Facts:

The appellants, Pipal Singh and Mukhtiar Singh, along with several others, were accused of causing the death of Sardara Ram and injuries to Sukhdev Raj when the victims were entering their own land. The trial court had sentenced the appellants and others to life imprisonment and a fine for murder and six months of rigorous imprisonment for simple hurt, both sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the High Court re-evaluated the evidence and found that the appellants had a common intention to commit the crime.

Issues:

The effect of the acquittal of other accused on sentencing the remaining accused under Section 302 IPC involving Section 34 IPC.

The nature of the offense committed by each of the accused.

Held:

The court can consider whether remaining accused were guilty of an offense involving Section 34 IPC, even when some accused are acquitted. Various factors, including the nature of injuries, the background of the incident, and the weapons used, must be considered to determine common intention.

Section 304 Part II is not applicable in this case, as rightly determined by the High Court.

Decision: Both contentions raised by the appellants' counsel were rejected, and the appeals were dismissed. This means that the appellants' convictions and sentences as imposed by the High Court were upheld by the Supreme Court.

Facts:

Pursuant to a notification dated 22.4.1998 issued by the Election Commission of India, a by-election in Margherita Legislative Assembly Constituency No. 124 was held in the month of May and June, 1998. Nine persons, including the appellant (Pradyut Bordoloi) and the respondent (Swapan Roy), filed nomination papers. A complaint was filed against the candidature of the respondent, alleging that he was disqualified from contesting the election under Article 191 of the Constitution of India and Section 10 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as he was holding an "office of profit" under the Government of India and also performing managerial functions in a company wherein the Government of India had not less than 25% shares. The complaint was supported by the appellant during the scrutiny of the nomination papers, leading to the rejection of the respondent's nomination.

Issues:

Whether the respondent was holding an "office of profit" under the Government of India on the date of his nomination?

Whether the respondent was disqualified due to being a manager of any company in which the Government of India held not less than 25% shares?

Held:

The basic facts are not in controversy. The respondent was an employee of Tirap Colliery, North Eastern Coal Fields under the Coal India Ltd., holding the post of Clerk Grade-I. The Coal India Ltd. is a Government company under Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, with 100% share capital owned by the Central Government. The President of India has certain powers over the appointment and removal of Directors, but the day-to-day management and control of the company is vested in the Board of Directors of Coal India Ltd. The respondent's role was that of a Clerk Grade-I.

The first issue is whether the respondent was holding any "office of profit" under the Government of India within the meaning of Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Court discusses various tests to determine this, including appointment, removal, remuneration, functions, and control. The Court concludes that the respondent did not hold an "office of profit" under the Government of India because the government did not have control over his appointment, removal, service conditions, or functions.

The second issue pertains to the respondent's disqualification as a manager of a company in which the Government of India held not less than 25% shares. However, it is found that the respondent was merely a Clerk Grade-I and not a manager of Coal India Ltd. This disqualification was not applicable.

The appeal is devoid of any merit, and the High Court's decision is affirmed. The appellant's election is declared void due to the improper rejection of the respondent's nomination.

Facts:

The petitioners were originally appointed as teachers in Panchayat Union Elementary Schools.

They were later transferred to High Schools when the Middle Schools were upgraded.

Some teachers who remained in the Elementary Schools were promoted as Head Masters and were granted a higher salary scale.

The petitioners approached the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal seeking equal pay with Head Masters.

Issues:

Whether the petitioners, who chose to work in High Schools after the upgradation of Middle Schools, are entitled to equal pay with Head Masters in Elementary Schools.

Held:

The petitioners chose to work in High Schools when the Middle Schools were upgraded, thereby ceasing to be part of the cadre of teachers serving in Panchayat Union Elementary Schools.

The protection granted by the Government, which was relied upon by the Tribunal, pertained to pay and selection or special grade awards but did not establish a single cadre.

Therefore, the petitioners' claim for equal pay with Head Masters in Elementary Schools was found to be unfounded.

The petitions were dismissed with no costs.

Referred Case:

The Director of School Education and Another Vs. A.N. Kandaswamy and Another, (1998) 80 FLR 931 : (1998) 7 JT 342 : (1999) 1 LLJ 442 : (1998) 5 SCALE 699 : (1998) 5 SCALE 690 : (1998) 8 SCC 26 : (1999) SCC(L&S) 75 : (1999) 1 UJ 4

Facts:

The case involved a detenu who had been detained under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, based on information received about his attempts to evade customs duties while traveling from Singapore to India. The detaining authority seized electronic goods from the detenu's luggage with a total value of Rs. 18,38,300. The detenu was informed of his right to make a representation against the detention order, but he chose to address a representation solely to the Advisory Board, without forwarding it to the appropriate government or confirming authority. The government confirmed the detention order without considering this representation, which led to the legal challenge.

Issues:

Whether the detenu's failure to forward his representation to the appropriate government rendered the detention unconstitutional or illegal.

Whether the Advisory Board had a duty to forward the detenu's representation to the government.

Whether the government was obligated to consider the representation even if it was addressed only to the Advisory Board.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that:

The detenu's failure to forward his representation to the appropriate government did not render the detention unconstitutional or illegal.

The Advisory Board was not obligated to forward the entire record, including the detenu's representation, to the government.

The government's obligation was limited to examining the report and opinion of the Advisory Board regarding further detention.

Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the order of confirmation by the appropriate government was valid and that the failure to consider the representation made solely to the Advisory Board did not render the detention illegal.

Facts:

The appellant obtained a decree for possession of a property in 1970.

A Second Appeal filed by one of the respondents against the decree was dismissed by the High Court in 1976 as time-barred.

The appellant attempted to use the High Court's order of dismissal of the Second Appeal as a basis for reviving his enforcement rights.

The primary issue was the interpretation of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which governs the execution of decrees.

Issues:

Whether the dismissal of the Second Appeal due to delay constitutes a decree.

How the Limitation Act applies to the enforcement of decrees.

Held:

A decree, as defined in Section 2(2) of the CPC, requires an adjudication in a suit that conclusively determines the rights of the parties. Rejection of an application for condonation of delay or the dismissal of an appeal as time-barred does not meet this definition and, therefore, does not constitute a decree.

The judgment emphasizes that a liberal and broad-based construction should be applied when interpreting the Limitation Act, without considering hardships. It also differentiates between cases where an appellate court affirms the lower court's decree, making the appellate court's decree enforceable.

The enforcement period for a decree begins either from its date or, in specific cases, on a future date or upon the occurrence of specified events. Filing an appeal does not affect the enforceability of the original decree unless the appellate court stays its operation.

The appellant's decree became enforceable on August 1, 1973, when the appellate court passed a decree superseding the trial court's decree.

As the appellant initiated execution proceedings long after the 12-year period from that date had expired, the execution process is barred.

Decision: The appeal by the appellant is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, a registered Society, approached the government to acquire land for housing its members. The necessary approvals were obtained, and the acquisition process was initiated. However, after the acquisition process had progressed substantially, a letter from the Department of Revenue led to the withdrawal of the acquisition. The appellant challenged this withdrawal through writ petitions.

Issues:

Whether the withdrawal of the land acquisition process under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was valid.

Whether the appellant, as the beneficiary of the acquisition, had the right to be heard before the withdrawal.

Held:

The Court held that the withdrawal of the acquisition under Section 48(1) was not valid because the appellant was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard. The lack of any stated reasons for withdrawal further invalidated the decision. The Court emphasized that the principles of natural justice must be applied unless expressly or implicitly excluded by statute. While Section 48(1) excludes the owner's right to be heard, there is no similar provision for the beneficiary of the acquisition, who could suffer substantial loss without redress.

The Court concluded that the appellant, being registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, met the requirements of Section 3(j)(vi) of the Land Acquisition Act. The opinion of the Law Department, which had questioned the appellant's eligibility, was found to be factually incorrect. Once the notification under Section 6 was issued declaring the land for a public purpose, this aspect could not be reopened without challenging the Section 6 notification. Therefore, the acquisition was validly initiated under Part II, and the earlier proceedings were not rendered null and void.

Facts:

The case involved I.A. No's. 7-9 of 1999 in Civil Appeal No's. 2987-2989 of 1997. These applications sought the same relief as granted in the earlier judgment dated 6th December 1996, which held that sweepers in airports were entitled to be regularized in service after the contract labor system's abolition. The sweepers in question worked in car parks at the Santacruz and Sahar Airports in Mumbai.

Issues:

Whether the sweepers in airport parking areas were entitled to regularization in service after the abolition of the contract labor system.

Whether the notification dated December 9, 1976, prohibiting contract labor for certain tasks applied to these workers.

Held:

The Court disagreed with the respondents' contention that the sweepers in parking areas were not covered by the notification dated December 9, 1976. It ruled that car parking areas were an integral part of airport buildings and, therefore, the prohibition on contract labor for sweeping and cleaning of buildings applied to these workers.

The respondents argued that agreements with contractors for maintaining cleanliness in the car parking areas were in place. However, the Court deemed this argument unnecessary to examine, as the notification already covered sweepers in buildings owned or occupied by the establishment.

The Court clarified that the judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 2987-2989 of 1997, which followed previous decisions, applied to these workers as well. Thus, the workers were entitled to regularization in service.

Facts:

The appellant school, Noor Niwas Nursery Public School, challenged the application of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (the Act) to their institution.

The school was operated by Baptist Union North India, a registered society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860.

The appellant school argued that it and Francis Girls Higher Secondary School, both operated by the same society, were distinct institutions with separate management and accounts.

The appellant school had only four employees and contended that it did not meet the criteria for coverage under the Act.

Issues:

Whether the appellant school and Francis Girls Higher Secondary School constituted a single establishment for the purpose of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952.

Held:

The Court referred to Section 2-A of the Act, which deals with the treatment of different departments or branches of an establishment as parts of the same establishment. The Court emphasized that the determination of whether two units should be treated as one establishment depended on factors such as functional integrality, interdependence, and the employer's treatment of the units in terms of finance and employment.

The Court found that the two schools were located adjacent to each other, shared a small number of common staff, and were run by the same society. The Head Clerk possessed information about both schools, and they were geographically proximate. Therefore, the Court concluded that the two units constituted a single establishment for the purposes of the Act.

The Court rejected the appellant's argument regarding a letter sent to Francis Girls Higher Secondary School, excluding it from the Act's purview due to another provident fund scheme. The Court held that both establishments had more than 20 employees, and the exemption under Section 17 of the Act was subject to conditions. Therefore, the appellant's unit could not rely on the letter to claim non-applicability of the Act based on the number of employees.

The Court upheld the decision of the Provident Fund Commissioner and the High Court, affirming that both schools constituted a single establishment covered by the Act. This appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Aristocrat Agencies, held distributor licenses and had obtained permits for importing liquor under the Andhra Pradesh Foreign Liquor and Indian Liquor Rules, 1970. These permits were issued with the payment of countervailing duty at the prevailing rate at the time of permit issuance. Subsequently, the government issued a notification on February 8, 1991, amending the rate of countervailing duty from Rs. 45/- per litre of the strength of proof spirit to Rs. 70/- per litre of the strength of proof spirit. The appellant imported liquor based on these permits before the enhanced countervailing duty came into effect. The imports were made within the 30-day validity period of the permits.

Issues:

Whether the enhanced countervailing duty should be applied to imports made within the permit's validity period, even if those imports occurred after the issuance of the notification that increased the duty rate.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that countervailing duty becomes payable at the rate prevailing on the date of the actual import of the consignment into the State. This duty is not influenced by the rate of duty at the time of permit issuance. Excise duty primarily pertains to the production or manufacture of excisable goods, with the taxable event being the manufacture. In contrast, countervailing duty is imposed upon the import of excisable articles into the State and is levied at the time of entry into the State. Therefore, the demand for the differential amount of countervailing duty from the appellant was justified as it was based on the duty rate in effect at the time of import. The Court upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss the writ petition filed by the appellant.

Decision: The decision of the Supreme Court was to affirm the dismissal of the appellant's writ petition. It clarified that countervailing duty is chargeable at the rate prevailing on the date of actual import into the State, irrespective of the duty rate in force at the time of permit issuance.