Facts:

The case relates to the assessment year 1985-86. The respondent company had obtained a loan from the Government of Kerala for expanding its Titanium Dioxide Plant and set aside Rs. 1 crore as a "loan redemption reserve." The primary issue was whether this amount should be classified as a "reserve" or a "provision" for taxation purposes.

Issues:

Whether the loan redemption reserve of Rs. 1 crore is a reserve or a provision for the computation of capital for the purpose of surtax.

Whether the decision of the Supreme Court in Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. case supports the Tribunal's classification of the amount.

Held:

The Court examined the definitions of "provision" and "reserve" as per the Companies Act, 1956. A provision is an amount written off or retained for known liabilities, while a reserve is an appropriation of profits retained as part of the capital employed in the business. The Court emphasized that the distinction should be based on the true nature and purpose of the appropriation, taking into account factors like intention and purpose.

The Court found that the amount in question was set aside to meet a known loan liability, and therefore, it should be classified as a provision rather than a reserve. The argument that an appropriation for an unknown or non-existent liability should be automatically considered a reserve was rejected.

The Court ruled in favor of the Revenue (tax authorities) and against the respondent-assessee, upholding the order of the Assessing Authority.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The appellants in this case were State Police Service Officers seeking promotion to the Indian Police Service (IPS). They claimed that the competent authority had failed to conduct a triennial review of cadre strength as required by the law, which affected their eligibility for promotion. They sought a mandamus from the court to compel the review and reconsideration of their promotions based on the altered cadre strength.

Issues:

Whether the failure to conduct a triennial review of cadre strength within the specified period by the competent authority entitles the appellants to seek a mandamus from the court.

What relief, if any, should be granted to the appellants in light of the infraction of the statutory provisions?

Held:

In this judgment, relevant paragraphs are referred to as follows:

The Court held that the failure to conduct the triennial review of cadre strength within the specified period was an infraction of the statutory provisions. The court emphasized that when statutory rules and regulations prescribe certain actions to be taken within specified periods, authorities must comply with those requirements.

The Court determined that the failure to conduct the review did not automatically confer a vested right upon the employees, but it did entitle them to seek a mandamus from the court to compel the competent authority to perform its duty under the law.

The Court cited previous judgments and noted that the failure to perform duties under the statute could be challenged in court, and the court may issue appropriate directions based on the circumstances of each case.

In this specific case, the court set aside the decisions of the tribunal and directed the Union Government and State Government to reconsider the promotion of State Cadre Officers to the IPS based on the re-determined cadre strength, treating it as if it had been altered in 1989. The court ordered this reconsideration to be completed within six months.

Facts:

VST Industries Ltd. is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, engaged in the manufacture and sale of cigarettes.

Respondent No. 1, VST Industries Workers' Union, filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus. They aimed to establish the workers in the canteen of VST Industries Ltd.'s factory as employees of the company and obtain monetary and other consequential benefits.

The canteen was provided within the factory premises of the appellant, as required by Section 46 of the Factories Act, 1948.

Issues:

Can a private company like VST Industries Ltd. be subject to a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution?

What is the employment status of the workers in the canteen, and are they entitled to benefits?

Held:

The judgment discusses the key legal principles regarding the writ of mandamus and the scope of Article 226. It emphasizes that a private company can be subject to a writ of mandamus if it performs a public duty or function. In this case, the Court concludes that manufacturing and selling cigarettes do not involve a public duty.

The judgment outlines the Court's findings regarding the employment status of the canteen workers. The Court notes that the appellant (VST Industries Ltd.) exercised significant control and responsibilities over the canteen and its employees, including providing facilities, supervising the menu and quality of food, and exercising administrative control. Therefore, the workers are considered employees of the appellant.

Discusses the appeal's dismissal. The Court decides to dismiss the appeal but clarifies that this is due to the lack of jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a petition under Article 226, despite agreeing with the High Court's findings on the merits of the case.

Facts:

The appellant, Gura Singh, was committed to the sessions court for trial under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution's case rested on the extra-judicial confession made by the appellant immediately after the alleged crime. Subsequently, the main prosecution witnesses turned hostile during the trial, weakening the prosecution's case.

Issues:

The admissibility and reliability of the extra-judicial confession made by the appellant.

Whether the main witnesses turning hostile invalidated the prosecution's case.

The significance of the recovery of blood-stained evidence based on the appellant's disclosure statement.

Held:

1. Admissibility of Extra-judicial Confession: The court held that, despite the inherent weakness of extra-judicial confessions as evidence, they can be relied upon if proven to be true and voluntary. In this case, it was determined that the confession was made before a credible witness, free from any reason to falsely state, and under circumstances that supported its authenticity. Therefore, the extra-judicial confession was deemed admissible.

Additionally, it was found that the appellant made the confession before PW 7 when arrested by the police, and any subsequent confessions were inadmissible. The confession was deemed voluntary, made without fear, favor, or coercion.

2. Hostile Witnesses: The court noted that the main prosecution witness, PW 5, was declared hostile, but the hostility was based on a post-event detail that did not significantly impact the witness's credibility. The court disagreed with the prosecutor's claim that the witness became totally hostile to the prosecution. Furthermore, the permission granted by the trial court to cross-examine the witness was wrongly permitted and was limited in scope.

3. Recovery of Blood-Stained Evidence: Blood-stained evidence, including a sheet, was recovered based on the appellant's disclosure statement. While the classification of the blood could not be determined due to the lapse of time, the court held that this fact did not grant any benefit to the accused. The absence of dimensions of the blood stains on the sheet was not sufficient to entitle the accused to the benefit of reasonable doubt, especially when the accused did not raise a defense or allege prosecution malafides.

Decision: The court, despite the main prosecution witnesses turning hostile, found sufficient evidence, including the admissible extra-judicial confession and the recovered items, to justify the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The confession was considered voluntary and not obtained under duress.

Facts:

The case revolves around a dispute regarding the possession of land that was declared surplus under the Pepsu Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act, 1955.

The Collector initially dismissed the application of respondents 5 to 10 for possession of the land.

The Commissioner, Patiala Division, allowed their appeal and remanded the case to the Collector.

Daljit Singh, the landowner, filed a revision against this order before the Financial Commissioner (Appeals-II), which was dismissed.

The appellant, claiming to be the legatee of Daljit Singh, filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the Financial Commissioner's order, which was also dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

When the surplus land, if any, of Daljit Singh, the landowner, vested in the State Government and whether the allotment to respondents 5 to 10 was legal.

The interpretation of relevant sections of the Pepsu Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, and the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972, is central to resolving this issue.

Held:

The judgment clarifies that under the Pepsu Act and the Land Reforms Act, surplus land would only vest in the State Government upon the State taking possession of the land.

The Court emphasized that the vesting of surplus land in the State Government was a prerequisite for framing a utilization scheme and subsequent allotment.

As the land had not vested in the State Government, the allotment to respondents 5 to 10 was declared illegal and void.

Therefore, the Court set aside the orders of the Financial Commissioner Appeals-II and the High Court and allowed the appellant's appeal.

Facts:

These appeals pertain to the interpretation of Section 269UA(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, within Chapter XX-C, concerning the purchase of immovable properties by the Central Government. The central issue revolves around the calculation of "apparent consideration" for immovable property transfers.

Issues:

The correct interpretation of Section 269UA(b) concerning the calculation of "apparent consideration" in cases of immovable property transfers.

Whether the discounting should be based on the period between the date of payment by the Central Government and the last date of payment under the agreement or if it should be calculated differently.

Held:

Section 269UA(b) prescribes how the "apparent consideration" under the agreement for transfer should be determined. It stipulates that if the consideration under the agreement is payable after the date of the agreement, the value of the consideration payable after the agreement date shall be deemed as the discounted value. This discounting period is calculated based on the period between the date of the agreement and the date(s) on which the consideration or part thereof is payable. The objective is to determine the real consideration for the agreement or the "apparent consideration."

The discounting period, as per the Court's interpretation, commences from the date of the agreement for transfer, not from the date of payment by the Central Government. This decision is rooted in the need to ascertain whether there has been an under-valuation of the immovable property. The expression "as on the date of such agreement for transfer" in Section 269UA(b) refers to the starting point for calculating the discounting period.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed with costs, and the interpretation that the discounted value of the consideration should be calculated from the date of the agreement for transfer is upheld.

Facts:

The case involves various parties, including Western Press Pvt. Ltd., in a dispute related to securities transactions and financial institutions.

The Special Court passed a consent order on July 5, 1995, which included undertakings by the parties involved.

The appellant challenged the consent order and the undertakings, raising legal issues related to authorization, registration, and mistaken views of facts.

Issues:

Validity and enforceability of undertakings given to the Special Court.

Whether the undertakings required compulsory registration under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act.

The authority of the Chairman of the appellant-company to bind the company.

Whether there was a genuine mistake of fact that could invalidate the undertakings.

Held:

The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's arguments and upheld the Special Court's order.

The undertakings given to the court were valid and enforceable.

The undertakings did not require compulsory registration under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, as they did not purport to create, declare, assign, limit, or extinguish any right, title, or interest in immovable property.

The undertakings fell under the exempted category of 'any decree or order of the Court' as per Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act.

Section 145 of the Civil Procedure Code was cited to support the enforcement of the undertakings.

The court emphasized that the parties involved could not disown their responsibilities or change their positions after giving undertakings to the court.

The appellant was ordered to pay costs of Rs. 25,000 to the Custodian. The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellants filed Company Petitions under various sections of the Companies Act, claiming to be Trustees of CBMF, and asserting their ownership of certain bonds purchased from NTPC. The dispute revolved around the transfer of these bonds to Canara Bank, Trustee of CBMF.

Issues:

Whether NTPC was obligated to transfer the bonds to Canara Bank, Trustee of CBMF.

Whether a genuine dispute existed between the parties, justifying referral to a High-Powered Committee, as per a previous judgment in ONGC's case.

Held:

The Company Law Board found that CBMF was the true owner of the bonds, and Canara Bank held them in a trustee capacity. However, statutory restrictions prevented the Board from directing NTPC to transfer the bonds.

The Board also determined that there was no genuine dispute between the parties. NTPC's dispute lacked a proper basis or supporting evidence.

The Board ordered NTPC to pay the redemption amount to Canara Bank, Trustee of CBMF.

On appeal, the High Court referred the case to a High-Powered Committee based on the ONGC's case. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with this referral, stating that the bonds were transferable, and NTPC was obliged to pay the bond value to the transferee. The Court found NTPC's dispute to be imaginary and not a genuine basis for resistance.

As a result, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgments, and reinstated the Company Law Board's orders. The appellants were awarded costs.

Facts:

In this case, D.P. Chadha was hired as an advocate by the complainant in an ejectment suit against a landlord's company. Chadha engaged in misconduct by using a signed blank vakalatnama and blank paper, which had been provided to him by the complainant for court proceedings, to fabricate a compromise petition without the complainant's knowledge. The fabricated compromise petition led to a decree against the complainant, ordering them to vacate the suit premises. The complainant, who had not been informed of these court proceedings, later discovered Chadha's misconduct and filed a complaint with the State Bar Council.

Issues:

Whether D.P. Chadha had engaged in professional misconduct by fabricating a compromise petition detrimental to the complainant's interests.

Whether the punishment imposed by the State Bar Council and subsequently enhanced by the Bar Council of India was justified.

Held:

The State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India correctly found that D.P. Chadha was guilty of professional misconduct. There was no emergency or urgency that warranted the hasty verification of the compromise, and the replacement of counsel for the parties appeared to serve no valid purpose. The Trial Court had doubts about the genuineness of the compromise and rightly directed the personal appearance of the parties for verification. Chadha's resistance to this order raised suspicions about his intentions. The correctness of the Trial Court's proceedings was beyond doubt, and no effort was made to rectify the record of proceedings in accordance with the law. Chadha's conduct amounted to professional misconduct as it involved betraying the confidence of his client and attempting to mislead the court.

The power of the Bar Council of India to vary or enhance punishment was upheld. However, this power must be exercised in accordance with the principles of natural justice, which require giving the advocate a reasonable opportunity to be heard before enhancing the punishment. In this case, Chadha was not provided with such an opportunity when his suspension was increased from 5 years to 10 years. Given the age of the appellant and the delay involved, the court decided not to remit the case back to the Bar Council of India and upheld the original punishment of a 5-year suspension from practice.