Facts:

The states of Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan entered into an agreement in 1981 regarding the reallocation of Ravi and Beas Waters.

Punjab failed to comply with the terms of this agreement, leading to litigation.

The Supreme Court issued a decree directing Punjab to fulfill its obligations under the 1981 agreement.

Punjab enacted the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, to terminate the 1981 agreement and nullify the Supreme Court decrees against it.

Issues:

Whether Punjab's unilateral termination of the 1981 agreement and nullification of the Supreme Court decrees were legal.

The appropriateness of Punjab's action in using legislative power to nullify the decree instead of approaching the appropriate authority under the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956.

The constitutionality of the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004.

Held:

The Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, cannot be considered legal and valid. Punjab cannot absolve itself from its duties/liabilities arising out of the 1981 Agreement (Para 31).

Punjab's unilateral action to nullify the effect of the decree was deemed illegal. Once a binding decree is passed by a Court of law, a party cannot act unilaterally to nullify its effect (Para 32).

Instead of seeking relief from the appropriate authority under the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, Punjab used legislative power to nullify the decree, which was inappropriate (Paras 33, 39).

The unilateral termination of the 1981 agreement by Punjab was against the Constitution and provisions of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 (Para 36).

The Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, was deemed contrary to the Constitution of India. Punjab cannot nullify the judgment and decree issued by the Supreme Court or terminate the 1981 Agreement (Para 41).

Decision: The Court held that the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, was unconstitutional, and Punjab cannot nullify the judgment and decree issued by the Supreme Court or terminate the 1981 Agreement.

Facts:

The appellant, Manganese Ore India Ltd., contested the definition of "mine" under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Duty Act, 1949, particularly concerning the inclusion of processing activities within mining.

The appellant also argued against the classification of ferro manganese alloy manufacturing as a mining activity.

Issues:

Whether the term "processing" in the definition of "mine" should include manufacturing activities.

Whether the manufacturing of ferro manganese alloy should be considered a mining activity for the purpose of electricity tariff rates.

Held:

The court interpreted the term "processing" narrowly, restricting it to activities directly connected to mining, such as those aimed at making the mined mineral marketable, saleable, and transportable without substantially changing its identity (Para 20).

Processes resulting in a substantial change in the mined mineral, producing a different commodity, fall outside the scope of "processing" (Para 20).

Manufacturing activities, including those producing a different commodity, should not be considered mining activities for the purpose of electricity tariff rates (Para 20).

The Ferro Manganese Plant, involved in manufacturing ferro manganese alloy, does not qualify as a mining unit as it is not engaged in activities directly linked to mining (Para 24).

The manufacturing of ferro manganese alloy results in a different product from the raw material manganese ore, both physically and chemically (Para 30).

Therefore, the Ferro Manganese Plant should be treated as a manufacturing unit rather than a mining unit for electricity tariff purposes (Para 31).

Appeals are allowed (Para 32).

Facts:

The appellant, Mahavir Singh, was convicted for the offense under Section 302 IPC by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The case stemmed from an incident where Mahavir Singh allegedly shot and killed Jagannath Singh. The prosecution relied on eyewitness testimony and medical evidence to secure the conviction.

Issues:

The credibility of the prosecution's evidence, including eyewitness testimony and medical evidence, as well as the adequacy of the investigation conducted by the police.

Held:

The Supreme Court scrutinized the evidence presented in the case, highlighting inconsistencies and deficiencies in the prosecution's case.

The Court criticized the Investigating Officer for a lackluster investigation, noting that proper procedures were not followed.

Contradictions between eyewitness testimony and medical evidence raised doubts about the guilt of the appellant.

The Court emphasized the importance of a fair and diligent investigation, especially in cases involving serious offenses like murder.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court, and ordered the appellant's release from custody.

Facts:

The case concerned the selection criteria for the appointment of Secondary Grade Teachers and B.T. Assistants in Tamil Nadu. The State Government provided a relaxation of 5% marks in the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) for candidates belonging to socially backward classes, as per the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) Guidelines.

Issues:

Whether the State Government has the competence to grant relaxation of 5% marks in TET, and if the relaxation provided is legally justified.

Whether the State Government is estopped from granting relaxation.

Whether providing relaxation of 5% marks in TET amounts to changing the criteria of selection after the selection process commenced.

Challenge to Government Orders regarding the introduction of new grading systems and weightage of marks for academic performance.

Held:

The Court held that the State Government's decision to grant relaxation in TET marks was legally justified, citing the enabling provisions in the NCTE Guidelines and the constitutional obligation to uplift socially and economically backward communities (Para 21, 23, 24, 25, 27).

The Court ruled that there can be no question of estoppel against the Government in exercising its powers, and policy decisions taken in public interest to further the advancement of reserved categories cannot be interfered with by courts (Para 28, 29, 30).

The Court determined that the relaxation in TET marks did not change the selection criteria mid-process and was a prerogative of the State Government to address socio-economic conditions prevalent in the State (Para 33, 35, 37).

Regarding the challenge to Government Orders, the Court upheld them, stating that the government had the authority to formulate grading systems and weightage of marks, especially based on expert recommendations (Para 38, 39, 41, 43).

Facts:

The respondent sought eviction of the appellant from the suit premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, claiming bona fide requirement for her son's business of sanitary and hardware products.

Issues:

The bona fide requirement of the respondent and the availability of alternative accommodations for the appellant.

Held:

The concurrent findings of the lower courts, which upheld the eviction petition, were based on evidence and materials on record. The appellant's contention that alternative accommodations were available was dismissed, and the courts held that the respondent had the right to choose a more suitable premises for her son's business. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was granted time until March 31, 2017, to vacate the premises.

Facts:

The case involved the levy of purchase tax on the State Bank of India (SBI) and its branches concerning their acceptance of Exim Scrips (Export Import License) as directed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.

Issues:

Whether the transaction of accepting Exim Scrips by the SBI attracted purchase tax under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.

Held:

The Court concurred with the High Court's view that the SBI was not liable to the levy of purchase tax under the Act, considering the distinctive features of the case. (Para 35)

Replenishment licenses or Exim Scrips were considered "goods" and attracted sales tax when transferred or assigned for consideration. However, when returned for cancellation or extinction, they ceased to be marketable instruments and lost their value. The SBI, as an agent of the RBI, did not purchase any goods but acted to nullify them in compliance with RBI's directions. (Para 33)

The initial issue or grant of scrips did not constitute a transfer of title or ownership in the goods. Therefore, when the RBI sought the return of these scrips for cancellation, they were not treated as marketable commodities purchased by the grantor. As the SBI acted as an agent of the RBI, the ownership in the goods was never transferred to the bank. The purpose was to extinguish the rights granted by the issuance of these scrips rather than acquiring them as goods. (Para 34)

Facts:

M/s Welspun Projects Ltd. (formerly known as M/s MSK Projects India Ltd.) entered into a concession agreement with the Government of Punjab to design, finance, construct, operate, and maintain Bus Terminal Projects at Jalandhar and Ludhiana on a Build, Operate, and Transfer (B.O.T) basis.

Lease deeds were executed between the parties, with the appellant-Company required to pay only an annual rent of Re. 1 as lease rental.

The Municipal Corporation of Jalandhar and Ludhiana issued notices for the recovery of house tax, claiming that the appellant-Company was liable to pay.

The appellant-Company argued that it was not liable to pay house tax as it was operating on a BOT basis and the actual owner was the State Transport Authorities. They also pointed to clauses in the lease deeds exempting them from paying any fees, rent, tax, or other charges apart from the lease rental.

Issues:

Whether the appellant-Company is liable to pay house tax under the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, considering the terms of the concession agreements and lease deeds.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the relevant clauses of the concession agreements and lease deeds and concluded that the appellant-Company was not liable to pay house tax under the Act. They highlighted the specific exemption given under the lease deeds regarding the payment of any taxes on the demised premises. The Court also noted that the Department continued to pay the house tax for several years even after the signing of the agreement, suggesting that if the intention was to pass this burden onto the appellant-Company, it would have been explicitly mentioned in the agreement. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and allowed the appeals, ruling in favor of the appellant-Company and directing the refund of the house tax paid along with interest.

FACTS:

The case involved the murder of Nathiya's husband, with Suresh alleged to be her paramour.

The prosecution contended that Nathiya and Suresh conspired to murder the deceased due to an illicit relationship.

The evidence relied upon by the prosecution was primarily circumstantial, including allegations of an extramarital affair, previous attempts to harm the deceased, and statements from witnesses.

ISSUES:

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the allegations of an illicit relationship between Nathiya and Suresh are substantial enough to implicate them in the murder.

HELD:

The court held that the chain of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution was incomplete and incoherent. While there were suspicions surrounding the appellants, the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, leading to the discharge of Nathiya's bail bonds and the immediate release of Suresh from jail, if not required in any other case.

Facts:

The State Bank of Patiala initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act against Mukesh Jain for default in loan repayment.

Mukesh Jain challenged these proceedings by filing a civil suit.

The trial court rejected the bank's application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC, leading to further appeals.

Issues:

Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain matters falling under the SARFAESI Act.

The applicability of the DRT Act's jurisdictional threshold in cases involving the SARFAESI Act.

The availability of remedy for debtors facing actions under the SARFAESI Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to entertain matters covered by the SARFAESI Act. It clarified the applicability of the DRT Act's jurisdictional threshold, emphasizing the DRT's appellate jurisdiction under the SARFAESI Act. The Court affirmed that debtors have remedies available even when facing actions under the SARFAESI Act. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment and order were set aside.