Facts:

Premium Capital Market & Investments Pvt. Ltd. (PCMIL) changed its name to PCMIL and transferred its membership of the National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. (NSE) to Premium Global Securities Pvt. Ltd. (PGSL), a subsidiary formed for this purpose.

SEBI refused to grant fee continuity benefits to PGSL, arguing that although there was compulsion to comply with regulations, it did not extend to transferring the brokerage business to a subsidiary.

Issues:

Whether there was a compulsion of law to transfer the membership to PGSL?

Held:

The court referred to SEBI Circular dated 30.9.2002, which stated that fee continuity benefits could be granted if the transfer was made to a 100% subsidiary, group company, or holding company due to compulsion of law.

The court agreed with the appellants, stating that any action taken to comply with the prohibition of engaging in both fund-based and trading activities simultaneously would be under compulsion of law.

The court set aside the judgment of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) and directed SEBI to grant fee continuity benefits to the appellants.

In another appeal (C.A. No. 2310 of 2007), the court dismissed the appeal as the second transfer of trading membership was not under compulsion of law.

Facts:

The dispute between the parties (wife - Appellant herein and husband - Respondent No. 2 herein) primarily concerned the custody of their minor daughter, Roshni. The appeal arose from the final judgment and order passed by the High Court of Delhi, which disposed of the habeas corpus petition filed by the Appellant seeking the production and return of her minor daughter.

Issues:

The custody of the minor daughter, Roshni, and the directives to be issued regarding the disposal of the main custody case and interim custody arrangements.

Held:

The court held that Having heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and having interacting with the child, we feel that it would be just and proper to direct the Family Court, which has seized of the main custody case (Guardianship Case No. 115/2014) to dispose of the pending main case, i.e., Guardianship Case No. 115/2014, on merits preferably within six months as an outer limit strictly in accordance with law keeping in view the paramount interest and welfare of the child and all relevant factors necessary for deciding the custody of minor child uninfluenced by any of our observations.

During the pendency of the main custody case, the temporary custody of the child-Roshni will be with the Respondent No. 2 - i.e. husband/father. The Respondent No. 2 will drop the child on every Saturday by 6.00 pm. at the Petitioner's residence and collect the child by 6.00 pm. on the next day (Sunday).

We, therefore, direct the Family Court to hold regular sittings for reconciliation during the pendency of the custody case and if considers necessary for the welfare and interest of the child pass any interim orders till final disposal of the custody case.

Concluded that with these directions, the appeal stands disposed of finally.

Facts:

Sat Parkash, along with his uncle and aunt, was charged with kidnapping, rape, and murder of a minor girl named Sushila.

The deceased Sushila left a suicide note indicating she left her home willingly because of her love for Sat Parkash.

The charges against Sat Parkash included Sections 363, 366, 366-A, 368, 302, and 376 of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether the evidence supported the charges against Sat Parkash.

Whether the suicide note provided a basis for acquittal.

Held:

The court found that there was no evidence to support the charge of kidnapping against Sat Parkash. The deceased Sushila had left her home of her own free will, as indicated by her suicide note. Therefore, the presumption that Sat Parkash had kidnapped her was considered misconceived and untenable.

The charge under Section 366A was not sustainable against Sat Parkash as there was no evidence to suggest he induced Sushila with the intent to force or seduce her into illicit intercourse with another person.

The court found insufficient evidence to establish that Sat Parkash had committed rape against Sushila. Despite her being a minor at the time of the incident, there was no evidence of sexual intercourse.

Based on the above findings, the conviction of Sat Parkash was set aside, and he was acquitted of all charges. Additionally, his bail bonds were discharged as per the motion Bench order.

Facts:

Sodexo SVC India Private Limited (the appellant) issues paper-based meal vouchers to its customers. These vouchers are then distributed by the customers to their employees for use in obtaining food and beverages from various outlets.

Issues:

Whether meal vouchers issued by the appellant can be considered as 'goods' subject to Octroi or LBT.

Whether the transaction involving meal vouchers constitutes a sale of goods or provision of services.

The tax implications of the meal vouchers under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Held:

The vouchers provided by the appellant are not commodities sold but represent a service provided by facilitating the provision of goods through affiliates.

The transaction involving meal vouchers is primarily a service provided by the appellant, acting as a facilitator between affiliates and customers.

Without authorization from the Reserve Bank of India under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, such systems cannot operate, further indicating the service-oriented nature of the transaction.

The meal vouchers do not satisfy the test of being tradable or sellable separately, supporting the conclusion that they do not constitute 'goods'.

The value of meal vouchers provided to employees constitutes a fringe benefit or amenity under the Income Tax Act, 1961, and is subject to tax implications.

Decision: The court rules in favor of Sodexo SVC India Private Limited, holding that meal vouchers are not subject to Octroi or LBT as they represent a service provided by the appellant. The transaction primarily involves the provision of services rather than the sale of goods.

Facts:

A civil suit was filed by A. Andisamy Chettiar against A. Subburaj Chettiar seeking a permanent injunction over property rights.

The trial court dismissed Andisamy's suit, finding his evidence insufficient to prove ownership based on a will.

Andisamy appealed the trial court's decision and sought to introduce additional evidence during the appeal process.

The first appellate court allowed Andisamy's application for additional evidence, prompting a challenge by Subburaj in the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the first appellate court was justified in allowing the application for additional evidence.

Whether the High Court was correct in exercising revisional powers in this matter.

Held:

The Court, after analyzing the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, emphasized the limited circumstances under which additional evidence can be admitted on appeal. It held that parties are generally not allowed to introduce new evidence at the appellate stage, except as provided by law.

The Court set aside the High Court's decision and directed the first appellate court to reconsider the application for additional evidence, taking into account the principles outlined by the Supreme Court. This was done to ensure a fair and just resolution of the case. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal invoking Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

A Section 4 Notification was issued on November 13, 1959, followed by a Section 6 Declaration on July 12, 1966, and an Award on June 24, 1968.

The possession of the land was in dispute, but the appellants primarily argued non-payment of compensation.

Issues:

Whether the conditions for invoking Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act were met.

Whether compensation was deemed "paid" as per the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Held:

The court clarified the sequential process for invoking Section 24(2) and established that the conditions were met.

Since compensation was neither paid to the appellants nor deposited in court, the acquisition proceedings were deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2).

The court relied on previous decisions, including Pune Municipal Corporation vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Others, to define the term "paid" in the context of compensation.

The appeals were allowed with no orders as to costs.

Facts:

The trial court convicted the accused, including the husband and mother-in-law, for the offence of dowry death under Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The High Court upheld the conviction but altered the sentence from life imprisonment to 10 years rigorous imprisonment.

Issues:

Whether the essential elements of dowry death under Section 304B IPC were satisfied, and whether the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 was applicable in the case.

Held:

In order to convict an accused under Section 304B IPC, specific conditions must be satisfied, including the occurrence of the woman's death within seven years of marriage, death caused by unnatural circumstances, and evidence of cruelty or harassment related to dowry demands. The term "soon before her death" indicates a proximate link between the cruelty and the death.

The presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 is mandatory, shifting the burden of proof to the accused to disprove the allegation of causing dowry death. However, this presumption is rebuttable, and the accused can present evidence to prove their innocence.

Decision: The court upheld the conviction of the accused for dowry death under Sections 304B and 498A IPC, modifying the sentence but dismissing the appeal.

Facts:

The case involves an acid attack on two Dalit girls in Bihar.

The attackers had been harassing the elder sister, and the attack left both sisters with severe injuries.

The petitioner, a registered NGO, filed a writ petition highlighting the lack of adequate compensation and medical care for acid attack survivors.

Issues:

Inadequacy of compensation and medical care for acid attack victims.

Lack of proper implementation of guidelines and regulations to prevent acid attacks and provide support to victims.

Held:

The court referred to its previous judgment in Laxmi vs. Union of India, which laid down guidelines for regulating the sale of acid, compensating victims, and ensuring their medical treatment and rehabilitation.

The court directed all states and union territories to provide a minimum compensation of Rs. 3 lakhs to acid attack victims, with the possibility of providing more based on the severity of injuries.

In the present case, considering the extensive injuries suffered by the victims and the expenses already incurred on their treatment, the court awarded compensation of Rs. 10 lakhs to the main victim and Rs. 3 lakhs to her sister.

The court emphasized the responsibility of states to ensure the inclusion of acid attack victims' names under the disability list and to provide comprehensive treatment and rehabilitation as per the guidelines established.

Facts:

The appellant, M/S. Steel Authority of India Ltd., discharged excise duty on goods cleared based on invoices indicating the value of the goods at the time of clearance.

Differential duty arose later due to a price variation clause in the contract for sale.

The appellant paid the differential duty immediately upon receiving the enhanced price due to price escalation.

Issues:

Whether interest under Section 11AB is payable on the differential duty.

Determination of the point at which duty "ought to have been paid" in cases of price revision.

Held:

The appellant paid excise duty on the goods cleared based on invoices reflecting the value at the time of clearance. The differential duty arose later due to a price variation clause, and the appellant paid it upon receiving the enhanced price.

Interest under Section 11AB is chargeable where duty has not been levied or paid, or has been short levied or short paid. Duty "ought to have been paid" refers to the time when the price is agreed upon by both the seller and the buyer. In the context of price revision, duty is payable only after the revised price is agreed upon.

Duty is payable on the escalated price in cases of price revision, but the time for payment of differential duty is when the parties agree to the escalation. Therefore, interest on differential duty starts from the date of agreement on the escalated prices.

The excise duty was paid based on the price charged at the time of clearance, and it could not be treated as short paid. Interest is not payable on the principal amount of excise duty in such cases.

Previous judgments holding interest payable did not consider the expression "ought to have been paid" in Section 11AB. The rationale behind imposing interest as compensation for loss of revenue was questioned.

The decision in previous cases requires reconsideration due to the fundamental principle that the value of goods for duty purposes is determined at the time of removal.