Facts:

The case involves criminal proceedings initiated by the Employees State Insurance Corporation against the respondents for failure to pay contributions required by the Employees' State Insurance Corporation Act. The respondents were found guilty, and the dispute arose regarding the imposition of a fine, specifically whether the court has discretion to levy no fine or a fine of less than five thousand rupees.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 85(a)(i)(b) of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation Act, specifically whether the court has discretionary power not only to reduce the term of imprisonment but also to impose no fine or a fine of less than five thousand rupees.

Held:

The court, after considering various legal precedents, holds that the discretion provided by the proviso in Section 85(a)(i)(b) is limited to the term of imprisonment and does not extend to the fine. The legislative intent behind the Employees' State Insurance Act is to create deterrence, and therefore, a fixed minimum term of imprisonment and a specified amount of fine have been prescribed. The court emphasizes that the wording of the statute is clear, and there is no provision for imposing a lesser fine than the specified amount of five thousand rupees.

The appeals are allowed, affirming that the fine imposed should be five thousand rupees, and the courts have no discretion to reduce it once the offense has been established. The respondents are directed to pay the fine within six weeks, and in default, the fine shall be realized expeditiously in accordance with the law.

Referred Cases:

Chern Taong Shang Vs. S.D. Baijal, (1988) 1 SCC 507

Palaniappa Gounder Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 2 SCC 634

Rajasthan Pharmaceutical Laboratory Vs. State of Karnataka, (1981) 1 SCC 645

Sebastian @ Kunju Vs. State, (1992) Cri LJ 3642

Surinder Kumar Vs. State, (1987) 1 SCC 467

Tetar Gope Vs. Ganauri Gope, AIR 1968 Pat 287

Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs. Union of India, (1999) 7 SCC 409

Facts:

The case involved a member of a co-operative society nominating his married daughter under Section 79. After the member's death, the society transferred the membership to the daughter, leading to objections from the son and wife of the deceased member. The Deputy Registrar declined the transfer, citing that the daughter did not fit the definition of 'family' under Section 79 and Rule 127.

Issues:

The validity of the nomination, the interpretation of Section 79, and the objections raised by the inheritors against the membership transfer to the nominee.

Held:

The court clarified that as per Section 79, a co-operative society must transfer the share or interest of a deceased member to the nominee if a valid nomination has been made. The rights of inheritance or succession are secondary, applicable only in the absence of a valid nomination. Rules 127 and 128 of the 1987 Rules further support this interpretation.( Para 15, 17-19)

The court emphasized that the transfer of share or interest to the nominee is binding on the co-operative society and has no bearing on the title issues between inheritors or successors. The society is directed to transfer the share or interest to the nominee, while the inheritors retain the option to pursue their case of succession or inheritance separately.( Para 20)

The instant appeal is disposed of.

Referred Cases:

Atmaram Mohanlal Panchal Vs. Gunvantiben, AIR 1977 Guj 134

D. Mohanavelu Muldaliar Vs. Indian Insurance and Banking Corporation Ltd. Salem, AIR 1957 Mad 115

Gayatri De Vs. Mousumi Cooperative Housing Society Limited, (2004) 5 SCC 90

Kesari Devi Vs. Dharma Devi, AIR 1962 All. 355

Lakshmi Amma Vs. Saguna Bhagath, ILR 1973 Kant 827

Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. United Bank of India Ltd., AIR 1970 Cal. 513

Malli Dei Vs. Kanchan Prava Dei, AIR 1973 Ori 83

Ramballav Dhandhania Vs. Gangadhar Nathmall, AIR 1956 Cal 275

S. Fauza Singh Vs. Kuldip Singh, AIR 1978 Del 276

Sarbati Devi Vs. Smt. Usha Devi, (1984) 1 SCC 424

Sarojini Amma Vs. Neelakanta Pillai, AIR 1961 Ker 126

Uma Sehgal Vs. Dwarka Dass Sehgal, AIR 1982 Del 36

Usha Ranjan Bhattacharjee Vs. Abinash Chandra Chakraborty, (1997) 10 SCC 344

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding stamp duty under Sections 33 and 47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.

The High Court considered the tripartite agreement between the State, developer, and allottees as a lease, demanding full stamp duty.

Two judgments were issued by the High Court on August 4, 2011, and August 16, 2011, concerning the developer and allottees, respectively.

Issues:

Whether the tripartite agreement qua the allottees is a lease, and if so, whether the High Court was justified in adjudicating that issue directly.

Whether the allottees were exempted from payment of stamp duty.

The appropriateness of the High Court's decision to delve into the matter without the required materials.

Held:

The court found that the High Court was not justified in adjudicating the lease issue directly without the necessary materials.

There exists a statutory scheme for adjudication of such issues by competent authorities, and the parties were directed to approach the competent authority in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

The High Court's judgment dated 16.8.2011 in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 73277 of 2010 was set aside.

Parties were directed to the competent authority for adjudication, with a six-month timeline for issuing notice, hearing, and passing final orders.

No opinion was expressed on the legality of orders in another writ petition, leaving it for parties to address before the High Court.

The High Court was requested to dispose of the writ petitions expeditiously.

Facts:

The case involves the Appellants, Balwan Singh and Others, challenging the entitlement to interest for the duration between the date of dispossession and the date of Notification Under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Issues:

Whether the Appellants have the right to receive interest for the period mentioned above.

Held:

In a concise judgment, the Division Bench referred to established legal precedents. Notably, in the case of R.L. Jain (D) by L.Rs. v. DDA (2004) 4 SCC 79, it was held that the landowner is not entitled to interest under the Act. However, the Court clarified that the landowner could receive rent or damages for the use and occupation of the property by the government. Subsequently, in the case of Madishetti Bala Ramul (dead) by L.Rs. v. Land Acquisition Officer (2007) 9 SCC 650, the Court directed the payment of additional interest at the rate of 15% per annum on the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector for the period between dis-possession and the date of Notification Under Section 4(1) of the Act.

The appeals were disposed of with no order as to costs.

Referred Cases:

Madishetti Bala Ramul dead by Lrs. Vs. Land Acquisition Officer, (2007) 9 SCC 650

R.L. Jain D by Lrs. Vs. DDA, (2004) 4 SCC 79

Tahera Khatoon Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer/Land Acquisition Officer, (2014) 13 SCC 613

Facts:

The case involved the Commissioner of Income Tax and M/S. Meghalaya Steels Ltd. It centered on the eligibility of deductions under Sections 80IB and 80IC of the Income Tax Act, 1961, pertaining to subsidies for various elements of cost related to the manufacture or sale of products.

Issues:

Whether subsidies for transport, interest, power, and insurance, being revenue receipts reimbursed to the assessee, had a direct nexus with the profits and gains of the industrial undertaking or business.

Held:

The judgment in the Sterling Foods case established a significant test requiring a direct nexus between profits and gains and the industrial undertaking or business. In applying this test to the present case, it was held that all four subsidies were revenue receipts with a direct nexus to the profits and gains of the industrial undertaking.( Para 1-17)

The immediate source of the subsidies being the government did not diminish the directness of the nexus. The subsidies aimed to reimburse costs incurred by the assessee in manufacturing and selling its products, contributing to the net profit derived from the business.( Para 18)

The argument that subsidies reimbursed on incurring costs related to a business fall under the head "income from other sources" was rejected. Section 28(iii)(b) clarified that income from cash assistance against exports is chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business or profession," encompassing subsidies related to the reimbursement of production costs.( Para 28)

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the eligibility of subsidies for transport, interest, power, and insurance under Sections 80IB and 80IC.

Referred Cases:

Decided on : 09-03-2016

Customs Act, 1962 - Section 75

Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 14, Section 2, Section 2(2), Section 260A, Section 28, Section 33B, Section 33B(4), Section 52, Section 52(1), Section 52(2), Section 56, Section 57, Section 80A, Section 80AB, Section 80E, Section 80HH, Section 80IA, Section 80IB, Section 80IB(1), Section 80IB(10), Section 80IB(11), Section 80IB(11A), Section 80IB(11B), Section 80IB(2), Section 80IB(3), Section 80IB(4), Section 80IB(5), Section 80IB(6), Section 80IB(7), Section 80IB(8), Section 80IB(9), Section 80IC, Section 80IC(2), Section 80IC(3), Section 80J

Deduction — Respondent is engaged in the business of manufacture of Steel and Ferro Silicon. — Respondent submitted its return of income for the year 2004-2005 disclosing an income of Rs. 2,06,970/- after claiming deduction Under Section 80-IB of the Income Tax Act on the profits and gains of business of the Respondent's industrial undertaking. — Whether the profits and gains are derived from the business. — Refund of excise duty should not be excluded in arriving at the profit derived from business for the purpose of claiming deduction Under Section 80-IB of the Act.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

K. Radhakrishnan, Sr. Adv., D.L. Chidananda, Sadhna Sandhu, Gargi Khanna, Arijit Prasad, Vikas Malhotra, Rupesh Kumar, Rashmi Malhotra, Guru Krishna Kumar, S.A. Haseen, B.V. Balaram Das and Anil Katiyar, Advocates, for the Appellant; S. Ganesh, Sr. Adv., K.V. Mohan, K.V. Balakrishnan, Kavita Jha, Rajinder Mathur, Rani Chhabra, K. Sampath, R.P. Garg, V. Raj Kumar, Sunil Murarka, Kunal Chatterji and Maitrayee Banerjee, Advocates, for the Respondent

Cases Referred

Additional Commissioner of Income-tax Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, (1980) 121 ITR 1 SC

Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Company Limited Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat II, (1978) 2 SCC 644

CIT Vs. Andaman Timber Industries Ltd. 2000 242 ITR, 204

CIT Vs. Dharampal Premchand Ltd., 317 ITR 353

CIT Vs. Sterling Foods, (1999) 237 ITR 579

Commissioner Of Income Tax, Karnataka Vs. Sterling Foods, Mangalore, (1999) 4 SCC 98

Indian Chamber of Commerce Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1975) 101 ITR 796SC

Jai Bhagwan Oil and Flour Mills Vs. Union of India, (2009) 14 SCC 63

K.P. Varghese Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam, (1982) 1 SCR 629

Liberty India Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2009) 9 SCC 328

Loka Shikshana Trust Vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, (1975) 101 ITR 234SC

Merino Ply & Chemicals Ltd. Vs. CIT, (1994) 209 ITR 508

Pandian Chemicals Limited Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, 262 ITR 278

Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1997) 7 SCC 764

Supriya Gill Vs. CIT, (2010) 193 Taxman 12 HP

Facts:

Pratibha Ramesh Patel filed a writ petition (Civil) No. 35 of 2016 under Article 32 challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act, 2012. The petitioner had also filed a similar writ petition before the High Court of Bombay under Article 226 with identical prayers.

Issues:

Whether filing a writ petition Under Article 32 after invoking a constitutional remedy before the High Court Under Article 226 on identical facts and reliefs constitutes an abuse of the process of the court?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that filing a writ petition Under Article 32 after invoking a constitutional remedy before the High Court Under Article 226 on identical facts and reliefs is an abuse of the process of the court. The writ petition was dismissed with costs of Rs. 1,00,000 (rupees one lakh only), to be deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks. Writ petition is dismissed

Facts:

The appellants sought the release of their land but faced rejection from the High Powered Committee, asserting that possession had already been taken and handed over to Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA).

The High Court upheld the decision, contending that once land is acquired and possession taken, there is no scope for release under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The appellants disputed dispossession, claiming unclear information in the Committee's decision.

Issues:

Whether the possession of the land had been taken and handed over to HUDA.

Whether the appellants were dispossessed from their land.

The validity of the rejection of the request for release under Section 48.

Held:

The court found it difficult to accept the state's claim of possession based on unclear evidence. Symbolic possession, without legal possession, was deemed insufficient. The matter was remanded to the High Powered Committee for fresh consideration, emphasizing that the appellants should not be denied relief solely on the ground of Section 16. If the land is in Lal Dora, appellants are entitled to similar treatment as Millennium Industries Private Limited. The Committee was directed to make a decision within three months, with personal liability for costs if delayed. Interim orders maintaining possession status quo were to continue.

Referred Cases:

Raghbir Singh Sehrawat Vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 792

Facts:

The case involves an appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 131 of 2016) where the appellant, Anant Prakash Sinha, was facing charges in a case filed by his wife in Haryana. The wife filed an application under Section 216 of the CrPC during the trial, seeking the addition of a charge under Section 406 IPC against the husband.

Issues:

Whether the court has the authority to add or alter charges during a trial, specifically in response to an application filed by the informant-wife under Section 216 CrPC.

Held:

The court emphasizes that the trial court has the jurisdiction to add or alter charges if there is a defect or if something crucial has been omitted. The decision should be based on materials presented before the court or evidence that comes to light during the trial. The court underscores the importance of ensuring a fair trial and preventing prejudice to the accused. In this case, the wife's application under Section 216 for framing an additional charge was allowed by the magistrate after considering the materials and being prima facie satisfied.

The court clarifies that if the court has not framed a charge despite the material on record, it has the jurisdiction to add a charge or alter it.( Para 16)

The court reiterates that the charge framed by the magistrate should align with the materials produced before him or with subsequent evidence that comes to light. The court emphasizes the duty of the trial court to ensure no prejudice is caused to the accused.( Para 17)

The court affirms that the magistrate, in this case, did not err in allowing the application under Section 216. The order of the High Court, expressing disinclination to interfere with the magistrate's decision, is upheld.( Para 20)

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, and the court directs the magistrate to proceed with the trial, deciding the matter based on the evidence on record and without being influenced by any observations made, which are limited to testing the legal defensibility of the impugned order.

Referred Cases:

Abdul Sayeed Vs. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259

Amar Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (1974) 3 SCC 81

Bhimanna Vs. State of Karnataka, (2012) 9 SCC 650

CBI Vs. Karimullah Osan Khan, (2014) 11 SCC 538

Fakhruddin Vs. State of M.P., AIR 1967 SC 1326

Gurpreet Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2005) 12 SCC 615

Harihar Chakravarty Vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 266

Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi Vs. State of Gujarat, (2004) 5 SCC 347

Jasvinder Saini Vs. State Government of NCT of Delhi, (2013) 7 SCC 256

Kantilal Chandulal Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 3 SCC 166

Rajbir alias Raju Vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 15 SCC 116

Ramji Singh Vs. State of Bihar, (2001) 9 SCC 528

Sanichar Sahni Vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 7 SCC 198

Shiv Kumar Vs. Hukam Chand, (1999) 7 SCC 467

State of A.P. Vs. Thakkidiram Reddy, (1998) 6 SCC 554

Thakur Shah Vs. King Emperor, (1942) 43 70 IA 196 : 1943 56 LW 706 : AIR 1943 PC 192

Topandas Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 33

Umesh Kumar Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 10 SCC 591

Willie William Slaney Vs. State of M.P., AIR 1956 SC 116

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Notifications No. 14/02-CE and 15/02-CE, providing duty exemptions for knitted garment manufacturers.

The dispute centers on whether the benefit is applicable only when garments are made from duty-paid fabrics.

Assessees argue that Explanation II creates a legal fiction, deeming textile yarn or fabrics duty paid even without documentary proof.

Issues:

Interpretation of the conditions for full exemption under Notifications No. 14/02-CE and 15/02-CE.

Whether the benefit is available only when garments are made from duty-paid fabrics.

The significance of Explanation II in creating a legal fiction.

Held:

The Court holds that Explanation II creates a legal fiction, intending that no duty is required to be paid by manufacturers of knitted garments. The benefit of the exemption notification is available to the assessees. The court refers to the Budget Explanatory Notes, emphasizing that those not availing MODVAT facility were allowed to clear goods without paying excise duty. The court rejects reliance on a previous judgment (CCE, Vadodara v. Dhiren Chemical Industries) by the Tribunal, stating that Explanation II was added to overcome such interpretations. Condition No. 3, mentioning "read with any notification for the time being in force," was included to overcome previous interpretations. Appeals filed by the assessees are allowed, and those by the Revenue are dismissed.

Referred Cases:

CCE, Vadodara Vs. Dhiren Chemical Industries, (2002) 2 SCC 127

Union of India Vs. Jalyan Udyog, (1994) 1 SCC 318