Service Law - Promotion and Re-designation - Recruitment by Transfer - The Appellant, a Junior Engineer (Electrical) in the Tamil Nadu Public Works Department, challenged the practice of re-designated Assistant Engineers being empanelled for promotion to Assistant Executive Engineer (Electrical) against the 25% quota reserved for the Subordinate Engineering Service. The Supreme Court held that re-designation of diploma-holder Junior Engineers as Assistant Engineers upon acquiring a degree qualification did not constitute recruitment by transfer within the meaning of the Special Rules applicable to the State Engineering Service. [Paras 6-7, 13]

Equal Treatment - Promotion Quotas and Lien - The Supreme Court observed that an officer cannot hold lien in two different cadres simultaneously and cannot be considered for promotion in both channels. The practice of considering re-designated Assistant Engineers for promotion against both the 25% quota for Subordinate Service and 75% quota for State Service was found to be legally unsustainable. [Paras 12-14, 21]

Judicial Precedent - Principles of Promotion and Upgradation - The Court referred to principles established in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. R. Santhakumari Velusamy and Others and Union of India v. S.S. Ranade, which distinguish between promotion and upgradation. Upgradation or re-designation, merely based on acquiring a higher qualification without a selection process or correlation to vacancies, does not amount to recruitment by transfer. [Paras 15-16]

Decision - Appeals Dismissed - Clarification on Promotion Quotas - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the Division Bench's decision. It clarified that degree-holder Junior Engineers, upon re-designation as Assistant Engineers, continue to be members of the Subordinate Engineering Service and can only be considered against the 25% promotion quota reserved for the Subordinate Service. Past promotions of re-designated Assistant Engineers to Assistant Executive Engineers against the 75% quota for State Service members were held legally invalid, but the Court chose not to unsettle settled positions. [Paras 22]

Intellectual Property Law - Rectification Petition - Delay and Limitation - The Appellant, proprietor of Kundan Cables, challenged the dismissal of his rectification petition by IPAB, which was filed to cancel the registered trademark 'KUNDAN' granted to the Respondent. The Supreme Court held that the Appellant had pursued his remedy diligently and that the delay in filing before the IPAB, due to earlier proceedings in the Delhi High Court, should be condoned under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. [Paras 11-13]

Jurisdiction - Bona Fide Mistake - Section 14 of Limitation Act - The Supreme Court found that the Appellant initially filed the rectification petition in the Delhi High Court, which was returned due to lack of jurisdiction. The petition was then promptly filed before the IPAB. The Court held that the time spent in the wrong forum should be excluded, as the Appellant had acted in good faith. [Paras 11-12]

Judicial Review - Erroneous Dismissal by IPAB and High Court - The Supreme Court criticized the IPAB and High Court for dismissing the rectification petition on grounds of delay without considering the Appellant's bona fide efforts and the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The Court emphasized that technicalities should not impede justice when a party has diligently pursued their legal remedies. [Paras 10-13]

Decision - Appeals Allowed - Remand to IPAB - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the orders of the IPAB and the High Court, and remitted the matter back to the IPAB for a decision on merits. The Court directed the IPAB to adjudicate the rectification petition afresh, considering the principles of equity and good conscience. [Paras 13-14]

Criminal Law - Domestic Violence Act - Live-in Relationship - The Appellant challenged the High Court's judgment which denied her protection under the Domestic Violence Act, stating that her live-in relationship with the Respondent did not constitute a "relationship in the nature of marriage." The Supreme Court held that a live-in relationship can be considered "in the nature of marriage" under certain conditions and provides protection under the Domestic Violence Act. The Court examined the nature of the relationship and concluded that it did not meet the criteria of "relationship in the nature of marriage." [Paras 3, 6-7, 13]

Legal Principles - Relationship in the Nature of Marriage - The Court laid down several criteria to determine whether a live-in relationship qualifies as a relationship in the nature of marriage, including duration, shared household, pooling of resources, domestic arrangements, sexual relationship, children, socialization in public, and the intention and conduct of the parties. The Court found that the Appellant's relationship did not satisfy these criteria as she knew the Respondent was already married. [Paras 35-36, 55-56]

Domestic Violence - Definition and Scope - The Supreme Court analyzed the definition of domestic violence under Section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act and held that mere non-maintenance by the Respondent does not constitute domestic violence unless the relationship meets the criteria of "relationship in the nature of marriage." The Court emphasized the need for clear evidence of cohabitation and mutual dependency. [Paras 18, 22, 30, 57]

Decision - Appeal Dismissed - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision. The relationship between the Appellant and the Respondent was not considered a "relationship in the nature of marriage," and thus the Appellant was not entitled to relief under the Domestic Violence Act. The Court suggested that the Parliament consider amending the Act to protect individuals in similar situations. [Paras 60-62, 68]

Income Tax - Search and Seizure - Interest on Seized Assets - The Appellant's house was searched on 31.1.1990, and a cash amount of Rs. 2,35,000/- was seized. The Assessing Officer passed an order under Section 132(5) on 31.5.1990, appropriating the seized cash against the tax liability. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal set aside the Assessing Officer's order on 20.2.2004, and the revenue accepted this order, refunding the seized amount along with interest from 4.3.1994 (date of the last regular assessment) to the date of refund. The Appellant claimed interest under Section 132B(4)(b) for the period from 1.12.1990 (six months after the Section 132(5) order) to 4.3.1994. [Paras 2-3]

Statutory Interpretation - Sections 132 and 132B of the Income Tax Act - The Supreme Court examined the provisions of Section 132B(4)(b), which mandates interest on retained assets from six months after the Section 132(5) order to the date of regular assessment. The Court held that the department's refusal to pay interest for this period was incorrect. Section 132B(4)(b) deals with the pre-assessment period, whereas Sections 240 and 244(A) pertain to the post-assessment period. The Court found no conflict between these provisions. [Paras 6-7]

Decision - Appeals Allowed - Award of Interest - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order. The Court held that the Appellant was entitled to simple interest at the rate of fifteen percent per annum under Section 132B(4)(b) from 1.12.1990 to 4.3.1994. The revenue was directed to calculate and pay the interest within two months. [Paras 8-9]

Criminal Law - Limitation for Taking Cognizance - Relevant Date - The Supreme Court addressed the conflict between two lines of judgments regarding the computation of the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC. The Court held that the relevant date for computing the period of limitation is the date of filing the complaint or the institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. The rationale was that taking cognizance is an act of the Magistrate, which can be delayed due to various reasons beyond the control of the complainant. [Paras 1-14]

Legal Maxims - Guiding Principles in Statutory Interpretation - The Court justified the use of legal maxims such as 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' (the act of the court shall prejudice no man) and 'nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi' (a crime never dies) to support its interpretation that the date of filing the complaint should be considered for the limitation period. The Court emphasized that these maxims aid in ensuring justice and preventing absurdity. [Paras 13-14]

Statutory Provisions - Cumulative Reading - The Supreme Court stressed the need to read Sections 468, 469, and 470 of CrPC cumulatively. The Court noted that Section 468 imposes a bar on taking cognizance after the period of limitation, while Section 469 specifies when the period of limitation commences, and Section 470 provides for the exclusion of time in certain cases. Section 473 allows for the extension of the limitation period in the interest of justice. [Paras 21-22]

Precedent - Conflict Resolution - The Court resolved the conflict between the judgments in Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P. and Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, affirming that the view taken in Bharat Damodar Kale, which considers the date of filing the complaint as the relevant date, lays down the correct law. The Court clarified that Krishna Pillai's interpretation, which focused on the date of taking cognizance, was limited to the context of the Child Marriage Restraint Act and not applicable to the general provisions of CrPC. [Paras 1-14]

Decision - Appeals Allowed - Complaint Date as Relevant Date - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgments that considered the date of taking cognizance as the relevant date for computing the period of limitation. The Court directed that the period of limitation should be computed from the date of filing the complaint or the institution of prosecution. [Para 27]

Criminal Procedure - Powers of Magistrate - Addition of Sections Post-Chargesheet - The Appellant challenged the Gujarat High Court’s decision that supported the Additional District & Sessions Judge's order to quash the Chief Judicial Magistrate’s decision allowing the addition of Sections 364, 394, and 398 IPC into the chargesheet post-investigation. The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate does not have the authority to add sections into the chargesheet post-investigation in a police case; this is the purview of the trial court at the time of framing charges under Sections 216, 218, or 228 CrPC. [Paras 13-14]

Distinction Between Police Report and Complaint Case - The Supreme Court emphasized the procedural distinction between cases based on police reports (FIR) and those based on complaints lodged before a Magistrate. In the former, the Magistrate cannot modify the chargesheet after submission by the police, while in the latter, the Magistrate can conduct an enquiry and modify charges as necessary. [Paras 11-12]

Remedy for Omission in Chargesheet - Appropriate Stage for Consideration - The Court highlighted that any omissions in the chargesheet by the police can be rectified at the stage of framing charges by the trial court, where both prosecution and defense can argue for the inclusion or exclusion of specific sections based on the investigation and FIR. [Paras 14, 19]

Judicial Precedent - Correct Course of Action for Magistrate - The Court criticized the High Court and Additional District & Sessions Judge for failing to clarify the correct procedural course for the Magistrate and prosecution. It held that the appropriate stage for addressing such issues is during the trial when framing charges, ensuring that justice and procedural correctness are maintained. [Paras 17-19]

Decision - Appeal Disposed of with Directions - The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal, clarifying that the Appellant (State of Gujarat) is at liberty to raise all relevant issues concerning the addition of sections at the time of framing charges before the trial court. The Court directed that this should be done under Section 228 CrPC since the matter arose from a police case and not a Magistrate-initiated complaint case. [Paras 19]

Criminal Procedure - Jurisdiction - Section 138 NI Act - The Appellant filed complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, at the Small Causes Court in Mumbai. The Magistrate issued summons but later returned the complaints for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the transactions took place in New Delhi. The Sessions Judge set aside this order, but the High Court reversed it, holding that issuing a legal notice from Mumbai did not confer jurisdiction. [Paras 2-4]

Magistrate's Power to Recall Summons - Review Jurisdiction - The Supreme Court examined whether the Magistrate has the power to recall or review the order of issuance of summons under Section 204 CrPC by exercising power under Section 201 CrPC. The Court held that once the Magistrate issues summons, he cannot recall it as there is no provision for review or inherent power in subordinate criminal courts. The remedy lies before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC or Article 227 of the Constitution. [Paras 14-16]

Jurisdiction for Filing Complaints - Place of Business Transaction - The Court discussed the territorial jurisdiction for complaints under Section 138 NI Act, emphasizing that any of the acts constituting the offence, such as drawing the cheque, presenting it to the bank, or issuing a legal notice, can confer jurisdiction. Since the goods were supplied from Mumbai and the legal notice was issued from Mumbai, the complaint filed in Mumbai was maintainable. [Paras 17-18]

Decision - Appeals Allowed - Complaint Maintainable in Mumbai - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's order and affirming the Sessions Judge's order. The Court held that the complaint filed by the Appellant in Mumbai was maintainable and directed the case to proceed before the Special Metropolitan Magistrate at the Small Causes Court in Mumbai. [Paras 18-19]

Minor's Property - Sale by Natural Guardian - Requirement of Court Permission - The Appellant, along with her sisters, challenged the sale of their deceased father's property by their mother (natural guardian) without prior permission from the court. The Supreme Court held that as per Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, a natural guardian cannot transfer the minor's immovable property without obtaining the previous permission of the Court. The sale deeds executed without such permission are voidable at the instance of the minors. [Paras 2, 11-13]

Natural Guardian - Powers and Limitations - The Court noted that the mother sold the property, claiming it was for the maintenance, education, and marriage of her minor daughters. However, the absence of prior court permission rendered the sale voidable. The mother's assertion that the sale was necessary for the minors' welfare was insufficient to bypass the statutory requirement of obtaining court permission. [Paras 3-4, 11-13]

Legal Principles - Voidable Transactions - The Supreme Court emphasized that any disposal of a minor's property by a natural guardian in contravention of Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act is voidable at the minor's instance. This provision protects minors' interests by ensuring that their property is not mismanaged or inappropriately disposed of by their guardians. [Para 11]

Decision - Appeal Allowed - Sale Deeds Voidable - The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the trial court and the First Appellate Court, decreeing the suit in favor of the Appellant and her sisters. The Court held that the sale deeds executed by the mother without prior court permission were voidable and should be canceled. The appeal was allowed with no costs. [Paras 13-14]

**Civil Law - Rejection of Suit for Non-payment of Court Fee – Appeal against High Court's rejection of condonation of delay – Appellant's financial constraints leading to inability to pay the court fee – Trial court's rejection of suit due to non-payment without granting extension – High Court's dismissal of appeal for condonation of delay unsupported by evidence – Supreme Court sets aside the High Court's decision, condones the delay, and remands the case to the trial court with directions to accept court fee within stipulated time or facilitate through legal aid – Emphasis on justice under Article 39A of the Constitution and Section 12(h) of the Legal Services Authorities Act. [Paras 1-19]

**Power of Courts to Condon Delay – Legal Precedents and Principles – Analysis – Supreme Court reaffirms that the discretionary power under Section 149 CPC and the rationale behind the Limitation Act aims to ensure substantial justice – Liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause' to prevent technicalities from overriding justice – Directions to trial courts to consider financial hardships and facilitate legal aid where necessary – High Court's error in a rigid approach towards delay condonation highlighted. [Para 8-17]

**Decision – Condonation of Delay and Remand – Supreme Court allows the appeal, condones the delay in payment of court fee, and remands the matter to the trial court – Directions to trial court for expeditious disposal ensuring justice per constitutional mandates and legal aid provisions – Order for trial court to adjudicate the merits post facilitation of court fee payment either personally by appellant or through legal aid services. [Para 18-19]