Facts:

The suit was filed under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by individuals associated with the Aurobindo Ashram Trust. The plaintiffs sought the removal of trustees, alleging their failure to support the philosophy of Shri Aurobindo. The trustees were accused of not taking action against an objectionable book and assisting its author.

Issues:

Whether the suit fell within the ambit of Section 92 CPC. The focus was on the purpose for which the suit was filed—specifically,

Whether the failure to take action against the objectionable book constituted maladministration.

Held:

The Court clarified that the allegations in the plaint should be examined to determine if the suit falls within Section 92 CPC. If the purpose is to remedy a private right, the suit would not be within the section. [Para 31]

Analyzing the purpose of the suit, it was evident that it aimed to highlight the trustees' failure to act against the objectionable book and its author. The Court noted that a determination by the Orissa High Court regarding the objectionable nature of the book was pending. [Para 32]

The Court acknowledged that the trustees had expressed displeasure with the objectionable book, clarified their non-sponsorship, and stated it was not published under the Ashram's aegis. The failure to take precipitate action pending a determination by the Orissa High Court was reasonable. [Para 33]

The Court emphasized that the failure to ban the objectionable book did not constitute a cause of action for removing trustees. Trustees are entitled to wide discretion, and a mere disagreement with their exercise of discretion does not necessarily indicate maladministration. [Para 34]

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, holding that the suit did not fall within the ambit of Section 92 CPC. The application for revocation of leave should have been allowed, as the failure to ban the objectionable book did not warrant the removal of trustees. [Para 34]

Referred Cases:

Sri Aurobindo Ashram Trust Vs. S. Ramanathan, (2013) 4 CTC 566

Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati Vs. Ramji Tripathi, (1974) 2 SCC 695

Vidyodaya Trust Vs. Mohan Prasad, (2008) 4 SCC 115

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the management of Narendra and Company Private Limited (Appellant) and the workmen of Narendra and Company (Respondent).

The primary issue revolves around the entitlement of the workmen to back wages and the determination of the period for which they should be paid—whether until the beginning of January 1995 or until January 1999.

Issues:

The central question is the entitlement and duration of back wages for the workmen.

The management contends that the industry was virtually closed by the beginning of January 1995.

Held:

The learned Single Judge of the High Court limited the back wages to January 1995, citing the lack of evidence proving the industry's functioning beyond that point.

The Division Bench, in an appeal, extended the benefit of 50% back wages until the end of January 1999, considering the closure of the industry.

The Supreme Court criticized the Division Bench for reaching a different conclusion without additional material and emphasized that findings of fact should not be disturbed unless proven to be perverse.

The Court directed the Appellant to file an affidavit specifying the actual year of closure of the industry, and the affidavit, filed on July 11, 2013, stated that the industry became non-functional by the beginning of January 1995.

The Supreme Court vacated the order for payment of back wages beyond January 1995 but retained the Division Bench's order in all other aspects.

Workmen are directed to be paid the entitled benefits within three months, and if not, they will be entitled to interest at the rate of 10% per annum.

Facts:

The appeal is against the interim order of the High Court granting a stay on the excavation of minor minerals by the Appellant, who held a lease executed on October 17, 2013.

The High Court found that the lease was granted in violation of its earlier judgments, particularly those dated January 29, 2013, and September 12, 2014.

Issues:

Whether the lease granted to the Appellant is in violation of the High Court judgments.

The impact of the Government Order dated May 31, 2012, and its subsequent withdrawal on the validity of the lease.

Held:

The High Court had issued directions in its previous judgments, debaring the grant of leases under Chapter II after May 31, 2012.

The renewal claimed by the Appellant was found to be in pursuance of a Government Order dated February 26, 2013, conflicting with the High Court orders.

The withdrawal of the Government Order dated May 31, 2012, could not benefit the Appellant as it was operative at the time of the lease grant.

The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's interim order and leaving the final decision on merits to be decided by the High Court.

Referred Cases:

Centre for Public Interest Litigation Vs. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1

Deepak Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 4 SCC 629

Goa Foundation Vs. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590

Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary, (2014) 9 SCC 516

Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1

Nar Narain Mishra Vs. The State of U.P., (2013) 2 ADJ 166

State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M/s. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205

Sukhan Singh Vs. State of U.P., (2014) 11 ADJ 89

Sukkhan Singh Vs. State of U.P., (2014) 11 ADJ 89

Facts:

The case involves the grant of mining leases and the application of the G.O. dated 31st May 2012 in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

The G.O. mandated e-tendering for mining leases to ensure transparency and safeguard government revenue.

The appellants claimed a vested right prior to the G.O., arguing that they had already applied in accordance with Chapter II of the Rules.

The High Court rejected the appellants' claim, upholding the validity of the G.O.

Issues:

Validity of the G.O. dated 31st May 2012 and its application to pending lease applications.

Appellants' claim of a vested right prior to the G.O.

Held:

The High Court upheld the validity of the G.O. dated 31st May 2012, emphasizing transparency and consistency with Article 14 of the Constitution. All applications pending as of 31st May 2012, including the appellants', were rejected. The High Court held that the mere filing of an application did not confer a vested right for the grant or renewal of a lease. The G.O. dated 31st May 2012 covered "Building Stone," and the subsequent G.O. dated 22nd October 2014 could not be applied retroactively. The appeals were dismissed, and the interim order granted by the Court was vacated. The State was directed to assess the extent of pecuniary advantage taken by the appellants under the interim order and recover the same from the appellants.

Referred Cases:

Centre for Public Interest Litigation Vs. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1

Deepak Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 4 SCC 629

Goa Foundation Vs. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590

In Re : Natural Resources Allocation, (2012) 10 SCC 1

Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary, (2014) 9 SCC 516

Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1

Nar Narain Mishra Vs. The State of U.P., (2013) 2 ADJ 166

State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M/s. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205

Sukhan Singh Vs. State of U.P., (2014) 11 ADJ 89

Final Result : Dismissed

Facts:

The case involved Central Bank of India (Appellant) versus Virudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. and Others (Respondents).

The Appellant provided credit facilities to the Respondent Company, which were secured by movable and raw materials.

Directors of the Respondent Company (Respondent Nos. 2 to 4) provided personal guarantees through various documents executed on August 30, 1974.

The Appellant filed a suit in 1980 for recovery of debts amounting to Rs. 12 lakhs.

The Trial Court decreed the suit against the company but dismissed it against the directors.

The High Court upheld the Trial Court's decision, stating that the directors were not liable for debts incurred before August 30, 1974.

Issues:

Whether the directors are liable for debts incurred by the company prior to the execution of personal guarantees.

Interpretation of the guarantee deeds executed by the directors.

Held:

In view of the foregoing discussion, there appears to be no controversy as to the fact that the Guarantee Deeds executed by Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 on 30.8.1974 rendered them personally liable for any transactions or advances made by the Appellant Bank to the Respondent Company after 30.8.1974. There is also no controversy whatsoever that the Bank account lay dormant after this date, all dealings having been transacted much prior thereto. Such being the position, it is not open to the Appellant Bank to pursue Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 for recovery of debts incurred by the Respondent Company in favour of the Appellant Bank.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the directors were only liable for transactions or advances made after August 30, 1974, and not for debts incurred by the company before that date. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the findings of the lower courts.

Facts:

LIC of India issued circulars restricting the assignment of insurance policies, especially those intended for trading purposes.

The respondents challenged these circulars, arguing that insurance policies are freely tradable and assignable under the Insurance Act, 1938.

The case revolved around the interpretation of Section 38 of the Insurance Act and subsequent amendments.

Issues:

Whether insurance policies are freely tradable and assignable.

The interpretation of Section 38 of the Insurance Act, 1938, and its applicability to assignments.

The validity of circulars issued by LIC restricting assignments.

Held:

The Court examined Section 38 of the Insurance Act, 1938, and its mandatory nature prior to its amendment. It concluded that insurers like LIC were mandated to accept assignments following the procedure laid down in the section.

The Court emphasized the importance of legislative intent and held that subsequent amendments granting insurers discretion did not apply retrospectively. It ruled that the circulars issued by LIC were ultra vires the statute and invalidated them.

Additionally, the Court rejected arguments based on public policy, highlighting the contra proferentem rule, and emphasized the importance of contractual obligations. Ultimately, the Court upheld the judgment of the High Court, declaring insurance policies to be freely tradable and assignable in accordance with the provisions of the Insurance Act.

Facts:

The Railways leased out Front Second Class Luggage Rake (FSLR) and Ventilated Parcel Van (VP) for a two-year period. The notification inviting tenders for this lease was challenged on the grounds that it denied traders the ability to transport goods at specified rates. Initially, a Single Judge of the High Court quashed the notification, but a Division Bench issued directions to incorporate regulatory checks on the lessee's power in setting tariffs.

Issues:

Whether the notification inviting tenders for the lease of FSLR and VP was valid.

Whether the regulatory checks imposed by the Division Bench were justified.

Held:

The statute did not prescribe a specific manner for leasing the wagons. Therefore, the absence of a prescribed method did not render the lease action illegal.

The burden of proving a violation of Sections 70 and 71 of the Railways Act, 1989 rested on the appellant, who failed to provide evidence of undue preference being given to any person, especially considering the lease was awarded through an auction process.

The direction by the Division Bench to fix an upper limit on rates chargeable by the contractor aimed to regulate the contractor's power in setting tariffs and had attained finality as the respondents did not challenge it further .

The Railways must adhere to the ethos and parameters set by the Railways Act. While the executive has the right to formulate policy, it cannot shift the fundamental nature of the Railways without parliamentary approval.

The Railways are empowered to auction space for a specific period, provided the auction contractor adheres to prescribed tariffs. They must ensure that successful tenderers do not charge carriage prices exceeding those set in the Coaching Tariff No. 24 Part III. The Appeal is accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The case involved the sale of secured assets by a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act.

The auction sale was challenged on the grounds that the consideration money did not reflect the correct value of the secured assets.

Issues:

Whether the sale of secured assets by a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act can be controlled by the company court or the official liquidator.

Whether the auction sale was conducted fairly and whether the consideration money reflected the correct value of the secured assets.

Held:

The SARFAESI Act is a complete code in itself and does not require supplementation from the Companies Act. The necessary provisions from the Companies Act have already been incorporated into the SARFAESI Act to harmonize the two legislations.

The involvement of the official liquidator in the sale process is mandated by express provisions of the SARFAESI Act and Rules, not to supply any omission in the SARFAESI Act but because of explicit provisions therein.

The Parliament's clear intention expressed in Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act is that a secured creditor has the right to enforce its security interest without court intervention. However, the Act provides mechanisms for redressal of grievances by borrowers, including companies under liquidation.

The sale confirmed in favor of the auction purchaser was upheld as valid. No illegality or irregularity was established against the conduct of the auction. The offer made during the auction was fair, and the sale was conducted in a competitive and transparent manner.

Fluctuations in property prices do not warrant reopening a confirmed sale unless there are compelling reasons to do so. Once a sale is confirmed and possession is delivered to the purchaser, it should not be disturbed without valid cause.

Decision: The appeals were disposed of, affirming the validity of the auction sale conducted under the SARFAESI Act.

Facts:

The appellant, Pramod, challenged the denial of his appointment to the post of Principal in a private Polytechnic Institution administered by Shri Shiva Ji Education Society.

The core issue revolved around whether the appellant, as the senior-most lecturer, was entitled to be considered for appointment to the post of Principal as required by Rule 3 of the MEPS Rules.

The appellant had been working at the institution since 1977 and fulfilled the qualifications for the post. Despite this, he was denied promotion to the Principal's position, leading to legal proceedings.

The High Court ruled against the appellant, stating that appointment to the post of Principal could also be made by nomination or direct recruitment, not solely by promotion. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, as the senior-most lecturer, was entitled to be considered for appointment to the post of Principal by promotion in accordance with Rule 3 of the MEPS Rules.

The applicability of the Government Rules 2012 to private polytechnics like the respondent institution.

The determination of the appellant's superannuation age and its impact on the case.

Held:

The Court held that the MEPS Rules, being statutory, could not be ignored, and Rule 3(3) mandated the appointment of the senior-most member of the teaching staff as Principal. The Court emphasized that the Government Rules 2012 did not apply to private polytechnics like the respondent institution.

The Court addressed the issue of the appellant's superannuation age, noting discrepancies and lack of clarity in the applicable regulations. Despite this, the Court ordered the immediate reinstatement of the appellant within two weeks and directed his appointment as Principal by promotion within four weeks.

The appellant was deemed to have been appointed Principal from December 1, 2012, and entitled to all consequential benefits. Additionally, the Court awarded costs of Rs. 50,000 to the appellant, payable by the respondent society.