Facts:

Nineteen members, including the petitioners, faced suspension from the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly for allegedly obstructing proceedings.

A Privileges Committee, relying on a video recording, found a breach of privilege and recommended action against the petitioners.

Issues:

Challenge to the second Assembly Resolution, which suspended the petitioners for ten days and withheld salaries and benefits.

Alleged violation of fundamental rights, particularly those guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).

Held:

The court underscored the distinction between the freedom of speech available to citizens and the specific constitutional right of freedom of speech granted to members of legislative bodies (Para 18).

Emphasized that the right to participate in legislative proceedings is not a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) (Para 25).

Cited that the suspension, while limiting the constitutional right of free speech, did not violate fundamental rights as it was subject to other constitutional provisions, rules, and standing orders (Para 19, 20).

Highlighted that the economic benefits incidental to the office of a legislator do not constitute pursuing an 'occupation' under Article 19(1)(g) (Para 25, 26).

Rejected the argument that the deprivation of salaries and benefits during suspension amounted to a violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 (Para 29).

Acknowledged the limited scope of judicial review in matters relating to actions against members by legislative bodies, with non-compliance with principles of natural justice being a valid ground (Para 30).

Found a significant flaw in the process as the Privileges Committee relied on a video recording but failed to provide a copy to the petitioners, resulting in a denial of a reasonable opportunity to meet the case (Para 42, 43).

Consequently, set aside the second Assembly Resolution, restoring salaries and benefits to the six petitioners (Para 43).

Referred Cases:

Air India Statutory Corpn. Vs. United Labour Union, (1997) 9 SCC 377

Gujarat State Financial Corporation Vs. Lotus Hotel, (1983) 3 SCC 379

In re under Article 143 of Constitution of India, AIR 1965 SC 745

Jagjit Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1

P.V. Narasimha Rao Vs. State CBI/SPE, (1998) 4 SCC 626

Raja Ram Pal Vs. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184

Sodan Singh Vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee, (1989) 4 SCC 155

T.M.A. Pai Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481

Facts:

An FIR was lodged on 22.11.2005, alleging a murder incident.

Twelve accused were charged with offenses under various sections of the Indian Penal Code.

Trial Court convicted the accused based on eyewitness testimonies, conspiracy evidence, and weapon recovery.

High Court acquitted all accused, citing absence of proof of wrongness and certainty of guilt.

Issues:

Discrepancies in eyewitness testimonies.

Doubts about the recovery of weapons and articles.

Lack of substantial evidence to prove the alleged conspiracy.

Held:

Eyewitness testimonies presented discrepancies, and material alterations were found in their statements. Witness silence and unnatural conduct cast doubt on their credibility. The number of assailants was doubtful from the beginning.( Para 7)

Recovery of weapons and articles, pivotal to the prosecution, was disbelieved by the High Court. Lacuna in the investigation hit the root of the prosecution case. Attesting witnesses turned hostile, and the Forensic Science Laboratory Report could not aid the prosecution.( Para 8)

Alleged conspiracy lacked cogent and positive evidence. Proof of conspiracy required reasonable grounds, which were not established. Witnesses' conduct and cross-examination raised doubts about the veracity of conspiracy claims.( Para 9)

Other serious lacunae in the prosecution case were pointed out, including the reliance on the recovery of a mobile phone and the failure to link it to any accused. The recovery of weapons lacked proper evidence.( Para 10)

No compelling reasons found to interfere with the High Court's judgment. Appeals dismissed, upholding the acquittal.( Para 11,12,13)

Referred Cases:

Facts:

The State Government rejected applications under Section 5 of the 1969 Act, asserting that both the Act and the 1970 Scheme were applicable to the factories in question. Writ petitions were subsequently filed against this decision.

Issues:

The primary issues involved the ultra vires nature of the 1970 Scheme concerning the 1969 Act and the applicability of both to the specific factories in question.

Held:

The court held that Clause 5 of the Schedule to the 1969 Act is a residuary clause covering employment in factories related to loading, unloading, etc., by workers not covered by other entries. The provisions of the 1970 Scheme dealing with the manufacture of petro-chemicals in factories fall within the coverage of the residuary entry, and no part of the 1970 Scheme is ultra vires the 1969 Act.

The court analyzed Clause 2(1)(1) of the 1970 Scheme, determining it to be intra vires Section 1(4A) of the 1969 Act. The expression "products including fertilizers" in the 1970 Scheme was deemed wider than "chemical products including fertilizers," making the 1970 Scheme consistent with the 1969 Act.

The court recognized "petrochemical products" as a species of "chemical products," citing the appellant's admission to manufacturing polystyrene. References were made to official reports and inquiry officer findings supporting the conclusion that petrochemicals are a subset of chemical products.

Sections 3 and 4 of the 1969 Act were interpreted to allow for a composite scheme covering various employments contained in more than one entry of the Schedule to the 1969 Act. The nomenclature of the 1970 Scheme as a grocery market or shop scheme was deemed inconsequential.

The court emphasized the broad definition of "establishment" in the 1969 Act, covering places where the manufacture of petrochemicals is carried out, including transportation within the factory precincts.

Taking cues from the Objects and Reasons of the Act as social legislation, the court upheld the High Court's decision. The 1970 Scheme's objective of providing work and amenities to registered workers was highlighted.

The court rejected the plea that the appellant's purchasers, not the appellant company itself, were the principal employer. Even if the Central Parliamentary Act impliedly repealed the 1969 State Act, Section 30(1) of the 1970 Act was cited to support continued entitlement to more favorable benefits for contract labor.

The High Court's decision was affirmed, and the writ petition filed by the appellant company was dismissed.

The court rejected the argument to find the meaning of the expression "grocery" based on the date of the Act's extension in 1983, emphasizing that in 2005, the term included soft drinks and bottled water.

Referred Cases:

Decided on : 12-02-2016

Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 - Section 24, Section 24(1)

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226, Article 254

Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 - Section 1(4A), Section 13, Section 14, Section 2(11), Section 2(12), Section 2(3), Section 2(4), Section 2(7), Section 3, Section 3(1), Section 4, Section 4(1), Section 5, Section 6

Applicability of Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and Other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 and Grocery Markets or Shops Unprotected Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Scheme, 1970 — It was incumbent upon the writ Petitioner not only to take up the plea of repugnancy and implied repeal but also to state as a fact that what the workmen would be entitled to under the 1969 State Act would not be as beneficial as what they would be entitled to under the 1970 Central enactment. This would then give the Respondent Board, in turn, an opportunity of either admitting or denying this factual averment. There being no pleading to this effect in the writ petition before the High Court, it is clear that it is not possible for us to accede to Shri Cama's request to go into the argument on repugnancy and implied repeal. — Court thus find that the High Court was absolutely correct in not interfering with the State Government order and in dismissing the writ petition filed by the Appellant company. For the same reasons given in Civil Appeal, Court therefore reject this appeal as well. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

J.P. Cama, V. Giri, Sr. Advocates, Kirti Chandra, Amit Dhingra, Amandeep Bawa, Divyam Agarwal, Kunal Mimani, Dheeraj Nair, Advocates for Dua Associates, for the Appellant; R. Basant, Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Advocates, Sushil Karanjkar, K.N. Rai, Jayashree Wad, Ashish Wad, Jayant B. Shaligram, Paromita Majumdar, Jaya Khanna, Advocates for J.S. Wad & Co., Jitendra Kumar, Sunil M. Chinchwadkar, Nitin S. Tambwekar, B.S. Sai, K. Rajeev, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Advocates, for the Respondent

Cases Referred

Bhuwalka Steel Industries Limited Vs. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board, (2010) 2 SCC 273

The Senior Electric Inspector Vs. Laxmi Narayan Chopra, (1962) 3 S.C.R. 146

Final Result : Dismissed

Facts:

Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. (Appellant) awarded a transportation contract to Prathyusha Resources and Infra Private Limited (Respondent).

The contract, initially set to expire on 31.03.1993, extended several times and completed on 23.10.1997.

Dispute emerged over the rate of escalation based on the base year of 1992 or 1994.

Issues:

Determination of the base year for escalation.

Disagreement on calculations and rejection of a part of the final bill by the Appellant.

Appellant claimed the relief was barred by the law of limitation.

Held:

The Court emphasized that the cause of action arises when the real dispute occurs, specifically when one party asserts and the other denies any right. In this case, the dispute over the determination of the base year and calculations emerged in the letter dated 15.7.1996.( Para 5)

The Court further clarified that the bills raised in 1998, resulting in a dispute and forming the base of the disagreement, were not finalized as per letters dated 7.2.2000 and 9.5.2000. The cause of action was determined to have arisen on or after 4.9.1998.( Para 6)

The civil appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs, affirming the correctness of the High Court's decision.( Para 7)

Facts:

The incident occurred on 12.8.1995, where the deceased, a social worker, was shot in a Ganesh festival Pandal.

Charges were framed against 13 accused persons, and the trial proceeded against the remaining accused.

The Trial Court initially convicted certain accused, but the High Court acquitted all the accused.

The State of Maharashtra filed appeals challenging the High Court's decision.

Issues:

The proper establishment of the identity of the accused through eyewitness testimonies and the conduct of Test Identification Parades.

Held:

The testimonies of eyewitnesses suffered from various infirmities and contradictions.

The Test Identification Parade was not conducted properly and was delayed.

The incident occurred in circumstances where there was little time for eyewitnesses to clearly see the accused.

Emphasized the importance of conducting prompt and proper Test Identification Parades.

Dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court's decision to give the benefit of doubt to the accused.

Referred Cases:

Siddanki Ram Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2010) 7 SCC 697

Facts:

The appellant, the State of Jharkhand, had granted tax exemptions to industrial units for a specified period. Subsequently, the Jharkhand Value Added Tax (JVAT) Act withdrew the exemption, offering deferment of tax for the remaining period. The respondent, Tata Steel Ltd. & others, applied for the conversion from tax exemption to deferment, challenging the withdrawal of exemption.

Issues:

The eligibility for the conversion from tax exemption to deferment, the repayment schedule for the deferred tax amount, and the imposition of penalties.

Held:

Section 95(3)(ii) of the JVAT Act allows a registered dealer to convert the facility of tax exemption into deferment for the unexpired period. The respondent had availed deferment and paid the tax amount.

Deferment of tax comes with specific terms and conditions, including the repayment of the deferred tax amount. In this case, the period of deferment was for 8 years, and the repayment schedule was for 5 years from the expiry of the eligibility period.

The repayment schedule, as per the notification, should be completed within 13 years from the date of start of deferment. The court clarified that the repayment period must end on 31.08.2013 within 5 years from the expiration of the eligibility period.

Rule 66 of the Rules provides for payment for breach, but the court decided not to apply it due to the special features of the case. Instead, the respondent was directed to pay 12% interest per annum within three months.

Decision: The court disposed of the appeal, upholding the grant of deferment but rejecting the challenge to the withdrawal of exemption. The respondent was directed to pay 12% interest per annum within three months.

Referred Cases:

Chandavarkar S.R. Rao Vs. Ashalata, (1986) 4 SCC 447, 476

Hansraj Gordhandas Vs. H.H. Dave, Assistant Collector of Central Excise & Customs, Surat and Two, (1969) 2 SCR 252

K.P. Varghese Vs. ITO, (1981) 4 SCC 173

Keshavji Ravji and Co. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1990) 2 SCC 231

Luke Vs. IRC, (1964) 54 ITR 692

M/s Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 299

Mahadeo Prasad Bais Dead Vs. Income-Tax Officer `A' Ward, Gorakhpur, (1991) 4 SCC 560

Maunsell Vs. Olins, (1975) 1 All ER 16, 21, 18

Nokes Vs. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Limited, (1940) AC 1014, (1022)

Oxford University Press Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2001) 3 SCC 359

State of T.N. Vs. Kodaikanal Motor Union P Ltd., (1986) 3 SCC 91

Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 7 SCC 242

Telangana Steel Industries Vs. State of A.P., (1994) Sup 2 SCC 259

Utkal Contractors and Joinery Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa, (1987) 3 SCC 279

Facts:

The respondents filed a Claim Petition seeking compensation for the death of Raj Kumar Gautam in a vehicular accident involving the appellant's bus. The Tribunal partly allowed the claim, and the High Court affirmed the decision. The appellant challenged the High Court's judgment in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The negligence in the accident, contributory negligence, and the adequacy of compensation awarded by the Tribunal.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court failed in its duty as a first appellate court. It did not adequately address the factual details, grounds raised by the appellant, and failed to appreciate the evidence and legal principles involved. The Court referred to precedents emphasizing the duty of the first appellate court to decide the appeal by giving reasons on both facts and law.

The judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits. The High Court was directed to decide the appeal within six months. The Supreme Court clarified that it had not delved into the merits of the case, and the High Court should decide it strictly in accordance with the law, providing an opportunity for both parties to be heard.

Referred Cases:

B.V. Nagesh Vs. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 13 SCC 530

H.K.N. Swami Vs. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243

Jagannath Vs. Arulappa, (2005) 12 SCC 303

Kurian Chacko Vs. Varkey Ouseph, AIR 1969 Kerala 316

Madhukar Vs. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756

National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Naresh Kumar, (2000) 10 SCC 158

Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari Deceased, (2001) 3 SCC 179

State Bank of India Vs. Emmsons International Ltd., (2011) 12 SCC 174

State of Punjab Vs. Navdeep Kuur , (2004) 13 SCC 680

Facts:

The case involves the appellant Mukund Dewangan and the respondent Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. The primary issue pertains to whether drivers with licenses for light motor vehicles must obtain an endorsement to drive transport vehicles, especially when the transport vehicle belongs to the category of light motor vehicles.

Issues:

The interpretation of licensing requirements, particularly whether a separate endorsement is necessary for drivers holding licenses for light motor vehicles when driving transport vehicles.

Held:

The Court observes that there is a distinct syllabus for light motor vehicles and medium/heavy vehicles, but no separate syllabus is provided for transport vehicles. It notes the significance of vehicle weight in licensing and registration procedures.

In accordance with Rule 16, Form 6 issues driving licenses, including separate categories for light motor vehicles and transport vehicles. The Court highlights the emphasis on gross vehicle weight and unladen weight in the registration particulars to determine the class of the vehicle.

The Court opines that, prior to the 2001 amendment, a person with a license to drive a light motor vehicle could also drive light passenger carriage vehicles and light goods carriage vehicles. It points out a conflict in previous decisions regarding the pre-amended and post-amended positions.

Given the conflicting interpretations, the Court decides to refer the questions raised in the case to a larger bench for further clarification.

Referred Cases:

Ashok Gangadhar Maratha Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. 1999 6 SCC 620

Glynn Vs. Margetson & Co., (1893) AC 351, 357

Kulwant Singh Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2015) 2 SCC 186

Nagashetty Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 56

National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Annappa Irappa Nesaria alias Nesaragi, (2008) 3 SCC 464

National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Prabhu Lal, (2008) 1 SCC 696

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Roshanben Rahemansha Fakir, (2008) 8 SCC 253

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Angad Kol, (2009) 11 SCC 356

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Zaharulnisha, (2008) 12 SCC 385

S. Iyyapan Vs. United India Insurance Co., (2013) 7 SCC 62

Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kokilaben Chandravadan, (1987) 2 SCC 654

Sohan Lal Passi Vs. P. Sesh Reddy, (1996) 5 SCC 21

Suissee Atlantique Societe d' Armement Maritime S.A. Vs. N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale, (1967) 1 AC 361, 393, 412-413, 427-428, 430

Facts:

The appellant was convicted under Section 376 IPC for raping a blind and illiterate girl on the promise of marriage.

The victim, being physically disadvantaged, was already in a socially disadvantaged position, exploited by the accused.

The victim's blindness made her susceptible to the accused's malicious actions.

Issues:

The main issue revolved around the conviction of the accused under Section 376 IPC.

Victim compensation and the need for a special rehabilitation scheme for physically handicapped victims were additional issues.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding no infirmity in the lower courts' judgments.

The court directed the state to pay Rs. 8,000 per month to the victim for her lifetime, treating it as interest on a notional fixed deposit of Rs. 10,00,000.

The court recommended that all states and union territories formulate a uniform scheme for victim compensation in cases of rape/sexual exploitation, especially for physically handicapped women.

Due to the victim's unique circumstances, the court emphasized the need for a special rehabilitation scheme.

Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upheld the conviction, and provided a detailed decision on victim compensation and the need for a special rehabilitation scheme, emphasizing the unique circumstances of the physically handicapped victim.