Judicial Independence – Financial Independence of Judges – Non-discrimination based on Source of Appointment – Held: High Court judges, irrespective of their recruitment source (Bar or judicial service), are entitled to uniform financial benefits to maintain judicial independence – Differentiation between judges based on their pre-appointment service violates Articles 14 and 217 – Directed all judges to have access to the General Provident Fund – The communication dated 13 December 2022 was quashed as unconstitutional [Paras 10-20].

Provident Fund – Section 20 of the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 – Scope of Proviso – Mandate to extend GPF benefits to all judges of the High Court – Proviso interpreted as preserving benefits accrued before High Court appointment without creating a discriminatory regime – Directed refund of New Pension Scheme contributions and opening of GPF accounts for petitioners [Paras 22-28].

Constitutional Interpretation – Uniform Service Conditions – Financial Security as Integral to Judicial Independence – Emphasized: Salaries, allowances, and pensions of High Court judges determined by parliamentary enactments to ensure uniformity – Article 221 prohibits discriminatory service terms – Equality in post-retirement benefits like GPF underlines judiciary’s homogeneity [Paras 30-33].

Decision: The petitions were allowed, directing that:

A General Provident Fund account be opened for the petitioners, effective from their date of appointment as High Court judges.

Contributions under the New Pension Scheme be refunded to petitioners within four weeks.

The impugned communication dated 13 December 2022 be quashed.

Civil Law – Mega Power Policy and Change in Law – Press Release as Binding Legal Instrument – Appeal Dismissed - Mega Power Status and Notification Requirements – Appellants contended that the 01.10.2009 press release announcing the Union Cabinet's decision on the revised Mega Power Policy constituted a legally binding "Change in Law" under Clause 13 of the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) – The Supreme Court rejected this view, affirming that a press release does not enact or modify existing law and lacks the necessary formalities of a notification under Section 25 of the Customs Act – Held: The extant legal regime was modified only on 11.12.2009 and 14.12.2009 with the issuance of the official notifications and policy documents [Paras 42, 55, 57].

Interpretation of "Law" and "Order" in the PPA – The definition of "Law" in the PPA requires that any change must be implemented through a formally recognized instrument, such as a notification, for it to qualify as a legal enactment – Court held that the term "order" under the PPA did not extend to an informal announcement like a press release – The 01.10.2009 press release was deemed a statement of intent rather than a formal order or legally binding change [Paras 39-43, 48].

Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel – Argument of estoppel advanced by appellants asserting reliance on the press release in their bid submission was rejected – Court found the doctrine inapplicable since PSPCL (respondent) was not the promisor of any customs duty concession – Additionally, the Union of India, as the entity capable of conferring such benefits, was not a party to the agreement, making promissory estoppel inapplicable in inter-party disputes under the PPA [Para 65].

Business Efficacy Test and Clause 13 – Appellants invoked business efficacy to assert that the press release should be treated as law to prevent commercial detriment – Supreme Court clarified that business efficacy cannot override explicit terms of the PPA, which clearly define "Law" and prescribe specific enactment requirements for changes in law – The business efficacy test cannot contradict the express terms, and here the PPA’s requirements were clear and did not accommodate the appellants’ interpretation [Paras 41, 63-64].

Doctrine of Legal Certainty – Supreme Court underscored the principle of legal certainty as fundamental to the rule of law – Held: Allowing a press release to alter legally enforceable terms without official notification would create dual, conflicting legal regimes, which undermines predictability and certainty in contractual obligations – Court emphasized that the formal requirements under the Customs Act and the General Clauses Act must be met for a change in law to be recognized [Paras 58-61].

Notification and Official Gazette Requirements – Section 25(1) of the Customs Act mandates that exemptions must be notified in the Official Gazette – The Court highlighted the importance of compliance with procedural requirements, ruling that the absence of such formal publication invalidates any claim of legal change based on informal announcements or press releases [Paras 50-51].

Decision – Appeal dismissed, with the Court affirming that no "Change in Law" occurred as of 01.10.2009 – Concurrent findings of the lower tribunals upheld, and the appellants' request for benefits based on the press release was denied – PSPCL entitled to adjustments in tariff for the benefits accrued from the formal change in law on 11.12.2009 [Paras 72-73].

Criminal Law – Murder – Appeal against conviction - Circumstantial Evidence – Requirement of a Complete Chain – Appeal Allowed – The appellant was convicted for murder and disposing of evidence under Sections 302 and 201 IPC based on circumstantial evidence alone. The Supreme Court reviewed whether the evidence constituted a complete and conclusive chain that pointed solely to the appellant's guilt. Held: Conviction based on circumstantial evidence demands an unbroken chain leading to no other plausible explanation but the accused's guilt. Here, discrepancies in witness testimony, questionable recovery evidence, and the prosecution’s failure to prove critical facts undermined the chain of evidence and warranted acquittal [Paras 26-32, 42-45].

Key Principles in Circumstantial Evidence – Panchsheel Principles – Relying on Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P., the Court underscored that suspicion cannot substitute proof. For conviction, each link in the evidence chain must conclusively establish guilt. The Court further stressed that any break or inconsistency in circumstantial evidence entitles the accused to benefit of doubt, aligning with established judicial principles [Paras 26-28].

Last Seen Theory – Insufficient Corroboration – The prosecution’s case leaned on the last seen theory, contending that the appellant was the last to be seen with the deceased. The Court held that the time gap and lack of corroborating evidence between the last sighting and discovery of the body introduced doubt, highlighting that such cases require tight proximity and supporting evidence to preclude alternative explanations [Para 28].

Recovery of Alleged Murder Weapon and Other Articles – Lack of Credible Evidence – The prosecution's recovery of the alleged murder weapon and blood-stained items was found unreliable due to procedural lapses and inconsistent testimony. Witnesses contradicted each other, some claiming that police obtained evidence off-site rather than directly from the appellant’s possession, further casting doubt on the integrity of the recovery evidence [Paras 34-37].

Acquittal in Cases with Doubts in Evidence – Gaps in Proof Benefit the Accused – Following precedents, the Court reinforced that circumstantial evidence must unequivocally establish guilt; any gaps favor the accused. Here, inconsistencies in witness accounts and procedural ambiguities in the prosecution’s evidence led to acquittal, underscoring that conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 41-45].

Decision:

The appeal is allowed, and the judgments of the High Court and Sessions Court are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of all charges due to the prosecution's failure to establish a conclusive chain of circumstantial evidence. If the appellant is on bail, his bail bonds and sureties are discharged, and he is to be released immediately.

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR – Alleged Offenses under IPC and Atrocities Act – FIR filed for offenses under Sections 376(2)(N) and 506 of IPC, along with Sections 3(1)(R), 3(1)(w), and 3(2)(5) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act – High Court quashed proceedings on the basis of an alleged settlement between the parties, directing the complainant to refund compensation – Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, remanded the case for verification of settlement, and ordered inquiry if necessary [Paras 2, 9-14].
Settlement in Non-Compoundable Offenses – Guidelines for High Court – Supreme Court emphasized that in cases of serious offenses, especially those involving women and marginalized groups, High Court must ensure the genuineness of settlement – Advised personal presence or virtual appearance of the victim for verification – Directed that affidavits by illiterate complainants must include endorsements that contents were explained in the complainant's language – Found High Court erred by accepting affidavits without proper inquiry into their authenticity or securing complainant’s presence [Paras 7-9].
Evidentiary Concerns – Affidavits and Thumb Impressions – Allegations of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of affidavits – Affidavits lacked endorsements explaining content to the illiterate complainant – Appellant argued coercion and improper procedure in obtaining thumb impressions – Supreme Court directed the High Court to examine the appellant’s claims through inquiry by a Judicial Officer if needed [Paras 8-10].
Seriousness of Offenses – Impact on Society – Supreme Court noted that offenses under Section 376(2)(N) IPC and Atrocities Act are grave and affect society at large – Held that even if a settlement is genuine, the court must independently assess whether quashing proceedings would serve justice – Highlighted the need for caution in quashing cases of such nature [Para 7].
Directions on Remand – Supreme Court remanded the case to the High Court for fresh consideration – Directed the appellant to be present before the High Court to clarify her stance – Allowed appellant to file an affidavit addressing the alleged settlement – Empowered the High Court to order an inquiry into the execution of affidavits – High Court instructed to assess both the genuineness of the settlement and the appropriateness of quashing proceedings under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution [Paras 10-14].
Decision – Appeal Partly Allowed – Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order quashing criminal proceedings – Restored the quashing petition for reconsideration by the High Court – Directed specific steps for verifying the settlement and deciding its legal effect – Observed that serious offenses demand rigorous judicial scrutiny before quashing [Paras 12-16].
 

Secularism and Minority Rights – Constitutional Validity of Madarsa Act – The Court analyzed whether the Madarsa Act violates secularism, a core principle of the Constitution, by establishing a board that regulates Islamic educational institutions – Held: The Act, being regulatory and aiming at educational standardization, does not per se contravene secularism if balanced with minority rights under Article 30. However, provisions granting legislative discretion in the membership structure were adjusted to reinforce neutrality and inclusivity. The Act remains largely valid under Entry 25, List III [Paras 29-45, 51].

Legislative Competence – Entry 25, List III vis-à-vis Entry 66, List I – The Act’s provisions were scrutinized for potential overlap with the UGC’s powers under Entry 66, List I, particularly concerning higher education standards – Held: State law is constitutionally valid under Entry 25, List III for primary and secondary education; higher education must comply with UGC standards without contravening Entry 66, List I. Only provisions that exceed state competence or conflict with UGC norms require revision [Paras 54-59].

Right to Education – Exemption of Madarsas from the RTE Act – Section 1(5) of the RTE Act exempts religious institutions, including madarsas, from compliance – Held: While exclusion of madarsas from the RTE Act is constitutional, States should ensure curriculum standards and educational quality to facilitate secular and skill-based learning for greater integration of minority students into the broader socio-economic framework [Paras 25-28].

Equality and Non-Discrimination – Article 14 and Discrimination based on Religion – The composition of the Madarsa Board, largely drawn from members of a specific religious community, was challenged for violating Article 14’s equality mandate – Held: The selection process is permitted under Article 30 but requires adjustments to include educational experts regardless of religious affiliation to maintain neutrality in regulatory oversight [Paras 36-39].

Right to Establish and Administer Educational Institutions – Article 30 and Minority Rights – The Court examined whether the Act infringes upon the minority community's rights to administer educational institutions – Held: Regulation by the State is constitutionally sound as it aims to enhance educational quality while respecting minority rights under Article 30 [Paras 41-45].

Judgment – Legislation Upheld with Modifications – The Court upheld the Madarsa Act with stipulations to ensure adherence to secular principles in governance while allowing state oversight for standardizing educational standards in minority institutions [Paras 69-70].
 

Service Law - Recruitment Qualification – Prescribed vs. Equivalent Qualifications – Rule Interpretation – The qualification specified for the post of LDC was a Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation from an approved institution. The Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC) initially took a strict stance against recognizing higher qualifications, such as a Diploma in Computer Applications (DCA), as equivalent. The Court held that the Rules of 2011 did not provide for an equivalent qualification to the prescribed certificate, thus precluding DCA and similar qualifications – Held: The prescribed qualification requirement is limited to specific certificate holders, and the equivalence pertains only to the institution, not the qualification [Paras 15-17].

Doctrine of Estoppel – Consistent Stance Required from Public Bodies – The Court observed that the KPSC's inconsistent stance—initially opposing and later supporting the inclusion of DCA holders—led to protracted litigation. The KPSC, a statutory authority, was expected to maintain consistency and transparency in its actions, as inconsistent positions undermine the predictability required under the rule of law – Held: The KPSC is estopped from changing its stance on the eligibility of DCA holders after previously asserting that DCA was not a valid qualification [Paras 20, 24-27].

Equivalence of Higher Qualifications – Requirement of Foundational Inquiry – The Court held that the KPSC failed to conduct a foundational inquiry into whether higher qualifications like DCA presuppose the skills imparted by the prescribed Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation. The KPSC’s assumption that higher computer-related degrees or diplomas automatically included data entry and office automation skills was arbitrary and unsupported by evidence – Held: KPSC’s decision to treat DCA as equivalent to the prescribed certificate without inquiry was arbitrary and lacked rational basis [Paras 21-23].

Rule of Law – Importance of Predictability and Consistency – The Court emphasized that public authorities must act with consistency to uphold citizens' expectations of fairness and stability in decision-making. Citing the principles of regularity and predictability, the Court criticized the KPSC's arbitrary shift in position, as it resulted in needless litigation and uncertainty for affected candidates – Held: The KPSC’s deviation from its initial stance without public interest justification violates the principles of fairness under Article 14 of the Constitution [Para 26].

Procedural Fairness – Representation of Interested Parties – The Court rejected the appellants' contention that all affected candidates had not been impleaded, noting that over 100 candidates with DCA or higher qualifications were already parties, which was sufficient representation of their collective interest. The Court held that the purpose of Rule 148 of the Kerala High Court Rules is to ensure representation of affected persons, not to delay proceedings by requiring individual impleadment of each candidate – Held: No merit in the argument of non-impleadment due to sufficient representation of the affected group [Para 11].

Decision – The Supreme Court upheld the Kerala High Court’s decision to exclude candidates with DCA or higher qualifications from the LDC selection process, affirming that only those with the prescribed qualification were eligible. The appeals were dismissed, with each party bearing its own costs [Paras 28].
 

Compassionate Appointment – Rejection on Grounds of Delay – Appeal Dismissed – Opportunity Granted for Ex-Gratia Compensation [Paras 1–26].
Compassionate Appointment – Claim by Minor Dependent – Delay Beyond Policy Period – Appellant’s father, a Haryana Police constable, died on duty in 1997 – Minor dependent’s claim recorded in Minor’s Register in 1998 – Appellant attained majority in 2008 and applied for compassionate appointment – Claim rejected in 2009 on the grounds of delay beyond the three-year period prescribed in Government instructions dated 22.03.1999 – 2006 Rules under which the claim was considered did not provide for compassionate appointments – Held: Compassionate appointment is not a vested right; rejection of claim upheld [Paras 1–6, 13–16].

Promissory Estoppel – Not Applicable in the Absence of Statutory Backing – Appellant contended that communications from authorities promising consideration for appointment created legitimate expectation – Supreme Court held: Entries in Minor’s Register or administrative communications do not create enforceable rights absent statutory support – Principle of promissory estoppel inapplicable as the 1999 instructions prescribed a three-year limit for such claims [Paras 3–5, 9–12].

Compassionate Appointment – Objective and Limitation – Purpose of compassionate appointment is to provide immediate relief to families facing destitution due to the loss of the sole breadwinner – Policies prescribing time limits for claiming such benefits are reasonable – Held: Appellant’s claim after 11 years from the father’s death fell outside the scope of such policies [Paras 13–15].

Ex-Gratia Compensation – Opportunity Granted for Consideration – Claim for compassionate appointment remained pending until rejection in 2009 – Government of Haryana’s 2011 decision provided a one-time relaxation for old cases to apply for ex-gratia compensation – Widow of deceased employee not informed of this option – Held: Widow permitted to submit a representation for lump sum ex-gratia compensation – Authorities to decide within six weeks of receipt, failing which interest at 6% per annum shall be payable [Paras 17–23].

Decision: 
Appeal dismissed as regards compassionate appointment.
Opportunity granted to widow of the deceased to apply for ex-gratia compensation.
Authorities directed to decide representation within six weeks – No interest on timely disbursal, but interest at 6% applicable for delays.
No order as to costs [Paras 23–26].
 

Criminal Law – Murder – Acquittal – Appeal Against Acquittal – The appellants were convicted by the Trial Court for the murder of the deceased, Naseem Khan, under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, based on testimonies of the deceased’s family members as eyewitnesses and corroborative medical evidence – Upon appeal, the High Court reversed the conviction, granting benefit of doubt to the accused due to inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses – The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s acquittal, emphasizing that appellate interference in acquittal judgments is warranted only when there is clear perversity in evidence appreciation by the lower courts [Paras 1, 5, 8, 24, 30].

Witness Testimony – Reliability and Contradictions – Family Members as Eyewitnesses – Key witnesses (PWs 5 and 9, minor brothers of the deceased, and PW 8, the mother) claimed to have seen the attack – The Trial Court relied on their testimonies, finding corroboration with medical evidence – The High Court, however, deemed their testimonies unreliable due to contradictions and omissions, noting significant discrepancies between their court statements and earlier police statements – Testimonies were found to be inconsistent, as witnesses failed to mention crucial details in initial statements, such as the specifics of the alleged attack and an oral dying declaration, undermining credibility [Paras 5, 20, 23, 28, 29].

Oral Dying Declaration – Veracity and Evidentiary Value – The mother (PW-8) claimed that the deceased made a dying declaration implicating the accused – The High Court questioned its reliability, highlighting that neither this statement nor corroborative evidence of the deceased’s ability to speak was present in initial police records or statements of other witnesses – The Court cited legal principles on caution in accepting verbal dying declarations, especially when first introduced in court testimony – Absence of corroboration and significant omissions justified rejection of the dying declaration as evidence [Paras 10, 17, 20, 22].

First Information Report (FIR) – Evidentiary Role and Limitations – The Court clarified that while an FIR is not an exhaustive account, it serves as an important document for setting the criminal law in motion – Omissions of vital facts in the FIR, like the alleged dying declaration, raised concerns about witness reliability and the prosecution’s case – These omissions affected the credibility of PW-8, weakening the prosecution’s stance, as such information was expected to be present in initial reports if genuine [Paras 11, 13, 15, 16].

Eyewitness Testimonies – Inconsistencies Among Witnesses – Other eyewitnesses, including PWs 2 and 17, either turned hostile or provided contradictory accounts – PW-17’s testimony that the accused threw the deceased on a stone boulder was inconsistent with the medical evidence, which did not support this mode of injury – Such contradictions, coupled with the absence of corroborative detail from PW-8 and other witnesses, led the High Court to reject these testimonies as unreliable [Paras 27, 28].

Necroscopical Evidence – Cause of Death – The medical evidence, presented through the testimony of PW-1 and the postmortem report, confirmed that the injuries sustained by Naseem Khan were sufficient to cause death – Both the Trial Court and High Court agreed on the homicidal nature of the death but diverged on the identification of the perpetrators due to the inconsistencies in eyewitness accounts [Paras 24, 25].

Judgment on Acquittal – Scope of Appellate Review in Acquittal Cases – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s acquittal, reiterating that appellate courts should interfere in acquittals only if there is a clear perversity or error in evidence appraisal – Referring to precedents, the Court emphasized that if the view taken by the High Court is reasonable, even if not the sole possible view, it should be upheld to avoid unwarranted appellate interference in acquittal judgments [Paras 7, 8, 26, 29].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, acquitting the accused based on inconsistencies and gaps in witness testimonies – The accused were acquitted due to lack of conclusive evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt [Para 30].

Civil Law - Horizontal Reservation – Right of Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PWBDs) – The petitioner, with a locomotor disability of 60%, sought quashing of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Examinations, 2024 results for not applying separate cut-offs for PWBDs – The petitioner argued that the denial of such benefit violated Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution – Held: The principle of horizontal reservation for PWBDs must be respected as it cuts across vertical reservations, ensuring fair representation within each category [Paras 3-5, 8].

Eligibility Criteria – Distinction Between Vertical and Horizontal Reservations – Clarified that horizontal reservations are applied across vertical categories, and candidates are adjusted within their respective vertical reservation categories – Cited Indira Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) and its clarification on horizontal reservation, ensuring PWBDs are considered in each category [Paras 7-8].

Equal Opportunity and Non-Discrimination – Upholding Constitutional Mandates – The refusal to apply a distinct cut-off for PWBDs in the main examination violated constitutional provisions ensuring equality and non-discrimination – The petitioner, who met the lower cut-off threshold prescribed for PWBDs, was entitled to an interview – The Court directed the respondent to include the petitioner in the interview process [Para 9].

Provisional Inclusion in Interview Process – Interim Relief Granted – Similar to the relief granted in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 710 of 2024 involving a blind candidate – Directed that the petitioner be included in the ongoing interview process, pending the final hearing [Paras 5, 7].

Decision: The petition was allowed in part as an interim measure. The respondents were directed to call the petitioner for an interview as part of the ongoing process. The case was listed for further hearing along with Writ Petition (Civil) No. 710 of 2024 [Paras 7-9].