Facts:

Jeeja Ghosh, a person with disabilities, filed a Public Interest Litigation alleging that she was de-boarded from a private airline due to her disability. The petitioner asserted that this action resulted in agony, humiliation, and emotional trauma.

Issues:

The alleged violation of the petitioner's fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21, the obligations of the State and private entities under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, and the relevant international legal instruments.

Held:

The judgment highlighted the government's obligation under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, to ensure that individuals with disabilities are free from discrimination. It recognized the applicability of international legal instruments, such as the UNCRPD, even to private carriers. The court affirmed that the obligation to fulfill the rights of the disabled extends to both government and private entities.

The court discussed the issuance and revision of Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) in 2008 and 2014, indicating the government's recognition of the challenges faced by persons with disabilities during air travel. Certain recommendations for improvement were acknowledged, and the need for further amendments to fine-tune guidelines was suggested.

The judgment underscored that the rights guaranteed to differently-abled persons under the Act are founded on the core value of human dignity. Human dignity, as a constitutional value, is intertwined with the right to life and liberty under Article 21.

International standards on human rights and the principle of non-discrimination were emphasized. The court highlighted the shift from a patronizing approach to persons with disabilities to recognizing them as equal members of the community with full human rights and freedoms.

The court found that the petitioner was not given appropriate, fair, and caring treatment, leading to a violation of her human dignity. The decision to de-board her lacked sensitivity and proper justification, violating Aircraft Rules, 1937, and CAR, 2008 guidelines.

Due to the callous actions of the private airline, a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs was awarded as damages to the petitioner for the mental and physical suffering experienced, as well as unreasonable discrimination.

Facts:

The Madhya Pradesh Professional Examination Board (Vyapam) was brought into existence for conducting examinations for admission to medical colleges, engineering and agricultural universities, and polytechnics.

The Board is a non-statutory body, having no separate existence apart from the government.

The appellants appeared for the entrance examination (PMT) conducted by Vyapam and secured admissions into various medical colleges based on the marks obtained.

Issues:

• Whether Vyapam, being a non-statutory body, had the authority to cancel the examination and admissions.

• Whether the examination process was tampered with, justifying the cancellation.

• Whether the appellants, even if involved in tampering, could be subjected to punishment under criminal law.

Held:

Per Chelameswar, J:

The notification constituting Vyapam as a non-statutory body had not been issued, but its existence was upheld by previous judgments.

The executive power of the State extends to protecting public interest, and if unfair means contaminated the entrance examination process, the State had the authority to take appropriate action.

The case falls within exceptions to the rule of audi alteram partem if reliable material establishes tampering with the examination process.

The cancellation of admissions is upheld, but considering the technical training invested in the appellants, they are allowed to complete their medical studies. The appellants must serve the nation for five years without regular salary or benefits.

Per Sapre, J (Partly Dissenting):

The case involves "mass copying," and the procedure adopted by Vyapam is not unfair or arbitrary.

No breach of rules of natural justice is found, and the decision to cancel results was not taken hastily.

The appellants are not entitled to equitable relief solely based on completion of their course during the interim period.

Suggests that the State may consider permitting appellants and other candidates to appear in future competitive examinations.

Decision: Due to a difference of opinion, the matter is referred to the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

Facts:

The Madhya Pradesh Professional Examination Board (Vyapam) was brought into existence for conducting examinations for admission to medical colleges, engineering and agricultural universities, and polytechnics.

The Board is a non-statutory body, having no separate existence apart from the government.

The appellants appeared for the entrance examination (PMT) conducted by Vyapam and secured admissions into various medical colleges based on the marks obtained.

Issues:

Whether Vyapam, being a non-statutory body, had the authority to cancel the examination and admissions.

Whether the examination process was tampered with, justifying the cancellation.

Whether the appellants, even if involved in tampering, could be subjected to punishment under criminal law.

Held:

Per Chelameswar, J:

The notification constituting Vyapam as a non-statutory body had not been issued, but its existence was upheld by previous judgments.

The executive power of the State extends to protecting public interest, and if unfair means contaminated the entrance examination process, the State had the authority to take appropriate action.

The case falls within exceptions to the rule of audi alteram partem if reliable material establishes tampering with the examination process.

The cancellation of admissions is upheld, but considering the technical training invested in the appellants, they are allowed to complete their medical studies. The appellants must serve the nation for five years without regular salary or benefits.

Per Sapre, J (Partly Dissenting):

The case involves "mass copying," and the procedure adopted by Vyapam is not unfair or arbitrary.

No breach of rules of natural justice is found, and the decision to cancel results was not taken hastily.

The appellants are not entitled to equitable relief solely based on completion of their course during the interim period.

Suggests that the State may consider permitting appellants and other candidates to appear in future competitive examinations.

Decision: Due to a difference of opinion, the matter is referred to the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

Facts:

The case involves a juvenile accused, Parag Bhat, represented by his legal guardian, Smt. Rajni Bhat. The discrepancy in the date of birth is identified in various school certificates, leading to doubts about the accused's claim of juvenility.

Issues:

Determination of the accused's age based on conflicting dates of birth in different certificates.

Validity of the ossification test conducted by the Medical Board.

Applicability of Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Rules, 2007, in cases of doubt regarding the date of birth.

Held:

Under Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act, the court is mandated to inquire and take necessary evidence to determine the age of the person claiming juvenility. Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Rules, 2007, guides the Board in obtaining relevant certificates and seeking medical opinion in cases of doubt.

The date of birth discrepancy is highlighted in various school records. The Board concluded that the date of birth mentioned in the matriculation certificate raises doubts, leading to the ossification test. The transfer certificate from Junior High School, found to be forged, further raises questions about the accuracy of the recorded date of birth.

Due to the discrepancies, the Medical Board conducted an examination, assessing the age of the accused to be about 19 years. The Board did not grant the benefit of one year under Rule 12, considering the evidence from the complainant's side.

The appellant's claim of studying in a different school was not raised before the Board, and such new claims cannot be entertained at this stage.

Emphasizes that a casual or cavalier approach is unacceptable when determining juvenility, especially in cases involving grave offenses. The court must protect public confidence in the justice system.

The principle of benevolent legislation applies only when there is at least prima facie evidence regarding the accused's minority, and it cannot be used to shield serious offenses.

If matriculation certificates are available and there is no contradictory evidence, the date of birth mentioned in the matriculation certificate is conclusive. An inquiry for age determination is permissible when there is doubt.

Conclusion: The court dismisses the appeal, stating that there is no illegality in the orders passed by the Board and the Courts below.

Facts:

Accused No. 2 (Rambraksh @ Jalim) and Accused No. 1 (Bechan Ram) were tried for murder and disappearance of evidence.

The trial court acquitted Accused No. 1 and convicted Accused No. 2 based on circumstantial evidence, especially the last seen theory.

The prosecution relied on the testimony of PW3 Dasmatiya Bai, the wife of the deceased, who claimed that the appellant took her husband to Ambikapur, and later, bones and articles belonging to the deceased were found in a field.

The appellant challenged the conviction, highlighting the time gap between the last seen theory and the discovery of the bones, lack of corroborative evidence, and an unexplained delay in lodging the complaint.

Issues:

Reliability of the last seen theory.

Adequacy of circumstantial evidence.

Validity of the inordinate delay in lodging the complaint.

Held:

Reliability of the Last Seen Theory: The court emphasized that a conviction cannot be based solely on the last seen theory. It noted the significance of completing the chain of circumstances and highlighted that the last seen theory is valid only when the time gap is small enough to exclude the possibility of another perpetrator. Referring to precedent cases, the court asserted that the prosecution failed to establish guilt based on the last seen theory alone.

Adequacy of Circumstantial Evidence: The court noted the absence of corroborative evidence and the failure of the prosecution to establish the death of the deceased conclusively. The medical evidence did not provide sufficient support for the prosecution's case.

Validity of the Inordinate Delay: The court criticized the unexplained delay of 7 days in lodging the complaint and registering the case. It considered the delay as a significant factor impacting the credibility of the prosecution's case.

Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant was set aside. The court ordered the release of the appellant, Rambraksh @ Jalim, unless required in any other case.

Facts:

The appellant, Sujatha Ravi Kiran @ Sujata Sahu, had filed Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 351 of 2013 seeking the transfer of cases filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. from the High Court of Kerala to the High Court of Delhi. The case arose from allegations of physical and mental cruelty, sexual abuse, and wife-swapping against the appellant's husband and others.

Issues:

The transfer of cases and the petitioner's request for a CBI investigation due to alleged lackadaisical approach by the state police. The petitioner expressed difficulties in traveling to Kerala and raised concerns about threats to her life.

Held:

The Court dismissed the transfer petitions (Criminal) Nos. 351 of 2013 and 384 of 2013. It declined a CBI investigation but directed the State of Kerala to constitute a special team of police officers for further inquiry into the case. The Court emphasized the rarity and caution in exercising the power to direct a CBI investigation and stated that such power must be sparingly used, especially in exceptional situations where credibility and confidence in investigations are at stake.

The Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 164 of 2013 was disposed of with a direction to the Director General of Police, Kerala, to constitute a special investigation team. The team was to be headed by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Inspector General of Police, with the task of completing the investigation within three months.( Para No. [12])

The Transfer Petitions (Criminal) Nos. 351 of 2013 and 384 of 2013 were dismissed, with the order not preventing the petitioner from seeking a transfer of the divorce petition filed by the husband.( Para No. [13])

Facts:

The impugned regulation, Telecom Consumers Protection (Ninth Amendment) Regulations, 2015, mandated cellular mobile telephone service providers to credit consumers for call drops.

The Cellular Operators Association of India challenged the validity of the amendment, asserting it violated the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997.

Issues:

Whether the amendment is consistent with the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997.

Whether the amendment infringes fundamental rights under Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Whether the amendment is manifestly arbitrary and violates the regulatory process.

Held:

The power to make the Impugned Regulation is traced to Section 36(1) of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997. The Regulation-making power is non-delegable and must be consistent with the Act. The Impugned Regulation is not referable to Section 11(1)(b)(i) and (v) as it does not ensure compliance with license terms or lay down quality of service standards.

The Impugned Regulation does not carry out the purposes of the Act and is ultra vires. The Authority's functions, as laid down in Section 11, are not aligned with the source of power mentioned in the Impugned Regulation.

The Impugned Regulation does not carry out the purpose of the Act and is ultra vires. It violates the balance sought by the Act for orderly growth in the telecom sector.

Subordinate legislation must not be manifestly arbitrary, and it can be challenged on grounds applicable to plenary legislation.

The State, under Article 19(6), must conform to the tests of reasonable restriction and public interest. The Impugned Regulation, though brought in the interest of the public, is manifestly arbitrary and violates Article 14 and 19(1)(g).

The Impugned Regulation, besides the general public interest, must pass the separate test of not being manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable. It must be a result of intelligent care and deliberation.

The basis for the Impugned Regulation, assuming service providers are 100% at fault for call drops, is contradicted by technical data, making it manifestly arbitrary.

The doctrine of reading down cannot apply to the definite and unambiguous language of the Impugned Regulation.

The plea that the Regulation may be administered reasonably does not save an otherwise invalid statute.

The Regulation does not accord with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the TRAI Act, 1997. Motive aside, means must be as pure as ends for regulations to pass constitutional muster.

Profits or losses of service providers are irrelevant to determining the arbitrariness or unreasonableness of the Regulation.

The appellants did not approach the Court in haste, and the Regulation would have affected their rights from January 1, 2016.

The claim that the Regulation is an experimental measure is incorrect, as the Explanatory Memorandum only suggests a review after six months if found necessary.

The Quality of Service Regulations and Consumer Regulations must be read together to test their reasonableness.

Penalizing a service provider complying with another Regulation from the same source of power is manifestly arbitrary and violates Articles 14 and 19(1)(g).

Strict penal liability without establishing fault is manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable.

The notion of notional compensation is without basis, and the Regulation lacks intelligent care and deliberation.

The Authority's recognition of fault distribution in a technical paper after the Regulation shows manifest arbitrariness.

The Regulation is manifestly arbitrary, violating Article 14 and being an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g).

The Regulation avoids adjudicatory processes, legislates penalties without proof, and is manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable.

Interference with license conditions without legal authority renders the Regulation invalid.

Facts:

Commissioner of Income Tax-1, Mumbai, passed an order under Section 263.

The order was challenged by the Revenue in the High Court.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

The case involved issues related to the assessment order for the year 2001-2002.

Issues:

Whether the Commissioner's revisional power was rightly exercised under Section 263.

Whether the withdrawal of the claim for additional expenses justified further inquiry.

Whether the High Court's decision to dismiss the appeal was justified.

Held:

The court held that the Commissioner was justified in his conclusions, and the Tribunal and High Court should not have interfered.

Withdrawal of the claim did not preclude further inquiry, and the Assessing Officer should have examined the matter regarding the actual incurring of additional expenses and their sources.

The court allowed the Revenue's appeal, setting aside the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court, and restored the Commissioner's order. The appeals are disposed of.

Facts:

In 2002, Chandigarh Administration notified the rules for the Allotment of Small Campus Site in Chandigarh Information Services Park. Rule 9 of these rules prohibited the transfer of the campus site by the allottee for a period of 10 years from the date of allotment. The respondent, M/S. ESYS Information Technologies Pvt. Ltd., was allotted a 6-acre land in 2006 with similar conditions. The estate officer canceled the allotment in 2008, alleging a violation of Rule 9 and Clause 15 of the allotment letter, as the respondent had transferred a significant portion of shares to another company in Dubai without permission.

Issues:

The violation of Rule 9 and Clause 15, the subsequent cancellation of the allotment, and the legality of the resumption of the allotted land.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision setting aside the orders of resumption was not sustainable. The respondent was found guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi for violating the court's order regarding disclosure. The Court concluded that there was a clear violation of Rule 9 and Clause 15, justifying the resumption of the allotted land by the appellant (Estate Officer). The appeal was allowed, and each party was directed to bear its own costs.