Criminal Law - Acquittal - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307 and 120-B - Appellants challenged High Court judgment which set aside trial court conviction of twenty accused for murder and attempt to murder - Trial court had convicted twenty-two accused based on ocular evidence of injured and eyewitnesses - High Court reversed noting stereotypic identity in narration of roles and discordance between medical evidence and ocular version - Supreme Court held that High Court view was a reasonable and possible view and interference under Article 136 is unwarranted - Held - acquittal upheld - appeals dismissed - [Paras 1-49].

Criminal Law - Ocular testimony - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 3 - Stereotyped and identical depositions - Six witnesses attributed identical roles weapons and overt acts to twenty-three accused persons - High Court doubted veracity considering it an imprint of tutoring - Held - High Court justified in treating identical narratives with caution - [Paras 24-29].

Criminal Law - Medical evidence - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 45 - Conflict with ocular version - Eyewitnesses deposed that four persons continuously beat the deceased on the head with iron pipes whereas post-mortem revealed only a single laceration - Doctor admitted multiple continuous blows by four persons would either crush the head or cause multiple injuries - Held - medical improbability of the fatal assault undermines the prosecution version - [Paras 30-33].

Criminal Law - Unexplained injuries on accused - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 149 - Defence proved that four accused sustained injuries during the incident which were suppressed by the prosecution - Held - non-explanation of injuries creates doubt on the true genesis of the occurrence - [Paras 40-41].

Decision: Appeals dismissed - Impugned High Court judgment of acquittal affirmed - Bail bonds of the accused discharged.

Criminal Law - Cruelty by husband or relatives - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 498A - Appellant-husband and respondent-no.2 faced matrimonial discord leading to criminal complaints under Section 498A and other provisions - Appellant filed petitions under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings on the ground that a valid marriage is a sine qua non for Section 498A and they were never validly married - High Court dismissed petitions holding that the term husband must be given a purposive and expansive construction extending to live-in relationships bearing attributes of marriage - Supreme Court granted leave and considered whether Section 498A applies to live-in relationships - Supreme Court held that Section 498A applies to live-in relationships that qualify as relationships in the nature of marriage with the intent to marry being established as an intrinsic part thereof - held that the High Court was justified in refusing to quash proceedings as prima facie allegations disclosed cognizable offences - appeals disposed of with specific directions and safeguards - [Paras 1-24].

Criminal Law - Interpretation of penal statutes - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 498A - Strict interpretation versus purposive interpretation - Rule of strict construction of penal statutes does not warrant a narrow or pedantic construction that defeats the obvious intention of the legislature or leaves loopholes for offenders to escape - Held - socially reformative and beneficial legislations designed to curb public evils require purposive interpretation to advance the remedy and suppress mischief - [Paras 6, 9, 19].

Criminal Law - Live-in relationship - Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 - Section 2(f) - Relationship in the nature of marriage - Distinction between live-in relationships and relationships in the nature of marriage - Supreme Court held that not all live-in relationships amount to relationships in the nature of marriage - Only those live-in relationships that satisfy common law marriage criteria and possess the requisite intent to marry are entitled to the protection of Section 498A IPC - Held - higher standard of proof applies with initial burden on the female partner - [Paras 10-12, 21].

Constitutional Law - Right to equality and personal liberty - Constitution of India - Articles 14, 15 and 21 - Discrimination based on the form of relationship - Supreme Court held that distinguishing between married women and women in relationships in the nature of marriage regarding protection against domestic cruelty violates Article 14 as it lacks rational nexus with the object of preventing domestic violence - Right to choose a partner is an intrinsic part of individual autonomy and spatial and associational privacy under Article 21 - [Paras 15-18].

Criminal Law - Safeguards against misuse - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 41 - Arrest under Section 498A IPC - Supreme Court reiterated and underscored strict compliance with the safeguards and checklists against automatic arrest laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar - Held - no person in a relationship in the nature of marriage accused of cruelty shall be arrested without preliminary enquiries and strict adherence to statutory and judicial safeguards - [Paras 21, 23].

Decision: Appeals disposed of – High Court order refusing to quash proceedings upheld – Section 498A held applicable to live-in relationships satisfying relationship in the nature of marriage with intent to marry, subject to strict safeguards against arrest.

Civil Law - Court Fees - Court Fees Act 1870 - Section 8 - Land Acquisition Act 1894 - Section 54 - Appeal against award of statutory benefits - Ad valorem court fee - Decretal amount - Land was acquired for rehabilitation of Tehri Dam oustees - Reference Court partly allowed reference and granted statutory benefits (additional amount at 12% under Section 23(1-A), solatium at 30% under Section 23(2), and statutory interest under Section 28) under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 to the respondents-landowners - Appellant challenged the grant of these statutory benefits in First Appeal before the High Court - Appellant paid a fixed court fee of Rs. 10/- on the appeal valued at Rs. 2,34,03,602.05 - High Court, by impugned judgment dated 25.10.2017, directed the appellant to pay ad valorem court fee on the decreetal amount - Appellant contended that the grant of solatium and other statutory benefits does not amount to a determination or enhancement of compensation, and thus Section 8 of the Court Fees Act 1870, which is attracted only where an appeal challenges an enhancement or renewed determination of compensation, has no application - Supreme Court examined the provisions of the Court Fees Act 1870 and the Land Acquisition Act 1894, noting that Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of LA Act 1894 mandate payment of additional amount, solatium, and interest as incidents of compensation, not optional or collateral claims - Award of Reference Court is deemed a decree under Section 26(2) of LA Act 1894 - An appeal under Section 54 challenging any component of this decree, including statutory benefits, necessarily seeks modification of the decree itself - Relied on the authoritative pronouncements in Sunder v. Union of India and Indore Development Authority v. Tarak Singh and others, holding that statutory benefits form an integral part of compensation and an appeal against them attracts ad valorem court fee - Held - The High Court was correct in directing payment of ad valorem court fee as the appeal relates to 'compensation' within the meaning of Section 8 of the Court Fees Act - appeal dismissed - [Paras 1-25].

Civil Law - Land Acquisition - Land Acquisition Act 1894 - Sections 23(1-A) - 23(2) - 28 - Compensation - Solatium - Additional Amount - Interest - Statutory benefits under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 namely additional amount under Section 23(1-A) solatium under Section 23(2) and statutory interest under Section 28 are mandatory incidents of compensation flowing directly from the statute - These statutory additions are neither optional nor collateral - They are integral and inseparable components of the compensation awarded and not independent statutory claims - The award passed by the Reference Court comprises one composite determination of compensation under the Act - Held - These components form an integral part of the compensation and cannot be compartmentalized or segregated from the award for the purpose of determining the nature of compensation - [Paras 12-16].

Civil Law - Statutory Interpretation - Court Fees Act 1870 - Section 8 - Fiscal Statute - The Court Fees Act 1870 is a fiscal statute and its provisions are required to be construed strictly - Section 8 mandates that court fee shall be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant - It makes no distinction between various constituents of compensation - An erroneous acceptance of deficient court fee by the Registry or even by the Court cannot confer any vested right upon the litigant nor dispense with compliance with the statutory mandate - Court is fully empowered to require payment of the deficit court fee after affording a reasonable opportunity - Held - The plain language of Section 8 must receive full effect in the absence of any express legislative provision by the State of Uttarakhand excluding statutory benefits from computation of court fee or prescribing payment of a fixed court fee - [Paras 11, 21-22].

Civil Law - Precedent - Land Acquisition Act 1894 - Section 26(2) - Court Fees Act 1870 - Section 8 - Award as Decree - Ad valorem court fee - The award passed by the Reference Court under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is deemed to be a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure - An appeal under Section 54 of the LA Act 1894 challenging such decree, even if seeking reduction or exclusion of only statutory benefits, seeks modification of the decretal compensation and therefore attracts ad valorem court fee under Section 8 of the Court Fees Act 1870 - Previous High Court decisions that treated statutory benefits as independent of compensation for court fee purposes were rendered prior to authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court and are no longer good law - Held - The ratio of Indore Development Authority v. Tarak Singh and others squarely governs the controversy, establishing that an appeal against the decree awarding compensation, including its statutory components, attracts ad valorem court fee - [Paras 17-20].

Decision: Civil Appeal dismissed – High Court to proceed with the First Appeal in accordance with law – Amount deposited in fixed deposit to be transferred to the account of the High Court.

Criminal Law - Evidence Law - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 299 - Admissibility of prior evidence - Absconding accused - Fresh trial - Two accused charged with murder in 1999 - Appellant absconded, other accused tried and acquitted - Appellant arrested in 2017 and tried - Crucial witness (PW1) expired, other eyewitnesses turned hostile - Trial Court and High Court relied on PW1's earlier testimony recorded in the co-accused's trial - Supreme Court examined Section 299 CrPC - Held - For evidence recorded in the absence of an absconding accused to be used in a subsequent trial, the court must have passed an order under Section 299 CrPC at the time of recording, conclusively finding proof of both jurisdictional facts-that the accused was absconding and there was no immediate prospect of arresting him - In this case, no such order was passed in 1999 when the evidence was recorded - Prosecution failed to establish the jurisdictional facts to allow reliance on PW1's prior testimony - Appellant acquitted - [Paras 2, 11-14].

Evidence Law - Criminal Law - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 299 - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 33 - Jurisdictional facts - Right of cross-examination - Section 299 CrPC is a two-part provision - First part for recording evidence in the absence of an accused upon satisfaction of abscondence and no immediate prospect of arrest - Second part for using such evidence in a subsequent trial if the witness is unavailable (dead, incapable, cannot be found without unreasonable delay/expense) - This provision is an exception to the general rule under Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, regarding the indefeasible right to cross-examine - An accused who deliberately absconds to frustrate investigation and trial cannot claim the benefit of cross-examination - Held - Strict compliance with establishing these jurisdictional facts is mandatory for invocation of Section 299 - [Paras 2-3, 6-9].

Criminal Law - Procedural Compliance - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 299 - Conjunctive conditions - Satisfaction of court - The two jurisdictional facts required for invocation of Section 299 CrPC, namely, the accused absconding and there being no immediate prospect of arresting him, must be read conjunctively and not disjunctively - Satisfaction of one requirement is not sufficient - The court must record a definite categorical finding based on cogent evidence - Held - Both conditions must be proved to the satisfaction of the court for an order under Section 299 to be valid and for subsequent reliance on the recorded testimony - [Paras 6-8].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Appellant acquitted of charges – Appellant to be released if in custody, or bail bonds cancelled if already on bail.

Civil Law - Specific Performance - Specific Relief Act 1963 - Section 20 - Discretionary relief - Clean Hands - Continuous Readiness and Willingness - An Agreement to Sell was executed in 2004 - Dispute arose over consideration and advance payments - Defendant No. 1 revoked a Power of Attorney granted to Plaintiff No. 2 (husband of Plaintiff No. 1) alleging misuse through a sub-agreement for a lower consideration - Criminal complaints were filed by both parties, with Plaintiff No. 2 seeking recovery of advance money and alleging fraud by Defendant No. 1 - The Trial Court denied specific performance finding the plaintiffs had not approached with clean hands as Plaintiff No. 2's criminal complaint explicitly sought money recovery and stated he would not have entered the agreement if aware of an injunction, an averment Plaintiff No. 1 never disowned or testified against - The Trial Court decreed only a refund of the advance amount - The High Court reversed this, granting specific performance, holding Plaintiff No. 2's complaint was a "counterblast" and Plaintiff No. 1, the actual vendee, showed readiness and willingness including producing a demand draft during the appeal - The Supreme Court, exercising its discretionary powers under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, reversed the High Court, finding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness, exhibited inconsistent conduct by previously asserting assignment of rights to a third party but denying it in the current suit, and by pursuing criminal proceedings for money recovery while simultaneously seeking specific performance, thereby "blowing hot and cold" - The Court emphasized that specific performance is an equitable remedy requiring the party seeking it to act with clean hands and that even a slight doubt about the plaintiff's bona fides or withholding material facts justifies denial of relief - Furthermore, the long lapse of two decades since the agreement, coupled with the advanced age of Defendant No. 1 and the demise of Plaintiff No. 2, rendered specific performance inequitable due to hardship to the defendant - Held - The High Court erred in granting specific performance by overlooking the plaintiffs' lack of continuous readiness and willingness and inconsistent conduct, and by misapplying the "clean hands" doctrine - The Trial Court's judgment denying specific performance and granting refund was correctly founded on these principles - appeal allowed - [Paras 23-24, 28, 32, 33, 38-39, 45-48, 51-52].

Civil Law - Specific Performance - Specific Relief Act 1963 - Section 16(c) - Readiness and Willingness - For specific performance, plaintiff must prove continuous readiness and willingness from agreement execution to decree execution - The High Court erroneously concluded readiness based on a demand draft produced during appeal and the defendant's failure to specifically plead lack of funds - The Supreme Court noted that two initial cheques from plaintiffs were dishonoured for insufficient funds and that a Memorandum of Understanding relied upon to show funds was not mentioned in earlier pleadings and its associated sale deed was executed after the suit filing, indicating a lack of funds at the time of instituting the suit - Held - Plaintiffs failed to establish continuous readiness and willingness - [Paras 16-17, 33, 38-39, 41].

Civil Law - Specific Performance - Maintainability of Suit - Unilateral Termination of Contract - Where a vendor unilaterally cancels an agreement for sale without a contractual right to do so, it amounts to a breach by repudiation - The vendee is entitled to treat such termination as ineffective and sue for specific performance without seeking declaratory relief that the termination is invalid, especially if the validity of termination has already been adjudicated by the Trial Court - Held - Suit was maintainable - [Paras 36-37].

Civil Law - Appeals - Civil Procedure Code 1908 - Order XLI Rule 22 - Cross-Objections - A respondent supporting a decree may impugn an adverse finding without filing cross-objections under Order XLI Rule 22 CPC, provided no additional relief beyond what the decree already grants is sought - Held - Defendant No. 1 was entitled to assail the readiness and willingness finding without filing cross-objections - [Para 35].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned judgment and decree of the High Court set aside – Judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court restored – Plaintiffs permitted to withdraw the deposited amount with accrued interest – No order as to costs.

Civil Law - Compensation for death due to stray animal - Article 226 of the Constitution of India - Maintainability of writ petition involving disputed facts - Delayed adjudication - Deceased Vijay Kumar hit by stray bull in 2007 leading to head injury and eventual death - Widow Nisha filed writ petition after initial claim for compensation and legal notice failed - Single Judge awarded Rs. 29.32 lakhs compensation with 6% interest from 1st September 2012 by applying Motor Vehicles Act 1988 principles - Division Bench set aside Single Judge's order holding writ petition non-maintainable due to "disputed questions of fact" - Supreme Court observed that the incident was reported to police an FIR was lodged and the factum of the incident was never questioned or denied by respondents - Deputy Commissioner denied compensation citing lack of funds not disputed facts - Emphasized the long efflux of time (2007 incident 2010 writ 2019 Single Judge order 2025 DB order) making a Civil Court remedy unjust and inequitable - Noted that Punjab Government had later introduced bye-laws for compensation in such incidents from 2020 onwards (Rs. 5 lakhs for death Rs. 2 lakhs for permanent incapacitation) but no quantified amount for prior incidents - Held - In the specific facts and circumstances of this case considering the undisputed nature of facts and the considerable delay the writ petition was maintainable - a lump sum compensation of Rs.15 lakhs awarded - this order passed in attending facts and circumstances and shall not be treated as a precedent - [Paras 2, 4-8, 24-25].

Constitutional Law - State's Duty - Constitution of India - Article 48, 51-A(g) - Animal Welfare and Management - State's obligation to protect animals and prevent their suffering - Recognition of animal life as having inherent dignity - Article 48 (Directive Principle of State Policy) implores organisation of agriculture and animal husbandry on modern methods and prevention of cow slaughter - Article 51-A(g) (Fundamental Duty) enjoins citizens to have compassion for living creatures - Court observed that animals roaming on roads and causing accidents constitutes "unnecessary pain and suffering" - Highlighted the prevalence of bovine-related incidents and their impact on human life and safety citing statistics of persons killed by animals - Held - State and citizens have a constitutional obligation towards animal welfare preventing stray animal menace and ensuring public safety from such incidents - [Paras 9-12, 16].

Civil Law - Public Liability - Stray Animals - Cattle Trespass Act 1871 - Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1960 - Mechanism for management of stray cattle - Review of existing Central and State laws (e.g. Cattle Trespass Act PCA various state-specific Gau-Seva Acts and Municipal Corporation Acts) regarding establishment of pounds gaushalas and institutions for care of uneconomic/stray cattle - Highlighted provisions for impounding powers registration tagging and appointment of welfare officers - Noted the issue of owners abandoning animals once their utility diminishes contributing to the stray animal problem - Held - A robust legal and administrative framework exists for stray cattle management but implementation is key to reducing incidents and ensuring public safety - [Paras 13-19, 21-23].

Civil Law - Directions to Government - Public Safety - Compensation for accidents due to stray bovines - Supreme Court suggestions to Centre and State Governments for consideration and implementation - Directions include ensuring complete and immediate implementation of existing state laws pertaining to cattle - developing mechanisms for payment of compensation in all bovine-related accidents (pedestrian or vehicular) - mandating tagging of all animals for health tracking - holding owners responsible for safe transfer of uneconomic animals to shelters - and appointing nodal officers in every Corporation/Department for tagging digitisation of records and shelter management - Held - Directions issued for proactive measures to address the systemic issue of stray animal accidents and ensure public safety - [Para 26].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Compensation of Rs. 15 lakhs awarded to the appellant to be remitted within four weeks – Copy of judgment to be sent to Chief Secretaries of all States Administrators of all UTs and Member Secretary of State Legal Services Authority for appropriate action.

Matrimonial Law - Maintenance - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 125(4) - Interim maintenance - Adultery as a bar - Appellant husband alleged wife's adultery and filed an application under Section 125(4) CrPC seeking denial of interim and final maintenance, presenting electronic evidence (photographs/CDs) - Trial Court dismissed the application, holding that authenticity of evidence could only be determined during final adjudication of the main maintenance petition, and subsequently granted interim maintenance - High Court upheld the Trial Court's order, stating that there is no provision in CrPC mandating adjudication of adultery as a preliminary issue before deciding interim maintenance - Supreme Court held that both courts erred in deferring the decision on Section 125(4) CrPC - The provision explicitly bars maintenance if adultery is proved, applying to both interim and final maintenance - If clear and cogent ex-facie evidence of adultery is presented, interim maintenance should become a non-starter - Remanded the matter to the Trial Court to decide the Section 125(4) application on merits based on the evidence presented - Held - The issue of adultery under Section 125(4) CrPC can and must be decided prior to the final adjudication of the maintenance application if ex-facie evidence is presented to establish the charge - [Paras 2-5, 9-16, 19-24].

Civil Law - Maintenance - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 125 - Object and Nature - Proceedings under Section 125 CrPC are summary and civil in nature, designed for speedy relief to prevent vagrancy and destitution for those unable to maintain themselves - The standard of proof is not beyond reasonable doubt - The provision is secular and applies irrespective of religion - Orders made are subject to final determination by the Civil Court - Given its beneficent nature, the provisions must be interpreted liberally - Held - The intent of Section 125 CrPC is to ensure dignified life and accountability, necessitating a liberal interpretation of its provisions - [Paras 5, 6-6.8, 7].

Criminal Law - Maintenance - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 125(4) - Bar to maintenance - Conditions for denial - Section 125(4) CrPC stipulates that no wife is entitled to maintenance if she is living in adultery, or refuses to live with her husband without sufficient reason, or lives separately by mutual consent - This bar applies to both interim and final maintenance - The determination of such an application is crucial and can occur between the order granting interim maintenance and the final adjudication - Held - Proof of adultery under Section 125(4) CrPC, if established by clear and cogent ex-facie evidence, is a definitive bar to the grant of maintenance, including interim maintenance - [Paras 2, 9, 10, 12-14, 16-18].

Evidence Law - Electronic Evidence - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 65B - Admissibility - Private Investigations - The Court noted concerns regarding the admissibility of electronic evidence like photographs and videos, particularly when procured by private investigators - Verification of authenticity and originality, especially under Section 65B IEA, is mandatory for electronic records - Raised issues of privacy rights, data protection, and the unregulated nature of private investigative agencies - Highlighted that evidence from private investigations is not recognized as investigation under law - Referenced the dormant Private Detective Agencies (Regulation) Bill, 2007 - Directed the Ministry of Law and Justice and the Law Commission of India to review and propose a regulatory framework for private investigators - Held - Electronic evidence from private investigators must strictly conform to Section 65B IEA for admissibility, and the legislature must address the absence of a regulatory framework for such agencies - [Paras 3.3, 18, 20-24].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 04.02.2025 set aside – Matter remanded to the Trial Court to decide the appellant's application under Section 125(4) CrPC on merits – Copy of judgment to be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, and Chairman, Law Commission of India for review on private investigation regulation.

Criminal Law - Quashing of FIR/Criminal Proceedings - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 406 and 420 - Abuse of Process of Law - Commercial Dispute given Criminal Colour - Appellants (landowners) entered into an unregistered Joint Development Agreement (JDA) with Respondent No.2 (complainant/developer) to develop an unapproved property - Complainant paid Rs.3 crore refundable security deposit and was given a General Power of Attorney (GPA) - Planning permission rejected due to unapproved layout - Appellants unilaterally cancelled GPA and sold property to a third party without refunding deposit - Complainant alleged dishonest intention and suppression of facts from inception - Filed complaint leading to FIR under IPC Sections 406, 420 - High Court refused to quash criminal proceedings - Supreme Court noted that the dispute was essentially civil, with arbitration proceedings already invoked by appellants, and an arbitral award passed and challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act - Court held that mere payment of refundable security deposit as consideration for GPA did not constitute entrustment for criminal breach of trust, nor was there sufficient material to prove dishonest intention at the inception for cheating - Further held that the offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating cannot co-exist on the same set of facts for the same property - Observed that the complainant failed to conduct due diligence of the property's unapproved status - Held - The allegations in the FIR and chargesheet did not prima facie disclose the commission of offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC - continuation of criminal proceedings would be nothing but a sheer abuse of the process of law - High Court erred in dismissing the quashing petition - [Paras 2-9.3].

Criminal Law - Criminal Breach of Trust - Cheating - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 405 and 415 - Essential Ingredients - Mutual Exclusivity - Court reiterated that for cheating, fraudulent or dishonest intention must be proved from the very inception of the transaction, while for criminal breach of trust, entrustment of property and subsequent dishonest misappropriation are essential - Held - These two offences cannot co-exist simultaneously on the same set of facts involving the same property - [Paras 7.1-7.3, 8.1-8.8].

Criminal Law - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 482 - Constitution of India - Article 226 - Bhajan Lal Principles - Civil dispute - Court cited State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal and Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd., noting the growing tendency to convert civil disputes into criminal cases - Emphasized that courts should exercise powers under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution to prevent abuse of process where allegations do not prima facie constitute an offence or proceedings are mala fide - Held - Categories (1), (3), (5) and (7) enumerated in Bhajan Lal are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, warranting quashing of the criminal proceedings - [Paras 8.10, 9.1-9.2].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court judgment and order dated 28.03.2025 set aside – Crl. O.P No.15131 of 2023 allowed – FIR No.181 of 2021, chargesheet dated 23.03.2023, and criminal case C.C. No.2776 of 2023 quashed – Parties free to pursue appropriate civil remedies on their own merits in accordance with law.

Criminal Law - Right to Appeal - The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 374 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Section 415 - First-time conviction by appellate court reversing acquittal - Maintainability of second appeal to High Court - Appellant, husband, initially acquitted by Judicial Magistrate First Class (Trial Court) of offences under IPC Sections 498-A, 323, 34 and Dowry Prohibition Act Sections 3, 4 - Complainant-wife filed appeal before Sessions Court under Section 419 BNSS (Section 378 CrPC) - Sessions Court reversed acquittal, convicted Appellant for the first time, and sentenced him, while affirming acquittal of his parents - Appellant filed appeal to High Court under Section 415 BNSS (Section 374 CrPC) challenging this conviction - High Court dismissed appeal on maintainability grounds, holding only a Revision Petition was available, relying on judgments from Karnataka and Madras High Courts and Rule 48 of Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules (regarding surrender) - Appellant contended this was his first effective appeal against conviction, denying substantive statutory right and Article 21 constitutional guarantee - Argued against narrow interpretation of "convicted on a trial" to mean only conviction by a trial court - State and Complainant contended no second statutory appeal is provided, and remedy is revisional jurisdiction only - Supreme Court reiterated that right of appeal is a creature of statute and cannot be judicially legislated or expanded on equitable grounds - Distinguished trial jurisdiction from appellate jurisdiction - Held that the expression "on a trial held by" in Section 374 CrPC refers exclusively to a conviction by the court which conducted the entire original trial proceedings, commencing with framing of charges and culminating in judgment/sentence - It does not encompass a conviction recorded by an appellate court exercising appellate jurisdiction, even if it is the first conviction for the accused - Overruled the contrary interpretation in Arun Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh - Held that the remedy available to the appellant is to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Sections 397 and 401 CrPC (corresponding Sections 438 and 442 BNSS) - Emphasized the qualitative difference between appellate and revisional jurisdiction, but directed that in cases of first-time conviction by an appellate court reversing an acquittal, High Courts should adopt a more liberal and careful approach in exercising revisional powers, including employing appellate powers under Section 401(1) CrPC to prevent miscarriage of justice, while adhering to the statutory limitation against converting acquittal into conviction in revision - Held - Appeal to High Court under Section 374 CrPC (415 BNSS) against conviction by Sessions Court in appellate jurisdiction is not maintainable - [Paras 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 27-61].

Criminal Law - Appellate Jurisdiction - The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Sections 372, 374 - Appeal as creature of statute - Brief facts - Appellant sought to appeal against a first-time conviction by an appellate court which had reversed his acquittal - Ratio Decidendi - The right of appeal is not an inherent or natural right but a substantive statutory right, existing only where expressly conferred by law - Courts cannot, on considerations of equity, convenience, or perceived legislative omission, create or enlarge a right of appeal, as this would amount to judicial legislation - The statutory scheme strictly delineates the circumstances and forum for appeals - Held - In the absence of an express statutory provision, no appeal can be maintained - [Paras 14-18, 28-32].

Criminal Law - Interpretation of Statutes - The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 374 - Meaning of "on a trial held by" - Brief facts - The meaning of "on a trial held by" in Section 374 CrPC (415 BNSS) was crucial to determine appeal maintainability - Ratio Decidendi - The expression "on a trial held by" signifies a conviction founded upon or arising out of a trial, where the entire trial process, from framing of charges to judgment and sentence, was conducted by the Court of first instance - It clearly distinguishes between original trial jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction - A conviction by an appellate court, even if it's the first conviction for the accused and is based on re-appreciation of evidence from the original trial, does not constitute a conviction "on a trial held by" that appellate court - Held - The Sessions Court, when reversing an acquittal, exercises appellate jurisdiction, not original trial jurisdiction, and therefore its conviction is not appealable as if it were a trial court conviction - [Paras 19-26, 33-39].

Criminal Law - Revisional Jurisdiction - The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Sections 397, 401 - Distinction from Appellate powers - Brief facts - Appellant argued revisional jurisdiction is not an adequate substitute for appellate jurisdiction for a first-time conviction by an appellate court - Ratio Decidendi - Appellate jurisdiction permits comprehensive re-appreciation of evidence, facts, and law, treating the appeal as a continuation of original proceedings - Revisional jurisdiction is supervisory, discretionary, and primarily confined to correcting jurisdictional errors, legal infirmities, procedural irregularities, or manifest perversity, not a full re-hearing on facts - However, Section 401(1) CrPC empowers the High Court, in revision, to exercise any powers of an appellate court - In cases where an accused is convicted for the first time by an appellate court reversing an acquittal, thereby being deprived of a statutory appeal against conviction, the High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction should adopt a more liberal and careful approach, invoking appellate powers under Section 401(1) to ensure effective remedy against patent illegality, perversity, or miscarriage of justice, while respecting the prohibition against converting an acquittal into a conviction in revision - Held - Revisional jurisdiction, thus exercised, serves as a calibrated safeguard, preserving legislative intent while ensuring justice - [Paras 40-50, 51-60].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – High Court's order dismissing the criminal appeal on maintainability affirmed – Appellant given liberty to file a revision petition against the Sessions Court's conviction order.