Facts:

In 1973, the Central Government appointed a Committee (Pillai Committee) to bring about uniformity and standardization in the conditions of service for officers of various Nationalized Banks. The recommendations of this Committee were adopted by the State Bank of India, resulting in the State Bank of India Officers (Determination of Terms and Conditions of Service) Order, 1979 (Conditions of Service Order), which became effective from October 1, 1979. This order led to the bifurcation of Grade I officers into two categories: those confirmed before December 31, 1972, and those confirmed after December 31, 1972.

Issues:

Challenged this bifurcation, arguing that it was arbitrary and violated Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. They contended that placing some Grade I officers in Junior Management Grade Scale I, along with Grade II officers, after October 1, 1979, amounted to a demotion and was discriminatory.

The respondent-bank defended the Conditions of Service Order, 1979, as a statutory order made under the State Bank of India Act, 1955. They argued that it rationalized and standardized the administrative setup of the Management cadres based on relevant and germane materials.

Held:

Article 14 of the Constitution permits reasonable classification for legislation. For classification to be valid, it must be based on intelligible differentia distinguishing the group from others, and the differentia must have a rational relation to the object of the law. Article 14 does not demand scientific perfection, and a law is not discriminatory if it deals equally with all in a well-defined class. Differentiation is not discrimination unless it is unreasonable or arbitrary and lacks a rational basis.

The bank's classification based on the confirmation date was found to have a rational basis, considering factors such as probation periods, entitlement to confirmation, and the need to implement restructuring by October 1, 1979. The date of December 31, 1972, was not arbitrary, and the Court would not interfere unless there was evidence of arbitrariness or malafides. Placing Grade I officers in different grades post-restructuring was not discriminatory under Article 14.

The restructuring of the managerial cadre, resulting in the merger of pre-existing grades, did not amount to demotion or treating unequals as equals. It was part of the cadre adjustment process after minimizing the number of grades, following expert recommendations. The Central Board of the State Bank of India did not discriminate against Grade I officers not confirmed by December 31, 1972.

The concepts of categorization, placement, and fitment in the new scale of pay were distinct. The placement of Grade I officers not confirmed by December 31, 1972, in Junior Management Grade Scale I was not in violation of the Conditions of Service Order, 1979.

Facts:

The appeals arise from judgments and orders of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in various criminal cases initiated under the Kerala Abkari Act.

The central question is whether proceedings based on samples collected from liquor shops under Section 31 of the Kerala Abkari Act, 1077 (before its 1997 amendment) can be quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC.

Issues:

Whether the Excise Inspector had the authority to collect samples for offenses under Section 57A of the Act before its 1997 amendment.

Whether the amendments made in 1997 had retrospective effect.

Whether the High Court erred in not quashing the proceedings initiated based on the Excise Inspector's report.

Held:

The unamended Section 31 of the Kerala Abkari Act authorized the Excise Inspector to collect samples and initiate prosecution under Section 57A.

The power to enter and search a place, seize items, and arrest individuals was conditional upon the officer having reason to believe that an offense under the Act had been committed.

The first limb of Section 31 specified offenses, and the third limb allowed for actions in cases where any offense under the Act had been committed.

Prosecution for offenses could be initiated based on samples collected under Section 31, and trial procedures were outlined in Section 50.

The 1997 amendments did not change the fundamental principles of the law.

Whether the Excise Inspector had valid reasons to believe that an offense was committed and whether it could be prosecuted were questions of fact to be determined during trial.

The High Court did not commit any legal error in not quashing the proceedings.

Facts:

The case originated from a group of Original Applications (OAs) filed before the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal.

General candidates contended that they should be considered senior to reserved candidates for promotion when the reserved candidates had been promoted earlier at lower levels based on roster points.

This issue was based on the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of "Ajit Singh and Others Vs. The State of Punjab and Others."

Issues:

Whether general candidates should be considered senior to reserved candidates when promotions had been made based on roster points.

The interpretation and application of seniority rules in promotions.

The impact of previous Supreme Court judgments on the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that seniority rules applied to normal promotions made according to rules but not to promotions made under the roster system.

Promotions under the roster system were meant for the representation of backward classes and should not confer seniority.

The Court directed the review of seniority lists and promotions at various levels, ensuring that general candidates were treated as seniors to reserved candidates if they reached a particular level before the reserved candidate.

Reversions were not directed for reserved candidates promoted before a specified date, and the principle of prospectivity was maintained.

Retired reserved candidates were given some protection regarding their retiral benefits. All the appeals stand disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

Chiranjilal Goenka adopted Radheshyam, and a letter written by Radheshyam's natural father addressed to Chiranjilal outlined terms regarding the adoption. The letter specified that Radheshyam would be the sole heir of Chiranjilal's property after the death of Chiranjilal and his wife.

Issues:

Whether the letter constitutes a valid agreement between the parties regarding the adoption.

Whether the letter imposes any restrictions on Chiranjilal's right to dispose of his property during his lifetime or through a will.

Whether the letter requires registration.

Held:

The judgment clarified that the letter, at most, represented a unilateral offer by the natural father to give his son in adoption. There was no clear agreement that restricted Chiranjilal's right to dispose of his property during his lifetime or through a will.

The judgment cited relevant sections of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, which govern the rights and agreements related to adoption. It emphasized that, without a specific agreement to the contrary, adoptive parents maintain the power to dispose of their property by transfer or through a will.

Therefore, the judgment set aside the Arbitrator's award, confirming the validity of Chiranjilal's will, and declared Sushilabai N. Rungta as the legal heir of Chiranjilal.

Decision: The decision upheld the right of Chiranjilal to dispose of his property by will and declared Sushilabai N. Rungta as the legal heir of Chiranjilal.

Facts:

The appellants sold mustard/edible oil in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, with manufacturing taking place in Punjab and Haryana. Various notifications were issued, raising the sales tax rate to 8% for manufacturers outside the state. Local manufacturers in Jammu and Kashmir were granted exemption from paying sales tax. The exemption granted to local manufacturers was found to be invalid due to its discriminatory nature.

Issues:

Whether the appellants should be required to deposit the remaining 4% of the sales tax (since they had been collecting only 4% from customers) after the exemption granted to local manufacturers was declared invalid, effective from April 1, 1997.

Held:

The court observed that the exemption granted to local manufacturers was found to be invalid due to its discriminatory nature, as it violated constitutional provisions on the free flow of trade and commerce. This declaration was made in the case of Shree Mahavir Oil Mills and Another Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others.

The appellants had voluntarily collected sales tax from customers at a rate of 4%, even though the rate was 8%. They had not challenged this liability until it was raised to 8%.

The court rejected the appellants' request not to deposit the remaining 4% of the sales tax, stating that they were under a statutory obligation to collect it at the full rate. Unlike the local manufacturers, there was no legal impediment preventing them from doing so.

The court emphasized that the scope and limitation of Article 142 of the Indian Constitution (which allows the Supreme Court to pass orders to do complete justice) was not a matter to be considered in this appeal.

The court also noted that the exemption given to local manufacturers in the past should not be extended to the appellants, as they had not enjoyed any such concession and were always liable to pay the full sales tax.

The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The Municipal Committee in Sangrur issued a notice to the Food Corporation of India, informing them of its intent to amend the assessment of the Corporation's property, specifically a godown, and provided reasons for the proposed revision. The Corporation objected to the notice, claiming that no additional tax liability should be imposed, as there had been no changes to the godown since the last assessment. Nevertheless, the assessing officer amended the assessment list, increasing the property tax for the godown. The Corporation appealed this decision, and the Additional Deputy Commissioner upheld the assessment but modified the effective date of the amended assessment. The Corporation then petitioned the State Government, challenging the decision but was unsuccessful. Finally, the Corporation filed a Writ Petition before the Punjab & Haryana High Court, seeking to quash the orders of the statutory authorities. The High Court dismissed the petition without providing detailed reasons. The Corporation appealed the High Court's decision to the Supreme Court of India.

Issues:

The validity of the notice issued by the Municipal Committee for amending the assessment list.

The basis for increasing the property tax on the godown.

The proper procedures and compliance with statutory requirements in property tax assessments.

Held:

The notice issued by the Municipal Committee was found to be vague and lacking specific particulars, failing to comply with the statutory requirements. It neither stated the grounds for the proposed amendment nor provided any material or evidence to support the revision. Such a notice was deemed inadequate and in violation of statutory requirements.

Regarding the increase in the godown's capacity and the rate of rent, the Court observed that there was no basis for these changes, and no evidence or material was presented to justify them. The contentions raised by the Corporation were upheld, emphasizing that the notice was vague and had been issued without due application of mind, and the grounds stated in the order were unsupported by any material.

The Court ruled that the orders passed by the assessing officer, the appellate authority, and the State Government were unsustainable. The High Court's summary dismissal of the writ petition without providing reasons was also considered an error.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and quashed the orders of the assessing authority, appellate authority, and State Government.

Facts:

For the assessment year 1984-85, the appellant (M/S. K. Govindan and Sons) filed a return of income in response to a notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. During the assessment, the assessing authority charged interest under Section 139(8) and also under Section 217 of the Act. The appellant contended that the assessment in this case was not a 'regular assessment' within the meaning of Section 2(40) of the Act, and therefore, no interest could be charged under Section 139(8).

Issues:

Whether an assessment made under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could be considered a "regular assessment" for the purpose of charging interest under Section 139(8) of the Act.

Held:

The Court held that the initial assessment made by the assessing officer, whether based on a voluntary return or a return filed in response to a notice under Section 148, is considered a 'regular assessment' under Section 2(40) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The Court emphasized that the procedure for making assessments under Section 143 and Section 144 is similar and falls under the category of 'regular assessments.' Therefore, the Court ruled that interest under Section 139(8) can be charged in the case of an assessment made under Section 147, as long as the assessing officer follows the prescribed procedures.

The Court concluded that the introduction of Explanation 2 to Section 139(8) clarified the existing interpretation of "regular assessment" and applied to the assessment year in question (1984-85).

The Court dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee (M/S. K. Govindan and Sons), as it found no merit in the case.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the State of Assam and Shri Naresh Chandra Ghose regarding the classification and taxation of the medicinal preparation 'Mritasanjibani' under the Assam Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1956. The respondent, Ghose, manufactured this medicinal preparation, which was assessed for sales tax under Item 67 of the Act's Schedule.

Issues:

Whether the classification of medicinal preparations based on their alcohol content, as per Item 67 of the Schedule to the Assam Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1956, is valid under Article 14 of the Constitution of India?

Whether the judgment in the case of Ayurveda Pharmacy vs. State of Tamil Nadu is applicable to the present case?

Held:

The Court recognized that the Legislature has discretion in selecting persons or objects for taxation and that a statute cannot be challenged solely based on differential taxation.

The Court held that the classification of medicinal preparations based on alcohol content (more than 12% alcohol) as "spirituous medicinal preparations" for taxation purposes is not arbitrary. Such preparations form a distinct class from those with no alcohol or less than 12% alcohol, and this classification is valid under Article 14.

The Court distinguished the present case from Ayurveda Pharmacy vs. State of Tamil Nadu, stating that the Assam Act does not treat medicinal preparations with more than 12% alcohol the same as those with no alcohol; it classifies them separately for taxation.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and dismissed the writ petitions filed by the respondents. This upheld the classification and taxation of "spirituous medicinal preparations" under the Assam Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1956.

Facts:

The Appellant is a registered trade union representing the employees of Borosil Glass Works Ltd.

A dispute arose when the 4th Respondent and others applied for membership in the Appellant Union jointly, contrary to the proper procedure.

The Registrar of Trade Unions threatened to cancel the Appellant Union's registration based on a complaint filed by the 4th Respondent under Section 28(1A) of the Trade Unions Act.

The High Court interpreted Section 28(1A) broadly, allowing individuals who applied for membership to invoke this section, which was contested in this appeal.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 28(1A) of the Trade Unions Act, specifically regarding who could utilize this section and the scope of disputes covered by it.

Held:

Upon a plain reading of Section 28(1A), the interpretation given by the High Court was found to be untenable. The section clearly requires a person to be a member of the registered trade union for a minimum of six months before invoking the section. The purpose of Section 28(1A) is to resolve internal disputes within a trade union, and it is only applicable to disputes involving individuals who have been members for at least six months.( Para 7)

Disputes related to whether a person should be admitted as a member are not covered by Section 28(1A), and such disputes can be taken to a Civil Court for resolution.( Para 8)

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and allowed the appeal. No costs were ordered.( Para 9)