Facts:

The application filed on behalf of Shri R.R. Nair sought the recall of an order dated October 21, 2016, citing incomplete hearing and the filing of another writ petition challenging the same sections of the Advocates Act in the High Court of Delhi.

Issues:

The adequacy of hearing, the challenge to the constitutional validity of Sections 16 and 23(5) of the Advocates Act, and the related writ petition filed in the High Court of Delhi.

Held:

The Court recalls the earlier order and decides to set down the matter for fuller arguments afresh, along with the transferred Writ Petition (C) No. 6331 of 2016. This decision is based on the need for a comprehensive hearing, considering the dissatisfaction among certain sections of the bar and the challenges to the designation process of lawyers as senior advocates.

Facts:

The appellant, a member of GREF in Border Roads Engineering Services, raised the issue of refusal to grant financial upgradation before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT). The Government objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the AFT or CAT has jurisdiction over the grievances of GREF personnel.

The appropriate remedy for the appellant's grievance.

Held:

The Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, clearly outlines the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) to adjudicate complaints and disputes regarding service matters and appeals arising from court-martial verdicts of members of the services. GREF personnel belong to the Armed Forces, but AFT's jurisdiction is limited to appeals arising from courts martial verdicts.

Certain provisions of the Army Act 1950 are exempted in their application to civilian members of GREF. These personnel are subject to disciplinary control under the 1950 Act for the purpose of discipline.

GREF personnel are subject to dual disciplinary control, allowing action under the 1950 Act or the Central Civil Services (Control, Classification and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965) depending on the nature of the offense.

The AFT has jurisdiction over appeals arising from courts martial verdicts involving GREF personnel. However, it does not have jurisdiction over grievances related to terms and conditions of service or other service matters.

The previous tribunal's decision regarding the upgradation issue was deemed null and void due to lack of inherent jurisdiction. The appellant was granted liberty to approach the High Court for redressal of grievances.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the limited jurisdiction of the tribunals involved and granting the appellant the opportunity to seek redressal through the High Court.

Facts:

Sivanandi, an officer, was considered for promotion to the Indian Police Service (IPS) in 1994-95.

Some ACRs necessary for his promotion were missing or delayed.

A Review Select Committee reconsidered his case in 1999, taking into account the missing ACRs, and he was promoted to the IPS with the year of allotment being 1991.

Respondents challenged his selection, leading to a legal battle.

Issues:

Whether delayed or missing ACRs should be considered in the promotion process.

Whether the High Court's decision to exclude certain ACRs from consideration was correct.

Held:

The Court held that ACRs are integral to an officer's service record and should not be ignored due to delays caused by superior officers. The delay in writing and reviewing the ACRs should not disadvantage the officer.

The High Court's decision to exclude certain ACRs from consideration was deemed incorrect. Therefore, the Court upheld the decision of the Review Select Committee and allowed Sivanandi's appeals, entitling him to all consequential benefits of promotion.

Facts:

The case involves an eviction petition filed by the respondents against the appellant before the Rent Controller, Delhi. The appellant applied for impleadment as a necessary party, claiming that the disputed property was leased to a partnership firm, in which he was a partner. The respondents argued against the existence of a tenancy in favor of the firm.

Issues:

Whether the appellant should be impleaded as a proper party in the eviction petition.

The validity of the tenancy claimed by the appellant and the partnership firm.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that for proper adjudication of the issue, both the firm K.K. Lee and all its partners should be parties to the case. The Court invoked its power under Order I, Rule 10 to implead the firm and its partners as additional respondents. The Rent Controller was directed to ensure expeditious disposal of the eviction petition.

The interim order regarding the deposit of a specified amount per month was to continue until duly varied by an appropriate forum. The Rent Controller was directed to pass appropriate orders regarding the release of the deposited amount upon final disposal of the petition.

The Rent Controller was further instructed to dispose of the case within six months from the date of the first appearance. Pending applications were disposed of with no orders as to costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Suresh Singhal, was prosecuted for the murder of Shyam Sunder and Kishan Lal, which occurred on 04-03-1991 at the office of Lala Harkishan Dass. There were conflicting witness testimonies regarding the sequence of events leading to the shooting.

Issues:

Whether the appellant acted in the exercise of his right of private defence.

Whether the shooting amounted to murder or fell under any exceptions under IPC.

Held:

The court found that the appellant reasonably apprehended danger to his life during a scuffle where he was being strangulated by the deceased. It was held that a mere reasonable apprehension is sufficient to invoke the right of self-defence.

The shooting was deemed to have occurred in a sudden fight in the heat of passion, falling under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, and not premeditated murder.

Therefore, the appellant's actions were considered to be in the exercise of the right of private defence.

The appellant was convicted under Section 304 IPC for causing the death of Shyam Sunder and Kishan Lal. Considering he had already undergone a sentence of 13 years, he was sentenced to the period already served.

Regarding the conviction under Section 302 IPC for the murder of Kishan Lal, it was set aside due to insufficient evidence.

The court noted the difficulty in ascertaining whether the shots that hit Kishan Lal were fired by the appellant.

In conclusion, the appeal was partially allowed, and the conviction was modified under Section 304 IPC. The appellant was ordered to be released from custody forthwith.

Facts:

The appellants, who were the legal heirs of the deceased, filed a claim for compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) following the death of the deceased in a road accident allegedly caused by the negligent driving of a goods carriage vehicle. However, MACT dismissed the claim citing lack of territorial jurisdiction. Subsequently, the appellants' review petition against this order was also dismissed. They then filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution in the High Court of Calcutta, which was dismissed on grounds of delay.

Issues:

The delay in filing the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain the compensation claim.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that while there's no prescribed limitation for filing an application under Article 227 of the Constitution, the petition should be filed without unreasonable delay, and any delay should be satisfactorily explained. The High Court's approach of applying the limitation period prescribed for applications under Sections 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was deemed incorrect. The Court emphasized that if a petition under Article 227 is filed with some delay but with a satisfactory explanation, it should be entertained on merits.

The Court further held that the High Court should have considered the petition on its merits, especially considering the circumstances of the appellants as the widow and minor daughter of the deceased, who was the sole earning member. Therefore, the High Court's order dismissing the petition on the ground of delay was set aside.

In determining the compensation, the Court considered the deceased's income, age, and loss of consortium to the appellants. A compensation of Rs. 8 lakhs was awarded along with interest and costs.

The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The landlord sought eviction of the tenant for alleged sub-letting without obtaining written consent.

A partnership deed was executed between the tenant and his son-in-law for business purposes.

Dispute arose whether the son-in-law was a genuine partner or a sub-tenant.

The tenant did not obtain written consent from the landlord before allowing the son-in-law to occupy the premises.

Issues:

Whether the arrangement between the tenant and his son-in-law constituted sub-letting under Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958?

Whether the absence of written consent from the landlord invalidates the partnership agreement?

Held:

The Court held that the absence of written consent from the landlord invalidated the partnership agreement and constituted sub-letting.

The son-in-law's exclusive occupation of the shop premises, lack of proper accounts, and control over the business supported the finding of sub-letting.

The Court emphasized the requirement of obtaining written consent from the landlord before allowing any person to occupy the premises, as mandated by Section 14(1)(b) read with Section 14(4) of the Act.

The eviction of the respondents was ordered, granting them time till 31st October, 2017, to vacate the premises and directing them to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per month to the appellant.

The decision was based on the interpretation of relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Facts:

On 24-03-1998, an incident occurred near the house of the Appellant involving the Appellant and the Respondents.

Accused Nos. 1 to 14 were convicted by the Trial Court for various offences including Section 302 read with Sections 149/34 IPC.

The High Court acquitted some of the Accused under Section 302 read with 149 IPC, partially allowing their appeal.

The Appeal was filed by the Complainant against the High Court's judgment.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's acquittal of the accused under Section 302 read with 149 IPC was justified?

Whether the judgment of the High Court suffered from miscarriage of justice due to failure in reappreciation of evidence?

Held and Decision:The court concluded: "The background in which the attack was made by the Accused does not show that there was a common object of a murder amongst the accused. Common object to commit a murder cannot be inferred only on the basis that the weapons carried by the accused were dangerous.

The above facts would indicate that no knowledge about the likelihood of an offence of murder being committed can be attributed to the members of the unlawful assembly, barring Lakshmanbhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-10) who has been convicted under Section 302 IPC."

The Appeal was partly allowed and the Accused were convicted under Section 326 read with 149 IPC and sentenced to the period undergone.

Facts:

Bhulabhai Bhikhabhai, owner of landed property, died intestate in 1947, leaving behind his widow Harkhiben, two sons, Narsinbhai and Balubhai, and two daughters, Gangaben and Maliben.

Balubhai filed a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, claiming ownership of the land.

Competent Authority declared a portion of the land as surplus, which was accepted by Balubhai.

After the deaths of Balubhai and his siblings, Maliben and the children of Gangaben filed a suit for partition of the property and challenged the legality of the proceedings related to the surplus land.

The plaintiffs filed an appeal before the Urban Land Tribunal eight years after the original decision, which was entertained and allowed.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a share in the property of Bhulabhai Bhikhabhai under Hindu Law.

Whether the plaintiffs could maintain an appeal before the Tribunal after a lapse of about eight years.

Whether the plaintiffs, by not filing a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act, could claim any right in the property.

Held:

The Court held that Neither Harkhiben nor her daughters had any claim in the property under Hindu Law.

The Tribunal erred in entertaining the appeal after the original order had merged with the Tribunal's decision, which attained finality.

The plaintiffs could not claim any right in the property by not filing a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court.