Facts:

The land of the respondents was acquired by the appellants under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966.

Proceedings were initiated under sections 28, 29, and 30 of the 1966 Act, but no award was passed under section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The respondents challenged the acquisition through a writ petition, arguing that since no award was passed under the 1894 Act, the proceedings had lapsed.

The Single Judge of the High Court rejected the respondents' plea and allowed the appellants to proceed with fixing the market value.

The respondents appealed this decision to a Division Bench of the High Court.

Meanwhile, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 came into force, repealing the 1894 Act.

The respondents argued before the Division Bench that, under section 24 of the 2013 Act, the acquisition had lapsed due to the absence of an award under section 11-A of the 1894 Act.

Issues:

Whether the absence of an award under section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, renders the acquisition proceedings lapsed.

Whether the Right to Fair Compensation Act, 2013, affects the ongoing acquisition proceedings initiated under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966.

Held:

The High Court misunderstood the effect of the non-applicability of section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The Court clarified that once proceedings are initiated under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966, section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, would not be applicable.

On the parity of reasoning, the provision of section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation Act, 2013, is also not applicable.

Decision: The judgment of the Division Bench is set aside, and the direction passed by the Single Judge directing the appellant authorities to fix compensation in accordance with the provisions of section 29 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966, is restored. We, thus, allow this appeal.

Facts:

The appellant filed an election petition challenging the outcome of an election.

Several issues, including those related to the cause of action, were raised in the petition.

The High Court dismissed the petition based on preliminary issues, finding that it lacked material facts required under Section 83(1)(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Issues:

Whether the election petition disclosed a cause of action.

The scope of enquiry under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

The relevance of considering the pleadings of the plaintiff versus those of the defendant.

Held:

The court emphasized that the enquiry under Order VII Rule 11(a) should focus solely on the pleadings of the plaintiff.

The court clarified that consideration of rebuttals made by the defendant or other materials produced by the defendant is not permissible at this stage.

The scope of enquiry under Order XIV Rule 2(2) is limited to issues of jurisdiction and bars to entertaining the suit.

The High Court erred by considering explanations offered by the respondents in determining whether the election petition disclosed a cause of action.

The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the election petition was remitted to the High Court for trial on merits.

The court refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the case.

Facts:

The case pertains to the challenge against the increase in the number of attempts for physically handicapped candidates of the General Category in civil services examinations, while not extending the same increase to physically handicapped candidates of the Other Backward Classes (OBC) category.

Issues:

Whether the differential treatment in the number of attempts for physically handicapped candidates of the General Category and OBC Category violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

Whether the government's policy regarding horizontal reservation and relaxation for physically handicapped candidates is subject to judicial review.

Held:

The court elucidates that Article 16 of the Constitution provides for both vertical or social reservation and horizontal reservation, with the latter including reservations for physically handicapped individuals.

Reservation for physically handicapped candidates is considered a form of horizontal reservation, aimed at providing equal opportunities for individuals with disabilities across all categories.

The judgment clarifies that physically handicapped candidates of both the General and OBC categories are granted equal opportunities, with both groups allowed 7 attempts in civil services examinations, ensuring parity and no discrimination.

The court emphasizes that the relaxation and concessions provided to physically handicapped candidates, regardless of their category, are aimed at addressing similar disabilities and ensuring equal treatment.

The policy decisions regarding horizontal reservation and relaxation for physically handicapped candidates are considered matters of government policy and are not subject to judicial interference unless found arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

The judgment upholds the increase in attempts for physically handicapped candidates of the General Category, as consistent with government policy, and dismisses the challenge against it.

Decision: The court allows the appeals and upholds the increase in the number of attempts for physically handicapped candidates of the General Category in civil services examinations, while rejecting the challenge against the policy.

Facts:

The suit involves a property dispute where the appellants purchased property based on a Power of Attorney from Annasamy Pandian.

Disputes arose over the validity of the Power of Attorney and the transfer of property.

During the trial, discrepancies in survey numbers of the property and the execution of an Inam Settlement Deed in favor of the respondent's son were discovered by the appellants.

The appellants sought to withdraw the suit under Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC.

Issues:

Whether the discrepancies in survey numbers and execution of the Inam Settlement Deed constitute a formal defect justifying the withdrawal of the suit.

Whether the withdrawal of the suit under Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC was appropriate in the given circumstances.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the discrepancies in survey numbers and execution of the Inam Settlement Deed indeed constitute a formal defect justifying the withdrawal of the suit under Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC.

The trial court's decision to allow the withdrawal of the suit was appropriate and within its discretion.

The High Court erred in overturning the trial court's decision, and its interference was unjustified.

The costs imposed on the appellants were increased from Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 10,000.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's decision and reinstating the trial court's order to withdraw the suit.

Facts:

The court had found it inappropriate for Mr. Ranjit Sinha, the then Director of the CBI, to have met with persons accused in coal block allocation cases without the investigating officer being present. A committee, led by Mr. M.L. Sharma, submitted a report on these allegations.

Issues:

The court had to determine whether to appoint an outside body of investigators to look into the matter or to entrust the CBI with investigating the abuse of authority allegedly committed by Mr. Ranjit Sinha.

Held:

The court decided not to appoint an outside body of investigators but instead directed the CBI to constitute a Special Investigating Team (SIT) to investigate the allegations against Mr. Ranjit Sinha.

The SIT would be led by the Director of CBI and assisted by two nominated officers and Mr. R.S. Cheema, a Special Public Prosecutor. The Director of CBI was instructed to inform the court about the composition of the investigation team and the time required to complete the investigations.

The court emphasized the significance of the matter and urged the Director of CBI to handle it with seriousness.

Facts:

The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the validity of his admission to the MBBS course at CM Medical College & Hospital (the College), based on an examination conducted by the College.

The admission process involved an examination called CGMAT-2016, supervised and monitored by the State of Chhattisgarh.

Changes in regulations regarding admissions to MBBS courses, particularly concerning the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET), were a point of contention.

Despite regulatory changes, the College proceeded with admissions based on its own examination rather than NEET.

Issues:

Whether the admission granted by the College to the petitioner was valid.

Whether the College and the State of Chhattisgarh adhered to the regulations established by the Medical Council of India and endorsed by the Court.

Held:

The Court held that the admission granted to the petitioner by the College was unjustified and therefore set it aside. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the rule of law, even if it meant adverse consequences for the petitioner and similarly situated students.

The Court stated that the College and the State of Chhattisgarh did not adhere to the regulations established by the Medical Council of India, resulting in the petitioner becoming a victim of circumstances. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed. However, the petitioner was given the liberty to proceed against the College and the State of Chhattisgarh in an appropriate manner.

Facts:

Appellants and private respondents appointed as SFOs in 1993 through direct recruitment.

Dispute arose over inter se seniority due to government's classification based on test clearance timing.

Private respondents successfully completed probation and cleared two tests; exempted from the third test by government order.

Government issued a memorandum for determining seniority, creating two classes among SFOs.

Appellants objected to the classification, leading to legal proceedings in the Tribunal, High Court, and eventually the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the government's classification for determining seniority among SFOs was justified.

Whether the classification was in conformity with relevant Rules.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the government's classification lacked justification and contravened relevant Rules. The Court emphasized that the respondents had fulfilled all requirements for seniority, including probation completion and test clearance.

The creation of two classes for determining seniority was deemed irrational and unreasonable. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court. This decision aligns with recent precedent, providing no grounds for interference.

FACTS:

Accused appellant convicted for offences under IPC Sections 302 read with Section 34 and Section 411.

Prosecution based on circumstantial evidence including presence of accused at crime scene, recovery of stolen goods, and witness testimonies.

Witness accounts inconsistent; recovery of stolen property insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUES:

Whether circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Admissibility and credibility of witness testimonies.

Application of presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.

HELD:

The Supreme Court examined the evidence and found it insufficient to conclusively prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The recovery of stolen property, while suspicious, did not establish a direct link to the commission of the crime.

The witness testimonies were inconsistent and lacked credibility. Referring to the principle laid down in Sanwat Khan vs. State of Rajasthan, the Court emphasized that recovery of stolen property alone cannot establish guilt unless it is shown that the theft/robbery and the murder occurred in the same transaction.

The Court concluded that there was a significant gap in time between when the accused were last seen and the time of the incident, leaving room for the possibility that someone else could have committed the crime. Therefore, the appellant was acquitted of the murder charge under Section 302 IPC but the conviction for robbery under Section 392 IPC was upheld.

As the appellant had already served the sentence for the robbery offence, the Court ordered his immediate release.

Facts:

The appellant, S. Krishna Sradha, was denied admission to the MBBS course despite being more meritorious than the selected candidates. The High Court relied on the decision in Jasmine Kaur's case, denying admission benefits to the appellant due to the expiry of the cut-off date, but acknowledging lapses on the part of various authorities. The appellant approached the Court under Article 226 without delay, following the prescribed procedures for admission.

Issues:

Whether the previous decision in Jasmine Kaur's case restricting admission relief requires reconsideration by a larger bench.

Whether compensation alone is an adequate remedy for wrongful deprivation of admission, especially concerning the academic career of a student.

Held:

The decision in Jasmine Kaur's case, restricting admission relief based on the expiry of the time schedule, necessitates reconsideration by a larger bench, as it may not adequately address the grievances of meritorious students.

The Court emphasizes the importance of merit-based admissions and asserts that fundamental rights should not be denied to students due to institutional or administrative faults. The denial of admission based solely on the lapse of time may not serve the cause of justice.

Granting compensation may be an additional relief; however, it should not be the sole or adequate remedy for wrongful deprivation of admission, considering its impact on the academic career of the student. Restitution should be pursued where possible to restore the aggrieved party to their pre-wrongdoing condition.