Economic Law – Royalty Computation – Writ Petition under Article 32 – Petitioners challenge the validity of Explanation to Rule 38 of the Mineral (Other than Atomic and Hydrocarbons Energy Minerals) Concession Rules, 2016 (MCR, 2016) and Explanation to Rule 45(8)(a) of the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 2017 (MCDR, 2017) – Contend that these provisions create a compounding effect by including previously paid royalty, District Mineral Foundation (DMF), and National Mineral Exploration Trust (NMET) contributions in the Average Sale Price (ASP) for subsequent royalty computations – Held: Mechanism of royalty computation falls within policy-making domain and does not exceed statutory authority – No basis for judicial intervention unless evidence shows clear illegality or constitutional violation – Petition dismissed, respondents directed to conclude public consultation on royalty policy reforms within two months [Paras 1, 45-61, 84-86].

Policy-Making – Judicial Restraint on Economic Decisions – Petitioners argue that compounding of royalty in ASP computation is arbitrary and contrary to Article 14 – Contention that differential treatment between coal and other minerals lacks rational basis – Court finds no intelligible differentia requiring ASP calculation to exclude royalty for coal but not other minerals – Held: Economic policy decisions warrant judicial deference unless shown to contravene statutory or constitutional boundaries – Complexity of royalty determination and fiscal impact on state revenues justify executive latitude in royalty policy – Judicial review limited to assessing legality, not merits of economic policies [Paras 46-49, 67-71].

Royalty on Royalty – Manifest Arbitrariness – Court examines whether inclusion of prior royalty payments in ASP calculation constitutes ‘royalty on royalty’ and manifestly arbitrary policy – Finds that Explanation in Rule 38 and Rule 45 clarifies computation of gross sale value and does not exceed or alter the main provisions – No statutory prescription prohibits inclusion of royalty, DMF, or NMET contributions – Explanation in Rules merely clarificatory and aligns with statutory scheme of MMDR Act, therefore, not arbitrary or unreasonable [Paras 15, 25-27, 45, 62-66].

Policy Adjustment for Minerals – Inconsistency in Treatment of Coal – Petitioners point to exclusion of royalty and contributions in ASP calculation for coal, arguing similar treatment should apply to iron ore and other minerals – Court acknowledges potential anomaly, but declines to mandate similar calculation method without statutory requirement – Observes that policy distinctions in royalty calculation may stem from fiscal considerations and economic impact assessments – Directive to respondents to complete public consultation to address compounding of royalty within two months [Paras 16, 72-76, 83-84].

Separation of Powers – Court’s Deference to Legislative and Executive in Economic Regulation – Citing established precedent, Court emphasizes deference to executive decisions in economic matters like royalty determination, especially where policy decisions involve technical expertise – Courts avoid reviewing wisdom or efficacy of such policies unless shown to breach legal or constitutional limits – Observes that courts should assume policy-makers act in good faith absent clear evidence otherwise, emphasizing judicial restraint in economic governance [Paras 46-57, 59-60].

Decision and Directions – Respondents granted 2 months to conclude public consultation on amendments to MMDR Act to address cascading royalty impact in ASP computation – Petition dismissed with liberty to petitioners to challenge final policy decision if respondents adopt revised rules – Registry to notify matter for compliance report after two months [Paras 84-86].

Public Employment – Doctrine of “Rules of the Game” – Non-Alteration of Criteria Mid-Recruitment – High Court’s recruitment process set a 75% cutoff for selection after exams were conducted – Candidates argued this changed the criteria mid-selection, violating fairness – Supreme Court held that recruitment benchmarks cannot change once the process starts, barring specific provisions in rules or advertisements permitting such modifications – Doctrine confirmed as preventing arbitrary changes that may disadvantage candidates or affect transparency [Paras 12, 13, 14, 41].

Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation – Fairness in Public Employment – Application of Articles 14 and 16 – Candidates have a legitimate expectation that selection criteria remain consistent throughout recruitment – Supreme Court underscored that altering criteria post-facto is contrary to the expectations grounded in fairness and predictability in state conduct – Held: Adjustments to eligibility or selection rules post-application are inherently unfair, breaching the doctrine of legitimate expectation and violating Article 14’s principle of non-arbitrariness [Paras 14-16, 21, 33].

Right to Appointment from Select List – Placement in Select List Not a Right to Appointment – Article 309 and Discretion of State – Court clarified that while candidates on the select list are eligible for consideration, they do not gain an indefeasible right to appointment – State maintains discretion under Article 309 to establish qualifying benchmarks for final selection, prioritizing public service efficiency and suitability for the role – Held: Inclusion in select list does not guarantee appointment unless rules prescribe otherwise [Paras 7, 41].

Decision:

The Supreme Court ruled that benchmarks and criteria for selection cannot be altered mid-process unless expressly permitted by rules. The decision in K. Manjusree v. State of A.P. (2008) was upheld, affirming that recruitment criteria changes post-initiation violate fairness principles. Appeal allowed; referred to an appropriate Bench for final disposal in line with the above findings.

Criminal Law - Quashing of FIR – Absence of Specific Allegations – Investigation Necessity – Appellant’s complaints centered on family disputes and alleged forced execution of property gift deeds to family members – Supreme Court found complaints lacked specific allegations against certain respondents (4th and 5th), noting that vague claims and considerable delay in filing the FIR weakened prosecutorial validity – Held: High Court’s quashing of FIR against the 4th and 5th respondents upheld due to lack of detailed accusations and appellant’s inability to substantiate claims against them [Paras 7-12].

Delay in Filing FIR – Impact on Quashing – Significance of Specific Accusations – Complaint filed over 16 months after executing gift deeds, despite awareness of alleged coercion earlier – Court emphasized that undue delay without substantial allegations against all respondents affects the legitimacy of an FIR in family property disputes – Held: Absence of specific, timely accusations undermined the appellant's challenge against quashment [Paras 5, 10].

Decision: Criminal appeal dismissed – Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's order partially quashing the FIR for the 4th and 5th respondents, emphasizing the insufficiency of specific accusations and substantial delay in filing the complaint.

Arbitration – Appointment of Arbitrator – Limitation and Time-barred Claims – Referral Court’s Scope – Petitioner sought appointment of an arbitrator for disputes arising from a Shareholders Agreement after the respondent’s delay in issuing shares and share certificates – Supreme Court examined whether the claims were time-barred for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) – Held: Referral courts must only examine the existence of an arbitration agreement and if an application is within the limitation period under Article 137 of Limitation Act, leaving substantive limitation issues for the arbitral tribunal [Paras 56-58, 72-75].

Limitation Period for Arbitration Petition – Applicability of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 – Arbitration notice issued by petitioner on 23/01/2017; respondents’ refusal dated 07/11/2017 – Supreme Court clarified that the three-year limitation period under Article 137 starts from the date of refusal by the respondents to arbitrate – Held: The application for appointment of an arbitrator filed on 09/04/2019 was within limitation, accounting for time in earlier Bombay High Court proceedings [Paras 65, 78].

Existence of Arbitration Agreement – Section 11 Referral Limited to Existence – Respondents argued claims were time-barred and non-arbitrable – Court reasserted that at the Section 11 stage, the court need only confirm the existence of an arbitration agreement, not delve into evidentiary issues or claims’ merits – Held: Arbitral tribunal to adjudicate on limitation and merits of petitioner’s claims [Paras 63, 85].

Decision:

Petitions allowed – Supreme Court appointed Mr. Mayur Khandeparkar as sole arbitrator for both disputes under the Shareholders Agreement. Tribunal permitted to address the limitation issue as a preliminary point. Costs of arbitration to be borne by the petitioner if claims are found to be time-barred.

Arbitration Law – Appointment of Arbitrator – Appeal under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Appellant (Goqii Technologies Private Limited) challenged High Court’s dismissal of arbitration application, seeking appointment of arbitrator under Clause 18.12 of Master Services Agreement (MSA) with the Respondent (Sokrati Technologies Private Limited) – High Court held no arbitrable dispute existed, as appellant’s claims lacked merit based on independent audit report – Held: High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by assessing merits and engaging in detailed factual analysis beyond prima facie review under Section 11 – Appeal allowed, and arbitrator appointed [Paras 2, 8-9, 16-18, 21-23].

Scope of Referral Court under Section 11 – Prima Facie Review – Court held that inquiry at the Section 11 stage is limited to determining the existence of an arbitration agreement – Referral court should not assess merits or dismiss claims as frivolous or dishonest unless they are ex-facie frivolous – Arbitrator can adjudicate issues of frivolity and bad faith, including awarding costs if claims are found abusive – Emphasis on arbitral tribunal’s competence to examine disputed facts rather than the referral court’s jurisdiction at Section 11 stage [Paras 10-12, 17-19].

Audit Report and Existence of Dispute – Independent audit report highlighted serious deficiencies in respondent’s services, including overcharging and poor performance – Appellant relied on audit findings to invoke arbitration – High Court erred in concluding no dispute existed based on auditor’s findings without allowing arbitration to proceed – Tribunal is better suited to review evidence and merits of claims in detailed hearings [Paras 5-6, 18].

Judicial Restraint in Arbitration Matters – Citing SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Krish Spinning and In Re: Interplay between Arbitration Agreements and the Indian Stamp Act, Court reaffirmed limited scrutiny by referral courts under Section 11 – Referral courts should defer to arbitral tribunal on factual disputes, as tribunal possesses competence to assess merits comprehensively, thereby preserving arbitration’s role as primary dispute resolution mechanism [Paras 17, 19].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Supreme Court appointed Mr. S.J. Vazifdar, former Chief Justice of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, as sole arbitrator to adjudicate disputes under the MSA. All legal objections are preserved for consideration by the arbitrator, who may assess the merits of the appellant’s claims and impose costs if claims are found to be abusive.

Criminal Law - Quashing of FIR – Offenses Against Society – Compromise Inadmissibility – FIR filed against a teacher for sexual assault on a minor under POCSO and SC/ST Acts – High Court quashed the FIR based on compromise between the accused and the victim’s father – Supreme Court held that heinous offenses with societal impact, such as sexual assault on minors, cannot be quashed merely due to a private settlement between the parties – Held: Such cases are offenses against society, not just individuals, and cannot be treated as private matters suitable for compromise [Paras 12-16, 33].

Locus Standi – Third-Party Intervention in Public Interest – Locus of Public-Spirited Citizens – Appellants, residents of the same area, challenged the quashment of the FIR – Court allowed locus for public-spirited citizens in cases where societal interests are implicated, reinforcing that societal concerns override strict party standing – Held: Third-party locus standi valid where societal interests and justice demand intervention against the quashing of heinous crimes [Paras 5, 10, 29].

Interpretation of Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Inherent Powers – Restriction on Quashing Serious Offenses – Supreme Court underscored that Section 482 powers are not to be exercised to quash serious crimes against society solely on private settlement grounds – Held: Courts must weigh the gravity and public impact of the offense before considering quashing based on compromise, particularly under special statutes like the POCSO Act [Paras 20-23, 30].

Decision:

Appeal allowed – Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the FIR, holding that sexual offenses against minors are serious societal offenses unsuitable for quashment on private compromise grounds. Investigative and judicial proceedings are to continue as per law.

Arbitration – Appointment of Arbitrator – Limitation and Time-barred Claims – Referral Court’s Scope – Petitioner sought appointment of an arbitrator for disputes arising from a Shareholders Agreement after the respondent’s delay in issuing shares and share certificates – Supreme Court examined whether the claims were time-barred for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) – Held: Referral courts must only examine the existence of an arbitration agreement and if an application is within the limitation period under Article 137 of Limitation Act, leaving substantive limitation issues for the arbitral tribunal [Paras 56-58, 72-75].

Limitation Period for Arbitration Petition – Applicability of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 – Arbitration notice issued by petitioner on 23/01/2017; respondents’ refusal dated 07/11/2017 – Supreme Court clarified that the three-year limitation period under Article 137 starts from the date of refusal by the respondents to arbitrate – Held: The application for appointment of an arbitrator filed on 09/04/2019 was within limitation, accounting for time in earlier Bombay High Court proceedings [Paras 65, 78].

Existence of Arbitration Agreement – Section 11 Referral Limited to Existence – Respondents argued claims were time-barred and non-arbitrable – Court reasserted that at the Section 11 stage, the court need only confirm the existence of an arbitration agreement, not delve into evidentiary issues or claims’ merits – Held: Arbitral tribunal to adjudicate on limitation and merits of petitioner’s claims [Paras 63, 85].

Decision:

Petitions allowed – Supreme Court appointed Mr. Mayur Khandeparkar as sole arbitrator for both disputes under the Shareholders Agreement. Tribunal permitted to address the limitation issue as a preliminary point. Costs of arbitration to be borne by the petitioner if claims are found to be time-barred.

Arbitration Law – Appointment of Arbitrator – Application for Arbitration – Respondent’s fresh petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, filed after withdrawing the first petition, was held time-barred and non-maintainable in the absence of court’s permission for re-filing – NCLT had previously entertained insolvency proceedings under IBC upon respondent’s application, which was later reversed by NCLAT due to a pre-existing dispute – High Court had appointed an arbitrator upon respondent’s fresh petition despite appellant’s objections on maintainability and limitation – Held: Principles underlying Order 23 Rule 1 of CPC, governing withdrawal and re-filing, can be extended to Section 11 applications – Respondent’s fresh petition, having no liberty granted by court at first withdrawal, was not maintainable [Paras 31, 53, 61].

Insolvency Proceedings vs. Arbitration – Distinct Relief – Application under Section 9 of IBC differs in objective and nature from arbitration applications under Section 11 – High Court incorrectly allowed benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act for excluding time spent in pursuing insolvency proceedings under IBC – Held: IBC proceedings serve a public, in-rem purpose for corporate rehabilitation, while arbitration is a private dispute resolution mechanism, focused on adjudicating specific contractual disputes – No entitlement to benefit under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act [Paras 97-106].

Limitation and Condonation of Delay – Section 5 of Limitation Act – Application of Section 5 for delay condonation in Section 11(6) petitions discussed – While Section 5 may apply to Section 11 petitions, discretion must be exercised strictly in favor of expeditious arbitration process – Given respondent’s strategic withdrawal of the first Section 11 petition to pursue insolvency proceedings despite awareness of a pre-existing dispute, court declined to exercise discretion for delay condonation [Paras 111-124].

Liberty to Pursue Arbitration Post-IBC Proceedings – Interpretation of Court’s Directions – Court’s dismissal of insolvency proceedings with liberty to pursue arbitration in “accordance with law” does not override procedural bars on time limitations or maintainability – Liberty to pursue remedies must align with statutory provisions and does not inherently bypass limitation periods [Paras 125-130].

Decision : Appeal allowed – High Court’s appointment of arbitrator under Section 11(6) set aside – Respondent’s petition held time-barred and non-maintainable – Respondent not entitled to relief under Sections 14(2) or 5 of the Limitation Act – Each party to bear its own costs [Paras 131-134].
 

Arbitration Agreement Interpretation – Seat vs. Venue Distinction – The Court addressed whether Dubai, designated as the arbitration "venue," also serves as the arbitration's "seat," which would impact jurisdiction for appointing an arbitrator. The petitioner argued for Indian jurisdiction due to non-exclusive language on Dubai courts, substantial business ties in India, and an absence of explicit seat designation. However, the Court upheld the principle that the "seat" of arbitration—when clear—is determinative of supervisory jurisdiction, prioritizing party autonomy [Paras 55-57, 58, 63-64].

Doctrine of Concurrent Jurisdiction – Applicability of Part I of the Act, 1996 – The Court examined the scope of Part I of the Act, clarifying it applies only to arbitrations seated in India, excluding Indian jurisdiction for foreign-seated arbitrations. The Court referenced BALCO’s holding, which rejected concurrent jurisdiction by Indian courts over foreign-seated arbitrations, confirming that only Dubai courts held jurisdiction in this instance [Paras 28, 63].

Closest Connection Test – Determining the Seat of Arbitration – The Court rejected the applicability of the Closest Connection Test, asserting that where an express "seat" or "venue" designation exists, it supersedes indirect inferences about party intent. The Dubai designation was upheld as the exclusive arbitration seat due to explicit references to the UAE’s governing law and jurisdiction, aligning with the Shashoua principle that "venue" reflects the seat unless contrary indications exist [Paras 53-57, 64].

Forum Non Conveniens – Dubai as the Exclusive Forum – The Court applied the doctrine of forum non conveniens, finding Dubai as the appropriate forum given the contractual designation of Dubai as "seat," UAE governing law, and the respondent’s Dubai location. This assessment reinforced Dubai's exclusive jurisdiction and denied the petitioner’s attempt to invoke concurrent jurisdiction in India [Paras 66-70].

Decision on Petition – Jurisdiction Over Arbitration Denied to Indian Courts - Held: With Dubai designated as the seat of arbitration and UAE law governing, the Indian courts lack jurisdiction under Section 11. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the exclusive jurisdiction of Dubai courts [Paras 72-73].