Facts:

The appeal involves the enforceability of an agreement to sell dated 6.1.1995 for the allotment of a plot by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA).

The agreement details the receipt of Rs. 2,30,000 against the alternative plot recommended for allotment to the Defendant-Respondent.

Trial court decreed the suit for specific performance, affirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Validity and enforceability of the agreement to sell.

Discrepancies in the total sale consideration and suit valuation.

Defendant's deposit with DDA exceeding the agreed amount.

Allotment of land being non-transferable for ten years.

Held:

The court held that the lower courts failed to consider the provisions of the Specific Relief Act and relevant legal principles. The critical issue was whether a valid and enforceable contract existed. The court, referring to Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, emphasized that specific performance is contingent on the presence of such a contract. Notably, the court highlighted discrepancies, including a higher deposit made by the Defendant with the DDA and the non-transferable nature of the allotted land.

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the trial court and the High Court, concluding that no decree for specific performance could be passed based on the alleged receipt-cum-agreement. The Appellant was directed to refund Rs. 4,30,000 with 6% interest per annum to the Respondents within two months.

Referred Cases:

Mayawanti Vs. Kaushalya Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 1

Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew Vs. Nedumbara Kuruivila's, AIR 1987 SC 2328

Facts:

The Indian Navy required submarine batteries for three types of submarines.

Initially imported, a decision was made to indigenize the production of these batteries.

The Director General Quality Assurance (DGQA) had a detailed procedure for developing critical spares.

Existing suppliers, including M/s. Exide Industries Ltd., were developed as indigenous manufacturers.

The government explored the possibility of developing another supplier (second source) for submarine batteries.

The Respondent claimed to have developed submarine batteries and sought a development order.

Issues:

The Respondent challenged the government's decision to issue an RFP only to M/s. Exide Industries Ltd.

The High Court directed the government to issue tenders for submarine batteries, challenging the monopoly of a single source.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that for defense critical spare parts like submarine batteries, an open advertisement inviting tenders was not appropriate. The government's policy of issuing development indents, developing the source under DGQA supervision, and registration with DGQA was upheld. The High Court's direction to issue tenders for critical spare parts was set aside. The appeal was allowed.

Facts:

Appellant, a construction company, entered into a contract with the Respondent for construction work.

Nature of the work changed due to unforeseen conditions, leading to additional expenses for the Appellant.

Appellant claimed Rs. 30 lakhs under various heads, filed a civil suit in 1993, and obtained a favorable decree from the trial court.

High Court reversed the trial court's decision, emphasizing adherence to the written contract terms.

Issues:

Whether the change in the nature of work justified the Appellant's claim for additional expenses.

The applicability of Clause 11 of the contract regarding extra work.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering evidence, held that the change in work was acknowledged by the Respondent's Deputy Manager during the trial.

Parties, in the interest of justice, cannot be expected to renegotiate and reframe terms when work had a specified timeframe.

The High Court erred in emphasizing Clause 11 to reverse the trial court's findings.

Modified the interest rate from 12% to 6% per annum from the date of the suit till realization.

Facts:

The case involves the transfer of mining rights from a partnership firm to a private limited company, followed by the unauthorized transfer of the entire shareholding to another company without state permission.

Issues:

The legality of the transfer of mining rights, the application of the doctrine of lifting the corporate veil, and the violation of rules governing mining leases.

Held:

The court holds that mining rights belong to the State and are regulated under the doctrine of public trust. Transferring mining lease for private benefit without corresponding benefit to the public or the State is impermissible (Para 22).

The doctrine of lifting the corporate veil is applicable not only for tax evasion but also to safeguard public interest. The corporate entity was used to conceal the real transaction of transferring the mining lease without statutory consent (Para 23 and 26).

While each transaction may seem lawful independently, the court finds the real nature of the transaction illegal, involving the sale of mining lease without statutory consent (Para 28 and 30).

The court emphasizes that the competent authority was entitled to full disclosure of facts for an informed decision to prevent private benefit at the expense of public property (Para 35).

The transfer of mining lease for private profit without the State's consent is void. The State must regulate such transfers in the best interest of the public (Para 33).

The State is directed to frame and notify its policy for the transfer of mining leases. Until then, the court orders the maintenance of the status quo (Para 34 and 37).

Referred Cases:

Amit Products India Ltd. Vs. Chief Engineer O&M Circle, (2005) 7 SCC 393

Amritlal Nathubhai Shah Vs. Union Govt. of India, (1976) 4 SCC 108

Aron Salomon Vs. Salomon & Company Limited, (1897) AC 22

Arun Kumar Agrawal Vs. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 1

Bacha F. Guzdar Vs. CI, AIR 1955 SC 74

BALCO Employees' Union Vs. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333

Balwant Raj Saluja Vs. Air India Limited, (2014) 9 SCC 407

Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skiper Construction Company P Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 622

Electronics Corporation of India Limited Vs. Secretary, Revenue Department, (1999) 4 SCC 458

Geomin Minerals & Marketing Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa, (2013) 7 SCC 571

Goa Foundation Vs. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590

Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar, (1969) 1 SCC 765

IRC Vs. Westminister, (1936) AC 1

LIC Vs. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 264

Mc. Dowell & Co. Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, (1985) 3 SCC 230

Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1

New Horizons Ltd. Vs. UOI, (1995) 1 SCC 478

Orissa Mining Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Ministry of Environment and Forest, (2013) 6 SCC 476

State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M/s Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205

State of U.P. Vs. Renusagar Power Co., (1988) 4 SCC 59

The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras Vs. Sri Meenakshi Mills Ltd., (1967) 1 SCR 934

Union of India Vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2004) 10 SCC 1

Victorian Granites P Ltd. Vs. P.Rama Rao, (1996) 10 SCC 665

Vodafone International Holdings B.V. Vs. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613

W.T. Ramsay Vs. IRC, (1982) AC 300

Workmen Employed in Associated Rubber Industry Ltd., (1985) 4 SCC 114

Facts:

Respondent No. 4 claimed adoption of the 'Blenders Pride' trademark through its licensee 'Seagram.'

Appellant applied for the same trademark, leading to a notice of opposition from Respondent No. 4.

Registration certificates issued to the appellant and subsequent legal proceedings ensued.

A writ petition, a suit for infringement, and a show cause notice for rectification under section 57(4) were key elements.

Issues:

Applicability of sections 124 and 125 in the context of the trademark dispute.

Validity of the registration certificate issued to the appellant.

Territorial jurisdiction concerning the show cause notice under section 57(4).

Held:

The Appellate Board and the Division Bench correctly held that the registration certificate, issued before the extended period, violated Section 23(1) of the Act. The register was ordered to be rectified by deleting the trademark.( Para 15-18)

The plea challenging the jurisdiction of the show cause notice issued in Bombay was dismissed. Section 57(4) powers can only be exercised by the Registrar in Bombay, as per the Act's provisions.( Para 19-21)

Section 124(1) applies to a suit for infringement, and Section 125(1) applies to applications for rectification. In this case, Section 125(1) does not apply as the application for rectification was not made by any party defendant in the suit for infringement.( Para 22-25)

Section 57(4) does not fall within the scope of Section 125(1) as it involves the Registrar's suo motu powers. Excluding Section 57(4) is essential for maintaining the purity of the register.( Para 26)

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the decisions of the Appellate Board and the High Court.

Referred Cases:

Ghanshyam Dass Vs. Dominion of India, (1984) 3 SCC 46

Hardie Trading Ltd. and another Vs. Addisons Paint & Chemicals Ltd., (2003) 11 SCC 92

Kailash Vs. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480

M. Mazharuddin Ali Vs. Govt. of A.P., (2000) 10 SCC 383

M/s Allied Blenders and Distillers Private Limited, Mumbai Vs. Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai, AIR 2009 Madras 196

State of Punjab Vs. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719

Sushil Kumar Sen Vs. State of Bihar, (1975) 1 SCC 774

Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1

Powell's Trade Mark, (1894) 11 RFC 4

Final Result : Dismissed

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between Vishal N. Kalsaria and Bank of India & Others. The central issues pertain to the applicability of the SARFAESI Act in the context of eviction and its potential override of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act.

Issues:

Whether the SARFAESI Act, particularly Section 35, has the authority to override the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.

The status of "protected tenant" under the Rent Control Act.

The significance of non-registration of a tenancy deed and its impact on the validity of the lease.

Held:

The SARFAESI Act is intended for the efficient recovery of non-performing assets by banks and operates in a different field than the Rent Control Act. The two Acts serve distinct purposes and should not be interpreted to overlap (Para 10, 22, 23).

The court emphasizes the social welfare nature of the Rent Control Act and asserts that a landlord cannot exploit the SARFAESI Act to circumvent the protections provided to tenants (Para 24).

The judgment affirms that if the SARFAESI Act were interpreted to allow banks to evict tenants without following Rent Control Act procedures, it would undermine the legislative powers of state legislatures (Para 31, 32).

The court establishes that the SARFAESI Act cannot be used to arbitrarily evict tenants, and a non obstante clause in Section 35 does not extend to every law but only those operating in the same field (Para 30).

Decision: The court allows the appeals, ruling in favor of protecting the rights of blameless tenants and preventing the misuse of the SARFAESI Act to override the Rent Control Act provisions (Para 24).

Referred Cases:

Anthony Vs. K.C. Ittoop & Sons, (2000) 6 SCC 394

Bhanu Kumar Jain Vs. Archana Kumar, (2005) 1 SCC 787

Central Bank of India Vs. State of Kerala, (2009) 4 SCC 94

Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Sun Engineering Works P. Ltd., (1992) 4 SCC 363

H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior Vs. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 85

Harshad Govardhan Sondagar Vs. International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd., (2014) 6 SCC 1

Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1980) 4 SCC 136

Miss Santosh Mehta Vs. Om Prakash, (1980) 3 SCC 610

S.R. Bommai Vs. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1

Transcore Vs. Union of India, (2008) 1 SCC 125

Union of India Vs. Dhanawanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44

Facts:

The appellant, Nankaunoo, appealed against the High Court's judgment affirming his conviction under Section 302 IPC for the murder of Chhedi Lal. The incident arose from an altercation in the deceased's barber shop, leading to a fatal shooting near a canal. The prosecution relied on consistent eyewitness accounts and medical evidence.

Issues:

Consistency of witness testimonies.

Non-recovery of the alleged murder weapon.

Examination of intention and nature of the injury.

Held:

Consistency of Witness Testimonies: The court held that the prosecution's witnesses (PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3) provided a consistent version of events. Emphasizing the credibility of unimpeachable oral and medical evidence, the court rejected the defense's challenge based on investigating officer omissions.

Recovery of Weapon: Despite the non-recovery of the alleged murder weapon, a country-made pistol, the court ruled that in cases with robust oral and medical evidence, the absence of the weapon did not materially affect the prosecution's case.

Intention and Nature of Injury: The court discussed the distinction between intention and motive, emphasizing that the appellant intended to cause the gunshot injury. Considering the location and nature of the injury on the non-vital organ (inner part of left thigh), the court modified the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part 1 IPC.

Decision: The appellant's conviction was modified to Section 304 Part 1 IPC, and the appellant was sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment. The appeal was partly allowed.

Referred Cases:

Jai Prakash Vs. State Delhi Administration, (1991) 2 SCC 32

Jagrup Singh case, (1981) 3 SCC 616

Virsa Singh case, AIR 1958 SC 465

Facts:

The State of Haryana initiated land acquisition proceedings in 1992, which were later dropped due to a court order restraining construction in the area.

The acquisition proceedings were resumed in 1998 for the expansion and development of Surajkund Tourist Complex.

Eros City Developers Pvt. Ltd. owned a portion of the land proposed for acquisition.

The High Court quashed the acquisition notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, citing the doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation.

Issues:

Whether the purpose of acquiring the land for the Surajkund Tourist Complex is a public purpose.

Whether the state acted bona fide in resuming acquisition proceedings in 1998.

Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation applies in this case.

Held:

The court held that the purpose of acquiring the land for the expansion and systematic development of Surajkund Tourist Complex, including the development of a parking area near the annual Surajkund Fair, qualifies as a public purpose.

The court rejected the High Court's finding that the state did not act bona fide, emphasizing that the earlier proceedings were dropped due to court orders restraining construction in the area. After modifications in the orders, the state took a fresh decision to acquire the land for public purposes.

The court disagreed with the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation by the High Court, stating that the protection of legitimate expectation cannot block public interest for private benefit.

Both appeals were allowed, and the impugned judgment and order of the High Court were set aside.

Referred Cases:

A.P. Pollution Control Board II Vs. M.V. Nayudu Retd., (2001) 2 SCC 62

Hira Tikkoo Vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (2004) 6 SCC 765

Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited Vs. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1

Sooraram Pratap Reddy Vs. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, (2008) 9 SCC 552

State of Haryana Vs. Vinod Oil and General Mills, (2014) 15 SCC 410

Facts:

On 24-06-2002, SI Satbir Singh received information that the appellant was selling opium.

The appellant was apprehended at a bus stand, and a personal search was conducted in the presence of DSP Shyam Singh Rana.

Opium was found tied around the appellant's stomach in a polythene bag.

Issues:

The appellant challenged the investigation conducted by PW6 SI Satbir Singh, who was also the complainant.

The appellant argued that, based on a precedent (State v. Rajangam), the investigation was improper, leading to entitlement to acquittal.

Held:

The Court rejected the appellant's argument, distinguishing the present case from State v. Rajangam. In this case, the search was conducted in the presence of and under the instructions of a Gazetted Officer (PW4). The principle laid down in Megha Singh and followed in State v. Rajangam did not apply in the present matter. The Court found no reason to differ from the view taken by the High Court and dismissed the appeal.

Referred Cases:

State by Inspector of Police, Narcotic Intelligence Bureau, Madhurai, Tamil Nadu Vs. Rajangam, (2010) 15 SCC 369

Megha Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 709