Facts:

In this case, a contempt application was filed under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, before the Administrative Tribunal, seeking contempt proceedings against the Principal Secretary for non-compliance with its order. Additionally, another contempt application was filed directly before the High Court, without approaching the Tribunal under Section 17.

Issues:

Whether, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, remained valid and effective.

The question arose as to whether the petitioner could approach the High Court directly for contempt of a subordinate court, bypassing the procedure prescribed under the Contempt of Court Act, 1971.

Held:

The Constitution Bench did not declare the provisions of Article 323-A(2)(b) or Article 323-B(3)(d) or Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act as unconstitutional. Clause 2(b) of Article 323-A empowers Parliament to enact a law specifying the jurisdiction and powers, including the power to punish for contempt, conferred on administrative tribunals constituted under Article 323-A. Section 17 of the Act derives its legislative authority from this provision.

The power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself under Article 215 of the Constitution remains unaffected. However, the jurisdiction, power, and authority to hear and decide matters under Section 17 of the Act, which were previously within the jurisdiction of the High Court, have now been transferred to the administrative tribunals.

Administrative tribunals conducting proceedings under Section 17 remain amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, subject to established rules of self-restraint governing the High Court's interference with pending proceedings and interim orders of the tribunals.

Any order or decision of the tribunal punishing for contempt shall be appealable only to the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of the order appealed against, as provided in Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, and it was held that Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, remains valid and constitutional. The Administrative Tribunal retains the authority to exercise contempt jurisdiction under Section 17, subject to judicial review and appeal to the Supreme Court.

Facts:

The tenant leased a shop from the landlord, which was governed by the State Rent Act.

The leased shop was entirely destroyed by a natural calamity (fire).

The tenant constructed a new shop on the same site without the landlord's permission.

Issues:

Does the tenancy continue to exist after the complete destruction of the leased premises due to natural calamities?

Does the civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for recovery of possession of the land after the destruction of the tenanted shop?

Held:

The tenant argued that even after the complete destruction of the shop, the tenancy was not terminated, relying on Section 108(b)(e) of the Transfer of Property Act. The court cited relevant legal precedents but found that the tenancy could not continue when the subject matter of the lease (the shop) no longer existed.

The court examined the definition of "building" under the State Rent Act and rejected the interpretation that the land itself becomes part of the building when a structure is erected on it. The court held that the State Rent Act is applicable only to the building and not to vacant land.

It was emphasized that the State Rent Act curtailed the landlord's rights and provided specific provisions for eviction. When the subject matter of tenancy (the shop) was completely destroyed, the tenancy ceased to exist, and the provisions of Section 108(b)(e) of the Act did not apply.

The court held that when there is no superstructure (building) in existence, the landlord cannot claim recovery of possession of the vacant land under the State Rent Act. The only remedy available to the landlord is to file a suit in a civil court for the recovery of possession of the land.

Facts:

The case involves multiple appeals related to the same assessee for different assessment years (1969-70 to 1975-76 and 1977-78). The primary issue is whether the Appellate Tribunal was correct in upholding the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) order that directed the exclusion of the amount for the assessment year 1977-78 relating to the life interest of the assessee.

Issues:

Whether the life interest in question, which allows the assessee to reside in a house during his lifetime without paying rent, should be considered an asset for wealth tax purposes.

Held:

The court finds it difficult to uphold the decision of the High Court, considering the precedents set by previous judgments in cases such as Ahmed G.H. Ariff and Purshottam N. Amersey. It is established that property for wealth tax purposes includes every possible interest that a person could hold or enjoy, even if it is incapable of being sold in the market. Therefore, the life interest, although personal and inalienable, is considered property.

The alternative argument presented by the assessee, stating that Rule 1B resulted in a value of zero for a non-income-yielding life interest, is rejected. Rule 1B is not applicable in this case as it requires an income-yielding life interest. If no specific rule applies to value a particular asset, it should be valued in the ordinary way, assuming it is saleable in an open market.

Decision: The court sets aside the judgment and orders, answers the main question in the negative (in favor of the revenue), and orders the valuation of the life interest for each of the assessment years based on an assumed sale in the open market.

Facts:

Indian Airlines issued a notice for applications for the post of Junior Operator in its Southern Region.

The qualifications required included having two years of experience in equipment operating or driving and possessing a current heavy vehicle driving license.

The respondent, S. Gopalakrishnan, applied for the position and had an ITI certificate since 1994, a diploma in Mechanical Engineering obtained in April 1996, and a license to drive heavy motor vehicles since 1994.

Indian Airlines did not select the respondent for the position, citing that he did not possess two years of experience in heavy vehicle driving after acquiring his diploma.

The respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court, and the Single Judge ruled in his favor, stating that he possessed the necessary qualifications for the Junior Operator position, and the airline's action was arbitrary.

The airline appealed the decision to a Division Bench of the High Court, but the appeal was unsuccessful.

Issues:

The key issue for consideration was whether the respondent met the job requirements for the Junior Operator position, as specified in the employment notice and relevant rules.

Held:

The Supreme Court cited previous cases and explained that when both qualifications and experience are required, it means acquiring experience after obtaining the necessary qualification.

The High Court's view that the respondent's experience before acquiring the diploma should be counted was not accepted by the Supreme Court.

As a result, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's order, and dismissed the writ petition filed by the respondent.

Facts:

The appellant company, J.K. Synthetics, faced a layoff in 1983 due to a 100% power cut and generator repairs. Subsequently, they terminated the services of 1164 workmen, claiming it was due to the closure of a section of the Nylon Plant. Disputes were referred to the Industrial Tribunal, including the legality of the layoff, justification of retrenchment, and the constitutional validity of certain sections of the Industrial Disputes Act. A Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court initially allowed the appellant's writ petition and dismissed the one filed by the Rajasthan Trade Union Kendra (RTUK). The Industrial Tribunal passed an Award based on a settlement with some unions, opposed by RTUK. A secret poll was conducted among the workers, with the majority voting against the settlement. The Industrial Tribunal granted various reliefs to the workmen, mainly based on the settlement, which the company eventually accepted.

Issues:

Whether the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine the question of closure, which was essential to decide the justification of retrenchment.

Whether there was a valid closure of a section of the Nylon Plant.

Held:

The Division Bench erred in concluding that the question of closure was not referred to the Industrial Tribunal, as it was necessary to determine whether retrenchment was justified.

The Division Bench also erred in concluding that there was no closure, as there was substantial evidence and admissions that the Textile Section of the Nylon Plant had been closed.

The Division Bench's findings on the closure issue cannot be sustained and are set aside.

The Division Bench affirmed the findings of the Single Judge based on the decision in Meenakshi Mills Ltd.'s case, which is correct and cannot be disturbed.

The directions given by the Division Bench to prosecute the company and its office bearers for contravention of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and Rules were entirely unjustified and are unsustainable.

The judgment of the Division Bench is set aside, and the judgment of the Single Judge is restored. Government authorities are free to prosecute the company if they find any contravention of the Industrial Disputes Act or related rules.

Facts:

The appellant, Khatema Fibres Ltd., manufactures 'craft papers' used for packing/wrapping purposes.

The appellant applied for a Recognition Certificate under Section 4B of the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1948, to avail of tax exemptions on the purchase of raw materials, packing materials, and machinery.

The Recognition Certificate was granted but later challenged when a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court ruled in Lalji Board Industries v. State of U.P. that 'craft paper' was not 'packing material,' leading to doubts about the appellant's eligibility.

Respondent No. 2 issued a notice to remove 'craft paper' from the Recognition Certificate, and the appellant's writ petition against this notice was dismissed by the High Court based on the Lalji Board Industries decision.

Issues:

Is 'craft paper' to be categorized as 'packing material' or 'paper' for tax exemption purposes under Section 4B of the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1948?

Did the appellant provide sufficient evidence to establish that 'craft paper' is primarily meant for packing and cannot be used as regular paper?

Held:

The High Court relied on common parlance and commercial sense for interpretation since 'paper' and 'packing material' were not defined in the Act. The Court found that 'craft paper' could be used for various purposes, including writing, printing, and packing. Therefore, it was considered 'paper' in its generic sense.

The Full Bench decision in Lalji Board Industries was based on the specific pleadings and evidence presented in that case. It emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the party claiming exemption or a concessional tax rate. In the absence of clear evidence regarding the manufacturing process and exclusive use of 'craft paper' for packing, the Full Bench ruled that it should be considered 'paper' and not 'packing material.'

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and remanded the case for a fresh decision. The Court directed the parties to provide necessary material and evidence to establish whether 'craft paper' is primarily meant for packing purposes and should be considered packing material.

Facts:

The appellants were technically qualified direct recruits to the post of Operator/Overseer/Meter Reader/Assistant Store Keeper. The Karnataka Electricity Board Recruitment and Promotion Regulations, 1969 were amended on 3-2-1982, providing a ratio of 1:1 for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer (Electrical) between technically qualified (Direct Recruit) and technically not qualified (Promotees). The appellants challenged this amendment as discriminatory and arbitrary, claiming it lacked a rational basis.

Issues:

Whether the amended regulation, providing a 1:1 ratio for promotion between technically qualified direct recruits and technically unqualified promotees, violated Article 14 of the Constitution.

Held:

The concept of equality before the law allows for reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia that has a rational relation to the objective of the legislation. The guarantee of equal protection of law does not prohibit such classification.

The Regulation provided for promotion from a combined cadre of Operator, Overseer, Meter Reader, and Assistant Store Keeper to the post of Junior Engineer.

The amendment introduced a 1:1 ratio for promotion, affecting the 35% quota available for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer.

The Court upheld the amendment, considering it aimed to address the stagnation of unqualified promotees within the cadre. The classification was deemed rational and not discriminatory because both groups had access to 35% of the posts in the cadre of Junior Engineers, with different ratios applied to each.

The appeals were dismissed, and the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court's conclusion that the amendment did not violate Article 14 of the Indian Constitution was upheld.

Facts:

The dispute centers around the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board's practice of providing separate quotas for promotion to the position of Assistant Engineer based on the qualifications of Junior Engineers. Specifically, 95% of the vacancies for Junior Engineers are filled through direct recruitment of diploma holders, while only 5% are filled through promotion from among matriculates with I.T.I. certificates. The regulations governing these promotions have been amended over the years, providing for a specific quota for promotion between qualified and unqualified Junior Engineers.

Issues:

Whether it is constitutionally permissible to provide separate quotas for promotion based on the qualifications of Junior Engineers.

Whether such quotas amount to a form of reservation under Article 16(4) of the Indian Constitution.

Held:

The majority judgment upheld the validity of the regulations that provided different quotas for promotion based on the qualifications of Junior Engineers. It was argued that this differentiation was based on educational qualifications and was consistent with the efficiency of administration. The court found that such classification was not arbitrary or discriminatory.

The minority view, however, held that there had been a complete fusion between qualified and unqualified Junior Engineers, and providing different quotas for promotion after such fusion was not legally permissible.

Ultimately, the appeals by the direct recruit qualified Junior Engineers were dismissed, affirming the validity of the regulations providing separate quotas for promotion based on qualifications.

Facts:

The appellant, M. Narsinga Rao, was the manager of a Milk Chilling Center in Andhra Pradesh and was accused of accepting a bribe of Rs. 500 from a milk-transporting contractor, PW1 - Satya Prasad. He was caught red-handed during a trap operation conducted by the Anti Corruption Bureau. Subsequently, he was charged under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Issues:

Whether a legal presumption of corruption can be based on a factual presumption.

Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to establish that the appellant accepted gratification.

Whether the currency notes found on the appellant constituted gratification.

Whether the defense's contention that the currency notes were forcibly stuffed into the appellant's pocket is valid.

Held:

In this judgment, the following points were addressed:

Standard of Proof: The court affirmed that proof in criminal cases depends on the degree of probability of a fact's existence, based on the standard of a prudent person acting in an important matter concerning them.

Presumption: The court explained that the law allows the court to draw factual presumptions or inferences from established facts. Such presumptions can be tantamount to proof until they are disproved or dispelled.

Presumption of Corruption: Regarding Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the court clarified that if the prosecution establishes through circumstantial evidence that the accused received gratification, the legal presumption of corruption should apply, unless the accused can rebut this presumption with contrary evidence.

Rebuttal of Presumption: The court emphasized that while the legal presumption of corruption is rebuttable, it may be unsafe to use that presumption to draw another discretionary presumption unless there is a statutory compulsion.

Acceptance of Gratification: The court found that the circumstances surrounding the case, including the recovery of phenolphthalein smeared currency notes from the appellant's pocket, led to the presumption that the appellant had willingly received the currency notes. The appellant's attempts to disprove this presumption were deemed unreliable.