Facts:

The State Governments of Punjab and Haryana appointed Law Officers without a realistic assessment of their requirements.

No formulation of schemes, policies, or standards for appointing Law Officers was observed.

The prevailing system lacked transparency and a credible selection process for State Counsel appointments.

Issues:

Whether the appointment of Law Officers can be questioned on the ground of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14.

Lack of realistic assessment and absence of formulated norms for appointment.

Held:

The power to appoint Law Officers must be exercised in a fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory, and objective manner. Arbitrary exercise of such power makes the legitimacy of the appointment questionable.( Para 8)

A fair and realistic assessment of the requirement for Law Officers is essential to prevent appointments for political aggrandizement or personal benevolence. The absence of such assessment poses a risk to the rule of law and public faith.( Para 9)

The States of Punjab and Haryana failed to follow a credible selection process for Law Officers. The dominant purpose of selecting the most meritorious candidates for public interest is defeated by the current appointment method.( Para 15)

Public bodies are trustees of power, and their functions must be exercised in the best interest of the public. Duty to act fairly is a facet of the Rule of Law, and arbitrariness has no place in a polity governed by Article 14 of the Constitution.( Para 36)

The duty to select and appoint State Counsel includes adherence to Article 14, ensuring non-arbitrariness and protection of public interest. States must not frustrate or delay the judicial process heavily reliant on the assistance of the Bar.( Para 37)

Appointment of Government Counsel is not merely a professional engagement but has a "public element." Appointments must be in public interest, and the process should be transparent, fair, and objective.( Para 38)

A check on the power of the government to appoint a Public Prosecutor should also apply to the appointment of State Counsel, especially in unregulated situations.( Para 44)

Lawyers do not have a right to be appointed as State Government counsel. Consideration for appointment or extension must align with norms and criteria.( Para 45)

A consultative process involving the District & Sessions Judge or the High Court is required for appointment or extension. The Chief Justice should constitute a Committee of Judges for the review.( Para 47)

The States of Punjab and Haryana are directed to undertake a realistic assessment, constitute a Selection Committee, and follow a transparent process for Law Officer appointments. Other states are encouraged to reform their systems.( Para 48)

Referred Cases:

D.S. Nakra Vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305

Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons Vs. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293

E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3

Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1980) 4 SCC 1

Mahabir Auto Stores and Others Vs. Indian Oil Corporation, (1990) 3 SCC 752

Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621

Neelima Misra Vs. Harinder Kaur Paintal, (1990) 2 SCC 746

Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489

S.G. Jaisinghani Vs. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427

Sharma Transport Vs. Government of A.P., (2002) 2 SCC 188

Shrilekha Vidyarthi Vs. State of U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 212

Som Raj Vs. State of Haryana, (1990) 2 SCC 653

State of U.P. Vs. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714

State of U.P. Vs. U.P. State Law Officers Association, (1994) 2 SCC 204

United States Vs. Wunderlick, (1951) 342 US 98:96 Law Ed 113

Facts:

An agreement was executed between the Government and a party involved in the hotel industry under Section 41 of the Land Acquisition Act. Clause 4(viii) of the Agreement restricted the construction on the acquired land by the concerned party. The court had previously ordered the demolition of constructions on January 20, 2009.

Issues:

The constitutional validity of the Goa Amendment Act of 2009, which deleted Clause 4(viii) of the Agreement through amendments to Section 41, was challenged.

Held:

The court upheld the validity of the Land Acquisition (Goa Amendment) Act, 2009.

The power to invalidate a legislative or executive act lies with the court, but the legislature is competent to pass an amending or validating act with retrospective effect, removing the basis of the court's decision. The court may not approve a retrospective deprivation of accrued rights arising from a judgment.

Section 41(6) to (9) introduced by the Goa State Amendment renders ineffective Clause 4(viii) of the Agreement. With Clause 4(viii) being deleted, the embargo on constructions on the acquired land is removed. The State Amendment Act, by no means, sets the law in a collision course with the Central/Principal enactment.

The legislature was well within its domain to bring about the Amendment Act with retrospective effect. The balancing act between the judiciary and the legislature is guided by well-defined values.

The Goa State Amendment was not intended solely to benefit a singular entity (the third respondent), as per the available materials.

Referred Cases:

Bhaktwar Trust Vs. MD Narayan, (2003) 5 SCC 298

Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha Vs. Narayanamma, (2003) 1 SCC 228

M. Karunanidhi Vs. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 431

Madan Mohan Pathak Vs. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCC 50

Facts:

The appellants, accused Nos. 1 to 5, 10, and 25, along with others, faced trial for alleged offenses under various sections of the Indian Penal Code. The charges included rioting, abduction, and murder. The trial court convicted some accused while acquitting others. The appeals were filed against the judgment of the High Court, confirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the Sessions Court. The appeals and the same are dismissed.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were present during the incident and whether they shared a common object throughout the assembly.

Held:

The court emphasized that there was no contradiction in the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses regarding the presence of the appellants. The accused, in their responses under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, did not deny their presence. The court held that the prosecution needed to establish the presence of the appellants and their shared common object. The appellants, from the inception of the incident to the abduction, were found to have a common object, involving raiding a house, being armed with deadly weapons, and attacking individuals.

Referred Cases:

Akbar Sheikh Vs. State of West Bengal, (2009) 7 SCC 415

Facts:

The predecessor of the appellants leased out land for 199 years.

Secured creditors of the lessee filed a winding-up petition.

The appellants sought a permanent injunction against the sale of company assets, particularly the leased property.

The Company Judge issued a winding-up order and appointed the Official Liquidator (OL).

The appellants, citing the winding-up order and default in rent payment, applied for the return of the leased property.

Issues:

The case include non-payment of rent, subletting, and the impact of the winding-up order on the possession of the leased property.

Held:

The court addressed Section 12 of the Rent Act, emphasizing the importance of a notice from the landlord for the tenant to pay unpaid rent. In this case, no such notice was issued. The court held that the readiness and willingness of the tenant to pay rent, even without actual payment, would not deprive the tenant of protection under the Rent Act.( Para 17)

The court considered the liability of the Official Liquidator under Section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rent Act, emphasizing that the non-obstante clause in Section 13(1) overrides other provisions but is subject to Section 15. The court clarified that the mere fact of the company being ordered to be wound up does not automatically entitle the landlord to possession of the land.( Para 18)

The court discussed the argument of subletting by the Official Liquidator. It noted that the case involved an attempted assignment through notice/advertisement but emphasized that this did not amount to a completed action. The court highlighted the relief sought in the Company Applications regarding the sale/transfer/assignment of the leased property.( Para 18)

The court considered the liability under Section 13(1)(k) of the Bombay Rent Act, focusing on unjustified non-user for over six months. The court emphasized that the pending liquidation proceedings and the potential revival of the company were relevant factors. It reiterated that the winding-up of a company does not automatically lead to possession by the landlord.( Paras 19, 20, 21)

Referred Cases:

Decided on : 29-03-2016

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 - Section 11(2), Section 11(3), Section 12, Section 12(2), Section 12(3), Section 13, Section 13(1), Section 13(2), Section 15, Section 15(1), Section 18, Section 19

Companies Act, 1956 - Section 525

Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 - Section 21, Section 21(1)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 106, Section 106(2), Section 108, Section 114, Section 118

Winding up of Company — Creditor of Prasad Mills Ltd. had in the year 1984 filed a company petition seeking the winding up of the aforesaid Prasad Mills Ltd. While the company petition was pending some of the legal heirs of Predecessor of Appellants had filed a suit in the Small Causes Court seeking permanent injunction against the sale of assets of company more particularly the sale of the leased property. — Occupant Company i.e. Prasad Mills had no document in its favour entitling it to be in possession of the demised land — Admitted non payment of rent for a period of over 15 years rendering the company and now the official liquidator liable to eviction Under Section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act — Admitted non user of the land for a period of over 6 years attracting Section 13(1)(k) of the Rent Act — Sub-letting in favour of the company, Prasad Mills, in violation of Section 13(1)(e) of the Rent Act. — Mere fact that the company has been ordered to be wound up cannot be a ground to direct the official liquidator to handover possession of the land to the owners inasmuch as the company in liquidation continues to maintain its corporate existence until it stands dissolved upon completion of the liquidation proceedings in the manner contemplated by the Companies Act. In the present case it has been repeatedly submitted before this Court by both sides that presently revival of Prasad Mills is a live issue pending before the Gujarat High Court, a fact which cannot be ignored by this Court in deciding the above issue against the Appellants.

Cases Referred

Hans Raj Vs. Bejoy Lal Sel, AIR 1930 PC 59

Laxmidas Bapudas Darbar Vs. Rudravva Smt., (2001) 7 SCC 409

Ram Kinkar Banerjee Vs. Satya Charan Srimani, AIR 1939 PC 14

Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises P Ltd. Vs. Syeda Vajhiunnissa Begum Smt., (1994) 2 SCC 671

V. Dhanapal Chettiar Vs. Yesodai Ammal, (1979) 4 SCC 214

Facts:

The case involves MIS. CASIO INDIA CO. PVT. LTD. against the State of Haryana. The dispute centers around the interpretation of a notification dated 04.09.1995 issued under Section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and Rule 28A of the Haryana General Sales Tax Rules, 1975.

Issues:

Whether the notification, as per Section 8(5), relates to the exemption of goods or the person selling them. Additionally, the interpretation of the inter-state sales of goods manufactured by an "exempted unit" under Rule 28A is a point of contention.

Held:

The notification specifies that no tax is payable under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, from April 1, 1988, on the sale of goods during the exemption period, manufactured in Haryana by any dealer holding a valid exemption certificate under Rule 28A. Sub-section (5) of Section 8 empowers State Governments to issue notifications for exemption conditions.( Para 14-16)

Rule 28A(4)(c) supports the interpretation, exempting all intra-state sales, including subsequent sales. The intention is to exempt all subsequent stages within the State of Haryana, allowing eligible products to be sold multiple times without tax.( Para 17)

The exemption focuses on goods manufactured within the exemption period by a dealer holding an exemption certificate. There is no stipulation that limits exemption only to the first sale or the sale by the eligible industrial unit in interstate or intra-state trade.( Para 18)

The proviso in the notification, emphasizing that the manufacturing dealer should not have charged tax, serves as an exception and qualification. It should not nullify the main provision or unreasonably restrict its interpretation.( Para 19-20)

Contrary to the revenue's contention, the court rejects the limitation that the exemption applies only if the eligible industrial unit makes the sale in interstate trade. Rule 28A and the notification aim to exempt goods manufactured in the state during further transfers in interstate or intra-state trade.( Para 21)

Referred Cases:

Bansal Wires Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 6 SCC 545

CIT, Mysore etc. v Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd., AIR 1959 SC 713

Commissioner of Sales Tax Vs. Industrial Coal Enterprises, (1999) 114 STC 365

Govt. of A.P Vs. P. Laxmi Devi, (2008) 4 SCC 720

International Cotton Corporation P Ltd. Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Hubli, (1975) 35 STC 1

Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1966 SC 12

NOVOPAN India Ltd., Hyderabad Vs. Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Hyderabad, (1994) Sup 3 SCC 606

Parle Biscuits P Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 9 SCC 669

Pine Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Assessing Authority, (1992) 85 STC 432

Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (2011) 10 SCC 292

Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory Vs. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596

State Level Committee Vs. Morgardhsammar India Ltd., (1996) 101 STC 1

State of Rajasthan Vs. Sarvotam Vegetables Products, (1996) 101 STC 547

Village Soap Industries Association Vs. State of Haryana, (1992) 85 STC 432

Facts:

The appellant, Punjab & Sind Bank, offered an OTS to the first respondent for settlement of dues.

One condition of the OTS was a restriction on the sale of mortgaged properties for three years.

The first respondent entered into an agreement for the sale of half of the mortgaged property with a third party.

The entire settlement amount was paid as per the OTS, but the bank declined to settle, claiming entitlement to 50% of the fair market value due to the third-party interest.

Issues:

Whether the appellant bank is entitled to fifty percent of the increase in the fair market value of the property under the OTS Scheme.

Validity of the restriction on sale and the bank's claim in light of the third-party interest.

Held:

The OTS proposal, dated 01.03.2012, imposed a restriction solely on the sale of the mortgaged property for a period of three years.

Admittedly, the property had not been sold within the three-year lock-in period.

The bank had not released the mortgage, and possession of the mortgaged property had not been delivered to the first respondent.

The scheme did not provide any other restriction on the involvement of third-party interest for settlement of dues.

The appellant bank cannot claim a share of the increase in fair market value as recompense, as there was no loss or suffering on the bank's part.

The High Court's direction to release the title deed and hand over possession to the first respondent was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

The petitioner, D. Sudhakar, belonging to the Scheduled Caste community and with a physical handicap, claimed unfair treatment in the selection process for the IAS.

Despite being shortlisted, the petitioner was not selected for the IAS, invoking Section 33 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, which provides for 3% reservation for persons with disabilities in every establishment under the appropriate Government.

Issues:

Interpretation of Section 33 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, in conjunction with the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Selection) Regulations, 1997, and the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954.

Validity of the petitioner's claim for inclusion under the physically handicapped quota.

Held:

The Tribunal partly allowed the original application, setting aside the shortlisting of 15 candidates but rejecting the petitioner's inclusion under the physically handicapped quota.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, citing the prospective nature of an amendment to the Office Memorandum dated 29th December 2005.

The Supreme Court granted leave, considering the interlinked issues with pending Civil Appeals, and tagged the appeal with other related cases for a comprehensive decision.

Referred Cases:

H.C. Sharma Vs. N.D.M.C., (2014) 211 DLT 462

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Manoj Gupta, (2010) 171 DLT 600

Union of India Vs. National Federation of the Blind, (2013) 10 SCC 772

Facts:

Appellant societies provided loans to Tasgaonkar Sugar Mills Ltd., which took over the business of Daulat Shetkari Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd.

Financial difficulties led to unpaid dues to cane growers, resulting in an order for the release of a substantial amount under the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966.

Collector, Kolhapur, authorized to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue, leading to the attachment of sugar stocks, some of which were pledged to the appellant societies.

High Court directed auction of attached sugar stocks, and disputes arose regarding the priority of payments.

Issues:

Dispute over the priority of claims to attached property, specifically pledged sugar stocks.

Appellant societies claimed precedence as secured creditors due to the pledged sugar.

Collector prioritized payment of Provident Fund and dues to cane growers over claims of appellant societies.

High Court dismissed writ petitions, citing the availability of an alternative remedy under Section 218 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the rights of the appellant societies over the pledged sugar had precedence over other claims, as established in the Central Bank of India v. Siriguppa Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. case. The Court noted that the earlier orders of the High Court, recognizing the appellant societies' right of precedence, had attained finality. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the authorities were directed to disburse the amount with precedence given to the claims of the appellant societies.

Referred Cases:

Central Bank of India Vs. Siriguppa Sugars & Chemicals Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 353

Facts:

On June 2, 2014, the State of Andhra Pradesh was bifurcated into two separate states, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, as per the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014. The Andhra Pradesh State Council of Higher Education (APSC) was constituted under Section 3 of the APSC of Higher Education Act, 1988, to advise the State Government on matters related to Higher Education.

Issues:

The dispute arose when the State of Telangana claimed ownership over the entire funds and assets of the erstwhile APSC, leading to a legal challenge against the freezing of APSC's bank accounts.

Held:

The Constitution of India grants the power of forming new states to the Parliament under Article 3. Bifurcation of states is a sensitive matter, and legislative care is essential to ensure a smooth division of assets, liabilities, and funds. The court emphasized the need for equitable treatment of successor states to protect the interests of citizens.

The court held that the complete takeover of assets by Telangana was not the legislative intent behind the Reorganisation Act, 2014. The freezing of APSC's bank accounts by banks was deemed untenable in law. The court allowed the appeals by the State of Andhra Pradesh and APSC.

The court directed that the assets of APSC be divided between the two successor states in the population ratio of 58:42, as per Section 2(h) of the Reorganisation Act, 2014. If the states cannot agree, the Central Government may constitute a committee to facilitate an agreement within two months.

Referred Cases:

Electricity Employees Union Vs. Union of India, (2000) 7 SCC 339

H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior Vs. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 85

Prakash Kumar@ Prakash Bhutto Vs. State of Gujarat, (2005) 2 SCC 409

Raja Ram Pal Vs. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184

S.R. Bommai Vs. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1