Facts:

The appellant filed a suit for declaration of title, which was dismissed by the Gauhati High Court as time-barred under the Limitation Act, 1963.

Mizoram, formerly known as Lushai Hills District, was initially part of Assam and included in the tribal areas of Assam under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution.

The Governor of Assam issued a notification on 14.03.1966, excluding the application of the Limitation Act, 1963 from the tribal areas of Assam, including the Mizo District (now Mizoram).

Mizoram was established as a Union Territory by the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971, and the Mizo District became part of the Union Territory of Mizoram.

Over time, there were changes in tribal areas, including the exclusion of the Mizo District from tribal areas and the inclusion of other districts.

Mizoram was eventually established as a state in 1987.

Issues:

Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to Mizoram?

Whether the notification of 14.03.1966 continues to apply to Mizoram after it ceased to be part of the tribal areas of Assam?

Held:

The notification of 14.03.1966 ceased to apply to Mizoram once it ceased to be part of the tribal areas of Assam and became a Union Territory. The subsequent changes in tribal areas further affirmed this position.

Arguments based on the General Clauses Act were rejected as irrelevant to the case.

The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the High Court was affirmed.

Facts:

Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (the Appellant) was contesting a demand for additional motor vehicles tax under Sub-section (1A) of Section 6 of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930. The dispute centered on whether the vehicles in question, used by the Appellant for various purposes including carrying employees' children to school and business activities, qualified as "Public Service Motor Vehicles" subject to additional tax.

Issues:

The main issue revolved around the interpretation of the definition of "Public Service Motor Vehicle" under the Act, particularly regarding the requirement of being used for hire or reward.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's judgment was unsustainable because it failed to address the Appellant's contention regarding the vehicles' use for hire or reward. The Court emphasized that for a vehicle to be considered used for hire or reward, it must benefit another party, either through hire charges or rewards received. The Court found that the vehicles in question were primarily used for the Appellant's business purposes or for the benefit of its employees, which did not constitute use for hire or reward. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and allowed the appeal, ruling that the Appellant was not liable for additional motor vehicles tax.

Facts:

The case involved the termination of services of the petitioner-worker, leading to an industrial dispute. However, the dispute was raised after a significant delay of fourteen years.

Issues:

Whether the appropriate government had the jurisdiction or power to make a reference of a non-existing dispute due to the considerable delay in raising the issue.

Held:

The court highlighted that while there is no specific limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1), it is for the appropriate government to consider whether it is expedient to make the reference.

The court emphasized that very stale claims should not be encouraged, considering the potential risks to industrial peace and the financial arrangements of employers.

The court discussed the principles of laches and delays, as well as the doctrine of acquiescence. These doctrines imply that if a party delays unreasonably in raising a dispute or does not object to an action inconsistent with their rights, they may lose their remedy or be presumed to have waived their rights.

The court applied these principles to the case, stating that if a dispute is raised belatedly without a satisfactory explanation for the delay, it may be considered non-existent.

Ultimately, the court upheld the decision of the High Court, which held that the appropriate government had no jurisdiction to make a reference in this case due to the significant delay in raising the industrial dispute without any justifiable explanation. Thus, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed.

Facts:

The State of Haryana issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the acquisition of land for public purposes. Urgency provisions were invoked, denying landowners the opportunity to file objections under Section 5A of the Act. Legal challenges were raised against the acquisition proceedings, leading to various writ petitions before the High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the land acquisition proceedings.

Interpretation of Sections 6 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Applicability of the judgment in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu to the present case.

Effect of subsequent legal challenges on the acquisition proceedings.

Held:

The Court held that the acquisition proceedings were flawed due to violations of statutory provisions and precedents. The Division Bench's decision to quash the acquisition proceedings was upheld. The Court emphasized the strict interpretation of time limits prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as per the ruling in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu. It reiterated that no party should suffer due to a court's mistake. The Court clarified that quashing acquisition proceedings at the instance of one or two landowners does not nullify the entire acquisition. The judgment highlighted the importance of compensating landowners fairly and ensuring compliance with statutory procedures.

Facts:

Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd., the appellant, was involved in manufacturing and selling automobiles.

The case pertains to the company's practices regarding the booking of Tata Indica cars in 1999.

Three complaints were filed against the company, alleging that the demanded booking amount for Tata Indica cars was excessively high and constituted an unfair trade practice.

Issues:

Whether the actions of Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. constituted unfair trade practices under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969.

Whether the complaints filed against the company were valid and supported by evidence.

Held:

The court found that the allegations against the company did not satisfy the definition of unfair trade practices as outlined in the Act. Despite the complaints, the court ruled that there was no evidence to support the claim of unfair practices. The order passed by the Commission was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

In the words of the court: "The order of the Commission appears to be largely influenced by a conclusion that the Appellant should not have asked for deposit of an amount above the basic price because in the opinion of the Commission it was unfair for the Appellants to keep excise and sales tax with itself for any period of time. Such conclusion of the Commission is based only upon subjective considerations of fairness and do not pass the objective test of law as per precise definitions Under Section 36A of the Act."

"Even after stretching the allegations and facts to a considerable extent in favour of Respondent Commission, we are unable to sustain the Commission's conclusions that the allegations and materials against the Appellant make out a case of unfair trade practice against the Appellant. Nor there is any scope to pass order Under Section 36-D(1) of the Act when no case of any unfair trade practice is made out. Hence, we are left with no option but to set aside the order under appeal. We order accordingly."

Facts:

The case involves the sale of imported pig hair bristles and the applicability of Exemption Notification No. 34/98-Cus. dated 13.06.1998.

Issues:

Whether the importer is entitled to the benefit of the exemption notification despite the sale of pig hair bristles without payment of sales tax.

Held:

On a reading of Sections 3 and 7 of the Act, it becomes clear, therefore, that so far as the imported item, viz., pig bristles is concerned, no sales tax, in fact, is charged on the same. This being the case, it is obvious that the proviso to the Notification dated 13.06.1998 gets attracted and since no tax is chargeable on the sale of such goods, the said Exemption Notification will therefore, not apply.

We, accordingly, set aside the judgment of CESTAT and restore that of the Commissioner. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The subject land, acknowledged as evacuee property, was initially acquired under Section 12 of the DPCR Act and later transferred to the compensation pool. However, a subsequent attempt was made to acquire the same land under the LA Act. The appellant argued that the land ceased to be evacuee property after its acquisition under the DPCR Act. Conversely, the respondents contended that the land retained its evacuee property status even after inclusion in the compensation pool.

Issues:

Whether the land, after acquisition under the DPCR Act, ceased to be evacuee property, thus making it subject to acquisition under the LA Act.

If the land vested in the Central Government after acquisition under the DPCR Act, could it still be acquired under the LA Act?

Held:

The court analyzed the provisions of the DPCR Act and the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, and concluded that the land ceased to be evacuee property after its acquisition under Section 12 of the DPCR Act. Therefore, the exemption clause in the LA Act notification exempting evacuee property from acquisition did not apply to the subject land.

Additionally, the court held that the delivery of provisional possession created an encumbrance on the property, which could be subject to acquisition under the LA Act, even if the ownership vested in the Central Government. Consequently, the court set aside the order of the High Court and allowed the appeal.

Facts:

The case revolved around the alleged murder of the deceased, Manoj, who was last seen alive in the company of the appellants. The prosecution contended that the appellants murdered Manoj for the money he was carrying. The conviction was based on circumstantial evidence and the "last seen theory."

Issues:

Whether the prosecution had sufficiently proven the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence and the "last seen theory."

Held:

The court held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt. Several doubts and inconsistencies emerged during the examination of witnesses and the circumstances surrounding the case. Despite relying on the "last seen theory," the time gap between the alleged last sighting and the recovery of the body was significant, casting doubt on the prosecution's case. Additionally, no corroborative evidence supported the theory.

As a result, the conviction of the appellants under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. This decision underscores the importance of thorough investigation and conclusive evidence in criminal proceedings.

Facts:

Ravindra Kumar Shrivastava, the appellant, was initially employed as a daily wager in the Forest Department before 1990. His service was regularized as a Lower Division Clerk (LDC).

In 1992, he was made in charge of Office Steno, and in 2002, he was absorbed as a Steno-typist. Subsequently, in 2003, he was promoted to the position of Stenographer.

However, his promotion to Stenographer was canceled on the grounds that he did not meet the eligibility criterion of having worked continuously as a Steno-typist for five years before promotion.

Issues:

Whether the appellant fulfilled the eligibility criteria for promotion to the position of Stenographer.

Whether the cancellation of the appellant's promotion was justified.

Held:

The State Government's letter dated 23.02.1989 prescribed the criterion for promotion to the post of Stenographer, requiring five years of experience as a Steno-typist and passing the shorthand and typing exam. The appellant passed the exam only in 2000, and he was absorbed as a Steno-typist in 2002. Therefore, he became eligible for promotion to the position of Stenographer only in 2007.

Although the Divisional Forest Officer recommended seniority for the appellant as a Steno-typist from 1998, there was no official acceptance of this recommendation. Thus, he could not claim seniority from that year.

The High Court rightly held that the appellant did not satisfy the eligibility criteria of having continuously worked for a period of five years as Steno-typist before being promoted as Stenographer. The impugned orders do not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference exercising jurisdiction Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs.