Facts:

The case involves the kidnapping and gang rape of a minor victim by her uncle and maternal uncle. The victim innocently accompanied her uncle, unaware of their malicious intent, and was subjected to sexual assault.

Issues:

The determination of the victim's age, the relevance of consent in cases involving minors, and the appropriateness of the sentence.

Held:

The court upholds the conviction of the appellants, emphasizing the irrelevance of consent when the victim is below the age of consent and stressing the gravity of the offense of rape. It rejects any plea for reduction of sentence, affirming the importance of upholding the rule of law and protecting the rights of the victim.

Facts:

EMCO Ltd. manufactures transformers primarily supplied to State Electricity Boards.

Dispute arises regarding the inclusion of transportation and transit insurance costs in the transaction value for excise duty.

Commissioner of Central Excise contends that costs should be included based on agreements and statements from EMCO Ltd. officials.

Tribunal allows EMCO Ltd.'s appeal without detailed analysis, citing precedent.

Issues:

Whether transportation and transit insurance costs should be included in the transaction value for excise duty.

Held:

The Court held that the determination of the "place of removal" is crucial in deciding whether transportation and insurance costs should be included in the transaction value. The Court criticized the Tribunal's non-reasoned approach and emphasized the need for a thorough examination of facts. The case was remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration, focusing on determining the place of removal based on the terms and conditions of sale with the buyer.

The Court referred to precedent cases, including Commissioner of Central Excise, Noida vs. Accurate Meters Ltd. and Commissioner, Customs and Central Excise vs. Roofit Industries Ltd., to emphasize the importance of analyzing the facts of each case in determining the place of removal and transaction value for excise duty purposes.

Facts:

Pennar Industries Ltd. and others (respondents) imported hot rolled non-alloy steel wide coils against an advance license issued under the Duty Exemption Entitlement Certificate (DEEC) Scheme.

The imported material was to be used for specified exports under Notification No. 30/1997, which provides duty exemption under certain conditions.

While the respondents used the imported raw material for manufacturing, they failed to export the goods produced from it due to their inferior quality.

They arranged third-party exports to fulfill their export obligations, which was allowed by an amendment made by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) in the license.

Issues:

Whether the respondents fulfilled the conditions of Notification No. 30/1997 for duty-free import.

Whether the DGFT's amendment allowing third-party exports constitutes fulfillment of export obligations.

Held:

The Court emphasized that duty exemption under Notification No. 30/1997 is contingent upon fulfilling the export obligation by exporting the products manufactured from the imported raw material.

The respondents' failure to export goods produced from the duty-free imported material constituted non-compliance with the notification conditions.

While the DGFT accepted third-party exports as fulfillment of export obligations, its decision did not bind customs authorities, and the respondents remained liable to pay import duty.

The Court reduced the rate of interest from 24% to 9% per annum and waived the penalty, considering the circumstances.

The appeals were allowed, setting aside the Tribunal's order, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

Ramesh Kumar, the appellant, served in the Indian Army and faced a Summary Court Martial (SCM) for certain offenses under the Army Act.

His punishment was later commuted by the Central Government, and he was reinstated in service.

Despite being eligible for promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar, Ramesh Kumar was initially not considered due to certain criteria, including red ink entries on his record.

After representations and further consideration, Ramesh Kumar was eventually granted promotion with ante-dated seniority.

However, he was denied pay and allowances for the period before his actual promotion date.

Issues:

Whether Ramesh Kumar was entitled to pay and allowances for the period before his actual promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar.

Whether the principle of "no work no pay" applied in this case.

Held:

The Court held that Ramesh Kumar was entitled to pay and allowances for the period before his actual promotion, considering the circumstances of the case. Paragraph 14 of the judgment states: "The impugned orders passed by the High Court are set aside and this appeal is allowed. The Respondents shall release the arrears of pay and allowances to the Appellant for the period from 01.08.1997 till the date of his actual promotion that is 13.11.2000 in the promotional post of Naib Subedar within eight weeks from today." The court emphasized that the denial of pay and allowances was unjust considering Ramesh Kumar's reinstatement and eventual promotion.

Facts:

The case involves the acquisition of land by the State Government under Section 28 of the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Act, 1966 (KIAD Act) for industrial development by the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (KIADB). The acquired land was further allotted to a company on lease for the purpose of extracting sand-stone for cement manufacturing and infrastructure development. Compensation was initially awarded by the competent authority and later enhanced by the Reference Court.

Issues:

Whether the company, as the lessee of the acquired land, is considered a 'person interested' and has the right to participate in compensation proceedings.

The applicability of certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquisitions under the KIAD Act.

The maintainability of a writ petition filed by the company challenging the compensation award.

Held:

The Court held that the company, being a lessee by way of allotment, is not considered a beneficiary or a 'person interested' under the KIAD Act or the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the company's claim to participate in compensation proceedings is untenable in law.

Certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, such as Section 3(f)(viii), do not apply to acquisitions under the KIAD Act. The definition of "public purpose" under the Land Acquisition Act cannot be imported into acquisitions made under the KIAD Act.

The company does not have the right to file a writ petition challenging the compensation award, as it is not entitled to appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Facts:

The appellant, Yakub Abdul Razak Memon, had filed a writ petition challenging the execution warrant issued for his execution. The President of India had rejected the appellant's mercy petition under Article 72 of the Constitution.

Issues:

The main issue was whether the rejection of the mercy petition allowed for the minimum period of 14 days between the communication of the rejection and the scheduled execution.

Held:

The court held that the appellant had ample opportunity to challenge the rejection of the first mercy petition but chose not to do so. Therefore, the court found no merit in granting further time to challenge the rejection of the second mercy petition. Granting such time would delay the execution and be a travesty of justice. Thus, the court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the decision to proceed with the execution.

Facts:

Dharam Chand, the appellant, had been vending in the area outside the Supreme Court since 1965 and was allotted a kiosk opposite the Supreme Court in 1999.

Following a bomb blast near the Delhi High Court in 2011, security concerns led to the decision to remove vendors from the vicinity of the Supreme Court.

Dharam Chand challenged the New Delhi Municipal Council's (NDMC) decision to relocate him, citing his right to carry on his trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether the NDMC's decision to relocate Dharam Chand due to security reasons is justified.

Whether Dharam Chand's constitutional right to carry on his trade can be restricted in this case.

Held:

The Court upheld the decision of the High Court to dismiss Dharam Chand's appeal.

Despite acknowledging Dharam Chand's right to earn a livelihood, the Court deemed the security of the Supreme Court and its vicinity to be paramount.

The Court emphasized that citizens' constitutional rights, including the right to carry on business, are subject to reasonable restrictions, especially in sensitive areas like the Supreme Court.

The Court noted that the absence of incidents since the 2011 bomb blast near the Delhi High Court did not negate the potential threat to the Supreme Court's safety and security.

The order to relocate Dharam Chand was deemed justified in the interest of public security and safety.

Facts:

The Appellants, who are landowners, challenged the validity of the 'Kamal Vihar Township Development Scheme No. 4' (KVTDS) in Chhattisgarh. The Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, in Writ Appeal Nos. 379, 380, 381, 382, 389, and 393 of 2013 upheld the validity of the KVTDS. The impugned judgment was passed on 16.6.2014, affirming the order dated 15.4.2013, where the single Judge of the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, also upheld the validity of the KVTDS.

Issues:

The deviations from mandatory conditions prescribed under the Environmental Clearance (EC) dated 25.1.2011, changes in land use from agricultural to residential purposes, alterations in the scope of the project (specifically KVTDS-04), and the retrospective application of Section 50(8) of the Act.

Held:

In view of the specific conditions mentioned in the Environmental Clearance (EC), any deviation required obtaining fresh permission from the State Environmental Impact Assessment Authority (SEIAA). Changes in the scope of the project, such as KVTDS-04, necessitated fresh permission as per condition (v) of the General Conditions. The retrospective application of Section 50(8) of the Act was deemed inappropriate. Hence, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the landowners and set aside the impugned judgment, thereby invalidating the KVTDS.

Facts:

Rajeshwar Baburao Bone, the appellant, claimed to belong to the 'Koli Mahadev' scheduled tribe community. After securing employment with Zilla Parishad, Beed, on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribe category, his tribe certificate was referred to a Scrutiny Committee for verification after 18 years from his appointment. Despite providing various documents supporting his claim, including historical records, the Scrutiny Committee eventually recalled its earlier decision to issue a validity certificate.

Issues:

The validity of the tribe certificate claimed by the appellant and whether the Committee's decision to recall its earlier order was justified.

Held:

The Court upheld the decision of the High Court to dismiss the appellant's writ petition challenging the Scrutiny Committee's decision. It was held that the appellant had willfully misled the Committee and made false statements on oath, justifying the Committee's decision to recall its earlier order. However, due to the significant delay in considering the certificate, the benefit already availed by the appellant was not disturbed. Nonetheless, it was clarified that the appellant would not be entitled to any further benefits of reservation in the future. This appeal is dismissed.