Facts:

The Wakf Act, 1995, initially established a single-member tribunal to handle disputes related to waqf properties.

In 2013, the Act was amended to require the constitution of a three-member tribunal by the State Government through an official notification.

Despite the amendment, the State Government failed to issue a notification constituting the three-member tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the one-member tribunal, established under the Wakf Act, 1995, continued to have jurisdiction following the 2013 amendment until the constitution of a three-member tribunal by the State Government.

Whether the doctrine of implied repeal applies to the substitution of Section 83(4) of the Wakf Act, 1995, by the amendment.

Held:

The court held that the one-member tribunal would continue to exercise jurisdiction until the State Government constituted a three-member tribunal through an official notification, as mandated by Section 83(4) of the Act.

The court rejected the application of the doctrine of implied repeal to the substitution of Section 83(4) by the amendment, emphasizing the coexistence of both the old and amended provisions until the new provision was implemented.

Decision: The court partly allowed the appeals, affirming the continuation of the one-member tribunal until the constitution of a three-member tribunal by the State Government. It directed the States to promptly fulfill their obligations by constituting the three-member tribunal and issuing a notification to that effect.

Facts:

Shakti Kumar Gupta was selected for the Kashmir Civil Service (Judicial) in 1987.

His performance was evaluated through Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs).

Discrepancies were found in the assessment process, particularly in the ACR for the year 2009.

Complaints were lodged against Gupta's conduct, including allegations related to financial matters and behavior during court proceedings.

The decision for Gupta's premature retirement was made by the Full Court based on recommendations from the Administrative Committee.

Issues:

Whether the assessment process, especially the ACR for the year 2009, was reliable.

Whether complaints against Gupta's conduct justified his premature retirement.

Whether the Full Court's decision to retire Gupta was justified.

Held:

The court found discrepancies in the assessment process, particularly regarding the ACR for the year 2009, which was unreliable due to Gupta's non-submission of a self-assessment report. However, complaints against Gupta's conduct, including allegations related to financial matters and behavior during court proceedings, were considered significant. The Full Court's decision to retire Gupta was upheld based on various factors, including complaints against him and his behavior.

Decision: The court upheld Gupta's premature retirement, citing various factors, including complaints against him, and his behavior during court proceedings. The writ petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Sections 80-IA, 80-18, and 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether an assessee could claim deductions under both Sections 80-IA or/and 80-18, and Section 80HHC for the same profits and gains.

Held:

Majority Opinion (Justice Anil R. Dave): The majority opinion, as expressed by Justice Anil R. Dave, emphasized that if an assessee claims deductions under Sections 80-IA or/and 80-18, they are not entitled to claim deductions under Section 80HHC for the same profits and gains. This restriction is explicitly provided in Section 80-IA(9) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Dissenting Opinion (Justice Dipak Misra): Justice Dipak Misra dissented from the majority opinion, stating that the deductions under Section 80HHC are computed separately and should not be restricted by the provisions of Section 80-IA(9). He argued that including profits and gains allowed under Section 80-IA in the gross total income for computing deductions under Section 80HHC ensures the proper calculation of deductions without rendering the formula under Section 80HHC ineffective.

Decision: The matter was referred to a larger bench due to the difference of opinion between the two judges.

Facts:

The appellant, Balbhadra Parashar, was the Manager of the Primary Agriculture Credit Co-operative Society in Village Pipraua, District Gwalior.

A case was registered against him under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, alleging acquisition of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income.

Sanction for prosecution was granted, and charges were framed against the appellant.

The appellant challenged the legal propriety of the sanction granted for his prosecution under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issues:

Whether the sanction for prosecution was granted in accordance with the law.

Whether there was proper application of mind by the sanctioning authority in granting the sanction.

Held:

The sanctioning authority must apply its mind independently and genuinely assess whether prosecution should be sanctioned, without being influenced by external factors.

The entire records containing materials against the accused should be placed before the sanctioning authority before the order of sanction is passed (para 6).

The High Court concluded that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind and there was prima facie evidence to prosecute the appellant.

The Court found no evidence to suggest that the sanction was granted in a mechanical manner.

Therefore, the sanction granted in the case was not illegal, and the appeal was dismissed as devoid of merit.

Facts:

The detenu in this case was detained under both Section 3 and Section 12A of the COFEPOSA Act. Following the revocation of the declaration under Section 12A, the detenu was released under Section 3. Subsequently, the detenu challenged his detention under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act.

Issues:

The timing and scope of challenging the detention order under Section 3 after the revocation of the declaration under Section 12A of the COFEPOSA Act.

Held:

The substantive challenge to an order of preventive detention under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act is broader compared to the challenge under Section 12A. After the declaration under Section 12A, the challenge is restricted to technical grounds.

The proviso (iv) to Section 2(2)(b) of the SAFEMA Act must provide an effective right to a detenu to challenge the preventive detention order.

In this case, the detenu's detention under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act was continuous, and there was no occasion for him to challenge it under the limited scope of Section 3 after the revocation of the declaration under Section 12A.

Therefore, the appellant had the right to challenge the order of his detention even after the revocation of the declaration under Section 12A.

Additionally, considering that three of the detenu's brothers successfully challenged their detention orders, the appellant should have the same right.

The determination of the High Court in disallowing the detenu to challenge the order of his detention was unjustified. The appellant is directed to press his claim in the High Court on available grounds to challenge the detention order.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's determination. The detenu is directed to pursue his challenge to the detention order in the High Court. The authorities are instructed to proceed with action under Section 6 of the SAFEMA Act only if the detenu fails in his attempt to successfully challenge the detention order.

Facts:

The case pertains to the constitutional validity of specific provisions of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, amended in 2015. These provisions relate to disqualifications for contesting Panchayat elections, including clauses pertaining to indebtedness, educational qualifications, and the absence of functional toilets at the residence of candidates.

Issues:

Whether clauses (t) and (u) of Section 175(1) of the Act, disqualifying individuals with indebtedness or insolvency, are constitutionally valid.

Whether Section 175(1)(v), establishing educational qualifications for candidates contesting Panchayat elections, is constitutionally valid.

Whether Section 175(1)(w), disqualifying individuals without functional toilets at their residence from contesting Panchayat elections, is constitutionally valid.

The nature of the right to vote and the right to contest elections in the context of Panchayats.

The applicability of judicial review and legislative power in assessing the constitutionality of legislation.

Held:

The court upheld the constitutionality of clauses (t) and (u) of Section 175(1) of the Act. It reasoned that indebtedness and insolvency are recognized as factors incompatible with holding elected office under the Constitution and fall within the legislative competence of both Parliament and State Legislatures.

The court affirmed the constitutionality of Section 175(1)(v), which establishes educational qualifications for Panchayat election candidates. It found the classification based on educational qualifications reasonable and connected to the objective of ensuring effective discharge of duties.

The court upheld the constitutionality of Section 175(1)(w), which disqualifies individuals without functional toilets at their residence from contesting Panchayat elections. It deemed the classification reasonable and connected to the promotion of hygiene and sanitation, essential for civic administration.

The court affirmed that the right to vote and the right to contest elections are constitutional rights subject to regulation by appropriate legislative bodies. It clarified that certain further restrictions can be imposed on the right to contest elections.

The court emphasized the limited scope of judicial review in assessing the constitutionality of legislation, highlighting that legislative choices are not subject to scrutiny unless they violate specific constitutional provisions. It underscored the importance of legislative discretion within the constitutional framework.

The writ petition deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

Ramendra, the appellant, was appointed as an Assistant Grade III in the Regional Transport Office, Indore. Allegations surfaced that Ramendra's residential property was acquired through ill-gotten money, constituting criminal misconduct under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Following the enactment of the M.P. Vishesh Nyayalaya Adhiniyam, 2011, Ramendra was brought within its ambit through a declaration under Section 5 of the Act. Subsequently, the prosecution filed an application under Section 13(1) for the confiscation of Ramendra's property under Section 15(3) of the Act.

Issues:

The main issue revolved around the retrospective applicability of the M.P. Vishesh Nyayalaya Adhiniyam, 2011 (Special Courts Act) and its implications on the confiscation of property under the Act.

Held :

In our considered opinion, the view expressed by the High Court is infallible in view of the judgment pronounced by us today in Civil Appeal Nos. 6448-6452 of 2011 titled Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal Etc. v. State of Bihar and Ors. Resultantly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved a constitutional challenge to the Orissa Special Courts Act, 2006, and the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009. The appellants contested the establishment of special courts, provisions for confiscation of property, appeal mechanisms, and certain rules under the Acts.

Issues:

The main issues included the constitutionality of the Acts and their provisions, the validity of the establishment of special courts, the legality of confiscation procedures, and the interpretation of offences under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Held:

The Orissa and Bihar Special Courts Acts, 2006 and 2009, were deemed constitutionally valid and not in violation of Article 199 or Article 247 of the Indian Constitution.

The establishment of Special Courts under both Acts was upheld as constitutional and not violative of Article 247 of the Constitution.

Sections 5 and 6 of the Acts, pertaining to declaration and its effect, were upheld as constitutionally valid.

Provisions in Chapter III of both Acts regarding confiscation of property or money were found not to violate Articles 14, 20(1), or 21 of the Constitution.

The procedures for confiscation and appeal under the Acts were deemed constitutional, not infringing upon Articles 14 or 20(3) of the Constitution.

The proviso to Section 18(1) and Section 19 of the Orissa Special Courts Act were held to be constitutional.

The provisions relating to appeal in both Acts were treated as constitutional, with the power for the High Court to extend the order of stay.

The offences under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, were upheld as valid, justifying the establishment of Special Courts for their trial.

Confiscation under the Acts was considered an interim measure and not a punishment, hence not violating Article 20(1) or Article 21.

The proceedings for confiscation were found to be constitutionally valid, with ample guidance provided in the Acts.

The court ruled that there's no obligation for the State to provide compensation beyond what is prescribed in the legislation, as it would be against the larger public interest.

Part of Rule 12 of the Bihar Special Court Rules, 2010, prescribing summary procedure, was declared ultra vires the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Uttarakhand Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2011, specifically Section 27(c)(iii) and (iv) as amended by the Uttarakhand Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) (Amendment) Act, 2012.

Issues:

Whether the State Legislature of Uttarakhand had the legislative competence to enact Section 27(c)(iii) of the Act.

Whether Section 27(c)(iii) is in accordance with the primary objective of market legislation.

Whether Section 27(c)(iv) is valid and enforceable.

Held:

The preamble of the Uttarakhand Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2011, though not controlling the enacting part, provides clarity regarding the legislative scheme and the true meaning of the enacting provisions. A combined reading of relevant provisions and the preamble clarifies that the Act aims to regulate the buying and selling of agricultural produce within notified market areas.

The primary objective of market legislation is to ensure fair returns to agricultural producers and regulate buyer-seller relationships. Section 27(c)(iii) is found to be against the scheme of the Act as it levies fees on units bringing agricultural produce for manufacturing or processing without any sale or purchase within the market area.

The State Legislature lacked the competence to enact Section 27(c)(iii) as it encroached upon matters governed by Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, which pertains to industry. Therefore, Section 27(c)(iii) is struck down as enacted without legislative competence.

Section 27(c)(iv) is upheld, provided purchasers prove that agricultural produce brought from other states is part of an interstate sale and complies with the Sale of Goods Act, 1930.

Decision: The Court invalidates Section 27(c)(iii) of the Uttarakhand Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2011, as amended, due to lack of legislative competence. However, Section 27(c)(iv) is upheld, subject to compliance conditions mentioned regarding interstate sale. Consequential actions based on Section 27(c)(iii) are quashed.