Environmental Law – Environmental Compensation – Powers of NGT – Project Cost as Yardstick – Project proponents undertook large-scale real estate construction without obtaining mandatory statutory permissions and continued work despite stop-work/closure directions – NGT held violations established and imposed environmental compensation – In case of RHYTHM, compensation enhanced from Joint Committee’s recommendation to ₹5 crores by adopting project cost as yardstick – Held: Sections 15 and 20 of NGT Act confer wide discretionary powers on NGT to mould relief – Adoption of project cost or turnover as a relevant metric is legally permissible where it bears rational nexus with scale and impact of violations – Compensation of ₹5 crores, being approximately 1.49% of project cost, neither arbitrary nor disproportionate [Paras 18–31, 46.1].

Polluter Pays Principle – Scope and Application – Environmental compensation must ensure deterrence and restitution – Larger projects impose greater environmental stress and possess higher capacity to bear costs – Linking compensation with economic magnitude of project aligns with principles of sustainable development and polluter pays – Absence of a rigid statutory formula does not denude NGT of power to determine compensation on case-specific basis [Paras 19–28].

CPCB Guidelines – Nature and Applicability – Not Statutory or Exhaustive – CPCB methodology for computation of environmental compensation is sector-specific and primarily tailored to industrial units – Guidelines are facilitative and indicative, not prescriptive – They do not fetter NGT’s statutory discretion – NGT entitled to rely on expert-driven and guideline-based frameworks while independently applying its mind to facts of each case [Paras 40–44, 46.4].

Expert Committees – Role – Judicial Function of NGT – Expert or Joint Committees assist NGT in fact-finding and technical assessment – Committee reports are not binding and cannot supplant adjudicatory function – In present cases, NGT independently evaluated committee findings, objections of project proponents and surrounding circumstances before determining liability and quantum – No abdication of judicial function established [Paras 42–44].

Environmental Violations – Distinction Between Regularised and Independent Infractions – In KEYSTONE’s case, post-facto EC obtained under one-time violation window covered certain past violations – However, prolonged construction without Consent-to-Establish, continuation despite closure directions and occupation without Consent-to-Operate constituted distinct statutory violations – NGT rightly imposed separate environmental compensation for such infractions [Paras 8–10, 46.3].

Turnover / Project Cost – Not a Mechanical Formula – Turnover or project cost cannot be used as a blunt or mechanical instrument – Must be applied with rationality, proportionality and reasoning – Permissible indicium where facts justify correlation between scale of operations, environmental impact and violator’s capacity – Present determinations fall within permissible judicial discretion recognised by Supreme Court precedents [Paras 25–39, 46.2].

Judicial Review – No Interference Warranted – Findings of violations supported by evidence and contemporaneous material – Compensation imposed proportionate to gravity, duration and scale of violations – Orders of NGT neither perverse nor arbitrary – Supreme Court declined interference [Paras 46–47].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Environmental compensation imposed by NGT upheld – Time to deposit compensation extended by three months – Parties to bear their own costs.

Public Interest Litigation – Maintainability – Stem Cell Therapy for ASD – Maintainable – The Supreme Court held the writ petition to be maintainable as it raised an issue of public importance concerning the regulatory framework for stem cell therapies for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), despite contentions regarding commercial interests – The petitioners were found to be bona fide, and no personal grievance was sought to be addressed [Paras 50-52].

Medical Negligence – Standard of Care – Stem Cell Therapy for ASD – Not Permissible as Routine Treatment – Medical practitioners owe a duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care, skill, and knowledge—Administering interventions lacking credible scientific evidence of safety and efficacy, or expressly advised against by authoritative medical bodies, fails to meet this standard—Stem cell therapy for ASD is not recognized as a "sound and relevant medical practice" based on current scientific knowledge and should not be offered as a standard or routine clinical service outside approved research/clinical trials [Paras 58, 63, 64, 70, 73, 75, 90, 151(ii), 151(vi)].

Medical Ethics – Professional Misconduct – Stem Cell Therapy for ASD – Constitutes Misconduct – The Ethics & Medical Registration Board (EMRB) of the National Medical Commission (NMC) recommendations (06.12.2022), approved by the NMC (28.03.2024), unequivocally state that the use, promotion, and advertisement of stem cell therapy for ASD constitute 'professional misconduct' due to the lack of adequate evidence—Medical practitioners indulging in such practices are liable for disciplinary action under the Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 / National Medical Commission Registered Medical Practitioner (Professional Conduct) Regulations, 2023 [Paras 26, 28, 67, 68, 70, 74, 140, 145, 151(iii), 151(vi), 151(xiii)].

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Definition of "Drug" – Stem Cells – Included – Autologous stem cells, even if not classified as "stem-cell derived products" under the New Drugs and Clinical Trial Rules, 2019 due to minimal manipulation, fall within the broader definition of "drugs" as 'substances' intended for treatment under Section 3(b)(i) of the Drugs Act, 1940—This ensures that protections under the Act are available for such therapies [Paras 103, 109, 151(i), 151(ix)].

Patient Rights – Informed Consent – Unproven Treatments – Invalid Consent – Patient autonomy allows choosing or refusing offered treatments but does not confer a right to demand unproven treatments—Valid consent requires "adequate information" about the treatment's nature, purpose, benefits, risks, and alternatives—For stem cell therapy in ASD, where scientific evidence is absent or inconclusive, adequate information cannot be provided, rendering consent invalid and leading to "therapeutic misconception," which is a gross violation of medical ethics [Paras 91, 94, 95, 96, 128, 130, 151(vii)].

Regulatory Framework – Stem Cell Research/Clinical Trials – Mandatory Clinical Trial Setting – Therapeutic use of stem cells for ASD is permissible only within an approved and monitored research/clinical trial setting—"Stem-cell derived products" (substantial manipulation) are regulated as "new drugs" under NDCT Rules, 2019—Stem cells with minimal manipulation are governed by "biomedical and health research" framework under Chapter IV of NDCT Rules, 2019, with Rules 15 and 16(4) making National Ethical Guidelines binding, which mandate that all stem cell research (except for hematopoietic stem cell transplantation for haematological disorders) must be undertaken as a clinical trial [Paras 113-119, 151(x)].

Statutory Interpretation – Executive Orders vs. Statutory Rules – DHR's Regulatory Role – Executive Order Non Est – Clause 2(vi) of the Order dated 03.03.2024, dissolving the National Apex Committee for Stem Cell Research and Therapy (NAC-SCRT) and stating "no regulatory role is anticipated to be carried out by DHR related to stem cell research," is in conflict with Rules 17 and 18 of the NDCT Rules, 2019, which mandate DHR oversight on Ethics Committees (ECs) for biomedical and health research—Executive instructions cannot supplant statutory rules; therefore, Clause 2(vi) of the Order dated 03.03.2024 is non est—The Department of Health Research (DHR) or its appointed authority must continue to monitor ECs reviewing clinical trials for stem cells [Paras 133-138, 151(xi), 151(xii)].

Commercial Practices – Stem Cell Banking and Processing – Regulation – Commercial banking of only Umbilical Cord Blood stem cells is permitted with Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO) licenses—Commercial banking of all other biological materials is prohibited until further notification—Any entity processing stem cells, even partially, must obtain necessary prior approvals for biomedical and health research or clinical trials [Para 147].

Legislative Reform – Regulatory Vacuum – Consolidation of Framework – The current fragmented legal framework for stem cell research leads to ambiguity and exploitation of patients—The Union, specifically the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW), is urged to consolidate rules, regulations, and guidelines, clearly define stem cells, establish specific clinical trial procedures, ensure patient safety and compensation, provide timelines for approvals, and create a dedicated monitoring authority (suggesting reconstitution of NAC-SCRT) [Paras 148-150, 152].

Transitional Arrangement – Ongoing Treatments – Continuity Permitted – Patients already undergoing stem cell therapy for ASD are permitted to continue their treatment to avoid detrimental effects from abrupt cessation—The Secretary, MoHFW, in consultation with officials of AIIMS and the National Medical Council (NMC), is directed to provide the best possible solution within four weeks to ensure these patients can continue receiving therapy until re-routed to institutions conducting approved clinical trials [Paras 153-154].

Decision: Matter treated as part heard – Specific directions issued for regulatory clarity, patient safety, and continuation of ongoing treatments under a transitional arrangement – Secretary, MoHFW, to file submissions within four weeks [Paras 153-155].

Constitutional Law – Right to Education – Article 21A, Constitution of India, 1950 – Affirmed – The right to education is a fundamental human right and a 'multiplier right' that enables the exercise of other human rights – it forms an integral part of the broader framework of the right to life and human dignity, which cannot be fully realized without meaningful access to education – the quality of education extends beyond textbooks and classrooms to include all conditions enabling effective learning and continuous schooling – inaccessibility of menstrual hygiene management (MHM) measures disrupts attendance, hinders concentration, and breaks the continuity of schooling, thereby violating Article 21A [Paras 17-20, 39, 128, 137, 172(a), 172(f)].

Constitutional Law – Right to Equality – Article 14, Constitution of India, 1950 – Affirmed – The substantive approach to equality under Article 14 demands that treatment be accorded with due regard to individual, institutional, systemic, and contextual barriers that impede the translation of rights in reality – the State, as a benefactor, is under a positive obligation to remedy such structural disadvantages – lack of menstrual hygiene management measures acts as a significant barrier to girls' participation in school and impedes equality of opportunity, perpetuating systemic exclusion and discrimination – differential treatment is constitutionally permissible when directed towards securing equal outcomes for the disadvantaged [Paras 41-47, 53-58, 99-102, 115-117, 126, 172(b), 172(e)].

Constitutional Law – Right to Dignity and Privacy – Article 21, Constitution of India, 1950 – Affirmed – The right to life under Article 21 encompasses the right to live with dignity, which is an essential and inseparable facet of human existence – dignity finds expression in conditions that enable individuals to live without humiliation, exclusion, or avoidable suffering – privacy is inextricably linked with dignity and secures the autonomy of human beings, enabling choices in intimate and personal matters – the inaccessibility of menstrual hygiene management measures undermines the dignity and bodily autonomy of a girl child, compelling unsafe practices or absenteeism – the State has a positive obligation to protect individual dignity and privacy [Paras 69-75, 77-83, 172(c)].

Constitutional Law – Right to Health – Article 21, 47, Constitution of India, 1950 – Affirmed – The right to life under Article 21 includes the right to health, which extends to the right to menstrual health – access to safe, effective, and affordable menstrual hygiene management measures helps a girl child attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health – Article 47 imposes a primary duty on the State to improve public health, which includes ensuring the availability of and enhancing access to MHM products – lack of MHM measures violates reproductive health and impedes the physical well-being and overall development of menstruating girl children [Paras 84-85, 91-94, 98, 172(d)].

Education Law – Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Sections 3, 19 – Interpreted – Section 3 of the RTE Act, guaranteeing free and compulsory education, implies the removal of all financial barriers, including expenses related to menstrual hygiene products, which, if not provided, convert a guaranteed right into a conditional one – Section 19 mandates that all schools, whether government-run or privately managed, must adhere to prescribed norms and standards, including "barrier-free access" and "separate toilets for boys and girls" – "barrier-free access" is interpreted substantively to include the provision of sanitary napkins, safe disposal mechanisms, and awareness programs, as their absence constitutes a constitutional failure and impedes effective education – the State cannot plead absence of funds as a justification for non-compliance with these mandatory norms and standards [Paras 134, 138-146, 147-153, 159-163, 172(f), 172(g)].

Social Justice – Menstrual Hygiene Management – Mandatory Implementation – Directed – Menstrual hygiene management is a shared responsibility, not solely a woman's issue, requiring education and sensitization for boys, parents, and male teachers to break stigma and foster an empathetic environment – the Court issued a continuing mandamus directing all States and Union Territories to ensure functional, gender-segregated, accessible toilets with water and hand-washing facilities in all schools – provide free oxo-biodegradable sanitary napkins (ASTM D-6954 standards) readily accessible through vending machines or designated authorities – establish MHM corners with essential supplies – ensure safe, hygienic, and environmentally compliant disposal mechanisms for sanitary waste – incorporate gender-responsive curricula on menstruation and related health concerns by NCERT/SCERT – adequately train and sensitize all teachers on menstrual hygiene – widely disseminate information on sanitary napkin availability and child helplines – District Education Officers (DEOs) must conduct annual periodic inspections, obtain anonymous student feedback, and ensure compliance, with NCPCR/SCPCR overseeing implementation [Paras 164-171, 173-176, 178-179].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Directions issued for mandatory implementation of menstrual hygiene management measures in all schools across India, with a continuing mandamus to the Union for compliance reporting – Paras [173-182].

Arbitration Law – Liquidated Damages – Delay in Commissioning Power Project – Public Utility Contract – Solar Power Developer failed to commission 20 MW project within stipulated time under Power Purchase Agreement executed under Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission – Delay of two months for first 10 MW and five months for remaining 10 MW admitted – Clause 4.6 of PPA provided for liquidated damages – Held: Clause attracted on admitted breach and delay [Paras 11–12].

Contract Act – Section 74 – Proof of Actual Loss – Public Interest Exception – Contention that employer must prove actual loss rejected – Supply of solar power under national mission held to be a project involving public interest and environmental concerns – In public utility projects, delay itself constitutes loss – Pre-estimated damages enforceable unless shown to be penal – Burden lies on defaulting party to prove absence of loss – Principle in Construction and Design Services v. DDA applied [Paras 12, 16].

Arbitration Act – Section 34 – Power to Modify Award – Majority arbitral award granting nominal damages of ₹1.2 crores interfered with by Single Judge – Single Judge enhanced compensation to 50% of contractual liquidated damages – Held: Modification permissible within limited jurisdiction under Section 34 – No re-appreciation of evidence or merits undertaken – Power to modify affirmed in light of Constitution Bench decision in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. [Paras 14–15].

Arbitration Act – Section 37 – Limits of Appellate Interference – Division Bench reduced compensation from ₹27.06 crores to ₹20.70 crores by recalculating damages – Held: Section 37 court cannot substitute its own view where Section 34 court exercised discretion reasonably and within contractual framework – Re-working of damages amounts to excess of jurisdiction – Appellate court confined to examining correctness of Section 34 exercise [Paras 18–19].

Liquidated Damages – Reasonable Compensation – Judicial Discretion – Single Judge determined contractual damages at ₹54.12 crores and awarded 50% as reasonable compensation – No finding of arbitrariness or perversity recorded by Division Bench – Reduction by Division Bench unjustified – Restoration of Single Judge’s determination warranted [Paras 17–19].

Decision: Appeals by NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd. allowed – Appeals by Saisudhir Energy Ltd. dismissed – Judgment of Division Bench set aside to extent it modified compensation – Judgment of Single Judge under Section 34 restored – Parties to bear own costs.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 29A – Extension of Time for Arbitral Award – Jurisdiction of Court – Divergent views of High Courts on whether application under Section 29A(4) lies before High Court or Principal Civil Court depending on mode of appointment of arbitrator – Supreme Court reframed issue holding distinction to be artificial and unnecessary – Held: Application under Section 29A lies before “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e), irrespective of whether arbitral tribunal was appointed by High Court under Section 11 or by parties by consent [Paras 5–6, 16, 20–24].

Statutory Interpretation – Defined Term “Court” – Section 2(1)(e) – Contextual Interpretation – High Courts relied on perceived hierarchy and conflict of power to exclude Civil Courts from Section 29A jurisdiction – Supreme Court rejected interpretation based on notions of superiority or hierarchy of courts – Held: Jurisdiction flows solely from statute and not from perceived institutional status – Definition under Section 2(1)(e) must apply unless statute expressly provides otherwise [Paras 17–20].

Arbitration Law – Section 11 – Nature of Jurisdiction – Appointment of Arbitrator – Scope – Power of High Court or Supreme Court under Section 11 is special, limited and stands exhausted upon appointment – Appointing Court becomes functus officio thereafter – Held: Section 11 does not confer any continuing supervisory or controlling jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings or over applications under Section 29A [Paras 13–15, 23–24].

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 29A(6) – Power to Substitute Arbitrator – Concern that Civil Court may substitute arbitrator appointed by High Court – Supreme Court held such concern legally unfounded – Power of substitution is statutorily vested in Court defined under Section 2(1)(e) – Appointment under Section 11 does not alter statutory curial jurisdiction [Paras 16, 20, 24].

Arbitration Proceedings – Section 42 – Exclusive Jurisdiction – Applicability – Argument that Section 11 application before High Court attracts Section 42 rejected – Held: Section 42 does not apply to Section 11 proceedings as Chief Justice or designate is not a “Court” within meaning of Section 2(1)(e) – Extension application under Section 29A must therefore lie before Principal Civil Court having jurisdiction [Paras 25–26].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Orders of the Division Bench and Single Judge of the Bombay High Court at Goa set aside – Order of the Commercial Court extending time under Section 29A restored – Parties at liberty to seek further extension before Commercial Court – No order as to costs.

Election Law – Scope of Interference in Appeal – Tenure Lapsed – Merits Not Examined – High Court declared appellant’s 2012 election void on ground of improper rejection of 955 postal ballots – Supreme Court notes tenure (2012–2017) already lapsed and declines to go into merits of election dispute – Held: Appeal not to be adjudicated on merits in present circumstances [Paras 1-2, 4, 8].

Election Petition – Interim Stay – Effect – Protection of Benefits – High Court’s operative directions not implemented due to Supreme Court stay dated 05/09/2016 – Appellant contended that benefits flowing from stay should not be denied if merits are not examined – Held: In interests of justice, adverse observations/directions of High Court in paras 53-56 set aside in view of subsisting interim stay and lapse of tenure [Paras 6-8].

Judicial Directions – Expunging Observations – Costs/Adverse Remarks – Withholding Benefits/Pension – Action Against Returning Officer – High Court’s observations included alleged delaying tactics by returned candidate – directions/observations that appellant should not get election benefits/pension as ex-MLA for 2012 election period – and recommendation of strict action against Returning Officer – Held: Observations in paras 53-56 of impugned order set aside while leaving merits untouched [Paras 3, 8].

Decision: Appeal allowed in part – High Court observations in paragraphs 53 to 56 set aside – Merits of election petition not examined due to lapse of tenure and in view of interim stay operating since 05/09/2016 [Para 8].

Public Interest Litigation – Demolition of Construction – Scope and Limits – High Court directed demolition of a completed residential building on privately owned land on the assumption that it was constructed on “khoai” land and in violation of environmental norms – Supreme Court held that demolition is a drastic and extreme measure which cannot be ordered on conjectures, assumptions or inferential reasoning without clear statutory backing and unimpeachable evidence – Interference with property rights must satisfy Article 300A of the Constitution [Paras 41–44, 56].

Land Use and Town Planning – “Khoai” Land – Legal Status – No category of land known as “khoai” exists under the revenue laws of West Bengal – Subject plot recorded as “danga” land and earmarked as “residential” under the Land Use and Development Control Plan, 2002 – Held: Descriptive, literary or ecological notions of “khoai” cannot substitute statutory classification or notification for imposing construction restrictions [Paras 6–7, 24(D), 40–43, 47].

Environmental Law – Reliance on Inspection Reports – District Magistrate and Pollution Control Board – High Court relied on reports to conclude that construction was illegal – Supreme Court found that neither report conclusively established that the subject plot itself was “khoai” land – Reports were based on conjectures, lacked scientific or technical assessment, and at best referred to adjacent areas – Held: Adjacent ecological sensitivity cannot automatically render privately owned residential plots non-developable [Paras 45–47].

Local Self-Government – Building Permission – Competent Authority – Gram Panchayat, Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samiti – High Court held Panchayat Samiti alone competent to grant permission – Supreme Court held that during the relevant period, consistent practice showed building plans were approved by Gram Panchayat with vetting by Zilla Parishad – Even assuming lack of competence, it constituted a curable procedural irregularity – Held: Such irregularity cannot justify demolition of a completed structure undertaken bona fide [Paras 33–36].

Conversion of Land – “Danga” to “Bastu” – Timing of Conversion – Conversion granted after commencement of construction – Supreme Court held that land-use classification is a revenue entry – Subsequent approval and regularisation by competent authorities, in absence of fraud or mala fides, cannot be ignored – No statutory mandate requiring demolition as an inevitable consequence of delayed conversion [Paras 34–35].

Environmental Jurisprudence – Sustainable Development – Santiniketan Area – Sui Generis Character – Court reaffirmed heightened responsibility of authorities in Santiniketan as laid down in Sushanta Tagore – However, preservation must operate within statutory framework – Held: No equality in illegality, but equally no presumption of illegality without law – Past or existing constructions cannot be selectively ignored to target one builder [Paras 12–13, 36–37, 55].

Public Interest Litigation – Bona Fides – Burden of Proof – PIL petitioners themselves owned residential structures within the same tract of land – Selective targeting of one construction undermined bona fides – Burden lies on PIL petitioners to establish illegality with clear, cogent and contemporaneous material – PIL cannot be used to resolve disputed questions of fact requiring evidentiary adjudication [Paras 48–55].

Adverse Remarks against Statutory Authorities – Expunction – High Court directed initiation of proceedings against officers of SSDA, Panchayat and Revenue Authorities – Supreme Court held such directions unsustainable in absence of deliberate violation or mala fide conduct – Subsequent compliance and corrective measures by SSDA noted – Adverse remarks and consequential directions expunged [Paras 57, 21].

Costs – Abuse of PIL Jurisdiction – Writ petition found lacking bona fides – Supreme Court imposed costs of Rs.1,00,000/- on writ petitioners payable to West Bengal Legal Services Authority [Para 58].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Judgment and order dated 21–22 August 2013 passed by the Calcutta High Court set aside – Directions for demolition, compensation and costs quashed – Adverse remarks against SSDA expunged – Costs imposed on writ petitioners – No order as to costs in appeals.

Advocates Act, 1961 – Professional Misconduct – Disciplinary Proceedings – Withdrawal of Complaint – Appellant-advocate held guilty by the Bar Council of India for alleged failure to ensure timely deposit of costs leading to dismissal of quashing petition – During pendency of disciplinary proceedings, complainant filed sworn affidavit withdrawing allegations and expressing satisfaction with advocate’s services – Held: Once the complainant withdraws the complaint and substratum of allegations ceases to exist, continuation of disciplinary proceedings is unsustainable [Paras 5–7, 10].

Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 38 – Statutory Appeal – Scope of Interference – Disciplinary Committee ignored material evidence in the form of sworn affidavit filed by the complainant – Failure to consider amicable settlement and withdrawal of grievance vitiates the disciplinary order – Impugned judgment liable to be set aside for non-consideration of vital material on record [Paras 7–8].

Professional Ethics – Principles of Natural Justice – Requirement of Proof – Finding of professional misconduct recorded without examination of complainant on oath and without affording right of cross-examination to the advocate – Held: Mere bald allegations in the complaint, without supporting evidence, cannot form the basis for holding an advocate guilty of professional misconduct [Para 9].

Disciplinary Jurisdiction – Bar Council of India – Penalty – Imposition of Fine and Suspension – Penalty of Rs.1,00,000/- with default suspension of one year imposed on advocate – Supreme Court held the order to be wholly unsustainable on facts and in law and set aside the same [Paras 10–11].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment dated 04/04/2025 passed by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India set aside – No order as to costs.

Wakf Act, 1995 – Jurisdiction of Wakf Tribunal – Scope and limits – Section 83 – Nature and ambit – Held: Section 83 does not by itself confer substantive jurisdiction on the Tribunal – It merely enables constitution of the Tribunal – Jurisdiction must flow from specific provisions of the Act – Interpretation in Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf reaffirmed [Paras 15, 37, 44–47].

Civil Court Jurisdiction – Ouster under Section 85 Wakf Act – Not absolute – Exclusion applies only to matters required by or under the Act to be determined by the Tribunal – Presumption in favour of civil court jurisdiction reiterated – Held: Tribunal jurisdiction and civil court ouster are confined strictly to powers expressly conferred under the Act [Paras 13–15, 18, 47].

Wakf Property – Determination of status – Sections 6 and 7 – Mandatory requirement of inclusion in ‘list of auqaf’ or registration under Section 37 – Held: Tribunal can decide whether a property is wakf property only if it is specified in the list of auqaf or entered in the Register of Auqaf – Properties outside the statutory list cannot be subjected to Tribunal adjudication [Paras 12, 14, 30, 44, 50].

Wakf by User – Claim based on recent user – Mosque allegedly established in 2008 – Requirement of long and immemorial user – Held: Question left open – Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to decide ‘waqf by user’ claim when property is not notified or registered as wakf [Paras 6, 50].

Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Rejection of plaint – Injunction simpliciter before Wakf Tribunal – Property not notified or registered as wakf – Held: Suit before Tribunal is barred for want of jurisdiction – Plaint liable to be rejected – High Court erred in affirming Tribunal’s jurisdiction [Paras 4, 5, 50].

Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013 – Expansion of definition of ‘list of auqaf’ under Section 3(g) – Nature of amendment – Held: Amendment is procedural and clarificatory – Enables Tribunal to decide disputes relating to properties entered in Register of Auqaf under Section 37 – Does not enlarge Tribunal’s jurisdiction beyond statutory framework [Paras 30–36].

Section 83 Wakf Act – Misinterpretation in later decisions – Anis Fatma Begum and Rashid Wali Beg considered – Held: Expansive interpretation of Section 83 contrary to earlier binding precedent – Coordinate Benches could not have taken divergent view without reference to Larger Bench – Ramesh Gobindram continues to hold the field except to the limited extent of eviction of encroachers post-2013 amendment [Paras 28–29, 39–49].

Eviction and Encroachment – Power of Tribunal – Source of jurisdiction – Held: Power to remove encroachers flows from Section 54(3) & (4) and not from Section 83 – Amendment Act, 2013 only removes the bar noted in Ramesh Gobindram regarding eviction – Does not otherwise expand Tribunal jurisdiction [Paras 12, 46, 49].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Orders of Wakf Tribunal and High Court set aside – Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC allowed – Suit before Wakf Tribunal rejected – Question whether property is a wakf left open to be agitated before competent forum in accordance with law [Paras 50–51].