Facts:

The appellant, Balbhadra Parashar, was the Manager of the Primary Agriculture Credit Co-operative Society in Village Pipraua, District Gwalior.

A case was registered against him under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, alleging acquisition of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income.

Sanction for prosecution was granted, and charges were framed against the appellant.

The appellant challenged the legal propriety of the sanction granted for his prosecution under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issues:

Whether the sanction for prosecution was granted in accordance with the law.

Whether there was proper application of mind by the sanctioning authority in granting the sanction.

Held:

The sanctioning authority must apply its mind independently and genuinely assess whether prosecution should be sanctioned, without being influenced by external factors.

The entire records containing materials against the accused should be placed before the sanctioning authority before the order of sanction is passed (para 6).

The High Court concluded that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind and there was prima facie evidence to prosecute the appellant.

The Court found no evidence to suggest that the sanction was granted in a mechanical manner.

Therefore, the sanction granted in the case was not illegal, and the appeal was dismissed as devoid of merit.

Facts:

The detenu in this case was detained under both Section 3 and Section 12A of the COFEPOSA Act. Following the revocation of the declaration under Section 12A, the detenu was released under Section 3. Subsequently, the detenu challenged his detention under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act.

Issues:

The timing and scope of challenging the detention order under Section 3 after the revocation of the declaration under Section 12A of the COFEPOSA Act.

Held:

The substantive challenge to an order of preventive detention under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act is broader compared to the challenge under Section 12A. After the declaration under Section 12A, the challenge is restricted to technical grounds.

The proviso (iv) to Section 2(2)(b) of the SAFEMA Act must provide an effective right to a detenu to challenge the preventive detention order.

In this case, the detenu's detention under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act was continuous, and there was no occasion for him to challenge it under the limited scope of Section 3 after the revocation of the declaration under Section 12A.

Therefore, the appellant had the right to challenge the order of his detention even after the revocation of the declaration under Section 12A.

Additionally, considering that three of the detenu's brothers successfully challenged their detention orders, the appellant should have the same right.

The determination of the High Court in disallowing the detenu to challenge the order of his detention was unjustified. The appellant is directed to press his claim in the High Court on available grounds to challenge the detention order.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's determination. The detenu is directed to pursue his challenge to the detention order in the High Court. The authorities are instructed to proceed with action under Section 6 of the SAFEMA Act only if the detenu fails in his attempt to successfully challenge the detention order.

Facts:

The case pertains to the constitutional validity of specific provisions of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, amended in 2015. These provisions relate to disqualifications for contesting Panchayat elections, including clauses pertaining to indebtedness, educational qualifications, and the absence of functional toilets at the residence of candidates.

Issues:

Whether clauses (t) and (u) of Section 175(1) of the Act, disqualifying individuals with indebtedness or insolvency, are constitutionally valid.

Whether Section 175(1)(v), establishing educational qualifications for candidates contesting Panchayat elections, is constitutionally valid.

Whether Section 175(1)(w), disqualifying individuals without functional toilets at their residence from contesting Panchayat elections, is constitutionally valid.

The nature of the right to vote and the right to contest elections in the context of Panchayats.

The applicability of judicial review and legislative power in assessing the constitutionality of legislation.

Held:

The court upheld the constitutionality of clauses (t) and (u) of Section 175(1) of the Act. It reasoned that indebtedness and insolvency are recognized as factors incompatible with holding elected office under the Constitution and fall within the legislative competence of both Parliament and State Legislatures.

The court affirmed the constitutionality of Section 175(1)(v), which establishes educational qualifications for Panchayat election candidates. It found the classification based on educational qualifications reasonable and connected to the objective of ensuring effective discharge of duties.

The court upheld the constitutionality of Section 175(1)(w), which disqualifies individuals without functional toilets at their residence from contesting Panchayat elections. It deemed the classification reasonable and connected to the promotion of hygiene and sanitation, essential for civic administration.

The court affirmed that the right to vote and the right to contest elections are constitutional rights subject to regulation by appropriate legislative bodies. It clarified that certain further restrictions can be imposed on the right to contest elections.

The court emphasized the limited scope of judicial review in assessing the constitutionality of legislation, highlighting that legislative choices are not subject to scrutiny unless they violate specific constitutional provisions. It underscored the importance of legislative discretion within the constitutional framework.

The writ petition deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

Ramendra, the appellant, was appointed as an Assistant Grade III in the Regional Transport Office, Indore. Allegations surfaced that Ramendra's residential property was acquired through ill-gotten money, constituting criminal misconduct under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Following the enactment of the M.P. Vishesh Nyayalaya Adhiniyam, 2011, Ramendra was brought within its ambit through a declaration under Section 5 of the Act. Subsequently, the prosecution filed an application under Section 13(1) for the confiscation of Ramendra's property under Section 15(3) of the Act.

Issues:

The main issue revolved around the retrospective applicability of the M.P. Vishesh Nyayalaya Adhiniyam, 2011 (Special Courts Act) and its implications on the confiscation of property under the Act.

Held :

In our considered opinion, the view expressed by the High Court is infallible in view of the judgment pronounced by us today in Civil Appeal Nos. 6448-6452 of 2011 titled Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal Etc. v. State of Bihar and Ors. Resultantly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved a constitutional challenge to the Orissa Special Courts Act, 2006, and the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009. The appellants contested the establishment of special courts, provisions for confiscation of property, appeal mechanisms, and certain rules under the Acts.

Issues:

The main issues included the constitutionality of the Acts and their provisions, the validity of the establishment of special courts, the legality of confiscation procedures, and the interpretation of offences under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Held:

The Orissa and Bihar Special Courts Acts, 2006 and 2009, were deemed constitutionally valid and not in violation of Article 199 or Article 247 of the Indian Constitution.

The establishment of Special Courts under both Acts was upheld as constitutional and not violative of Article 247 of the Constitution.

Sections 5 and 6 of the Acts, pertaining to declaration and its effect, were upheld as constitutionally valid.

Provisions in Chapter III of both Acts regarding confiscation of property or money were found not to violate Articles 14, 20(1), or 21 of the Constitution.

The procedures for confiscation and appeal under the Acts were deemed constitutional, not infringing upon Articles 14 or 20(3) of the Constitution.

The proviso to Section 18(1) and Section 19 of the Orissa Special Courts Act were held to be constitutional.

The provisions relating to appeal in both Acts were treated as constitutional, with the power for the High Court to extend the order of stay.

The offences under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, were upheld as valid, justifying the establishment of Special Courts for their trial.

Confiscation under the Acts was considered an interim measure and not a punishment, hence not violating Article 20(1) or Article 21.

The proceedings for confiscation were found to be constitutionally valid, with ample guidance provided in the Acts.

The court ruled that there's no obligation for the State to provide compensation beyond what is prescribed in the legislation, as it would be against the larger public interest.

Part of Rule 12 of the Bihar Special Court Rules, 2010, prescribing summary procedure, was declared ultra vires the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Uttarakhand Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2011, specifically Section 27(c)(iii) and (iv) as amended by the Uttarakhand Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) (Amendment) Act, 2012.

Issues:

Whether the State Legislature of Uttarakhand had the legislative competence to enact Section 27(c)(iii) of the Act.

Whether Section 27(c)(iii) is in accordance with the primary objective of market legislation.

Whether Section 27(c)(iv) is valid and enforceable.

Held:

The preamble of the Uttarakhand Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2011, though not controlling the enacting part, provides clarity regarding the legislative scheme and the true meaning of the enacting provisions. A combined reading of relevant provisions and the preamble clarifies that the Act aims to regulate the buying and selling of agricultural produce within notified market areas.

The primary objective of market legislation is to ensure fair returns to agricultural producers and regulate buyer-seller relationships. Section 27(c)(iii) is found to be against the scheme of the Act as it levies fees on units bringing agricultural produce for manufacturing or processing without any sale or purchase within the market area.

The State Legislature lacked the competence to enact Section 27(c)(iii) as it encroached upon matters governed by Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, which pertains to industry. Therefore, Section 27(c)(iii) is struck down as enacted without legislative competence.

Section 27(c)(iv) is upheld, provided purchasers prove that agricultural produce brought from other states is part of an interstate sale and complies with the Sale of Goods Act, 1930.

Decision: The Court invalidates Section 27(c)(iii) of the Uttarakhand Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2011, as amended, due to lack of legislative competence. However, Section 27(c)(iv) is upheld, subject to compliance conditions mentioned regarding interstate sale. Consequential actions based on Section 27(c)(iii) are quashed.

Facts:

Premium Capital Market & Investments Pvt. Ltd. (PCMIL) changed its name to PCMIL and transferred its membership of the National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. (NSE) to Premium Global Securities Pvt. Ltd. (PGSL), a subsidiary formed for this purpose.

SEBI refused to grant fee continuity benefits to PGSL, arguing that although there was compulsion to comply with regulations, it did not extend to transferring the brokerage business to a subsidiary.

Issues:

Whether there was a compulsion of law to transfer the membership to PGSL?

Held:

The court referred to SEBI Circular dated 30.9.2002, which stated that fee continuity benefits could be granted if the transfer was made to a 100% subsidiary, group company, or holding company due to compulsion of law.

The court agreed with the appellants, stating that any action taken to comply with the prohibition of engaging in both fund-based and trading activities simultaneously would be under compulsion of law.

The court set aside the judgment of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) and directed SEBI to grant fee continuity benefits to the appellants.

In another appeal (C.A. No. 2310 of 2007), the court dismissed the appeal as the second transfer of trading membership was not under compulsion of law.

Facts:

The dispute between the parties (wife - Appellant herein and husband - Respondent No. 2 herein) primarily concerned the custody of their minor daughter, Roshni. The appeal arose from the final judgment and order passed by the High Court of Delhi, which disposed of the habeas corpus petition filed by the Appellant seeking the production and return of her minor daughter.

Issues:

The custody of the minor daughter, Roshni, and the directives to be issued regarding the disposal of the main custody case and interim custody arrangements.

Held:

The court held that Having heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and having interacting with the child, we feel that it would be just and proper to direct the Family Court, which has seized of the main custody case (Guardianship Case No. 115/2014) to dispose of the pending main case, i.e., Guardianship Case No. 115/2014, on merits preferably within six months as an outer limit strictly in accordance with law keeping in view the paramount interest and welfare of the child and all relevant factors necessary for deciding the custody of minor child uninfluenced by any of our observations.

During the pendency of the main custody case, the temporary custody of the child-Roshni will be with the Respondent No. 2 - i.e. husband/father. The Respondent No. 2 will drop the child on every Saturday by 6.00 pm. at the Petitioner's residence and collect the child by 6.00 pm. on the next day (Sunday).

We, therefore, direct the Family Court to hold regular sittings for reconciliation during the pendency of the custody case and if considers necessary for the welfare and interest of the child pass any interim orders till final disposal of the custody case.

Concluded that with these directions, the appeal stands disposed of finally.

Facts:

Sat Parkash, along with his uncle and aunt, was charged with kidnapping, rape, and murder of a minor girl named Sushila.

The deceased Sushila left a suicide note indicating she left her home willingly because of her love for Sat Parkash.

The charges against Sat Parkash included Sections 363, 366, 366-A, 368, 302, and 376 of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether the evidence supported the charges against Sat Parkash.

Whether the suicide note provided a basis for acquittal.

Held:

The court found that there was no evidence to support the charge of kidnapping against Sat Parkash. The deceased Sushila had left her home of her own free will, as indicated by her suicide note. Therefore, the presumption that Sat Parkash had kidnapped her was considered misconceived and untenable.

The charge under Section 366A was not sustainable against Sat Parkash as there was no evidence to suggest he induced Sushila with the intent to force or seduce her into illicit intercourse with another person.

The court found insufficient evidence to establish that Sat Parkash had committed rape against Sushila. Despite her being a minor at the time of the incident, there was no evidence of sexual intercourse.

Based on the above findings, the conviction of Sat Parkash was set aside, and he was acquitted of all charges. Additionally, his bail bonds were discharged as per the motion Bench order.