Judicial Service – Inter se Seniority in Higher Judicial Service – Annual 4-Point Roster – Loss of ‘Birthmark’ – Merit-cum-Seniority – Service in Lower Judiciary Not Relevant – Proposals for Extra Weightage / Quota for Promotees Rejected – Uniform Guidelines Issued Under Art. 142 – Directions to Amend State HJS Rules [Paras 38–52, 53–66, 70–86, 97–101].

Judicial Services – Inter Se Seniority – Higher Judicial Services (HJS) – Determination of Seniority – Issue concerning comparative seniority between Direct Recruits (DR), Regular Promotees (RP), and Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) recruits – Constitution Bench constituted to address imbalance and heartburn arising from divergent career progressions – Held: All officers lose the “birthmark” of recruitment source upon entry into HJS; Seniority must be determined through a uniform 4-point annual roster system – Merit, not length of service in lower judiciary, is key for further career advancement [Paras 1 to 3, 5, 6, 17, 31, 37, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 100(v), 100(x)].

Judicial Independence – Control over Subordinate Judiciary – Articles 233 to 235 of the Constitution – High Court’s primacy in regulating judicial service conditions acknowledged – However, Supreme Court empowered under Articles 32, 141, and 142 to lay down uniform principles for national consistency in judicial structure and functioning – Directions issued herein are binding and to be incorporated into statutory service rules by respective States in consultation with High Courts [Paras 18 to 20, 31 to 37, 36, 100(xiv), 101].

Service Law – Seniority – Judicial Cadres – Promotees’ Claim for Preferential Treatment Based on Longer Judicial Service in Lower Cadres – Rejected – Experience as Civil Judge (Junior or Senior Division) not a valid basis for preferential seniority in HJS – No intelligible differentia to justify separate classification – Past judicial service can justify entry into HJS through promotion or competitive recruitment, but cannot carry forward into HJS seniority – Any attempt to create such preference violates equality under Articles 14 and 16 [Paras 12, 13, 38 to 42, 47, 49, 64, 91 to 94, 100(vi), 100(vii)].

Roster System – Inter Se Seniority – Introduction of Uniform Annual 4-Point Roster – Two points for RPs, one each for LDCE and DR – Roster applicable per recruitment year – If recruitment from any source is delayed but completed within next year without overlapping new year’s appointments, such delayed appointees may claim placement in original year’s roster – Otherwise, seniority linked to actual year of appointment – Vacancies unfilled from LDCE or DR to be filled by RP but without claiming the diverted source’s roster position [Paras 66 to 80, 85, 86, 100(x) to (xiii)].

Judicial Promotions – Selection Grade and Super Time Scale – Basis for Advancement – Merit-cum-Seniority within HJS only – Length or performance in lower judiciary irrelevant – Promotions and administrative roles such as Principal District Judge depend on performance within HJS cadre – Earlier judicial service has no bearing after promotion or direct entry into HJS [Paras 47 to 49, 55, 64, 94, 100(vi)].

Recruitment Source – Irrelevance Post-Entry – 'Birthmark Theory' – Once officers from DR, RP, and LDCE enter HJS, their source of recruitment becomes immaterial – No classification based on source permitted – Relying on precedents including Roshan Lal Tandon, Triloki Nath Khosa, and Direct Recruit Class II Engineers Assn. – Seniority to be reckoned only within HJS based on date and roster position, not feeder service [Paras 53 to 63, 100(v), 100(vii)].

Bar Experience vs. Judicial Experience – Equivalence – Experience at the Bar and in Judicial Service both valued but neither considered superior – Decision in Rejanish K.V. clarified as recognising equivalence, not superiority of judicial service – Claim of DRs being unfairly advantaged rejected – DRs also face disadvantage due to mandatory ten-year minimum for HC elevation under R. Poornima [Paras 40 to 43, 100(i), 100(ii)].

Accelerated Promotion – Multiple Career Pathways – RPs and LDCEs have equal opportunities to advance via LDCE or DR exams – Rejanish K.V. and Sixth AIJA enable fast-track promotions and broader eligibility – Additional benefit of competing in direct recruitment exams also acknowledged – Heartburn due to age or speed of DR entry not a valid ground for special treatment [Paras 42, 44, 51, 52, 100(ix)].

Uniformity vs. State Variations – High Courts’ Role – While High Courts may vary in service rules and implementation, overarching uniformity essential – Separate seniority lists or State-specific preference rules may cause inequality and are not permissible unless incorporated through valid statutory rules – Preferential treatment must be rational, reasonable, and rule-based [Paras 68 to 70, 65, 94, 100(xiv)].

Data – Not Reliable Basis – Disparities in data across States and recruitment years over three decades render statistical reliance untenable – Varying rules and eligibility for entry into judicial service over time make present moment unfit for granting additional weightage to RPs based on lower cadre experience – Performance in HJS alone should determine career progression [Paras 87 to 90, 93, 94, 100(ii) to (iv)].

Decision: Interlocutory Application dismissed – General and mandatory guidelines issued for determining inter se seniority in HJS to be incorporated into statutory rules within 3 months – Existing seniority not to be reopened – Subject to future reconsideration depending on the impact of Rejanish K.V. and Sixth AIJA [Paras 95 to 104].

Registration Act – Assignment of decree – Specific performance – Nature of decree – No interest in immovable property created – Decree only confers a right to seek sale deed execution – Assignment of such decree does not fall under Section 17(1)(e) – Registration not compulsory – Contrary view in K. Bhaskaram overruled – Held: Assignment deed of decree for specific performance does not require registration [Paras 18, 21–22, 26–28, 31–34].

Specific Relief – Assignment of Decree for Specific Performance – Requirement of Registration – Decree for specific performance does not create or assign any interest in immovable property – Assignment of such a decree does not require registration – Appeal dismissed – High Court judgment upheld – Held: Section 17(1)(e) of the Registration Act not applicable to assignment of such a decree [Paras 2, 14, 18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 34].

Civil Procedure – Execution of Decree – Order 21 Rule 16 CPC – Assignment of Decree – Assignment of decree in writing permitted – Assignee entitled to execute the decree as if he were the original decree-holder – No challenge raised regarding notice under Order 21 Rule 16 – Held: Assignment deed (Ex. B1) valid and enforceable – Registration not required [Paras 28, 29].

Property Law – Contract for Sale vs. Sale – Transfer of Property Act – Agreement for sale or decree for specific performance does not create any title or interest – Ownership passes only upon execution and registration of sale deed – Mere decree for specific performance does not confer ownership [Paras 20, 21, 22, 31].

Registration Act – Section 17(1)(e) – Scope and Applicability – Only applies if decree or order itself creates or declares rights, title or interest in immovable property – A decree for specific performance does not do so – Assignment of such decree is not compulsorily registrable [Paras 25, 26, 27, 30].

Legal Nature of Decree for Specific Performance – Decree does not extinguish the contract – Court retains control post-decree – Relief is equitable and does not automatically confer ownership – Execution required to complete sale [Paras 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24].

Case Law Referred – Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal – Suraj Lamp & Industries – Hungerford Investment Trust – Amol v. Deorao – Held: Passing of decree does not vest title – Registration not needed for assigning decree for specific performance [Paras 17, 21, 24, 27].

Incorrect Law Declared – K. Bhaskaram v. Mohammad Moulana – Held: Does not lay down the correct position in law regarding requirement of registration for assignment of decree for specific performance [Para 33].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Decree-holder validly assigned decree to Respondent No.1 – Assignment deed not compulsorily registrable – High Court judgment allowing execution rightly passed – No costs imposed [Paras 34, 35].

CRIMINAL LAW – SECTION 482 CrPC – QUASHING – ABUSE OF PROCESS – SECOND COMPLAINT ON SAME FACTS – Held: Filing a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC by the same informant against the same accused regarding the same occurrence, after a negative final report had already been submitted and accepted by the court, amounts to a gross abuse of the process of law. The complainant cannot improve their case or bypass the earlier negative report merely by adding a new offence (Section 308 IPC) or invoking a private complaint after a significant delay (2.5 years) without having filed a protest petition against the original negative report. – Proceedings quashed.

CRIMINAL LAW – SECTION 154 & 200 CrPC – MAINTAINABILITY OF SECOND FIR/COMPLAINT – TEST OF SAMENESS – Held: Relying on Surender Kaushik & Ors. v. State of U.P., the Court reiterated that while rival versions of the same incident may justify a second FIR, a second complaint by the same complainant against the same accused for the same incident is prohibited. The concept of "sameness" bars a subsequent complaint intended to improve upon the facts of the original complaint. The ratio in Surender Kaushik actually supports the quashing of such vexatious proceedings where the spectrum of allegations remains identical.

CRIMINAL LAW – DOUBLE JEOPARDY – LIBERTY OF ACCUSED – Held: Where accused persons were named in the initial FIR but dropped from the investigation (negative report), dragging them into a second complaint for the same occurrence implicates the liberty of the person and raises questions of double jeopardy.

Decision: Appeal allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. Proceedings pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate qua the appellants are quashed.

Land Acquisition – Compensation – Parity with Similar Landowners – Appellants’ lands acquired for setting up MIDC Jintur in the 1990s – Compensation originally fixed at ₹32,000 per Acre – Reference Court enhanced it but High Court reversed enhancement – Supreme Court held appellants similarly situated to those in Manohar v. State of Maharashtra – Held: Compensation enhanced to ₹58,320 per Acre with statutory benefits [Paras 4-14, 16(iv)-(v)]

Comparable Sale Instances – Deduction for Small Plots – Reference Court had rightly considered ten sale exemplars from Jintur town – Court upheld 20% deduction from highest exemplar rate (₹72,900/Acre) – Held: Enhanced rate ₹58,320 per Acre applicable to appellants – Location near highway and N.A. potentiality validated by documentary evidence [Paras 10-13]

Non-Agricultural Potential – Evidence of Proximity – Land found near Nashik–Nirmal State Highway, adjacent to Jintur town, with irrigation and water sources – Claims of remoteness by MIDC rejected – Held: High Court erred in reversing Reference Court's award [Paras 10-12]

Delay in Appeal – Interest Denied for Delay Period – Though appeal allowed, interest on enhanced compensation not granted for period of delay in filing SLPs as per earlier notice orders [Paras 15-16(v)]

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court and Reference Court judgments set aside – Compensation enhanced – Statutory benefits under Land Acquisition Act to follow – Interest denied for delay period [Paras 16(i)-(v)]

Civil Law – Vakalatnama – No Instruction Pursis – Not Withdrawal – Counsel for defendant filed pursis claiming no instructions without formally withdrawing Vakalatnama – Trial Court decreed suit without issuing notice to litigant – Appellate Court held that absence of clear withdrawal or proof of non-service of RPAD notice cannot be grounds for remand – High Court erred in accepting pursis as withdrawal and remanding suit [Paras 7, 23-26].

Supervisory Jurisdiction – Article 227 – Scope and Limitations – High Court interfered with well-reasoned appellate court order based on procedural misinterpretation – Held: Article 227 jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely to substitute one plausible view for another – Interference unwarranted unless jurisdictional error or failure of justice is established [Paras 22-26].

Evidence – Defendant's Conduct – Absence of Effort to Engage Counsel – Defendant did not deny receipt of counsel’s letter nor attempted to contest suit after pursis filed – Appellate Court held defendants cannot benefit from own negligence – High Court’s remand disregarded factual findings of Appellate Court [Paras 5-8, 14-23].

Practice and Procedure – Withdrawal of Counsel – Requirement of Notice – Civil Manual Clause 660(4) and Bombay HC Rules require 7 days' prior notice and court’s leave for withdrawal – However, such formalities do not apply where Vakalatnama is not withdrawn and litigant fails to act despite communication – Held: Trial Court was justified in proceeding with decree [Paras 10-13, 23-26].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s remand order set aside – Order of Trial Court decreeing suit, as affirmed by Appellate Court, restored – Writ Petition dismissed [Paras 24-25].

Arbitration – Post-Award Interest – Commercial Loan Recovery – Arbitral award granting 24% interest upheld – Borrower (appellant) challenged arbitral award on ground of usurious and unconscionable interest – Arbitrator’s discretion in granting 24% post-award interest found valid – Held: Arbitrator has discretion to award post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Statutory rate of 18% applies only in absence of specific direction in award – Challenge under Section 34 rightly rejected; re-appreciation of evidence not permissible – Appeal dismissed [Paras 11, 31, 36-39, 42, 44-46, 56-57].

Arbitration Act, 1996 – Section 31(7)(b) – Post-award interest – Scope and interpretation – Discretion of arbitrator not controlled by contract – Clause (b) does not allow parties to “contract out” post-award interest – Arbitrator may fix rate, and if not fixed, statutory rate of 18% applies – Public policy ground under Section 34(2)(b) narrowly construed – Award of 24% post-award interest in commercial transaction not against public policy [Paras 33-39, 49-53].

Loan Transaction – High-Interest Commercial Loan – NBFC charging 24% interest on loan extended to defaulting borrower – Loan used to settle pre-existing debt – Rate justified due to high risk – Contention that agreement was signed on blank documents found untenable – Arbitrator and High Court concurrently found interest clause genuine – No merit in claim under Usurious Loans Act, 1918 – NBFCs not governed by State interest control statutes [Paras 5, 7, 25-27, 45, 54-55].

Arbitration – Section 34 and Section 37 – Limited scope of judicial interference – Courts below rightly refused to set aside award – Findings on facts including interest rate and validity of loan agreements cannot be re-examined – Error in law or high interest rate alone not grounds for interference – Concurrent findings of arbitrator and High Court upheld [Paras 12, 15, 29, 46].

Insolvency Proceedings – Non-payment of arbitral award led to initiation of CIRP under IBC – No resolution plan received – Liquidation followed – Recovery through liquidation much below awarded sum – Justifies award of interest and supports lender’s right to enforce full claim [Paras 13-14, 48].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Arbitral award upheld – Interest at 24% per annum confirmed – No interference warranted under Sections 34 or 37 of the Act – No violation of public policy or fundamental principles of Indian law found [Paras 56-57].

Environmental Law – Ex post facto Environmental Clearance – Review Allowed – The Supreme Court recalled its earlier judgment in Vanashakti v. Union of India dated 16.05.2025 which had declared the 2017 Notification and 2021 Office Memorandum ultra vires – Court held that the earlier ruling failed to consider binding precedents (D. Swamy, Pahwa Plastics, Alembic, Electrosteel Steels) and took a narrow view inconsistent with environmental jurisprudence – Further, Court noted that indiscriminate demolition of thousands of projects undertaken in public interest, including hospitals and public housing, would cause greater ecological damage and economic loss – Held: Ex post facto EC may be granted subject to stringent environmental safeguards and penalties as contemplated under the 2017 Notification and 2021 OM [Paras 114–127, 141–142].

Public Interest – Demolition vs Environmental Protection – Balancing Approach – Court held that the Vanashakti judgment would have led to indiscriminate demolition of completed and near-complete infrastructure projects, including those sanctioned by public bodies – Relying on judgments in Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Pankaj Babulal Kotecha and Bindu Kapurea v. Subhashish Panda, Court emphasized that post facto regularisation with safeguards may, in certain circumstances, better serve the environment and public interest than demolition and reconstruction – Held: A rigid approach risks economic waste and increased pollution [Paras 123–126, 128–140].

Environmental Jurisprudence – Doctrine of Per Incuriam – Vanashakti held per incuriam – Earlier judgment failed to consider binding coordinate Bench rulings in D. Swamy and Pahwa Plastics, which upheld the validity of the 2017 Notification and 2021 OM – Supreme Court reaffirmed that coordinate Benches must follow binding precedent or refer to a larger Bench – Held: Vanashakti judgment disregarded this principle and was liable to be recalled [Paras 121–122].

Judicial Discipline – Article 141 – Coordinate Bench Conflict – Court reiterated that if a two-Judge Bench disagrees with an earlier two-Judge Bench decision, it must refer the matter to a larger Bench – The Vanashakti judgment violated this principle by departing from binding precedents without reference – Held: Error on the face of the record warranting recall under review jurisdiction [Para 122].

Environmental Law – Ex post facto EC – Dissent – Justice Ujjal Bhuyan dissented, holding that the concept of ex post facto EC is alien to environmental jurisprudence and contrary to precautionary principle – Dismissed the review plea, stating that economic loss or administrative hardship cannot override the statutory requirement of prior EC – Held: 2006 EIA Notification mandates prior EC, and post facto clearances cannot be legitimised under guise of public interest [Dissenting Opinion, Paras 1–43].

Decision: Review Petition Allowed – Judgment dated 16.05.2025 in Vanashakti v. Union of India recalled – Writ petitions and appeals restored to file for fresh consideration – Matter to be placed before Chief Justice of India for further orders on administrative side.

BNSS – Quashing of FIR – Compromise – Dacoity Allegation – Absence of Dishonest Intention – All property returned – FIR lodged against unknown persons – High Court erred in sustaining Section 310(2) BNS (dacoity) despite quashing other offences – Held: Allegations do not satisfy ingredients of theft/robbery/dacoity; entire FIR quashed under Article 142 [Paras 9–15].

Quashing of FIR – Inherent Powers – Compromise – Single Transaction – High Court Wrong in Partially Quashing FIR - High Court quashed offences under Sections 115(2), 351(2), 351(3), 352 BNS but retained Section 310(2) BNS (dacoity) – Supreme Court held the entire incident formed a single inseparable transaction, and once compromise was accepted for all other offences, there was no justification to sustain only the charge of dacoity – partial quashing untenable [Paras 12–14].

Dacoity – Ingredients – Requirement of Dishonest Intention – Absence of Theft or Robbery – FIR Shows Purpose Was Only Retrieval of Particular Files - FIR itself disclosed that 6–7 persons entered the school premises searching for Engineering/BAMS files – no weapons used – no serious injury inflicted – materials (cash, cheque book, computer, letterheads) were only taken incidentally and immediately returned – complainant confirmed full restitution and no injury – Held: No “dishonest intention” under Section 303 BNS; hence no theft → no robbery → no dacoity [Paras 9–11].

Compromise – Voluntary Affidavit by Complainant – Full Restitution – No Harm Caused – Proceedings Should Not Continue

Complainant’s affidavit confirmed:

• All property returned (money, cheque book, letterheads, stamps, files, computer).

• No injury caused to anyone.

• Dispute amicably resolved with the accused.

Held: Ingredients of dacoity no longer survive; FIR continuation would be an abuse of process [Paras 8–10].

Exercise of Power Under Article 142 – To Prevent Abuse of Process – FIR Quashed in Entirety - Since allegations did not disclose the primary ingredients of dacoity, and compromise restored status quo ante, Supreme Court invoked Article 142 to “secure complete justice” and quashed FIR C.R. No. 270/2024 entirely, including proceedings under Section 310(2) BNS [Paras 15–16].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court order set aside – FIR C.R. No. 270/2024 and all proceedings quashed in entirety under Article 142 of the Constitution – Pending applications disposed [Paras 15–17].

Criminal Trial – Murder – Identification Evidence – Dock Identification After 8½ Years – Invalid TIP – Procedural Irregularities in Video-Conference Testimony – Recovery Not Connected to the Crime – Bloodstains Not Matched – Hostile/Infirm Evidence – Held: Conviction unsustainable; prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; accused acquitted [Paras 51–56, 57–66, 67–69, 70–72].

Identification Evidence – Reliability of Sole Eye-Witness – Dock Identification After Long Delay – Weak Eyesight – Video-Conferencing Deposition – Held Unsafe - Eye-witness PW-18 identified the appellant through video conferencing after an inordinate delay of nearly 8½ years, despite admitting weak eyesight, age-related infirmity, and absence of spectacles during deposition – material improvements in testimony (e.g., introduction of black shirt, introduction of “chheni” not mentioned in Section 161 statement) undermined credibility – witness denied presence in any TIP despite prosecution claim – Held: Dock identification in these circumstances wholly unreliable and unsafe for sustaining conviction [Paras 35–44, 50–56].

Test Identification Parade – Failure of Prosecution to Prove Sanctity – TIP Documents Do Not Contain Signature of Witness – No Proof Witness Attended TIP – Accused’s Face Not Kept Baparda – Refusal Cannot Lead to Adverse Inference - Arrest memo did not record accused’s face as muffled; recovery memoranda also silent – TIP alleged to have been fixed on 24.12.2008 but witness categorically stated she never attended Court or hospital after 25.12.2008 – TIP judge’s (PW-12) deposition showed witness was not produced; documents bore no signature of identifying witness – Held: Entire TIP exercise invalid; refusal to participate loses significance; adverse inference cannot be drawn [Paras 57–66].

Video-Conference Examination – Confrontation With Previous Statements – Mandatory Procedure Under Ss. 147–148 BSA / Ss. 144–145 Evidence Act – Directions Issued - Trial court failed to enable confrontation of the witness with her previous statement (Exh. PW-17/A) owing to limitations of video-conferencing – crucial contradictions remained untested – Supreme Court issued mandatory directions requiring electronic transmission of documents to witnesses in all future video-conference examinations to preserve fairness of trial and cross-examination integrity [Paras 42–49].

Recovery Evidence – Human Blood on Pant – Serology Report “No Reaction” – Recovery of ‘Chheni’ from Open Area – No Identification – Articles Not Identified at Trial – Held Inadmissible to Prove Guilt - Pant recovered from open bushes allegedly at appellant’s instance contained human blood but serology report recorded “no reaction”, thus no match with deceased or scene – recovery of chheni after 22 days from open bushes, with no independent witnesses and never shown to PW-18 – robbed articles allegedly recovered were never identified in court; witness son who identified in TIP not examined – Held: Recoveries fail to connect accused with offence; cannot sustain conviction [Paras 67–69].

Concurrent Findings – When Interference Justified – Misreading of Evidence – Perverse Appreciation – Miscarriage of Justice - Given defective identification, unreliable witness, invalid TIP, and inconclusive recoveries, the Court held that findings of trial court and High Court suffered from serious misreading of evidence resulting in grave miscarriage of justice – interference warranted under Article 136 [Paras 31–33, 70–72].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC set aside – Accused acquitted of all charges – Having remained in custody for 15½ years, directed to be released forthwith unless wanted in any other case [Paras 70–72].