Facts:

The original lease of a mining operation had expired.

The appellant, Common Cause and Others, sought renewal under the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.

Issues:

Validity of a mining lease after the original lease has expired but has been renewed.

Entitlement to benefits under Section 8A of the amended MMDR Act based on lease renewal application timing.

Determination of leaseholder status for those who did not apply for renewal at least twelve months before the lease expiration.

Conditions for considering a leaseholder as valid with a first renewal application.

Held:

A leaseholder with a renewed lease, still within the renewal period on January 12, 2015, is considered to have a subsisting lease, entitling them to benefits under Section 8A of the amended MMDR Act.

Leaseholders failing to apply for renewal at least twelve months before the original lease's expiration before January 12, 2015, are not considered valid or subsisting leaseholders post-expiration, excluding them from the benefits of the amended MMDR Act.

Leaseholders who applied for the first renewal of the original mining lease at least twelve months before the lease's expiration, and whose application was not rejected, are considered valid leaseholders with the right to conduct mining operations until two years after July 18, 2014.

Unless the State Government issues an order declaring a mining lease as lapsed, the lease is deemed subsisting until the specified expiration date in the lease document. A leaseholder facing lapse is disentitled to benefits under the amended MMDR Act as per Section 8A(9).

Decision: The Court, after thorough consideration, ruled that leaseholders meeting the conditions outlined in Paras 1, 2, 3, and 4 are entitled to the respective benefits or limitations stated in each paragraph.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1984. Solatium, a form of compensation for compulsory acquisition, was provided at 15% of the market value of the land before the amendment. The dispute arises from the applicability of enhanced solatium at 30%, even in cases initiated before the amendment, if the award by the Collector or the Court was made between April 30, 1982, and September 24, 1984.

Issues:

The correct interpretation of Section 30(2) and whether the enhanced solatium is applicable to awards made by the Collector or the Court during the specified period.

Held:

The Court, after considering previous judgments and the legislative intent, concluded that the enhanced solatium at 30% should be made available for acquisition proceedings initiated before the amendment if the award was made between April 30, 1982, and September 24, 1984. The term "any such award" refers to awards made by the Collector or the Court during this specific period. The appellants were held entitled to the benefits as per this interpretation, and the appeal was allowed.

The Court also emphasized the applicability of interest on the compensation amount, including solatium, as per the proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act. In case of non-compliance by the respondent, execution could be levied, and the matter could be addressed at that stage.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1984. Solatium, a form of compensation for compulsory acquisition, was provided at 15% of the market value of the land before the amendment. The dispute arises from the applicability of enhanced solatium at 30%, even in cases initiated before the amendment, if the award by the Collector or the Court was made between April 30, 1982, and September 24, 1984.

Issues:

The correct interpretation of Section 30(2) and whether the enhanced solatium is applicable to awards made by the Collector or the Court during the specified period.

Held:

The Court, after considering previous judgments and the legislative intent, concluded that the enhanced solatium at 30% should be made available for acquisition proceedings initiated before the amendment if the award was made between April 30, 1982, and September 24, 1984. The term "any such award" refers to awards made by the Collector or the Court during this specific period. The appellants were held entitled to the benefits as per this interpretation, and the appeal was allowed.

The Court also emphasized the applicability of interest on the compensation amount, including solatium, as per the proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act. In case of non-compliance by the respondent, execution could be levied, and the matter could be addressed at that stage.

Facts:

The case involves a resolution passed by the Board of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) for amending the LIC of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995. The resolution aimed at upgrading the basic pension for individuals who retired before August 1, 1997. Despite the resolution, the Corporation failed to execute the amendment.

Issues:

The authority of the Corporation to make amendments to pension rules, the applicability of the resolution, and the criteria for granting dearness allowance to existing pensioners based on a cut-off date.

Held:

In the absence of a specific rule, benefits cannot be granted solely on the basis of a resolution passed by the Corporation. The legal position, as clarified by Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, requires rules to be tabled before the Parliament for conferring benefits.[Para 15]

Two categories of employees are identified: those who retired before August 1, 1997, and those who retired after that date but are not receiving the benefit of dearness relief. The quantum of pension is affected for these individuals.[Para 22]

Orders passed by the High Courts of Rajasthan, Delhi, and Punjab & Haryana are set aside. Writ petitions are transferred to the High Court of Delhi to determine the constitutional validity of Para 3A of the Appendix to the Rules and address cases of individuals who retired after the cut-off date.[Para 23]

The matter is remanded back due to inadequate pleadings challenging the constitutional validity of Para 3A. Respondents are directed to receive a certain amount as an interim measure, and the Corporation is instructed to pay 40% as per Para 3A of the Appendix to each employee within six weeks.[Para 26, 27]

An interim order for the Corporation to pay 20% to individual employees is maintained, applicable to similarly placed persons until a final verdict.[Para 28]

The appeals are disposed of accordingly.

Referred Cases:

All India Reserve Bank retired Officers Association Vs. Union of India, (1992) Sup 1 SCC 664

B.S. Bajwa Vs. State of Punjab, (1998) 2 SCC 523

D.S. Nakara Vs. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130

K.J.S. Buttar Vs. Union of India, (2011) 11 SCC 429

Kallakkurichi Taluk Retired Officials Association, Tamil Nadu Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2013) 2 SCC 772

State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. K. Jayaraman, (1974) 2 SCC 738

State of Haryana Vs. State of Punjab, (2004) 12 SCC 673

State of Rajasthan Vs. Surendra Mohnot, (2014) 14 SCC 77

State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Kartar Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1135

Union of India Vs. SPS Vains (Retd.), (2008) 9 SCC 125

Union of India Vs. E.I.D. Parry (India) Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 223

Union of India Vs. Hira Lal, (1996) 10 SCC 574

V. Kasturi Vs. Managing Director, State Bank of India, (1998) 8 SCC 30

Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet Vs. Noor Ahmed Shariff, (2011) 12 SCC 658

Facts:

The appeal challenges an order summoning the appellant, Hardei, to face trial in a case related to embezzlement of funds from the MNREGA Scheme.

The FIR was filed based on a complaint by R.D. Sharma, alleging embezzlement by Rahul Yadav and Omkar Singh.

The trial progressed, and an application under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. was filed to summon additional accused, including the appellant, based on evidence recorded during the trial.

The appellant's defense highlighted her absence in the FIR and the lack of a charge sheet against her.

Issues:

Whether the trial court's summoning order under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. based on evidence recorded during the trial is justified.

The relevance of the appellant's absence in the FIR and the lack of a charge sheet against her.

Held:

The court, after giving due consideration to the rival submissions, found no good reason to interfere with the order under appeal. The key points include:

An FIR is not expected to contain all details, especially in complex cases involving conspiracy, economic offenses, or those without eyewitness accounts.

The fact that the police chose not to send a suspect to face trial does not affect the trial court's power under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. to summon such a person based on evidence recorded during the trial.

The appellant, being a cosignatory, was found accountable for jointly withdrawing money from the MNREGA account, supporting the prima facie evidence against her.

The court dismissed the appeal, clarifying that the observations made in the orders should not adversely affect either party, and the appellant is free to present her defense during the trial.

Relevant Paragraphs in the Judgment:

Paragraph 9: Acknowledges complexities in investigating crimes and emphasizes the trial court's power under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. to summon based on recorded evidence.

Paragraph 10: Dismisses the appeal and clarifies that observations made in the orders should not adversely affect either party, granting the appellant the liberty to present her defense during the trial.

Referred Cases:

Decided on : 30-03-2016

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) - Section 161, Section 319

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 409, Section 420, Section 467, Section 468, Section 471

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 319 — Summoning of additional accused to face trial — Fact that Police chose not to send up a suspect to face trial does not affect power of trial Court under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. to summon such a person on account of evidence recorded during trial — F.I.R. may not contain all details of occurrence or even names of all accused — It is not expected to be an encyclopedia even of facts already known — There are varieties of crimes and by their very nature, details of some crimes can be unfolded only by a detailed and expert investigation — This is more true in crimes involving conspiracy, economic offences or cases not founded on eye witness accounts — Appeal dismissed.

Facts:

The Respondent, Uttaradi Mutt, filed a suit for perpetual injunction against the Appellant, Raghavendra Swamy Mutt.

The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court partially allowed the appeal, imposing certain conditions.

The Appellant filed a second appeal, and during the pendency, sought an interim order through IA No. 1/2015.

The High Court observed procedural irregularities in the grant of the interim order and vacated it without admitting the second appeal.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in vacating the order of stay and interim orders without admitting the second appeal.

Whether the High Court had the authority to entertain IA No. 1/2015 without formulating substantial questions of law.

Held:

The High Court must formulate substantial questions of law before admitting a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC.

The Court clarified that an ex parte order under Order XLI Rule 5(4) can be passed during the pendency of an appeal, but it does not exempt the High Court from formulating substantial questions of law for the purpose of admission.

The judgment emphasized the importance of adhering to the procedural requirements and not passing an interim order without first formulating substantial questions of law.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision to vacate the interim order.

Referred Cases:

A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu Vs. S. Chellappan, AIR 2000 SC 3032

Ishwar Dass Jain Vs. Sohan Lal, (2000) 1 SCC 434

Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur Vs. Punjab SEB, (2010) 13 SCC 216

Ram Phal Vs. Banarasi, (2003) 11 SCC 762

Roop Singh Vs. Ram Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 708

Umerkhan Vs. Bismillabi alias Babulal Shaikh, (2011) 9 SCC 684

Facts:

The case involved a writ petition (C) No. 235 of 2012 filed by Savelife Foundation and others against the Union of India and others. The petition focused on the protection of Good Samaritans - bystanders and passers-by who render help to victims of road accidents.

Issues:

The development of a supportive legal framework, the constitution of a committee to create guidelines for protecting Good Samaritans, and the enforceability of such guidelines.

Held:

The court asserted its authority to issue guidelines and directions under Article 32 read with Article 142 until a proper legislation is enacted. These guidelines are necessary for the protection of rights under Article 21 read with Article 14, providing immediate help to accident victims and protecting Good Samaritans (Para 18).

The guidelines, as per the notification dated 12.5.2015, were accepted with modifications. The court directed the issuance of acknowledgments to Good Samaritans, and until a standard format is prescribed, acknowledgments can be issued on official letterheads (Para 19).

The notification dated 21.1.2016, regarding the examination of Good Samaritans by the police, was modified. The affidavit of a Good Samaritan, if filed, shall be treated as a complete statement during the investigation (Para 19).

The court emphasized that courts should not normally insist on the personal appearance of Good Samaritans to avoid delays and expenses. Courts can appoint a Commission for examination under Section 284 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Para 20).

States were directed to issue guidelines without prejudice to the liability of the driver of a motor vehicle under section 134 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Para 21).

The scheme framed by the Central Government and the court's order were to be widely published through electronic and print media to raise public awareness (Para 23).

Referred Cases:

Common Cause Vs. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 1

D.K. Basu Vs. State of W.B., (1997) 1 SCC 416

Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction Co. P Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 622

Delhi Judicial Service Assn. Vs. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406

Dinesh Trivedi, M.P. Vs. Union of India, (1997) 4 SCC 306

K. Veeraswami Vs. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655

Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav, (2005) 3 SCC 284

Lakshmi Kant Pandey Vs. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 244

Pt. Parmanand Katara Vs. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 286

State of W.B. Vs. Sampat Lal, (1985) 1 SCC 317

Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. Vs. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441

Union Carbide Corpn. Vs. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584

Union of India Vs. Association for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294

Vineet Narain Vs. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226

Vishaka Vs. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241

Facts:

The State Governments of Punjab and Haryana appointed Law Officers without a realistic assessment of their requirements.

No formulation of schemes, policies, or standards for appointing Law Officers was observed.

The prevailing system lacked transparency and a credible selection process for State Counsel appointments.

Issues:

Whether the appointment of Law Officers can be questioned on the ground of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14.

Lack of realistic assessment and absence of formulated norms for appointment.

Held:

The power to appoint Law Officers must be exercised in a fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory, and objective manner. Arbitrary exercise of such power makes the legitimacy of the appointment questionable.( Para 8)

A fair and realistic assessment of the requirement for Law Officers is essential to prevent appointments for political aggrandizement or personal benevolence. The absence of such assessment poses a risk to the rule of law and public faith.( Para 9)

The States of Punjab and Haryana failed to follow a credible selection process for Law Officers. The dominant purpose of selecting the most meritorious candidates for public interest is defeated by the current appointment method.( Para 15)

Public bodies are trustees of power, and their functions must be exercised in the best interest of the public. Duty to act fairly is a facet of the Rule of Law, and arbitrariness has no place in a polity governed by Article 14 of the Constitution.( Para 36)

The duty to select and appoint State Counsel includes adherence to Article 14, ensuring non-arbitrariness and protection of public interest. States must not frustrate or delay the judicial process heavily reliant on the assistance of the Bar.( Para 37)

Appointment of Government Counsel is not merely a professional engagement but has a "public element." Appointments must be in public interest, and the process should be transparent, fair, and objective.( Para 38)

A check on the power of the government to appoint a Public Prosecutor should also apply to the appointment of State Counsel, especially in unregulated situations.( Para 44)

Lawyers do not have a right to be appointed as State Government counsel. Consideration for appointment or extension must align with norms and criteria.( Para 45)

A consultative process involving the District & Sessions Judge or the High Court is required for appointment or extension. The Chief Justice should constitute a Committee of Judges for the review.( Para 47)

The States of Punjab and Haryana are directed to undertake a realistic assessment, constitute a Selection Committee, and follow a transparent process for Law Officer appointments. Other states are encouraged to reform their systems.( Para 48)

Referred Cases:

D.S. Nakra Vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305

Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons Vs. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293

E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3

Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1980) 4 SCC 1

Mahabir Auto Stores and Others Vs. Indian Oil Corporation, (1990) 3 SCC 752

Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621

Neelima Misra Vs. Harinder Kaur Paintal, (1990) 2 SCC 746

Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489

S.G. Jaisinghani Vs. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427

Sharma Transport Vs. Government of A.P., (2002) 2 SCC 188

Shrilekha Vidyarthi Vs. State of U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 212

Som Raj Vs. State of Haryana, (1990) 2 SCC 653

State of U.P. Vs. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714

State of U.P. Vs. U.P. State Law Officers Association, (1994) 2 SCC 204

United States Vs. Wunderlick, (1951) 342 US 98:96 Law Ed 113

Facts:

The predecessor of the appellants leased out land for 199 years.

Secured creditors of the lessee filed a winding-up petition.

The appellants sought a permanent injunction against the sale of company assets, particularly the leased property.

The Company Judge issued a winding-up order and appointed the Official Liquidator (OL).

The appellants, citing the winding-up order and default in rent payment, applied for the return of the leased property.

Issues:

The case include non-payment of rent, subletting, and the impact of the winding-up order on the possession of the leased property.

Held:

The court addressed Section 12 of the Rent Act, emphasizing the importance of a notice from the landlord for the tenant to pay unpaid rent. In this case, no such notice was issued. The court held that the readiness and willingness of the tenant to pay rent, even without actual payment, would not deprive the tenant of protection under the Rent Act.( Para 17)

The court considered the liability of the Official Liquidator under Section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rent Act, emphasizing that the non-obstante clause in Section 13(1) overrides other provisions but is subject to Section 15. The court clarified that the mere fact of the company being ordered to be wound up does not automatically entitle the landlord to possession of the land.( Para 18)

The court discussed the argument of subletting by the Official Liquidator. It noted that the case involved an attempted assignment through notice/advertisement but emphasized that this did not amount to a completed action. The court highlighted the relief sought in the Company Applications regarding the sale/transfer/assignment of the leased property.( Para 18)

The court considered the liability under Section 13(1)(k) of the Bombay Rent Act, focusing on unjustified non-user for over six months. The court emphasized that the pending liquidation proceedings and the potential revival of the company were relevant factors. It reiterated that the winding-up of a company does not automatically lead to possession by the landlord.( Paras 19, 20, 21)

Referred Cases:

Decided on : 29-03-2016

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 - Section 11(2), Section 11(3), Section 12, Section 12(2), Section 12(3), Section 13, Section 13(1), Section 13(2), Section 15, Section 15(1), Section 18, Section 19

Companies Act, 1956 - Section 525

Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 - Section 21, Section 21(1)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 106, Section 106(2), Section 108, Section 114, Section 118

Winding up of Company — Creditor of Prasad Mills Ltd. had in the year 1984 filed a company petition seeking the winding up of the aforesaid Prasad Mills Ltd. While the company petition was pending some of the legal heirs of Predecessor of Appellants had filed a suit in the Small Causes Court seeking permanent injunction against the sale of assets of company more particularly the sale of the leased property. — Occupant Company i.e. Prasad Mills had no document in its favour entitling it to be in possession of the demised land — Admitted non payment of rent for a period of over 15 years rendering the company and now the official liquidator liable to eviction Under Section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act — Admitted non user of the land for a period of over 6 years attracting Section 13(1)(k) of the Rent Act — Sub-letting in favour of the company, Prasad Mills, in violation of Section 13(1)(e) of the Rent Act. — Mere fact that the company has been ordered to be wound up cannot be a ground to direct the official liquidator to handover possession of the land to the owners inasmuch as the company in liquidation continues to maintain its corporate existence until it stands dissolved upon completion of the liquidation proceedings in the manner contemplated by the Companies Act. In the present case it has been repeatedly submitted before this Court by both sides that presently revival of Prasad Mills is a live issue pending before the Gujarat High Court, a fact which cannot be ignored by this Court in deciding the above issue against the Appellants.

Cases Referred

Hans Raj Vs. Bejoy Lal Sel, AIR 1930 PC 59

Laxmidas Bapudas Darbar Vs. Rudravva Smt., (2001) 7 SCC 409

Ram Kinkar Banerjee Vs. Satya Charan Srimani, AIR 1939 PC 14

Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises P Ltd. Vs. Syeda Vajhiunnissa Begum Smt., (1994) 2 SCC 671

V. Dhanapal Chettiar Vs. Yesodai Ammal, (1979) 4 SCC 214