Facts:

The landlord (Nirpal Singh) filed an eviction petition against the tenant (Inderjeet Kaur) under Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, claiming that he needed the premises for his residence and for the residence of his family members dependent on him.

The tenant filed an application supported by an affidavit seeking leave to contest the eviction application, raising various grounds opposing the eviction.

Issues:

Whether leave to the tenant to contest the eviction application should be granted under Section 25B(5) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Held:

The Court held that the burden on the tenant to obtain leave to defend was relatively light, requiring the tenant to make a prima facie case by disclosing facts that would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an eviction order.

The Court emphasized that leave to defend should not be denied solely because the tenant's defense might ultimately fail; the key criterion was whether the tenant's affidavit disclosed facts that raised triable issues.

In this case, the Court found that the tenant had raised triable issues, and the Rent Controller had exceeded his jurisdiction by prematurely dismissing the tenant's defense.

The Court allowed the tenant's appeal, set aside the orders of the Rent Controller and the High Court, and granted leave to defend to the tenant. The case was remanded to the Rent Controller for further proceedings.

Facts:

S.K. Sundaram, Advocate, sent a telegraphic communication to Dr. Justice A.S. Anand, the Chief Justice of India, on 3.11.2000, demanding his resignation from the office.

Within three days, Sundaram filed a criminal complaint in which he accused the Chief Justice of India of usurping the office, traveling abroad, making appointments, and causing financial losses.

The Supreme Court took suo motu cognizance of the matter, issued notice to Sundaram, and appointed the Solicitor General of India to assist the Court.

Issues:

Whether Sundaram's actions constituted contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act.

Whether Sundaram's actions were done in "good faith" as claimed by him.

Whether sending a telegraphic communication amounted to "publication" in the context of criminal contempt.

Held:

The Court noted that the telegraphic communication contained demands, threats, and imputations against the Chief Justice of India. It held that such actions tended to scandalize and lower the authority of the court and amounted to criminal contempt.

The Court clarified that "good faith" in criminal contempt required that the contemnor had conducted a reasonable and proper inquiry before making the imputation, with due care and attention. Sundaram's actions lacked bona fides.

The Court pointed out that Sundaram himself had previously filed a writ petition challenging the age of Dr. Justice A.S. Anand, and this matter was conclusively settled by a Presidential Order in 1991. Sundaram's persistent actions in this regard were deemed frivolous.

The Court emphasized the seriousness of vilifying the Chief Justice of India and undermining the dignity of the institution. Sundaram was found guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced to six months of imprisonment.

Considering Sundaram's claim of being a heart patient, the Court suspended the sentence for one month. If Sundaram gave an undertaking not to commit any act of criminal contempt during this period, the sentence would remain suspended for five years. Violation of this undertaking would lead to the immediate revocation of suspension.

Facts:

The dispute originated in 1971 when there were labor issues between the workers and the Amalgamated Electricity Co. Ltd.

An Industrial Tribunal passed an award in 1987, concluding that there was no lockout as claimed by the workers.

In 1974, the management of Amalgamated Electricity Company Ltd. was taken over by the Karnataka Electricity Board, including its assets and liabilities.

In 1991, a fresh reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal to determine whether the company and the Karnataka Electricity Board were justified in refusing employment to 29 workers from 25.3.1971.

The Industrial Tribunal's 1991 award held that most workers were entitled to reinstatement and 50% of back wages.

Issues:

Whether the principle of res judicata applies based on an earlier reference (I.D. 11/71).

Whether the workers were unjustly denied employment, and if so, what remedies are appropriate.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the subsequent reference (I.D. 32/86) was distinct from the earlier one (I.D. 11/71), and thus the principle of res judicata did not apply.

The Court ruled that the workers had been illegally denied employment from 25.3.1971 and, when the Karnataka Electricity Board took over, they should have been reinstated as per the Tribunal's Award.

The Supreme Court ordered the reinstatement of specific workers and the payment of 40% of back wages from 7.10.1978 until their reinstatement. Legal representatives of deceased workers were entitled to back wages until the respective dates of the workers' deaths.

Acknowledging that some workers had retired or died, the Court determined their entitlement to back wages based on their status.

Facts:

The dispute involves agricultural land in Patiala district, initially owned by Raunaq Ram and later mortgaged to Amar Singh, who subsequently sold his interest to Labhu Ram.

Labhu Ram, as the mortgagee, created a tenancy on the land by inducting Bir Singh as a tenant.

After Labhu Ram's death, his son Sat Pal inherited the mortgage rights and later transferred them to respondents 1 and 2.

Bir Singh, the original tenant, passed away in 1971, and respondents 1 and 2, who were his sons, claimed to inherit his tenancy rights.

Raunaq Ram's four daughters executed a second mortgage on the land in favor of Puran Chand (appellant no. 1).

Issues:

Whether respondents 1 and 2 have the right to continue in possession of the land as tenants after the redemption of the prior mortgage.

The applicability of relevant legal principles, including consent, prudent management, and statutory protection, to determine the rights of tenants in the context of mortgages and property transfers.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after a thorough review of legal principles, held:

The respondents 1 and 2 had no right to continue in possession of the land after the redemption of the mortgage.

Key principles established in previous cases, including the need for the consent of the mortgagor, prudent management by the mortgagee, and statutory protection for tenant rights, did not apply to the current situation.

The respondents became landlords after acquiring the mortgage rights, and the tenancy created by Labhu Ram ceased to exist upon the transfer of rights. The doctrine of merger applied in this case, and the respondents could not claim tenancy rights.

Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision, restored the judgment of the First Appellate Court, and allowed the appeal with costs.

Facts:The case involves the establishment of a permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur following the creation of the State of Rajasthan in 1956. Various orders were issued, including one by the Chief Justice, defining territorial jurisdiction between the principal seat in Jodhpur and the permanent Bench in Jaipur. The challenge in this case focused on the validity of these orders and, in particular, an explanation added by the Chief Justice to define "cause of action" for territorial jurisdiction.

Issues:

Whether the Chief Justice had the authority to define "cause of action" or determine where it would be deemed to have arisen for the purpose of territorial jurisdiction.

Whether the explanation appended to the Chief Justice's order was consistent with the Presidential Order establishing the permanent Bench.

Held:

The court held that the Chief Justice did not possess legislative competence to define "cause of action" or declare where it would be deemed to have arisen for the purpose of determining territorial jurisdiction. The concept of "cause of action" in territorial jurisdiction has a judicially settled meaning and should be decided on a case-by-case basis. The explanation added by the Chief Justice was deemed contrary to the Presidential Order and interfered with the jurisdiction of judges to decide the territorial jurisdiction of individual cases.

The court clarified that the term "exclusive jurisdiction" meant that cases arising in the specified districts should be heard at the permanent Bench unless the Chief Justice exercised his discretion to transfer them to the principal seat.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the findings of the High Court were upheld.

Facts:

The case involves a claim petition filed by the legal heirs of C. Abdul Shukkoor, who died in a road accident.

The accident was caused by an auto-rickshaw insured with the appellant insurance company.

The claimants sought compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs, while the insurance company argued that its liability was limited to Rs. 50,000 under the insurance policy.

Issues:

What is the extent of liability of an insurance company under Section 95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939?

What are the rights of the insurance company if it is required to pay an amount exceeding the policy's liability limit?

Held:

The insurance policy in this case had a limit of liability of Rs. 50,000 for each claim. However, the policy included an avoidance clause that did not affect the rights of third parties to recover under Section 96 of the Act.

The court held that the conditions in the insurance policy were effective only between the insured and the insurance company. Third parties' rights to recover under Section 96 of the Act were not affected by these conditions.

The court allowed the appeal and held that the insurance company was liable to pay the entire award amount to the claimants. However, the insurance company had the right to recover the excess amount paid from the insured through execution of the award under Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Facts:

This case pertains to Civil Appeal No. 6645 of 1999 in the Supreme Court of India. The appellant, Housing and Urban Development Corporation Ltd., filed the appeal against the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (M.C.D.) and another party. The appeal was heard by a bench consisting of U. C. Banerjee, J; Brijesh Kumar, J; B. N. Kirpal, J. After considering arguments from both sides, the court found no merit in the appellant's petition and declined to interfere with the challenged order.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court should intervene and overturn the impugned order in favor of the appellant.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that there was no merit in the appellant's petition, and therefore, it would not interfere with the impugned order. The court emphasized that the responsibility for expediting the trial lay with the appellant, who could use measures provided in the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) to speed up the proceedings. The appellant also expressed its intention to file an application before the trial court to split the case against certain accused individuals who had already appeared in court for further progress of the trial.

Decision: The Special Leave Petition (SLP) was disposed of accordingly.

Final Result : Allowed

Facts:

Late Naval Kishore Goel, a policyholder, had a life insurance policy with Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC). After his demise, his wife, Smt. Asha Goel, filed a claim under the policy. LIC refused the claim, alleging that Naval Kishore Goel had provided false information about his health when taking out the policy.

Issues:

Whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain a writ petition for the enforcement of a life insurance policy claim.

Whether LIC's repudiation of the policy was valid based on the alleged misrepresentation by the insured regarding his health.

Held:

The High Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 to entertain a writ petition for the enforcement of a life insurance policy claim, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, this jurisdiction should not be exercised in cases involving purely contractual rights, disputed questions of fact, or when there is an alternate forum for dispute resolution provided in the contract.

Repudiation of a life insurance policy should be carried out with extreme care and caution by LIC. Mere inaccuracy or falsity in some recitals in the policy proposal is not sufficient for repudiation. For the policy to be repudiated, LIC must establish: a. The statement was on a material matter or suppressed facts that were material to disclose. b. The suppression was fraudulent. c. The policyholder knew at the time of making the statement that it was false or that it suppressed material facts.

Decision: The Supreme Court directed LIC to pay the sum awarded by the learned Single Judge in favor of Smt. Asha Goel promptly. The appeals is dispose of

Facts:

The case involves railway employees caught unlawfully carrying away Railway Cement for sale.

Offenses under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966, were established against the accused.

An inquiry report (complaint) under the Act was filed by an officer of the Railway Protection Force (RPF) in the court of a Judicial Magistrate.

The accused argued that the RPF officer was not a "police officer" within the meaning of Section 173 of the CrPC, challenging the Magistrate's jurisdiction.

Issues:

Whether the inquiry report submitted by the RPF officer can be treated as a charge sheet under Section 173 of the CrPC.

The extent of powers and authority vested in an RPF officer conducting an inquiry under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act.

The proper procedure for initiating proceedings for offenses related to Railway property under this Act.

Held:

The inquiry report submitted by the RPF officer is not equivalent to a charge sheet under Section 173 of the CrPC. It is a complaint filed before the Magistrate under Section 200 of the CrPC. The RPF officer does not possess the authority to file a charge sheet before the Magistrate under Section 173 of the CrPC.

An officer conducting an inquiry under Section 8(1) of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act does not have all the powers of an officer in charge of a police station conducting an investigation under Chapter XIV of the CrPC. This is due to the non-cognizable nature of offenses under the Act.

The primary purpose of the Act is to empower the RPF with investigation and prosecution powers for offenses related to Railway property, similar to cases involving excise and customs laws. This Act specifically deals with non-cognizable offenses, which cannot be investigated by regular police officers under the CrPC.

Proceedings against the respondents are not to be quashed, and the Magistrate is directed to expedite the trial. The respondents have the statutory right to raise any relevant pleas during the trial, which can be considered and disposed of by the trial court.