Criminal Law – Dowry Death – Section 498A IPC – Cruelty – Acquittal of Father-in-Law – No Direct Evidence of Individual Role – Conviction of appellant Narendra Singh (father-in-law) under Section 498A upheld by High Court challenged – Prosecution case: deceased died of 55% burn injuries on 22.04.2001, within nine months of marriage; first dying declaration recorded by Executive Magistrate (PW-18) on 16.04.2001 stated husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law poured kerosene and set her on fire after stuffed cloth in mouth; second dying declaration recorded by DSP (PW-22) on 17.04.2001 stated deceased poured kerosene herself and set herself on fire – Held: No direct evidence implicating Narendra Singh in mental cruelty or dowry demand; allegations against him generic; prosecution failed to establish charge under Section 498A IPC beyond reasonable doubt; conviction set aside [Paras 25–29].

Dying Declaration – Evidentiary Value – Conflicting Declarations – Second Declaration Preferred – First dying declaration recorded by PW-18 (Tehsildar/Executive Magistrate) found doubtful as PW-18 deposed in cross-examination that a person present with the deceased in hospital had tutored her to depose in a particular manner – Second dying declaration recorded by PW-22 (DSP) wherein deceased stated she poured kerosene herself, held more reliable – Variation in the two declarations on the manner of death casts doubt on their veracity – Held: First declaration falls foul of settled principles governing dying declarations; conviction cannot safely be sustained on the basis of the same [Paras 23–25].

Witness Testimony – Family Witnesses – Interested Witnesses – Improvements in Examination-in-Chief – PW-1 (father), PW-2 (mother), PW-3 (uncle) and PW-5 (brother) all deposed to dowry demands and cruelty in examination-in-chief, but none of them had disclosed the factum of dowry demand in their statements under Section 161 CrPC before the police – Witnesses attributed omissions to the police but offered no credible explanation – Testimonies marked by uniform improvements across all witnesses suggesting afterthought; not corroborated by any independent witness – Neighbours (PW-7, PW-8, PW-9) turned hostile; PW-10 (neighbour) stated deceased complained of disliking small-town life and that accused Narendra Singh and Leela Singh were on a walk with her husband at the time of the incident – Held: Testimonies of interested witnesses, riddled with contradictions and improvements, unsafe to rely upon in absence of corroboration [Paras 17–18, 20, 22, 27–28].

Dying Declaration – Principles Governing – Law Summarised – Dying declaration can form the sole basis of conviction but need not be corroborated as an absolute rule of law; each case to be determined on its own facts; declaration recorded by a competent Magistrate in proper form stands on a higher footing; court must consider whether statement was made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties [Para 24] — Relied upon: Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 20.

Circumstantial Evidence – Panchsheel Principles – In criminal trial two inferences possible, the one favouring accused to be accepted – Circumstances must be fully established, consistent only with guilt, conclusive in nature, excluding every other hypothesis, and forming a complete chain leaving no reasonable ground for innocence – Held: Prosecution failed to establish a complete chain; benefit of doubt to accrue to accused [Para 25] — Relied upon: Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992) 2 SCC 86.

Misuse of Section 498A IPC – Courts to Guard Against Roping in All Family Members Without Specific Role – Observations made that father-in-law appears to have been roped into proceedings by extension of the case against the husband, without any specific allegation or evidence of individual role – This Court has repeatedly cautioned against misuse of Section 498A IPC against family members in the absence of any role attributable to them [Para 27].

Decision: Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2014 (filed by Narendra Singh) allowed – Conviction under Section 498A IPC set aside – Criminal Appeal Nos. 307 of 2014 (filed by State) and 309 of 2014 (filed by brother of deceased) dismissed.

Execution Proceedings – Compromise Decree – Guideline Value – Determination – Supervisory Jurisdiction under Article 227 – N.I.C.E. entered into a Memorandum of Settlement with the Decree Holders whereunder, upon failure to convey Schedule 'B' land, N.I.C.E. became liable to pay the guideline value of Schedule 'AA' land (3 acres 6 guntas, Survey No. 122, Kengeri Village) as prevailing on the date of settlement – Executing Court fixed compensation at Rs. 1,000/- per sq. ft. based on the Karnataka Government Notification dated 17.04.2007 – High Court, invoking Article 227, impleaded State of Karnataka, accepted State's interpretation of the notification and reduced the valuation to Rs. 500/- per sq. ft. by applying Instruction No. 6 – Both parties challenged the High Court's order before the Supreme Court [Paras 1–3, 8–9, 24].

Article 227 – Scope and Limits of Supervisory Jurisdiction – High Court cannot act as Appellate Court – Power of superintendence restricted to cases of unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, gross abuse of jurisdiction, or unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction – High Court cannot reappreciate evidence, substitute its own view for that of the inferior court, or correct every error of fact or law – Interference permissible only where finding is perverse or no reasonable person could have arrived at the same conclusion – Held: High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 by acting as an appellate court [Paras 30–36].

Supervisory Jurisdiction – Impleadment of State Government – Impermissibility – During writ petition filed by N.I.C.E. under Article 227, the High Court impleaded State of Karnataka to obtain clarification on interpretation of the guideline value notification – Held: Such impleadment was impermissible since the lis was entirely between private parties arising from a compromise decree – Permitting the State to interpret its own notification during litigation and allowing that interpretation to influence a private dispute placed the State simultaneously as rule-maker, interpreter, and adjudicator, which is contrary to law – The executive cannot be allowed to explain away or reinterpret a statutory instrument during litigation to the prejudice of one of the parties [Paras 36.3.1–36.3.2].

Guideline Value – Interpretation of Notification – Instruction No. 6 – Applicability – Karnataka Gazette Notification dated 17.04.2007 prescribed Rs. 800/- per sq. ft. as guideline value for converted sites within City Municipal Council/BBMP limits under Column 6 – Instruction No. 2 mandated an addition of 25% for lands abutting a State Highway, resulting in Rs. 1,000/- per sq. ft. – Instruction No. 6 operates only as a residual provision for industrial layouts where no specific guideline value is prescribed – Since the land fell within municipal urban limits and a specific rate of Rs. 800/- per sq. ft. was prescribed, the exclusionary phrase "excluding these areas" in Instruction No. 6 applied and the fallback rule of 50% of residential site value was not triggered – Applying Instruction No. 6 in such circumstances would lead to the anomalous result of valuing converted urban land within BBMP limits lower than agricultural land, which is impermissible – Held: The interpretation adopted by the Executing Court was plausible and legally correct; Instruction No. 6 was not applicable [Paras 37, 40].

Compromise Decree – Guideline Value – Party Estopped from Contending Agricultural Valuation – N.I.C.E. consistently contended that the land, though converted for industrial use in 2004, remained undeveloped and ought to be valued as agricultural land at Rs. 1,56,25,000/- per acre – Held: At the time of entering the compromise, both parties were fully conscious that the land stood converted for industrial use – Having agreed to compensation on the basis of guideline value, N.I.C.E. cannot be permitted to contend that value ought to be determined by treating the land as agricultural – Reliance on K.S. Shivadevamma (land acquisition case involving developmental potential) held misplaced, as present case involves a statutory benchmark (guideline value) independent of factual considerations of potentiality or development [Paras 39–39.2].

Interest – Delayed Payment – Compromise Decree Silent on Interest – Decree Holders entitled to interest at 6% per annum – High Court in W.P. No. 25158 of 2012 (order dated 11.06.2013) had already granted interest at 6% per annum from 20.08.2007 till payment – That order neither set aside nor modified – N.I.C.E., instead of depositing the full amount determined by the Executing Court (Rs. 13,72,14,000/-), deposited only its admitted sum of Rs. 4,92,18,750/- – Held: N.I.C.E. was required to pay the balance amount with interest as directed; the interest award under W.P. No. 25158 of 2012 to remain binding subject to outcome of any challenge thereto [Paras 39.3].

Decision: Civil Appeal No. 1388 of 2013 (filed by N.I.C.E.) dismissed – Civil Appeal No. 1354 of 2013 (filed by Decree Holders) allowed – Impugned judgment of the High Court of Karnataka in W.P. No. 21068 of 2012 set aside – Order of the V Additional City Civil Judge, Bengaluru (Executing Court) restored – Value of Schedule 'AA' land determined at Rs. 1,000/- per sq. ft., aggregating Rs. 13,72,14,000/- – N.I.C.E. directed to pay balance of Rs. 8,79,95,250/- with interest at 6% per annum as per W.P. No. 25158 of 2012 – Parties to bear their own costs [Para 41].

Civil Law – Execution of Compromise Decree – Guideline Value Determination – High Court Exceeds Supervisory Jurisdiction under Article 227 – N.I.C.E. having failed to convey Schedule 'B' land to Decree Holder No. 2 as agreed under the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10.08.2007, became liable under Clause (xiii) thereof to pay the guideline value of the Schedule 'AA' land (3 acres 6 guntas in Sy. No. 122/272/2, Kengeri Village, Bengaluru) as prevailing on the date of compromise – Executing Court determined the value at Rs. 1,000/- per sq. ft. by applying the Karnataka Government Notification dated 17.04.2007 (base rate of Rs. 800/- per sq. ft. for converted sites within BBMP/municipal limits, enhanced by 25% for abutting State Highway) – High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, impleaded the State of Karnataka, accepted its spot inspection report, and reduced the value to Rs. 500/- per sq. ft. by applying Instruction No. 6 of the Notification – Held: High Court exceeded the limits of its supervisory jurisdiction; the interpretation adopted by the Executing Court was plausible and reasonable and not perverse; High Court in effect acted as an Appellate Court [Paras 30–37].

Article 227 – Scope of Supervisory Jurisdiction – Power Not to Be Exercised as Appellate Court – The power of superintendence under Article 227 does not permit the High Court to reappreciate evidence or substitute its own view merely because an alternative interpretation is possible – Supervisory jurisdiction is limited to cases of unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, gross abuse of jurisdiction, unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction, or findings so perverse that no reasonable person could arrive at them – Held: High Court's impleadment of the State at a belated stage during a private lis, and acceptance of the State's self-serving interpretation of its own notification to influence the outcome, was impermissible [Paras 31–36].

Guideline Value – Karnataka Notification dated 17.04.2007 – Application of Special Instructions – Instruction No. 6 Inapplicable – The schedule land, bearing Sy. No. 122, falls within the jurisdiction of BBMP/Kengeri City Municipal Council and is expressly covered under Column 6 of the Notification attracting a base rate of Rs. 800/- per sq. ft. – Adding 25% under Instruction No. 2 for abutting a State Highway yields Rs. 1,000/- per sq. ft. – Instruction No. 6, which fixes industrial land at 50% of the residential site rate, operates only as a residual provision where no specific guideline value is prescribed; since a specific rate is prescribed under Column 6, the exclusionary phrase in Instruction No. 6 ("excluding these areas") squarely applies and the fallback 50% reduction never gets triggered – Applying Instruction No. 6 in the present facts would yield an anomalous result of valuing converted urban land lower than agricultural land [Para 37].

Compromise Decree – N.I.C.E.'s Contention Rejected – Judgment Debtors Cannot Approbate and Reprobate – N.I.C.E. consistently contended that the land, having been converted for industrial use in 2004 but remaining undeveloped, should be valued as agricultural land at approximately Rs. 350/- per sq. ft. – Held: Having agreed under the compromise that compensation would be payable at the guideline value prevailing on the date of settlement, and being fully aware that the schedule land stood converted for industrial use, N.I.C.E. cannot be permitted to resile from that position and seek valuation on an agricultural basis – Reliance on K.S. Shivadevamma (1996) 2 SCC 62 — a land acquisition case — held misplaced, as guideline value is a statutory benchmark not dependent on developmental potential [Paras 39–39.2].

Interest – Entitlement of Decree Holders – Interest at 6% p.a. Upheld – Compromise decree does not contain a specific interest clause; however, the order of this Court dated 09.04.2012 directed N.I.C.E. to pay the amount determined within eight weeks of determination by the Executing Court – N.I.C.E. deposited only the admitted amount and not the full amount determined – High Court in W.P. No. 25158 of 2012 (order dated 11.06.2013) separately allowed interest at 6% per annum from 20.08.2007 till payment – Held: That determination is binding and the direction for interest shall be subject to the outcome of any proceedings challenging that order [Para 39.3].

Decision: Civil Appeal No. 1388 of 2013 (filed by N.I.C.E.) dismissed – Civil Appeal No. 1354 of 2013 (filed by Decree Holders) allowed – Impugned judgment and order dated 12.09.2012 of the High Court of Karnataka in W.P. No. 21068 of 2012 set aside – Order of the V Additional City Civil Judge, Bengaluru (Executing Court) restored – Schedule 'AA' land valued at Rs. 1,000/- per sq. ft., total Rs. 13,72,14,000/- – N.I.C.E. directed to pay balance of Rs. 8,79,95,250/- with interest at 6% p.a. as ordered in W.P. No. 25158 of 2012 – Parties to bear their own costs.

Constitutional Law – Hate Speech – Legislative Competence – Judicial Restraint – Separation of Powers – Batch of writ petitions seeking directions to the Union of India to examine international laws on hate speech and rumour-mongering, implement Law Commission Report No. 267, and enact specific legislation; petitioners contended that failure to act has caused a legislative vacuum — Held: Courts cannot create or expand criminal offences in the absence of legislative action; the doctrine of separation of powers reserves law-making to Parliament and State Legislatures; a writ of mandamus cannot be issued directing the Legislature to enact a particular law; the Court may, at best, record its opinion or recommendation on the desirability of legislative reform [Paras 18–36, 98.1].

Criminal Law – Hate Speech – Legislative Occupancy of Field – Existing Statutory Framework – Petitioners contended that the field of hate speech is legislatively unoccupied — Held: The contention is misconceived; the existing framework under IPC (Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 124A, 298, 504, 505) and corresponding BNS provisions adequately addresses acts promoting enmity, outraging religious sentiments, and disturbing public tranquillity; the real problem is not absence of law but deficit in enforcement; such enforcement lapses cannot justify the Court assuming legislative functions — Law Commission's 267th Report on Hate Speech noted [Paras 37–45, 98.2].

Criminal Procedure – Registration of FIR – Mandatory Duty – Non-registration – Remedies – Section 154 CrPC (Section 173 BNSS) casts a mandatory duty upon the police to register an FIR upon disclosure of a cognizable offence; no preliminary inquiry is permissible as a matter of course before such registration — Held: The statutory scheme provides a comprehensive and layered remedy: aggrieved person may approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC (Section 173(4) BNSS), thereafter invoke Magistrate's jurisdiction under Section 156(3) CrPC (Section 175 BNSS), or file a complaint under Section 200 CrPC (Section 223 BNSS); this constitutes a complete statutory architecture — as settled in Lalita Kumari [Paras 47–65, 98.3].

Criminal Procedure – Section 156(3) CrPC – Prior Sanction – Cognizance – Stage of Applicability – Criminal Appeal partly allowed – The High Court of Delhi held that a Magistrate cannot direct registration of FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC in absence of prior sanction under Sections 196 and 197 CrPC — Held: This view is incorrect; an order directing investigation under Section 156(3) does not amount to "taking cognizance" within the meaning of Section 190 CrPC; the requirement of prior sanction under Sections 196 and 197 operates exclusively at the stage of cognizance and not at the pre-cognizance investigative stage; an order under Section 156(3) directing registration of FIR falls at the pre-cognizance stage; the High Court's impugned judgment set aside to that extent; on facts, no cognizable offence is made out from the speeches in question and the ultimate conclusion of the High Court is affirmed [Paras 100–138].

Constitutional Law – Continuing Mandamus – Judicial Oversight – Writ Petitions seeking continuing mandamus for judicial monitoring of hate speech incidents — Held: In the absence of any legislative vacuum or systemic failure of such magnitude as would warrant continuous judicial oversight, a continuing mandamus is neither justified nor consistent with the principle of judicial restraint; such a course would amount to micro-management of matters within the executive domain — National Federation of Indian Women (supra) followed [Paras 70–76, 98.4, 98.5].

Constitutional Values – Fraternity – Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam – The Court, in its epilogue, observed that hate speech is fundamentally antithetical to the constitutional value of fraternity enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution; every citizen bears a constitutional duty under Article 51A to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood; the ancient maxim of vasudhaiva kutumbakam (the world is one family) reflects India's civilisational ethos of inclusivity; public discourse carries a corresponding duty of restraint and responsibility — Court observed that issues of hate speech and rumour-mongering bear directly upon preservation of fraternity and it would be open to Parliament to consider whether further legislative or policy measures are warranted in light of the Law Commission's 267th Report [Paras 77–97, X].

Contempt Petitions – Compliance – Most contempt petitions either found to have been complied with or no case of contempt made out; certain contempt petitions directed to be listed separately for consideration on 19th May, 2026 after respondent-authorities file their response [Paras 141–164, 167–168].

Decision: All Writ Petitions and Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 6913 of 2021 dismissed — Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 5107 of 2023 partly allowed; impugned judgment of Delhi High Court set aside to the limited extent it holds that a Magistrate exercising power under Section 156(3) CrPC cannot direct registration of FIR in absence of prior sanction — Certain contempt petitions closed; remaining contempt petitions listed for 19th May, 2026 — Registry directed to transmit copy of judgment to all High Courts.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – NCLT – Systemic Delay in Approval of Resolution Plans – Suo Motu Cognizance – Court took suo motu cognizance of gross delays in approval of Resolution Plans pending before various Benches of the NCLT — As per report of the Registrar, NCLT Principal Bench, 363 applications awaiting approval with delays ranging from 48 days to 738 days and in some cases up to four years — Delays attributed to lack of adequate infrastructure, half-day sittings, interchange of bench combinations, large pendency of objections, and acute shortage of judicial and technical members — Held: In the prevailing state of affairs, the objective of time-bound resolution under the IBC is impossible to achieve — matter directed to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for further orders [Paras 1–13].

NCLT – Membership Strength – Shortage – Statutory sanctioned strength of NCLT is 63 members (1 President, 31 Judicial Members and 31 Technical Members) — As on 28.04.2026, only 28 Judicial Members and 26 Technical Members are posted across various NCLT Benches — acute shortage of ten members severely affecting efficiency and timely disposal of cases [Para 3].

NCLT – Infrastructure and Staffing – Contractual Appointments – Systemic Failures – Post of Registrar (barring few Benches) filled on contractual basis — none of the Benches have full-time permanent employees — staff including Secretary, Court Master, Stenographers and legal assistants appointed on contractual basis with services intermittently terminated — instances of non-payment of salaries leading to strike by NCLT Mumbai staff — Held: Such systemic deficiencies must be addressed on a war footing to prevent frustration of the very purpose and object of the IBC [Paras 7, 12].

IBC, 2016 – Section 31(2A) – Amendment – Thirty-Day Disposal Requirement – Amendment inserting Section 31(2A) requiring disposal of plan approval applications within thirty days has been enacted but not yet brought into force — Court expressed serious doubt whether true effect could be given to this amendment in light of the infrastructural and staffing deficiencies highlighted [Para 9].

Suggestions – Amicus Curiae – The Court recorded suggestions of Amicus Curiae including: recruitment of permanent staff for all NCLT Benches; filling of vacancies within defined timelines; ensuring full court hours; holding regular workshops; sequential disposal of issues (eligibility under Section 29A, challenge to claims, constitution of CoC) before plan approval; mandatory impleadment of key parties at the initial stage; de-linking of avoidance applications from plan approval under Section 26 of the IBC; and day-to-day hearing of plan approval applications after the initial stage [Para 8].

Decision: Suo motu cognizance taken — matter directed to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for further orders — merits of the appeals to await further directions — Amicus Curiae and Resolution Professional's counsel placed on record with gratitude for their assistance.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Limitation — Section 7 Application — Date of Default — Computation — NPA Classification — The corporate debtors' loan accounts were declared NPA on 06.12.2016, constituting the date of default from which the three-year limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 began to run — Limitation would have expired on 06.12.2019 — After excluding the period of DHFL's CIRP (03.12.2019 to 07.06.2021), the Covid-19 suo motu extension (15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022, plus 90 days), and the moratorium during the first CIRP of the corporate debtor (23.12.2021 to 29.07.2024) under Section 60(6) of the Code, only three days of limitation remained, expiring on 01.08.2024 — Petition under Section 7 filed on 23.09.2024 was therefore beyond limitation — Held: Application was time-barred [Paras 13-15].

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Interim Resolution Professional — Admission of Claim — Not an Acknowledgment under Section 18, Limitation Act, 1963 — The IRP/RP's admission of a secured financial creditor's claim in the first CIRP is a purely administrative and clerical function under Section 18 of the Code, involving collation and induction of claims — The IRP has no adjudicatory powers — Such admission does not evince a conscious and unequivocal intention to admit a subsisting jural relationship or existing liability — It is akin to a mere recital or reference to a debt and does not constitute an acknowledgment capable of extending limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 — Further, even if it were an acknowledgment, it must be made within the subsisting period of limitation to extend it, which was not the case here — Held: IRP's admission of claim on 02.05.2022 does not amount to acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and does not enure to the benefit of the secured financial creditor [Paras 16-17].

Decision: Appeals allowed — Impugned judgment dated 15.10.2025 of NCLAT and order dated 22.01.2025 of NCLT quashed and set aside — No order as to costs.

Right to Education — Neighbourhood School — Obligation to Admit RTE Students — SLP Dismissed — Petitioner school refused admission to a student duly selected and forwarded by the State Government under the RTE Act, 2009 and UP RTE Rules, 2011 citing uncertainty about eligibility — High Court directed immediate admission holding that schools cannot sit in appeal over the State's selection decision — Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's order — Held: Once the State Government completes the selection process and forwards the list to the school, the school is mandatorily bound to grant admission without waiting for the outcome of any representation it may make to the concerned authority — SLP dismissed [Paras 2, 14, 15].

Constitutional Mandate — Article 21A — Right to Free and Compulsory Education — Transformative Purpose of Section 12, RTE Act — Section 12 of the RTE Act, 2009 mandates that neighbourhood schools admit not less than twenty-five percent of entry-level class strength from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups — This legislative choice is a deliberate constitutional strategy to operationalise equality of status, dignity, and social integration among children in their formative years — Held: The neighbourhood school concept is designed to break down entrenched barriers of caste, class, and gender and to advance substantive social justice — Earnest implementation is a national mission binding on all duty bearers [Paras 8, 9, 11, 12].

Duty Bearers — Five Categories Identified — RTE Framework — Drawing from Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, the Court reiterated five categories of duty bearers under the RTE Act: (i) the appropriate Government, obligated under Sections 6 and 8 to establish neighbourhood schools; (ii) the local authority, obligated under Section 9 to maintain records and monitor admissions; (iii) the neighbourhood school, bound under Section 12(1)(c) to provide free and compulsory education to at least twenty-five percent of class strength; (iv) parents/guardians, duty now constitutionally recognised under Article 51A(k); and (v) elementary school teachers, who bear the most important role in nation-building — Held: Courts must also walk the extra mile to provide effective and expeditious relief to parents complaining of denial of the right [Paras 10–10.5, 12].

School's Limited Role — No Power to Sit in Appeal over State's Selection — Accountability and Transparency — Rule 8 of the UP RTE Rules, 2011 mandates that the admission process be totally transparent — Schools are bound to follow the State Government's prescribed process and must inform in writing with reasons any child not admitted — The school's window to reconsider the Government's decision is consciously limited by the State to avoid delays — Held: Schools disagreeing with the selection may make a representation to the concerned authority but must grant admission in the interregnum — This immediacy is essential to actualise the promise of Article 21A [Paras 7, 13, 14].

Decision: Special Leave Petition dismissed — High Court's direction to grant admission affirmed — No orders as to costs.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Corporate Guarantee — Financial Debt — Financial Creditor — SBI Consortium extended rupee loans to RCOM and RTL, secured by corporate guarantees executed by the Corporate Debtor (RITL) on 03.03.2017 — NCLT rejected claim holding guarantees unverified and undocumented — NCLAT affirmed, doubting timing, disclosure, and stamping of guarantees — On appeal, Supreme Court finds concurrent findings perverse — Held: Corporate guarantee constitutes "financial debt" under Section 5(8) of the Code; appellants entitled to recognition as financial creditors; impugned orders quashed; Resolution Professional directed to reconstitute Committee of Creditors [Paras 22, 31–32].

Financial Debt — Corporate Guarantee — Section 5(8), IBC — Liability under Corporate Guarantee — Essential ingredient of financial debt is disbursal against consideration for the time value of money — Liability arising from a corporate guarantee squarely falls within the ambit of "financial debt" under Section 5(8) — Amount of any liability in respect of guarantees for money borrowed against payment of interest qualifies as financial debt — Guarantor incurs coextensive liability with that of the principal borrower, enforceable in law [Para 22].

Corporate Guarantee — Timing of Execution — NPA Classification — Corporate Debtor's account declared NPA on 22.08.2016, subsequently restructured, whereafter CD executed corporate guarantees on 03.03.2017 — Per RBI Master Circular dated 01.07.2015 (Clause 17.2.6), asset classification of restructured NPA reckoned from the date it first became NPA — Account declared NPA w.e.f. 26.08.2016 — Held: Guarantees were executed before NPA declaration took effect on account of restructuring; timing and manner of corporate guarantees cannot be questioned on the ground that CD and holding company were already in default [Paras 24].

Disclosure in Financial Statements — Non-Disclosure — Effect — Corporate Debtor's counsel acknowledged disclosures in financial statements on an ongoing basis — Even if guarantees were not reflected in financial statements for FY 2016-17 and 2017-18, such non-disclosure cannot deprive the consortium lenders of their right to claim — Held: Non-disclosure, at best, amounts to a default by the Corporate Debtor and does not invalidate the guarantee or defeat the claim [Para 25].

Verification of Claims — Regulation 13, IBBI Regulations, 2016 — IRP/RP may call for evidence or clarification to substantiate claims — CD's counsel admitted execution of guarantees — Security Trustee confirmed possession of executed and stamped guarantees — RP verified guarantees by visiting Security Trustee's office in New Delhi — Held: Finding of NCLAT that there was no pleading on record establishing verification by IRP/RP is perverse [Para 26].

Documents — Admissibility — Production at Appellate Stage — Appeal is a continuation of original proceedings — Documents relevant to the lis can be produced at appellate stage — Corporate guarantees were produced before NCLAT — Held: Mere non-production before NCLT cannot lead to adverse inference regarding genuineness of corporate guarantees [Para 27].

Stamp Duty — Insufficiently Stamped Document — Effect — Corporate guarantees executed in New Delhi office of Security Trustee; stamp duty paid as per New Delhi rates — Production before NCLAT Principal Bench at New Delhi does not attract Maharashtra Stamp Duty Act, 1958 — Defect of insufficient stamping is curable and does not render instrument void or unenforceable — Non-stamping or improper stamping does not result in instrument becoming invalid; non-payment of stamp duty is a curable defect — Stamp Act is a fiscal measure and cannot be used as a weapon to defeat a party's cause — Held: Contention regarding non-payment of stamp duty under Maharashtra Stamp Duty Act is without substance [Para 28].

Perversity — Concurrent Findings — Interference by Supreme Court — This Court would ordinarily not re-appreciate facts when concurrent findings of NCLT and NCLAT exist — Exception arises where findings are perverse — NCLT had already rejected respondents' plea regarding preferential transactions and fraud under Sections 43 and 66 — Non-filing of guarantees with Form-C not sufficient to negate claim — Held: Perversity of tribunals' findings glaring and manifest; interference warranted under Section 62 of the Code [Para 30].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Orders dated 14.10.2022 (NCLAT) and 02.03.2021 (NCLT) quashed and set aside — Appellants recognised as "financial creditors" of the Corporate Debtor — Resolution Professional directed to reconstitute Committee of Creditors by including appellants and proceed with CIRP in accordance with law — No order as to costs [Paras 32–33].

Criminal Law — Murder — Mass Conviction — Acquittal — Sixteen persons charge-sheeted for brutal assault on deceased on 08.07.2008, causing death with cutting weapons and severing his left hand — Twelve accused convicted by trial court under Sections 147, 341, 326, 307, 323, and 302 read with Section 149 IPC — High Court upheld convictions — On appeal, Supreme Court finds eyewitnesses unreliable, injuries of alleged injured witnesses unproved, FIR delayed and suspect, investigation procedurally deficient, and seizure documents doubtful — Held: Prosecution failed to prove case beyond reasonable doubt — All appeals allowed, convictions set aside, appellants acquitted [Paras 2, 23].

FIR — GD Entry — First Information — Delayed Registration — Police reached the place of occurrence on 08.07.2008 at 9.30 P.M. on the basis of a GD entry made on telephone information from VDP Secretary — Neither the informant nor the recording Inspector examined — FIR registered only on 10.07.2008 on written complaint of PW1 naming 13 accused — PW1 not an eyewitness — High Court erroneously treated GD entry as FIR — Held: GD entry cannot constitute FIR as neither the informant nor the recording officer was examined; delay in registration of FIR renders the arraignment of accused suspect as it was made after due deliberation [Paras 8–9, 20].

Eyewitness Testimony — Credibility — Related Witnesses — Five eyewitnesses (PW2, PW7, PW13, PW14, PW15) all close relatives of the deceased — Incident on a public road; their collective presence not natural — PW18 (IO) does not speak of the presence of eyewitnesses at place of occurrence or recording of any statement from them — Eyewitnesses claimed to have been questioned by police at the spot, not corroborated by PW18 — No Section 161 CrPC statements recorded from any eyewitness promptly — Statements under Section 164 CrPC recorded nine days after incident — Held: Presence of eyewitnesses at place of occurrence highly improbable and not unequivocally established; testimonies not credible [Paras 10–12, 16–19].

Injured Eyewitness — Proof of Injury — Evidentiary Value — PW14, alleged injured eyewitness, spoke of injuries to hand, legs, wrist, and waist — No wound certificate from Solace Hospital or GMCH produced — PW18 examined PW14 on 22.07.2008, long after FIR — PW14 stated he regained consciousness at hospital on 09.07.2008 and was referred to GMCH, contradicting PW18's statement — No intimation to police from hospital — PW6 likewise disbelieved by trial court and High Court — Held: Injuries of alleged injured witnesses not proved; their testimonies cannot be accorded higher credibility of injured eyewitnesses; very presence at place of occurrence rendered doubtful [Paras 13–16].

Seizure — Motorbikes — Weapons — Forensic Analysis — Seizure list (Annexure P4) purportedly detailed ownership and riders of four motorbikes at place of occurrence — No documents produced to prove vehicle ownership — Bikes never produced before court or confronted to witnesses — Weapons seized (beki dao, lathi, spike) neither sent for forensic analysis nor confronted to eyewitnesses or the doctor conducting postmortem — No blood collected from scene for matching — Held: Seizure documents doubtful in genesis; prosecution story of five witnesses travelling with deceased on four bikes not substantiated by credible evidence [Paras 17–18, 21].

Investigation — Failure of Due Procedure — Scripted Enquiry — IO (PW18) reached spot at 9.30 P.M. on the night of the incident, conducted inquest, yet failed to register FIR or record statements from eyewitnesses present at spot — GD entry informant and recording officer not examined — Eyewitnesses present at spot not named in any FIR promptly — FIR filed two days later after deliberation — Held: Whether ignorance, inefficiency, or malicious motivation, due procedure under CrPC was not followed, leaving the crime unresolved and resulting in wrongful prosecution of sixteen persons — State urged to better equip investigating officers [Paras 8, 10, 22].

Decision: All appeals allowed — Convictions and sentences under Sections 147, 341, 326, 307, 323, and 302 read with Section 149 IPC set aside — Appellants acquitted — Bail bonds of accused on bail cancelled — Pending applications disposed of [Paras 23–24].