Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as amended in 2000, concerning the determination of assessable value of excisable goods. The specific question pertains to whether sales tax, cash discount, and volume discount are deductible for arriving at the assessable value.

Issues:

Whether cash discount is deductible from the sale price to determine the value of excisable goods at the time of their removal.

Whether the matters concerning volume discount and sales tax were rightly remitted back to the Tribunal for further consideration.

Held:

The court observes that the fundamental principle under Section 4 remains unchanged despite amendments. The value of excisable goods must be determined only at the time of removal. This principle has been consistent even after amendments, with changes made only to the definition of "place of removal.

The concept of "transaction value" introduced by the amendment means that the value of goods is determined individually for each transaction but still at the time of removal. The expression "when sold" refers to the agreement of sale, not the actual time of sale. Cash discount, being known at or before the clearance of goods, must be deducted from the sale price to determine the value of excisable goods at the time of removal.

Decision: The court holds that cash discount is deductible from the sale price to determine the value of excisable goods at the time of removal. However, the matters concerning volume discount and sales tax were rightly remitted back to the Tribunal for further consideration.

Facts:

A plot of land was allotted to the appellant's mother by respondent no. 4-Society.

After her death, respondent no. 4-Society unilaterally executed a Deed of Extinguishment canceling the allotment.

Subsequently, the society executed a registered sale deed in favor of other parties.

The appellant sought cancellation of the Deed of Extinguishment, but the Sub-Registrar and the Inspector General (Registration) rejected his requests, citing their limited jurisdiction under the Registration Act.

Issues:

Whether the authorities under the Registration Act had jurisdiction to cancel the Deed of Extinguishment and subsequent sale deeds.

Whether the High Court appropriately exercised its jurisdiction in this matter.

Held:

The Supreme Court, through Justice Dipak Misra, referred to the Thota Ganga Laxmi case, which held that a cancellation deed cannot be executed or registered based on a specific rule. However, since there was no such rule in Madhya Pradesh, he suggested a larger bench consider whether the principle laid down in Thota Ganga Laxmi should apply.

Justice V. Gopala Gowda criticized the High Court for not properly examining the documents and stated that the extinguishment deed could not have been registered by the Sub-Registrar. He emphasized the need for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to annul the extinguishment deed and subsequent transactions.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and quashed the extinguishment deed and subsequent sale deeds. Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were directed to vacate the property and compensate the appellant with Rs.10 lakhs for the injustice caused.

Facts:

The case revolved around an auction notice issued by the Managing Director, Punjab State Leather Development Corporation Ltd., concerning several properties, with two being the subject of contention.

The Respondents/Writ Petitioners had deposited earnest money and bid amounts marginally above the reserve prices set by the Competent Authority.

Despite the highest bids, the Appellant decided to re-auction the properties, citing marginal difference from the reserve prices and complaints from a third party.

Issues:

Whether the decision to re-auction the properties was justified.

Whether the government is obligated to accept the highest bid above the reserve price in every case.

Held:

The court held that every administrative decision must be comprehensive and self-sustaining, with reasons clearly stated.

The decision to re-auction lacked sufficient justification and rationalization.

While the government is not bound to accept the highest bid, reasons must be provided for any deviation.

The court balanced the interests of both parties and directed the respondents to pay the price of the land at prevailing circle rates, minus the sums already paid, within ninety days, with the appellant to convey the land accordingly.

The appeals were disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

Accused persons were noticed by the police during patrolling, leading to the discovery of a polythene bag allegedly containing intoxicant material. Subsequent chemical analysis revealed no contraband article as defined under the NDPS Act.

Issues:

Whether the trial judge was justified in granting compensation to the accused persons under Section 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) for malicious prosecution,

Whether the High Court's affirmation of the decision was sustainable.

Held:

The trial judge's decision to grant compensation was unjustified, as there was no evidence of malice or deliberate false implication by the prosecution. The delay in obtaining forensic reports and lack of expertise by the seizing officer were not sufficient grounds for compensation. The Supreme Court referred to precedents where compensation was granted in cases of proven false implication or malicious prosecution but found that such circumstances were absent in this case.

Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders granting compensation to the accused persons.

Facts:

The Board of Trustees of the Port of Mumbai, the appellant, filed a Contempt Petition against Nikhil N. Gupta and others, the respondents, for disobeying the Supreme Court's order dated 27.01.2006, which granted them one year's time to vacate certain premises subject to an undertaking.

The respondents failed to vacate the premises despite filing an undertaking before the court in February 2006. The appellant alleged that the respondents changed their addresses to avoid notice in the execution case.

The respondents argued that they couldn't vacate the premises due to pending eviction suits against tenants occupying the building.

Issues:

Whether the respondents willfully disobeyed the court's order?

Whether the pending eviction suits against tenants justified the respondents' failure to vacate the premises?

Held:

The court found that the respondents willfully disobeyed the court's order by failing to vacate the premises despite filing an undertaking. The respondents' claim of third parties being in possession did not absolve them of their obligation to vacate as per the court's order.

The court directed the executing court to issue a warrant of possession and remove all obstructionists from the premises. The Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, was directed to assist the bailiff in executing the warrant. The obstructionists were instructed to cooperate in the execution process, and they were given the option to approach the court for redressal if needed. The executing court was ordered to submit a report to the Supreme Court, and the Contempt Petition was listed for further consideration after three months.

Facts:

The Respondents had filed a Civil Suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land, which was decreed by the trial court.

The Appellant, claiming ownership of the land through gift deeds, filed objections which were rejected, and subsequent applications were dismissed.

The Appellant then filed a separate suit challenging the earlier decree, alleging fraud and collusion.

The trial court rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11, citing res judicata.

Appellate proceedings ensued, leading to the High Court upholding the rejection of the plaint based on res judicata.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the plaint based on res judicata was justified.

Whether the subsequent suit raised different grounds and cause of action.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the rejection of the plaint based on res judicata was premature, considering the different cause of action and grounds raised in the subsequent suit.

The Court emphasized that res judicata cannot be applied merely based on the pleadings, and a trial should have been conducted to examine all issues framed.

Referring to relevant legal principles, the Court clarified that Order 7 Rule 11(d) should be invoked only if the suit is barred by any law, and the question of res judicata involves a mixed question of fact and law, which cannot be determined at the initial stage.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's order, and restoring the decision of the appellate Judge.

The trial court was directed to proceed with the suit and dispose of it within six months.

Facts:

The appellants, engaged in construction projects for Madhya Pradesh government departments, contested the demand for cess under The Building and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Cess Act, 1996 (the Cess Act), arguing it couldn't be levied on projects initiated before the constitution of the Board.

They argued that the cost of construction couldn't be divided into pre-Board and post-Board periods for cess levy.

Issues:

Whether cess could be levied on construction projects initiated before the constitution of the Building and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Board.

Whether the cost of construction could be divided into pre-Board and post-Board periods for cess levy.

Held:

The court rejected the appellant's argument and upheld the levy of cess under the Cess Act from the date of the constitution of the Board. It emphasized that the objective of the Act was to provide welfare measures for construction workers and that delaying cess collection would impede those benefits.

The court clarified that welfare services to workers didn't need to precede cess levy, and cess should be collected promptly to facilitate the timely provision of benefits. The appellants were granted liberty to raise the contention that the liability for cess should be borne by the government in future proceedings.

The appeals were dismissed without costs, with a directive for the appellants to pay any outstanding cess dues within eight weeks.

Facts:

The case involved a serious crime in West Bengal, where nine people were killed and many others injured. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) took over the investigation and filed a charge sheet against several accused, including those arrested and absconding. Further investigation was ongoing to collect additional evidence and apprehend the absconding accused. Some of the absconding accused were later arrested, but when the CBI sought police remand for them, the Magistrate declined the requests.

Issues:

Whether police remand could be granted to an accused arrested during further investigation after the filing of the charge sheet.

Held and Decision:

The Supreme Court, after examining relevant provisions of the Arms Act, 1959, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC), and the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), held that an accused arrested during further investigation can be remanded to police custody under Section 167(2) of the CrPC if the investigating agency requires interrogation. The Court clarified that the term "accused if in custody" in Section 309(2) of the CrPC does not encompass those arrested during further investigation before a supplementary charge sheet is filed.

Therefore, the Court set aside the orders of both the High Court and the Magistrate declining police remand and directed the Magistrate to reconsider the CBI's applications for police remand in accordance with the law.

Facts:

Appellant sought to pay proportionate annual rental for an FL3 license due to third-party intervention.

Division Bench reversed the detailed judgment of the learned Single Judge based on Rule 14 of the Foreign Liquor Rules.

Issues:

Interpretation of Rule 14 regarding payment of full annual fee for FL3 licenses.

Whether licensee can claim proportionate payment due to non-utilization caused by third-party intervention.

Held:

The court held that a party is entitled to seek a remission in the payment of license fee if it is precluded from transacting business on the strength of that license because of factors and reasons extraneous to it.

The court allowed the appeal, directing the State to refund the balance amount of license fee with interest.

The court held that the appellant is only liable to pay the proportionate license fee for the period of utilization, not for the full year.