration of land and factory premises acquired in 2006 as part of Tata Motors’ Singur Project – Supreme Court held that its earlier decision in Kedar Nath Yadav quashing the acquisition and ordering restoration applied only to poor cultivators and vulnerable farmers – Relief intended to protect disadvantaged communities from dispossession, not commercial entities – Appeal allowed – High Court’s direction to restore land and structures to respondent set aside [Paras 12-18, 25-27]

Judicial Remedy – Scope of PIL Relief – Kedar Nath Yadav relief granted in PIL proceedings on behalf of poor agricultural workers – Court held that Respondent, a financially capable corporate house, was not similarly situated – Restoration under PIL judgment cannot be extended to parties who did not challenge acquisition or litigate – Strategic inaction cannot entitle post-facto benefit [Paras 15-18, 22-23, 26]

Acquiescence – Delay – Respondent accepted full compensation of Rs. 14.54 crores including for land and structures – Raised no challenge from 2006 till 2016 – Court held that such delay, coupled with voluntary acceptance of compensation, bars restitution claim – Respondent estopped from seeking reversal based on parity with cultivators [Paras 6-7, 21-22]

Procedural Relief – In Personam vs In Rem – Quashing of acquisition in Kedar Nath Yadav was based on procedural lapses in Section 5-A inquiries – Supreme Court held relief applied only to objectors who pursued litigation – Does not extend to commercial parties like Respondent who did not challenge proceedings at the time [Paras 19-21]

Practicality and Passage of Time – Nearly 20 years passed since acquisition – Land demarcated and restructured to restore to farmers post-Kedar Nath Yadav – Court held physical restoration to Respondent not feasible due to irreversible changes – Ordered removal of plant/machinery or public auction as alternative relief [Paras 24-25, 27]

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court orders set aside – Respondent not entitled to restoration – Directed removal or auction of existing structures – No further compensation or recovery [Paras 27-28]

Army Law – Possession of Ammunition – Substitution of Conviction – Scope of Tribunal’s Power under Section 15(6) of Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Appellant, a Colonel, was convicted by General Court Martial under Section 69 of the Army Act for unauthorised possession of ammunition and dismissed from service – Tribunal found no evidence to prove demand or acceptance of bribe and upheld acquittal for unexplained possession of cash – However, it held that possession of aged but live ammunition indicated neglect and failure to adhere to procedural norms – Held: Tribunal rightly substituted conviction to Section 63 of the Army Act (act prejudicial to good order and military discipline) under Section 15(6)(a) of the 2007 Act, as the same evidence lawfully sustained such finding – Punishment of compulsory retirement with full pensionary benefits held just and proportionate [Paras 19–26].

Armed Forces Tribunal – Jurisdiction – Power to Substitute Findings and Sentence – Tribunal under Section 15(6)(a) & (b) of the 2007 Act empowered to substitute a finding of guilty for any offence for which the accused could lawfully have been convicted by Court Martial and to pass a modified sentence – Provision analogous to Section 162 of the Army Act and Section 222 CrPC – Legislative intent clear that appellate forum can convict for a cognate or lesser offence based on same evidence – Tribunal acted within jurisdiction [Paras 20–22].

Appellate Interference – Limited Scope – Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Section 30 of the 2007 Act confined to examining whether Tribunal’s decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious – Tribunal’s order based on concurrent factual findings and proper exercise of discretion – Held: Tribunal acted within statutory powers and fairly balanced service discipline with individual fairness – No interference warranted [Paras 23, 27].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Tribunal’s substitution of conviction under Section 63 of the Army Act and modification of punishment to compulsory retirement affirmed – No costs [Para 28].

Service Law – Termination – Eligibility Criteria – Vocational Subject Marks – Rules 4 and 21 of Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 – Termination of teachers on the ground of not securing 40% in Intermediate Examination and invalidity of graduation certificates – Held: Rule 21 governs merit list preparation and not eligibility – Rule 4 prescribes eligibility to appear in Teacher Eligibility Test and contains no bar on inclusion of vocational marks – Marks in vocational subjects, as per marksheet guidelines, are to be added to aggregate for determining overall percentage – Exclusion of such marks erroneous – Appellants were eligible and termination unsustainable [Paras 25–29, 36–37].

Principles of Natural Justice – Violation – Termination Without Fresh Notice – Show-cause notices alleged candidates failed to secure 45% marks, but termination based on exclusion of vocational marks reducing percentage below 40% – Held: Finding of guilt on a charge not contained in notice violates natural justice – Department’s action arbitrary and illegal – Termination vitiated [Paras 31–35].

Recruitment Rules – Interpretation – Rule 4 v. Rule 21 – Distinct Fields – Rule 4 (Eligibility) applies for determining who may appear in TET – Rule 21 (Merit List) applies post-TET for ranking – Both operate in separate spheres – Department and High Court erred in applying Rule 21 for eligibility determination [Paras 26–28].

Administrative Law – Procedural Fairness – Where an employee successfully rebuts charges in a show-cause notice, authorities cannot alter the basis of termination without issuing a fresh notice – Violation renders order void [Paras 32–34].

Relief – Reinstatement – Continuity of Service – Arrears – Appellants (Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom) deemed in continuous service from initial appointment (December 2015) – Entitled to full arrears of pay and seniority benefits – However, period out of service not to count for experience-based promotion – Deceased appellant Surendra Munda’s termination quashed; heirs entitled to full arrears till date of death and eligible for compassionate appointment under scheme, if applicable [Paras 37–42].

Administrative Fairness – Government Conduct – State acted arbitrarily and without due process in terminating teachers despite clear eligibility and valid degrees—Court strongly deprecated such action [Para 38].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned judgments of the Jharkhand High Court in L.P.A. Nos. 83/2019, 332/2021, and 331/2021 set aside – Termination orders dated 07.10.2016 quashed – Appellants (Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom) reinstated with continuity and arrears – Legal heirs of deceased appellant (Surendra Munda) entitled to arrears till date of death and consideration for compassionate appointment – Compliance directed within three months.

Negotiable Instruments Act – Dishonour of Cheque – Complaint Against Trustee Without Trust as Party – Maintainability – Sections 138, 141, NI Act – Question whether complaint under NI Act is maintainable against the Chairman/Trustee of a Trust without arraying the Trust as an accused – Held: A Trust is not a juristic person capable of suing or being sued – It is an obligation, not an entity – Trustees alone are owners of trust property and must maintain and defend suits – Complaint maintainable directly against the Trustee who issued the cheque – No requirement to implead the Trust [Paras 23–29, 40–41].

Trusts Act – Legal Status of a Trust – Sections 3 and 13 – Trust lacks independent legal personality – Operates only through Trustees – Obligation to maintain and defend suits lies on Trustees, not the Trust – Trust cannot be equated with a “company” or “association of individuals” within the meaning of Section 141 NI Act – Trustees are answerable for acts done on behalf of Trust [Paras 22–27].

Vicarious Liability – Signatory of Dishonoured Cheque – Section 141 NI Act – Signatory of dishonoured cheque is directly responsible for the act and covered under Section 141(2) – No specific averment necessary regarding responsibility where accused is signatory or holds position analogous to Managing Director – Principle affirmed per SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89; K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48; S.P. Mani & Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan, (2023) 10 SCC 685 [Paras 17–20].

Juristic Person – Trust v. Company – Distinction – A Trust cannot be treated as equivalent to a company or corporate body for the purposes of NI Act – Trustees are liable in their individual capacities – Contrary High Court rulings equating Trusts with companies are erroneous and overruled [Paras 34–38].

Precedent – Co-equal Benches – Judicial Discipline – Later coordinate Benches cannot disregard earlier decisions of equal strength – If disagreement exists, reference must be made to larger Bench – Later Kerala HC ruling in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala (2023) held incorrect for ignoring binding coordinate decision in K.P. Shibu v. State of Kerala (2019) – Restatement of law from National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Union Territory of Ladakh v. J&K National Conference, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140 [Paras 32–33, 42–44].

Pending Reference – Effect of Larger Bench Referral – Though Pratibha Pratisthan v. Canara Bank, (2017) 3 SCC 712 is under reference to a Larger Bench (Tara Bai Desai Charitable Ophthalmic Trust Hospital v. Supreme Elevators India (P) Ltd., (2025) 3 SCC 80), it continues to hold the field till the Larger Bench decides otherwise – High Courts must follow prevailing law unless directed to await reference outcome [Paras 42–44].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s order quashing complaint under Sections 138/141 NI Act set aside – Complaint restored against Trustee who issued cheque – Held: A Trust has no separate juristic existence; proceedings under NI Act maintainable directly against the Trustee/Chairman who signed the cheque. Directions issued for expeditious trial.

Constitution of India – Article 233 – Appointment of District Judges – Eligibility – In-service Judicial Officers – Direct Recruitment – Interpretation of Clause (1) and (2) – Held: Both clauses form a complete code – Article 233(1) covers appointments, postings and promotions – Article 233(2) lays down qualification only for advocates/pleaders not in service – Judicial officers already in service are governed by Article 233(1) – No constitutional bar against their participation in direct recruitment – Textual and contextual reading must give effect to both clauses without rendering any part redundant [Paras 118–126].

Constitutional Law – Judicial Appointments – Article 233 – Eligibility of In-service Judicial Officers – Held: No constitutional bar against judicial officers competing in direct recruitment process for District Judges – Judicial officers having combined experience of seven years as advocate and judicial officer entitled to apply – Level playing field to be maintained between advocates and in-service candidates – Minimum age 35 years for both categories – Appointment to be based on merit through written examination and viva voce – No weightage to in-service candidates – Recruitment to Higher Judicial Service to continue in 50:25:25 ratio as per All India Judges Association v. Union of India (2010) 15 SCC 170 [Paras 155–161, 157–159, 172(i)–(v)].

Constitutional Law – Article 233(2) – Bar Quota – Reservation – Interpretation – The 25% direct recruitment under Article 233(2) is not an exclusive quota for advocates – Clause (2) only prescribes qualification for advocates/pleaders not in service – Reading it as a reservation for advocates would violate Article 14 and constitutional equality – Both advocates and judicial officers with requisite experience entitled to compete [Paras 164, 19–23 per Sundresh, J.].

Judicial Service – Independence of Judiciary – Article 50 – Separation of Powers – Held: Judicial officers are not “employees” of the State – They discharge sovereign judicial functions – To debar them from open competition would offend the constitutional principle of independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers – Recruitment and control over the judiciary is insulated from legislative and executive interference – Reliance placed on State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah, (2000) 4 SCC 640, and Registrar (Admn.), Orissa High Court v. Sisir Kanta Satapathy, (1999) 7 SCC 725 [Paras 8–13, 33–35 per Sundresh, J.].

Constitutional Law – Interpretation – Constitutional Silence – Doctrine Explained – Absence of express qualification for in-service candidates under Article 233(2) is a deliberate constitutional silence – Framers left it to the discretion of High Courts and Governors under Articles 233–235 – Such silence is not a gap but an intentional flexibility to preserve the independence and adaptability of the judiciary – Principle discussed in Bhanumati v. State of U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 1 [Paras 14–16 per Sundresh, J.].

Interpretation of Constitution – Textual and Contextual Reading – Harmonious construction required – Interpretation must give meaning to every word – Article 233(2) must be read so as not to render the words “not already in the service of the Union or of the State” redundant – Applying Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273, and RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co., (1987) 1 SCC 424 [Paras 114–125].

Constitutional Law – Equality Before Law – Article 14 – Exclusion of Judicial Officers from Direct Recruitment – Held: Such exclusion would amount to unconstitutional classification and deny equal opportunity – Would also amount to reservation in favour of advocates – Broader competition enhances merit and efficiency in judiciary [Paras 19–23, 153–155].

Judiciary – Efficiency and Merit – Object of Recruitment – Purpose of direct recruitment is to secure best talent for judicial service – Open competition between advocates and in-service judges fosters excellence and efficiency – Observations in Leela Dhar v. State of Rajasthan, (1981) 4 SCC 159, and Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, (2013) 4 SCC 540, relied upon [Paras 149–151].

Administrative Law – Shetty Commission Recommendations – Accepted – Commission found that allowing in-service judges to compete would promote efficiency, improve discipline and remove frustration – Recommended amendment to Article 233 to formalise such eligibility – Recommendations relied upon to interpret Article 233 in a progressive manner [Paras 128–134].

Professional Ethics – Rule 49, Bar Council of India Rules – Enrollment and Suspension – An advocate who joins judicial service only suspends right to practice; remains on Bar Roll – May resume practice after retirement – Such suspended status does not erase prior practice experience – Thus, judicial officers with pre-service Bar practice fulfil eligibility under Article 233(2) [Paras 140–145].

Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 29, 30, 33 read with BCI Rules – Continuous Experience – Candidate must have continuous seven years’ experience either as advocate or judicial officer, or combined, as on date of application – Discontinuous or interrupted practice not sufficient – Break in practice cannot be condoned [Paras 162–163].

Constitutional Law – Doctrine of Stare Decisis – Reconsideration of Long-standing View – Held: Doctrine not inflexible – Earlier rulings in Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Allahabad (1985) 1 SCC 225, and Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (2020) 7 SCC 401 misapplied Constitution Bench decisions in Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 123, and Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., 1966 SCC OnLine SC 35 – Earlier interpretation perpetuated injustice to judicial officers – Correct view restored – Satya Narain Singh and Dheeraj Mor expressly overruled [Paras 165–169, 172(vi)].

Constitutional Law – Judicial Review – Prospective Application – New interpretation to operate prospectively – Past appointments and completed selections not disturbed, except where protected by interim orders [Para 170].

Appointment Rules – Directions – All existing State rules inconsistent with present interpretation quashed – States directed to frame or amend recruitment rules in consultation with High Courts within three months – Uniform criteria to include combined seven-year experience, minimum age 35, and common competitive examination for advocates and judicial officers [Paras 174–175].

Separate Opinion – Per M.M. Sundresh, J. – Concurred with CJI – Emphasised that Article 233(1) itself covers both promotion and direct recruitment – Clause (2) provides qualification only for advocates – Constitutional silence permits High Court to fix eligibility for in-service candidates – Judicial independence and Article 14 mandate equal opportunity – Interpreting Article 233 to exclude in-service judges would violate basic structure and reduce judicial quality – Advocated open competition to secure excellence in judiciary [Paras 1–23].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Questions answered – In-service judicial officers with combined experience of seven years eligible to compete in direct recruitment for District Judges – Satya Narain Singh (1985) and Dheeraj Mor (2020) overruled – Directions issued to States and High Courts for rule amendment – Prospective application – No retrospective disturbance of existing appointments [Paras 172–175].