Facts:

The case arose from Civil Appeal No. D 35086 of 2013, which raised doubts about the period of limitation for filing a written statement or giving the version of the opponent under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Issues:

Whether the law laid down by the Supreme Court.

Held:

The Court reiterates the view expressed in Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra), which mandates that the District Forum can grant a maximum extension of 15 days for the opposite party to file its version, making the total period for filing or giving the version 45 days. This interpretation is essential to adhere to the legislative mandate of disposing of cases within a specified time frame.

The Court emphasizes the chronological precedence of Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) over Kailash (supra), underscoring that the latter should have respected the former's view as it was decided earlier.

The Court refers to the legal principle that a decision by a larger Bench binds subsequent Benches of lesser or equal strength.

Ultimately, the Court holds that the law laid down in Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) should prevail, thereby providing clarity on the issue of time limitation for filing a version in consumer protection cases.

Facts:

The dispute arose regarding the calculation of registration fees for stockbrokers under the amended Regulations, specifically Schedule IIIA, introduced effective from October 1, 2006. The appellant, OPG Securities Private Ltd., contested SEBI's demand for registration fees based on turnover beyond the previous year.

Issues:

Whether SEBI's demand for registration fees based on turnover beyond the previous year was justified.

The applicability of Schedule IIIA and its effect on the calculation of registration fees.

Held:

The Court held that SEBI's demand for registration fees beyond the turnover of the previous year was illegal and contrary to the regulations. The Court clarified that the annual turnover of a broker is merely a measure of the levy and not the subject matter of the levy itself. Therefore, SEBI's demand for fees based on turnover beyond the previous year was not justified. The Court also emphasized that Schedule IIIA, upon becoming applicable to the appellant, superseded the provisions of Schedule III for the calculation of registration fees. Hence, SEBI could not levy fees based on Schedule III once Schedule IIIA became applicable to the appellant.

The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order of the Securities Appellate Tribunal and quashing SEBI's demand for registration fees. It directed SEBI to refund any amount already paid by the appellant, along with interest, and ordered the refund to be made without delay. There was no order as to costs in the case.

Facts:

Adani Agri Fresh Ltd. (M/s. AAFL) entered into a contractual agreement with RMS Fruits and Company (M/s. RMSFC) for the supply of fruits.

M/s. AAFL required M/s. RMSFC to furnish bank guarantees for payment.

M/s. RMSFC failed to honor the payment, prompting M/s. AAFL to invoke the bank guarantees.

M/s. RMSFC sought injunctions against the invocation of bank guarantees through civil suits.

Issues:

Whether injunctions should be granted against the invocation of unconditional bank guarantees.

Whether the circumstances warranted the granting of such injunctions in the present case.

Held:

The court held that injunctions against the invocation of unconditional bank guarantees should only be granted under exceptional circumstances, such as flagrant fraud or irreparable injury. In the present case, the court found no evidence of fraud or irreparable injury. Therefore, the injunctions granted by the lower courts were not justified. The court directed the State Bank of Mysore to honor the bank guarantees. Additionally, the court granted liberty to M/s. RMSFC to amend their plaint to claim dues under the contractual obligations.

The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.

Facts:

The appellant, Sujoy Mitra, was facing trial in a case related to Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code.

The complainant was a citizen of Ireland residing in Dublin.

The trial court permitted the testimony of the complainant (PW5) to be recorded via video conference.

Issues:

The appellant challenged the procedure adopted by the trial court for recording the testimony of PW5.

Held and Decision:

The Supreme Court granted leave for the appeal and considered the challenges raised by the appellant regarding the procedure adopted by the trial court in recording the statement of PW5.

The Court laid down additional procedures and safeguards to be followed while recording PW5's statement through video conferencing, ensuring fairness and compliance with legal requirements.

These procedures included provisions for video conferencing facilitated by the National Informatic Centre (NIC) using "VC Solution" software, nomination of a responsible officer from the Indian Embassy in Ireland to be present during the recording, and ensuring no other person is present in the room during the recording.

The Court rejected the appellant's contention that the recorded video-graphic testimony should be furnished to him, stating it could lead to a cumbersome process and unnecessary duplication of records.

The appeal was disposed of, with instructions for the trial court to fix a hearing date after the video conferencing facilities were set up and synchronized between the trial court and the Indian Embassy in Ireland.

The trial court was directed to forward the order to the Ambassador of the Indian Embassy in Ireland for compliance.

The parameters outlined by the Court were to be followed for recording PW5's testimony afresh, in addition to the procedures and safeguards provided in the impugned order.

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) regarding the imposition and execution of sentences, particularly life imprisonment, as well as the power of remission granted to the executive authorities under the Constitution of India.

Issues:

Interpretation of "imprisonment for life" under the IPC.

Consideration of a special category of sentence and exclusion of remission in certain cases.

The authority to exercise the power of remission by the Appropriate Government under the CrPC.

Determination of primacy in the exercise of remission power between the Union Government and State Government.

Clarification on the suo motu exercise of power of remission under the CrPC.

Interpretation of "consultation" vs. "concurrence" in the context of executive powers.

Held:

The court held that "imprisonment for life" under Section 53 read with Section 45 of the IPC means imprisonment for the rest of the convict's life. However, the right to claim remission, commutation, or reprieve as provided under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution remains available.

The principle of establishing a special category of sentence, excluding remission in certain cases, was endorsed by the court.

The Appropriate Government, whether at the Union or State level, can exercise the power of remission under Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC, even if similar considerations were made earlier by the President or the Governor.

The court clarified that the status of the Appropriate Government depends on the order of sentence passed by the criminal court. In cases where specific executive powers are conferred on the Centre, the Union Government holds primacy as the Appropriate Government for remission.

The court ruled out the suo motu exercise of power of remission under Section 432(1) of the CrPC, stating that it can only be initiated based on an application from the convicted person as provided in Section 432(2).

In situations falling within the jurisdiction of the Central Government under Section 435(1) of the CrPC, the term "consultation" should be construed as "concurrence," giving primacy to the Central Government.

These Writ Petitions and Criminal Appeal are disposed of in terms of the decision in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 48 of 2014.

Facts:

The marriage between the petitioner and respondent was solemnized in April 2010.

The respondent-husband filed a suit for dissolution of marriage in 2015, citing cruelty by the petitioner-wife.

A Settlement Agreement was reached, wherein the respondent agreed to pay Rs. 12,50,000/- towards alimony and maintenance for the petitioner.

The petitioner-wife is suffering from breast cancer and urgently requires funds for medical treatment.

Concern arises regarding the validity of the consent for divorce by mutual consent due to the petitioner's medical condition.

Issues:

Whether the consent for divorce by mutual consent was freely given by the petitioner-wife, considering her medical condition and urgent need for funds for treatment.

Held:

The transfer petition to transfer the matrimonial suit from the Family Court at Bombay to the Family Court at Hyderabad is allowed.

The respondent-husband is directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- out of Rs. 12,50,000/- to the petitioner-wife immediately within a week for her treatment and other medical expenses.

After the petitioner-wife is fully cured from her illness or within six months, whichever is earlier, the Family Court at Hyderabad shall take up the case along with any fresh application filed by the parties under Section 13B for divorce by mutual consent.

The court shall dispose of these petitions in accordance with the law after recording its satisfaction and providing an opportunity for both parties to be heard.

Facts:

The Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) allotted Civic Amenity Site No. 2 for a petrol retail outlet.

The High Court set aside the allotment, citing a violation of Section 38A of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976.

The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which initially upheld the High Court's decision but later reviewed the judgment due to factual inaccuracies.

Issues:

Whether the allotment of Civic Amenity Site No. 2 for a petrol pump violated the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976.

Interpretation of Section 38A of the Act.

Determining the classification of a petrol pump as a civic amenity.

Held:

"In that view of the matter, there is no merit in the writ petitions filed before the High Court. They are, accordingly, dismissed. The civil appeals are allowed as above."

This paragraph signifies that the Supreme Court found no grounds to support the writ petitions challenging the allotment of Civic Amenity Site No. 2 for a petrol pump. Therefore, the writ petitions were dismissed, and the civil appeals were allowed, affirming the legality of the allotment.

Facts:

The Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. allocated a gas agency to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 jointly, subject to conditions mentioned in the 'Letter of allotment'. However, the 'Standard agreement' referred to in the letter was not provided to the respondents.

Issues:

The key issues revolved around the termination of the distributorship by the Corporation and the legality of such termination considering the absence of the 'Standard agreement' and the unilateral termination clause in the letter of allotment.

Held:

The court held that the 'Standard agreement' was never supplied to the respondents nor executed by them, rendering it legally non-binding upon them.

Since the agreement was not supplied to the respondents, it cannot be considered a concluded contract under Section 7 of the Contract Act.

Condition No. 8 of the letter of allotment, allowing unilateral termination without assigning any reason, was deemed unconscionable and liable to be read down in the light of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.

The Corporation, being a government undertaking, is bound to act fairly and reasonably, subject to scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution.

The court ruled that the provision under section 14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act is not applicable to the case since the contract was not revocable and had not become void.

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were awarded costs of Rs. 1 lakh due to the arbitrary termination of distributorship after years of litigation. The court emphasized the importance of justice for ex-servicemen like the respondents.

Facts:

The land of the appellants was compulsorily acquired under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, by the Jaipur Development Authority for the Indian Army's "Field Firing Range". Despite promises made by the State Government to allot developed land in lieu of compensation, the plots offered to the appellants remained undeveloped for over three decades. The appellants sought adequate reparation for the delay and non-compliance with the promises made by the State Government.

Issues:

Whether the circular dated 13.12.2001, promising developed land to the landowners, is enforceable against the State Government?

Whether the delay in fulfilling the promises made by the State Government can be attributed to the appellants?

Whether the Supreme Court can intervene under Article 142 of the Constitution to ensure complete justice in the case?

Whether the State Government's persistent failure to fulfill its commitment constitutes manifest injustice to the appellants?

Held:

The Court held that the circular dated 13.12.2001 is a valid executive decision enforceable against the State Government. The State's attempt to disown the policy was rejected.

The delay in fulfilling the promises made by the State Government cannot be attributed to the appellants, as they had no control over the State's actions. Therefore, the delay does not affect their entitlement to compensation.

The Court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to ensure complete justice in the case, emphasizing the importance of fairness, justice, and equity.

The State Government's persistent failure to fulfill its commitment constitutes manifest injustice to the appellants, and the Court intervened to ensure that the landowners receive the compensation and allotment promised to them.