Facts:

The dispute arose from a Contract of Affreightment dated 18.1.2008 between Eitzen Bulk A/S (Appellant) and Ashapura Minechem Limited (Respondent).

The Contract included an Arbitration Clause (Clause No. 28) stating that any dispute under the Contract would be settled through Arbitration in London, governed by English Law.

The Arbitration was held in London, and Ashapura was held liable to pay a specified amount along with compound interest.

Ashapura filed a suit in Gujarat challenging the legality of the Contract and the Arbitration Clause but failed to obtain an injunction.

Eitzen initiated proceedings to enforce the Foreign Award in various jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, the USA, Belgium, and the UK.

Ashapura, having failed in the Arbitration proceedings, filed objections in India under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to challenge the Award.

Issues:

Whether Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act applies when the juridical seat of Arbitration is outside India, and the Arbitration is governed by a foreign law.

Whether objections under Section 34 can be raised before a Court in India in such cases.

Held:

The Court held that by choosing London as the seat of Arbitration and specifying English Law as the governing law in the Arbitration Clause, the parties intended to exclude the application of Part I of the Arbitration Act to the proceedings. Therefore, objections under Section 34 were not tenable before a Court in India. The jurisdiction to decide such objections lies with the courts of the juridical seat. The Gujarat High Court's decision allowing objections under Section 34 was deemed incorrect. The Bombay High Court's decision enforcing the Foreign Award under Part II of the Arbitration Act was upheld.

Facts:

Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (HSIIDC) invited bids for the Kundli-Manesar-Palwal Expressway.

Consortium of banks, including IDBI Bank and State Bank of India, financed the project, with outstanding dues of approximately Rs. 1419.15 crores.

Due to delays and non-completion of work, the concessionaire was replaced by a new one as directed by the Supreme Court in its order dated 30.01.2015.

Disputes arose regarding the termination payment of RS. 1300.00 crores to the outgoing concessionaire and the obligation to take over the debts due to the lenders by the new concessionaire.

Issues:

Whether HSIIDC failed to adhere to the contractual obligations under the substitution agreement?

Whether the unilateral revocation of termination payment by HSIIDC caused prejudice to the rights of the lender banks?

Held:

All disputes between the lender banks, HSIIDC, and the outgoing concessionaire stand referred to the arbitral tribunal.

Eighty percent of the toll collected for the Manesar-Palwal Expressway is to be deposited in an escrow account, with the remaining 20 percent available for HSIIDC for maintenance.

The amount in the escrow account is to be disbursed by the arbitral tribunal based on its interim arrangements or as deemed appropriate after hearing the parties.

The pendency of arbitration shall not impede the new concessionaire from commencing its work, subject to a committee's measurement of the work done by the outgoing concessionaire.

Decision: The disputes are referred to arbitration. The escrow account mechanism is established for the toll collections. The new concessionaire can commence its work, and the measurement of work is to be determined by a committee.

Facts:

The charge sheet was filed against the respondent and others before the Magistrate under the Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act. Five individuals were taken as approvers after recording their confessional statements. The prosecutor filed an application under Section 306 for the grant of pardon. The Magistrate granted pardon, and the case was committed to a Special Judge. The Special Judge upheld the order of granting pardon. However, the High Court held that the Special Judge was empowered to grant tender of pardon, and the Magistrate's order was not lawful.

Issues:

The interpretation of the Magistrate's power under Section 306 in cases where the charge sheet is filed before the Magistrate, and whether this power extends to offenses triable by the Court of Session or a Special Judge.

Held:

Sub-section (1) of Section 306 explicitly mentions the Metropolitan Magistrate as a Judicial Officer with the power to grant tender of pardon. The Metropolitan Magistrate is specifically given this power under Section 306. Sub-section (2) clarifies that this section applies even to offenses triable exclusively by the Court of Session or a Special Judge. Sub-section (5) reinforces that even when an offense is triable by a Session Judge, the Magistrate has the power to grant tender of pardon. Section 307 restricts the power to grant tender of pardon to the Court to which the commitment is made, only after the commitment of a case. This supports the position that before commitment, the Magistrate is duly empowered.

A plain reading of Section 306 in conjunction with Section 307 shows that the Magistrate is empowered to grant tender of pardon even in cases triable by the Session Court or a Special Judge.

Section 5(1) of PC Act empowers a Special Judge to take cognizance of an offense without the accused being committed to him for trial, waiving the requirement of Section 193 of the Code. This does not imply that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance at all. The Magistrate has the option to commit the case to the Special Judge, and in such cases, the provisions of Section 306 of the Code would be applicable.

Section 460 of the Code considers tendering a pardon under Section 306 as an 'irregularity,' even if it is presumed that the Magistrate was not empowered. The order passed by the Magistrate is saved by Section 460(g).

The High Court formulated the wrong question by focusing on the competence of the Special Judge to tender pardon. The correct question was whether the Magistrate rightly passed the order of tender of pardon. The High Court's judgment does not stand legal scrutiny and is set aside.

Facts:

The case involves a writ petition (Crl.) No. 184 of 2014, where the constitutional validity of criminal defamation under Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) is challenged. The petitioner, Subramanian Swamy, raises concerns regarding the compatibility of criminal defamation with the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether criminal defamation, as outlined in Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC, is constitutionally valid.

The interpretation of the term 'defamation' in Article 19(2) of the Constitution.

The balancing of the right to freedom of speech and expression against the right to reputation.

Held:

The court rejects the argument that criminal defamation is obnoxious to freedom of speech and expression. It asserts that the existence of criminal defamation is constitutionally valid. The Preamble of the Constitution balances different rights, and the legislature has intentionally retained Sections 499 and 500 as a criminal offense.

The term 'defamation' in Article 19(2) is to be construed independently and not narrowly. The court emphasizes the protection of individual reputation as a fundamental and human right. The concept of crime is linked to social order, and defamation laws serve the societal interest.

The court discusses the concept of crime in relation to social order, emphasizing that the protection of individual rights is essential for social stability. Harm caused to an individual affects the society as a whole, justifying the existence of defamation laws.

The right to freedom of expression is distinct in the case of fictional characters compared to defamation concerning real individuals. Freedom of speech is a cherished value but subject to reasonable restrictions. The court underscores that defamation laws are not an absolute restriction on free speech.

The court examines the reasonableness of restrictions imposed by defamation laws. It discusses the "impact doctrine" and the principle of proportionality, emphasizing that limitations should not be arbitrary or excessive.

The right to reputation is recognized as a constituent of Article 21 of the Constitution. Balancing fundamental rights is imperative, and reputation should not be sacrificed for the sake of another's freedom of speech.

The permissibility of criminal defamation is tested based on the touchstone of constitutional fraternity and fundamental duty. The court highlights the duty of every citizen to promote harmony and common brotherhood, emphasizing that the concept of fraternity does not eliminate dissent or criticism.

Fraternity expects citizens to respect the dignity of others. The court clarifies that dissent and different voices are acceptable, but they should not jeopardize constitutional values. Fundamental duties under Article 51-A gain significance in promoting harmony and common brotherhood.

Individual interests serve collective interests, and constitutional values help structure both. The court reaffirms the constitutional duty to promote fraternity and highlights the interconnectedness of individual and community interests.

The court examines the role of public servants in filing complaints of defamation through public prosecutors. Public servants are considered a different class when it comes to defamation related to their discharge of duties.

The engagement of public prosecutors for public servants is justified, given the protection granted for their official acts. The court dismisses criticism that this provision allows authorities to misuse public prosecutors for personal vendettas.

Section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) envisages the filing of a complaint in court for criminal defamation. The magistrate plays a crucial role in scrutinizing complaints before issuing processes.

The court emphasizes the need for the magistrate to carefully examine complaints, especially in cases of criminal defamation. The burden is on the complainant to prove exceptions like good faith.

Facts:

The petitioner, Swaraj Abhiyan, challenges the low relief or subsidy provided by the government for crop loss, particularly during droughts. The petition also addresses issues related to the establishment of Fodder Banks and the restructuring of crop loans.

Issues:

Adequacy of the 'Crop Input Advance' or 'Agricultural Input Subsidy.'

Extension of Fodder Banks to all drought-affected areas.

Restructuring of crop loans for drought-affected farmers.

Held:

The court summarizes the position in law, stating that executive policies are subject to judicial review if unconstitutional, de'hors the provisions of the Act, beyond the power of delegation, or contrary to statutory or larger policy.( Paragraph 22)

The court suggests the establishment of watch-dog committees or ombudsmen by the Union of India and the States for effective implementation and monitoring of policies.( Paragraph 26)

The court affirms the principle of continuing mandamus as an integral part of constitutional jurisprudence. It keeps the possibility of continuing mandamus open to ensure compliance with directions.( Paragraph 32)

Facts:

The case pertains to Swaraj Abhiyan, the appellant, challenging issues related to the implementation of a government Scheme aimed at providing guaranteed wage employment in rural areas. The Scheme faces challenges concerning funding and, more prominently, the delayed release of payments for wages and materials.

Issues:

Lack of informal capping of funds for the Scheme.

Government's reluctance to release funds promptly.

Delayed release of payments, both for wages and materials, under the Scheme.

Dispute regarding the effectiveness of the National Electronic Fund Transfer System (Ne-FMS system) for wage payments.

Held:

The court acknowledged the absence of informal capping of funds for the Scheme but noted the government's reluctance to release funds promptly.

Highlighting the primary issue of delayed payments, the court discussed the introduction of the Ne-FMS system in various states for prompt wage payments. However, the petitioner contested the system's efficiency, citing significant delays in Kerala.

Addressing concerns raised by the petitioner, the court examined the working of the Ne-FMS system and evaluated its effectiveness in ensuring timely payments.

The court weighed the arguments presented by both parties, considering the delays in wage payments and the potential impact on the beneficiaries of the Scheme.

After careful consideration, the court arrived at a decision regarding the efficacy of the Ne-FMS system and its impact on addressing the issue of delayed payments.

Facts:

The judgment pertains to a Writ Petition (C) No. 857 of 2015 filed by Swaraj Abhiyan, addressing the implementation of the National Food Security Act, 2013, in light of drought-like conditions in various parts of the country.

Issues:

Ensuring food security to persons affected by drought.

Specific suggestions made by the petitioner, including the provision of food grains, dal (lentil), edible oil, and nutritional items for children under the Mid-Day Meal Scheme.

State's response regarding the challenges in implementing certain suggestions due to fiscal constraints and the decentralized nature of the National Food Security Act.

Held:

The court issued several directions, including:

Establishment of an internal grievance mechanism and appointment of District Grievance Redressal Officers.

Constitution of State Food Commissions for monitoring the implementation of the National Food Security Act.

Provision of monthly entitlement of food grains to all households in drought-affected areas, irrespective of their priority category.

Substitution of the requirement for a ration card with an appropriate identification or proof of residence.

States were given the freedom to provide additional food items beyond the statutory entitlement.

States of Bihar, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh were directed to provide eggs or milk for children under the Mid-Day Meal Scheme, preferably five days a week.

Extension of the Mid-Day Meal Scheme into the summer vacation period for schools in drought-affected areas.

Facts:

The State acquired land from original owners (farmers) for a public purpose. Subsequently, a private builder entered into agreements with some farmers whose land was under acquisition.

Issues:

The legality of the State's actions in facilitating the transfer of land title to a private builder and the subsequent release of land in favor of the builder.

Held:

The court found that the State's actions constituted a gross abuse of law, creating an unholy nexus between concerned authorities and the builder to facilitate profiteering.[Para 13]

While acquisition for public purposes is permissible, releasing land in favor of a builder after the acquisition notification amounted to acquisition for private purposes, violating constitutional rights.[Para 14]

The court emphasized the need for objectivity and transparency in the exercise of public power. The State's actions enabled the builder to enter the field after the initiation of acquisition, violating the Public Trust Doctrine.[Para 15]

The court rejected reliance on a policy dated March 6, 2000, stating that it is applicable only to release land owned/purchased by developers before the acquisition notification. The builder, in this case, did not own any land before the notification.[Para 17]

While acknowledging that belated petitions may not be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution, the court highlighted that quashing illegal actions based on fraud or abuse of law, even belatedly, is within its discretionary power.[Para 18]

The court held that the release of land in favor of the builder was an abuse of power, and the State and the builder's actions resulted in the illegal transfer of land. Undoing such illegal actions is in the interest of justice.[Para 22]

The High Court's observation that the notified public purpose was valid, but subsequent events resulted in illegality, was upheld. The release of land in favor of the builder was deemed inappropriate.[Para 23]

Release orders in favor of the builder were quashed, and the court modified the direction of quashing the entire acquisition, suggesting that the acquisition stands revived if it was mala fide or arbitrary.[Para 25]

The court recognized the scarcity of land as a natural resource and emphasized the owner's guarantee against deprivation, except under a valid law for compelling societal needs.[Para 26]

Notifications and awards were upheld, with the land vesting in HUDA free from encumbrances. All release orders in favor of the builder were quashed, and compensation issues were addressed.[Para 29]

Referred Cases in the Above Judgment:

Decided on : 13-05-2016

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 4, Section 48, Section 6

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Sections 4 and 6 — Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 — Acquisition of land — Public purpose — Transfer of title of land, covered by notification for acquisition in favour of a builder who sought release of land for setting up of a colony, was clearly to defeat law and notified purpose of acquisition — State has enabled builder to enter field after initiation of acquisition to seek colonization on land covered by acquisition — Such fraudulent and clandestine exercise of power by State is not permitted by law — This is in violation of Public Trust Doctrine — There is no legal sanction for such action — However, entirety of acquisition need not be quashed — Operative part of order passed by High Court modified.

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Sections 4, 6 and 48 — Acquisition of land — Applicability of Public Trust Doctrine — Policy is applicable only to release of such land from acquisition as is owned/ purchased by developers before issue of notification under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — This condition was required to be strictly complied with and no person other than original owners prior to acquisition could directly or indirectly avail of said policy — Even a bona fide error could not justify a patent illegality.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

S.L. Aneja, Dr. Kailash Chand, M.L. Sharma, Dinesh Verma, Subhasish Bhowmick, Gaurav Sharma, Rohit Kumar Singh, Ajay Pal, Sanjeev K Bhardwaj, Sunil Roy, D.N. Goburdhan, Advocates, for the Respondent

Cases Referred

Bangalore City Cooperative Vs. The State of Karnataka, (2012) 3 SCC 727

Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly, 1986 3 SCC, 156

Centre for Public Interest Litigation Vs. UOI, (2012) 3 SCC 1

Chairman Indore Vikas Pradhikaran Vs. Pure Industrial Coke, (2007) 8 SCC 705

Devinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 1 SCC 728

Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. Vs. UOI, (1986) 1 SCC 133

Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. Devendra Kumar, (2011) 12 SCC 375

Gyan Chand Vs. Gopala, (1995) 5 SCC 335

Mahavir Vs. Rural Institute, Amravati, (1996) 3 SCC 124

Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary, (2014) 9 SCC 516

Meera Sahni Vs. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, (2014) 15 SCC 394

Nazir Ahmad Vs. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC, 253

NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. Vs. NOIDA, (2011) 6 SCC 508

Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. Vs. Reliance Industries Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 1

Royal Orchid Hotels Vs. G. Jayarama Reddy, (2011) 10 SCC 608

State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Singh, AIR (1952) SC 252

State of Punjab Vs. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 417

State of Punjab Vs. Ramjilal, (1970) 3 SCC 602

The U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow Thr. its Chairman Vs. M/s. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow, (2008) 9 SCC 177

Facts:

M/s GTC Industries Ltd. became a sick company in 1997 due to erosion of net worth.

The Board conducted an inquiry to determine its status and appointed the Managing Director, State Bank of India, as the Operating Agency.

A Draft Rehabilitation Scheme (DRS) was prepared, proposing various income tax reliefs.

The appellant filed objections against the DRS.

The sanctioned Rehabilitation Scheme (SS-02) was approved by the Board, incorporating certain income tax reliefs.

The Scheme had a cutoff date of 31.12.1998, later changed to 31.03.2003, and a rehabilitation period of eight years.

In 2007, the company claimed its net worth turned positive and sought de-registration from SICA, which was granted.

The Revenue demanded outstanding income tax dues in 2010, leading to legal proceedings.

Issues:

Validity of the income tax reliefs granted under the DRS and SS-02.

Enforcement of the income tax dues by the Revenue post-Scheme expiration.

Company's compliance with the sanctioned Scheme and the alleged violation.

Entitlement to protection under Section 22(1) of SICA after de-registration.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the sanctioned Scheme had expired on 31.03.2011, and the company was no longer entitled to protection under SICA.

The Revenue was entitled to recover its dues, and the Board had no jurisdiction over the lapsed Scheme.

The Company's violation of the sanctioned Scheme, particularly in disposing of assets without prior approval, was noted. The appeal by the Company seeking an extension of the Scheme was dismissed.

The Court directed the Revenue to recover its dues, and the Board was not authorized to entertain any further proceedings related to the lapsed Scheme.

DECISION: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, affirming the Revenue's right to recover income tax dues after the expiration of the sanctioned Rehabilitation Scheme. The Company's violation of the Scheme was noted, and the Board was restrained from entertaining further proceedings related to the lapsed Scheme.