Facts:

The State Government initially stayed further action on granting mining leases for non-scheduled minerals, citing the need for a detailed environmental impact study. Subsequently, the State informed the lessee-company of its intention not to grant leases for mineral sand to private parties. Revision applications were filed, and the Central Government directed the State Government to reconsider the case.

Issues:

The ownership of mineral deposits, the power of the State Government to reserve areas for mining operations, and the compliance with legal procedures outlined in Section 17A of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957.

Held:

The Parliament has exclusive authority over the regulation and development of mines and minerals. The State Government owns mineral deposits but must comply with the procedures outlined in Section 17A for valid reservations. The absence of Central Government approval renders the State Government's claim of reservation untenable.

Section 17A(2) empowers the State Government to reserve areas, subject to Central Government approval. The State's failure to follow the prescribed procedure makes its claim invalid. The State can make a valid reservation by adhering to the legal process.

While the dismissal of the appeals does not prevent the State from invoking its right under Section 17(A)(2) by issuing a notification, adherence to the legal procedure is essential.

State Governments own mines and minerals within their territories, and the MMDR Act does not diminish this ownership. The State has discretion in granting mining leases. Section 17A(2) allows the State Government, with Central Government approval, to reserve areas for mining operations by government companies.

The State's policy decision aligns with the MMDR Act and the National Mineral Policy. The State's duty to balance developmental needs and environmental protection is consistent with Section 18 of the MMDR Act. The High Court was correct in upholding the State Government's policy decision. The appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves the migration of EWA spectrum to UL, allowing existing BWA spectrum to transition to UL. TRAI initiated the process in 2012, leading to the issuance of the National Telecom Policy-2012 by the Government of India. The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) made a policy decision allowing migration to UL from UASL and ISP to UL regime.

Issues:

The validity of the migration decision, potential undue benefit to a specific respondent, the fixation of additional fees, spectrum usage charges, and the scope of judicial review in matters of government policy.

Held:

The court upheld the validity of the government's decision to permit migration to the UL regime, considering it a lawful and well-considered policy decision.

The migration decision applied uniformly to all holders of BWA spectrum, and any benefit to a specific respondent was deemed a consequence of the policy rather than favoritism.

The fixation of an additional fee of Rs. 1,658 crores for migration was found justifiable, given the government's discretion to ensure a level playing field among different license classes.

The court affirmed the validity of fixing Spectrum Usage Charges (SUC) at 1% of Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR), citing TRAI's recommendation and government scrutiny.

Judicial review was deemed to have a limited scope, with minimal interference in government policies, especially those formulated by experts.

Decision: The writ petition was dismissed, confirming the legality and validity of the government's decisions and policies in the telecommunications sector.

Facts:

The State Government initially stayed further action on granting mining leases for non-scheduled minerals, citing the need for a detailed environmental impact study. Subsequently, the State informed the lessee-company of its intention not to grant leases for mineral sand to private parties. Revision applications were filed, and the Central Government directed the State Government to reconsider the case.

Issues:

The ownership of mineral deposits, the power of the State Government to reserve areas for mining operations, and the compliance with legal procedures outlined in Section 17A of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957.

Held:

The Parliament has exclusive authority over the regulation and development of mines and minerals. The State Government owns mineral deposits but must comply with the procedures outlined in Section 17A for valid reservations. The absence of Central Government approval renders the State Government's claim of reservation untenable.

Section 17A(2) empowers the State Government to reserve areas, subject to Central Government approval. The State's failure to follow the prescribed procedure makes its claim invalid. The State can make a valid reservation by adhering to the legal process.

While the dismissal of the appeals does not prevent the State from invoking its right under Section 17(A)(2) by issuing a notification, adherence to the legal procedure is essential.

State Governments own mines and minerals within their territories, and the MMDR Act does not diminish this ownership. The State has discretion in granting mining leases. Section 17A(2) allows the State Government, with Central Government approval, to reserve areas for mining operations by government companies.

The State's policy decision aligns with the MMDR Act and the National Mineral Policy. The State's duty to balance developmental needs and environmental protection is consistent with Section 18 of the MMDR Act. The High Court was correct in upholding the State Government's policy decision. The appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves a complaint filed under sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, against a company and its executive director and directors. The High Court, using its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, quashed the summons issued in the case.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and whether the accused company's directors can be held criminally liable for the offense under Section 138.

Held:

Upon a perusal of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Court emphasizes that the section creates constructive liability on persons responsible for the conduct of the business of the accused company. In this case, accused Nos. 4 and 5, who were whole-time Directors of the company, were alleged to be in charge of day-to-day business activities. The High Court erred in concluding that there were no specific averments in the complaint against them.

Decision: The Court allows the appeals and directs the Magistrate to proceed with the complaint, stating that the summons were wrongly set aside by the High Court.

Facts:

The case involves a complaint filed under sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, against a company and its executive director and directors. The High Court, using its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, quashed the summons issued in the case.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and whether the accused company's directors can be held criminally liable for the offense under Section 138.

Held:

Upon a perusal of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Court emphasizes that the section creates constructive liability on persons responsible for the conduct of the business of the accused company. In this case, accused Nos. 4 and 5, who were whole-time Directors of the company, were alleged to be in charge of day-to-day business activities. The High Court erred in concluding that there were no specific averments in the complaint against them.

Decision: The Court allows the appeals and directs the Magistrate to proceed with the complaint, stating that the summons were wrongly set aside by the High Court.

Facts:

The respondent, ABB Ltd., a Public Limited Company, was engaged in the manufacture and sale of engineering goods.

The Delhi Metro Railway Corporation Ltd. (DMRC) invited tenders for the supply, installation, testing, and commissioning of various electrical equipment for a specific project.

The respondent entered into a contract with DMRC to provide transformers, switch-gears, High Voltage Cables, SCADA system, and other electrical solutions.

The dispute arose when the respondent was asked to pay Delhi Value Added Tax (DVAT) on the deemed sales made to DMRC.

Issues:

Whether the inter-State movement of goods was in pursuance of and incidental to the contract for the supply of goods used in the execution of the works contract between the respondent and DMRC.

Held:

The High Court held that the inter-State movement of goods was in pursuance of and incidental to the contract for the supply of goods used in the execution of the works contract with DMRC.

The transactions constituting inter-State trade and those constituting sale or purchase in the course of import were deemed exempt from taxation under the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004, based on Section 3(a) and Section 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

The High Court's decision was based on a detailed examination of the relevant contract terms, specifications, and conditions, concluding that the movement of goods was integral to fulfilling the terms of the contract with DMRC.

The appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

Plaintiffs filed a suit seeking partition, challenging sale deeds, and claiming possession and mesne profits.

Allegations included improper alienation of ancestral property by the guardian without legal necessity.

Issues:

Whether the suit filed in 1989 for setting aside the sale deed dated 20.01.1982 is within limitation.

Applicability of Articles under the Limitation Act, particularly Article 60 and Article 109.

Held:

The court held that the suit is governed by Article 60 of the Limitation Act, applicable to a quondam minor challenging a transfer made by a guardian in violation of Section 8(1)(2) of the 1956 Act.

Articles 109, 110, and 113 were deemed not applicable to the facts of the case.

The court emphasized that the limitation is three years from the date of attaining majority.

Section 7 of the Limitation Act was discussed, stating that time runs against all plaintiffs when a discharge can be given without the concurrence of all.

The interpretation of statutes emphasized a literal approach, and inconvenience and hardship were not deemed decisive factors.

The appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The respondent, ABB Ltd., a Public Limited Company, was engaged in the manufacture and sale of engineering goods.

The Delhi Metro Railway Corporation Ltd. (DMRC) invited tenders for the supply, installation, testing, and commissioning of various electrical equipment for a specific project.

The respondent entered into a contract with DMRC to provide transformers, switch-gears, High Voltage Cables, SCADA system, and other electrical solutions.

The dispute arose when the respondent was asked to pay Delhi Value Added Tax (DVAT) on the deemed sales made to DMRC.

Issues:

Whether the inter-State movement of goods was in pursuance of and incidental to the contract for the supply of goods used in the execution of the works contract between the respondent and DMRC.

Held:

The High Court held that the inter-State movement of goods was in pursuance of and incidental to the contract for the supply of goods used in the execution of the works contract with DMRC.

The transactions constituting inter-State trade and those constituting sale or purchase in the course of import were deemed exempt from taxation under the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004, based on Section 3(a) and Section 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

The High Court's decision was based on a detailed examination of the relevant contract terms, specifications, and conditions, concluding that the movement of goods was integral to fulfilling the terms of the contract with DMRC.

The appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

Plaintiffs filed a suit seeking partition, challenging sale deeds, and claiming possession and mesne profits.

Allegations included improper alienation of ancestral property by the guardian without legal necessity.

Issues:

Whether the suit filed in 1989 for setting aside the sale deed dated 20.01.1982 is within limitation.

Applicability of Articles under the Limitation Act, particularly Article 60 and Article 109.

Held:

The court held that the suit is governed by Article 60 of the Limitation Act, applicable to a quondam minor challenging a transfer made by a guardian in violation of Section 8(1)(2) of the 1956 Act.

Articles 109, 110, and 113 were deemed not applicable to the facts of the case.

The court emphasized that the limitation is three years from the date of attaining majority.

Section 7 of the Limitation Act was discussed, stating that time runs against all plaintiffs when a discharge can be given without the concurrence of all.

The interpretation of statutes emphasized a literal approach, and inconvenience and hardship were not deemed decisive factors.

The appeal was dismissed.