FACTS:

VTU, a university constituted under the VTU Act, filed returns for the Assessment Years 2004-2005 to 2009-2010 claiming exemption under Section 10(23C)(iiiab).

The Assessing Officer denied the claim, and this decision was upheld by various authorities and the High Court.

ISSUES:

Whether VTU exists solely for educational purposes and not for profit.

Whether VTU is wholly or substantially financed by the government.

HELD:

The court establishes that the surplus generated by VTU, though significant, has been ploughed back for educational purposes. Following established principles, it is held that VTU satisfies the requirement of existing "solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit."( Paragraph 8)

The court examines whether VTU is wholly or substantially financed by the government. It rejects the argument that fees collected under statutory provisions should be considered government financing, emphasizing the need for direct grants or contributions. The court distinguishes between different sections and concludes that fees collected cannot be equated with government financing.( Paragraph 10)

The court determines that even if the value of the land allotted to VTU is taken into account, the total funding by the government would be around 4%-5% of its total receipt. VTU is found neither directly nor substantially financed by the government, rendering it ineligible for the exemption.( Paragraph 14)

REFERRED CASES:

Aditanar Educational Institution Vs. CIT, (1997) 3 SCC 346

American Hotel & Lodging Assn. Educational Institute Vs. CBDT, (2008) 10 SCC 509

CIT Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Assn., (1980) 2 SCC 31

Commissioner of Income-tax, Bangalore Vs. Indian Institute of Management, (2014) 49 Taxmann.com 136 (Karnataka)

Islamic Academy of Education Vs. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697

Mother Diary Fruit & Vegetable Private Limited Vs. Hatim Ali, (2015) 217 DLT 470

Queen's Educational Society Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2015) 8 SCC 47

Facts:

First respondent filed Securitisation Application No. 152 of 2010 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) challenging actions by the secured creditor (appellant).

Interim relief was granted initially but later vacated by DRT.

First respondent moved the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) under Section 18 of SARFAESI Act.

During pendency, Securitisation Application was disposed of by DRT, rendering the appeal infructuous.

First respondent sought to withdraw the appeal and refund the deposit of Rs. 50 lakhs made before DRAT.

High Court allowed withdrawal unconditionally, setting aside the condition tying it to the appeal result.

Appellant (Axis Bank) challenged the High Court order in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the first respondent is entitled to a refund of the deposit made before the DRAT under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act?

Does the bank have a right to set off the deposit against the borrower's dues?

Whether the bank has a lien on the deposit under Section 171 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872?

Held:

The court held that the deposit made under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is not a secured asset or debt, and on disposal of the appeal, the deposit must be returned to the appellant unless there are specific circumstances such as appropriation or attachment. The court rejected the argument that the bank has a lien on the deposit under Section 171 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872, as the deposit is not a bailment with the bank.

The appeal was dismissed without prejudice to the appellant's right to take appropriate steps under Section 13(10) of the SARFAESI Act read with Rule 11 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002.

Facts:

License Agreement between the appellant and respondent dated 22.2.1993.

Termination notice by the respondent on 12.3.2007.

Arbitration proceedings initiated; Partial Final Award (PFA) issued on 23.12.2011.

PFA directed the transfer of certain Indian Patents from respondent to appellant.

Correspondence and discussions between parties regarding the draft deed of transfer.

Final transfer deed executed by the appellant on 4.4.2012 based on the redrafted version forwarded by the respondent.

Respondent raised issues with the draft and final deed, leading to legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the appellant fulfilled its obligation as per the PFA?

Validity of changes in the draft deed executed by the appellant.

Enforceability of the PFA and subsequent orders.

Held:

The Court found that the appellant fulfilled its obligation as per the PFA by executing the transfer deed dated 4.4.2012.

The impugned order, directing the appellant to execute the transfer deed as per the original draft, was set aside.

The Court held that the respondent's failure to act on the final transfer deed was not the fault of the appellant.

The impugned order was deemed to be based on a patent illegality and was, therefore, set aside.

The appeals were allowed.

Facts:

Appellant (Prakash Nagardas Dubal-Shaha) and respondent no. 1 (Sou. Meena Prakash Dubal Shah) were married.

Respondents initiated proceedings under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005, claiming maintenance for the wife and children.

The appellant and his wife had initiated divorce proceedings by mutual consent, which got dismissed due to the appellant's alleged failure to pay agreed alimony.

Issues:

Whether the unsuccessful divorce proceedings adversely affect the maintainability of the application under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Whether the wife is entitled to maintenance under the Act despite the dismissal of the divorce proceedings.

Held:

Having given anxious consideration to the relevant facts and materials and on careful perusal of orders passed by learned Magistrate, Sessions Court, and the High Court, and appreciating those orders in the light of the submissions advanced before us, we have no hesitation in affirming the views of the High Court. The unsuccessful divorce proceedings cannot adversely affect the maintainability of the application filed by the contesting respondents under the Act. Even on merits of other issues, the views taken by the learned Magistrate are cogent and supported by relevant materials. Hence, the High Court rightly interfered with the order of the Sessions Court and confirmed that of the learned Magistrate. We, therefore, find no good reasons to interfere. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal by Ramesh Kumar @ Babla against his conviction under Section 307 IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge, Adhoc, Patiala.

The appellant argued for a lesser offense and punishment.

The incident included a clash between two groups resulting in injuries to both parties.

Issues:

Whether the appellant should be convicted under a lesser offense, such as Section 324 or 326 of the IPC.

The severity of the injuries and the appropriateness of the original conviction under Section 307 IPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined the evidence and injuries, concluding that only two out of seven injuries were caused by a sharp weapon.

The Court held that the appellant should be convicted under Section 324 IPC instead of Section 307 IPC.

Considering the circumstances, including the appellant's age and settlement in life, the Court modified the sentence.

The appellant was released on executing an appropriate bond before the trial court, with directions to appear and receive a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year when called upon.

The appellant was instructed to keep the peace and be of good behavior.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

A contract was in place for the purchase of RLNG at a fixed price.

The Central Government made a policy decision to pool RLNG prices, leading to a unilateral increase in gas prices.

Communication from RLNG sellers to the appellant informed them of the price revision based on the government policy.

Issues:

Validity of the policy decision and its impact on the RLNG contract.

Constitutionality of the policy decision in light of Articles 14, 73, and Schedule VII, List I, Entry 53.

Held:

The power of price fixing, though a legislative function, can be delegated and executed through executive orders. RLNG, being an essential commodity, falls under the ambit of the Essential Commodities Act, and the Executive has the authority to fix prices as necessary .

By virtue of Article 73 and Entry 53 of List I, the Union has the legislative and policy-making authority regarding mineral oil resources and inflammable substances, including RLNG. The policy decision in question was taken after due deliberation and in the interest of the public .

The impugned policy decision aimed to unify RLNG prices on a non-discriminatory basis, treating consumers through long-term contracts as a distinct class. The decision was applied uniformly within this class and was not found to be discriminatory, arbitrary, or illegal .

The Supreme Court, in its jurisdiction under Article 136, does not have the competence to judge the viability of government policy decisions. Judicial review should be exercised cautiously, only intervening if the policy is enacted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or with malafide intent or if it violates constitutional provisions ‘

Decision: The appeals were dismissed as there was no demonstrated reason to interfere with the impugned policy decision .

Facts:

The case involves the withdrawal of a suit where MGG, a German company, entered into a Share Purchase and Cooperation Agreement with the shareholders of an Indian company. The ownership title in MGG's shares is acknowledged until the date of the consent award. Claims by GGL and MHL for title over the shares stem from MGG's prior title and an alleged subsequent transfer pursuant to the consent award.

Issues:

Whether the Ruia family (RUIAS) would be entitled, pursuant to the settlement, to have their names entered into the registers of the BOCL (presumably Bombay Oxygen Corporation Limited) as holders of the shares.

The defendants in SUIT-IV are granted the liberty to raise every available defense in law and fact.

Held:

The existence of title in MGG in the shares is not disputed by GGL or MHL until the date of the consent award. GGL and MHL's claim for title over the shares is contingent on MGG's prior title and the alleged subsequent transfer pursuant to the consent award.

In the absence of any legally established right in any party other than MGG, the entitlement of RUIAS to have their names entered into the registers of the BOCL as holders of the shares is a matter for RUIAS to explore.

The defendants in SUIT-IV are granted the liberty to raise every available defense available in law and fact.

Exemplary costs, quantified at Rs. 25,00,000.00 (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs only), are imposed on each of the three parties involved.

FACTS:

The appellant, M/S Videocon Industries Ltd., and another were facing trial for alleged contravention of provisions under FERA.

Adjudicating authority imposed penalties against the appellant during the trial.

The tribunal, in an appeal, found no contravention of FERA, setting aside the penalties.

Criminal proceedings continued, and the accused sought discharge based on the tribunal's decision.

ISSUES:

Whether the findings in adjudication proceedings are binding on criminal prosecution?

The impact of exoneration in adjudication proceedings on the criminal proceeding.

HELD:

The Court held that the findings in adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution are independent. The exoneration on technical grounds may allow prosecution to continue, but exoneration on merits, where the allegations are not sustainable, should halt criminal proceedings. The High Court erred in considering the merits of the tribunal's decision, which was not under challenge. The appeals were allowed, and the order discharging the accused by the Magistrate was restored.

REFERRED CASES:

B.N. Kashyap Vs. Emperor, AIR 1945 Lah 23.

Collector of Customs Vs. L.R. Melwani, AIR 1970 SC 962.

G.L. Didwana Vs. ITO, (1995) Sup (2) SCC 724.

Iqbal Singh Marwah Vs. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370.

K.C. Builders Vs. CIT, (2004) 2 SCC 731.

K.G. Premshankar Vs. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87.

Radheshyam Kejriwal Vs. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581.

Standard Chartered Bank Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, (2006) 4 SCC 278.

Uttam Chand Vs. ITO, (1982) 2 SCC 543.

Facts:

The appellant, a Director in Devi Polymers Private Limited, faced criminal proceedings under various sections of IPC and IT Act.

The dispute involved the creation of a website and payments made for it, with allegations of criminal breach of trust, forgery, and conspiracy against the appellant.

The appellant, as Director of Unit 'C,' engaged consultants to enhance consultancy services, resulting in the creation of a separate entity, Devi Consultancy Services (DCS).

The appellant's actions were contested as forgery and misappropriation, leading to the initiation of criminal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's actions constituted offenses under Sections 409, 468, and 471 of IPC and Sections 65 and 66 of the IT Act?

Whether the website's content, specifically mentioning DCS, amounted to forgery and misappropriation of funds?

Held:

The acts of the appellant lacked dishonest intention, and no case was made out under Sections 65 and 66 of the IT Act.

The website's content did not project DCS as an independent entity; hence, forgery allegations were unsubstantiated.

The appellant did not receive any funds individually, and his actions did not fit the descriptions of offenses under Sections 409, 468, and 471 of the IPC.

Quoting the guidelines from Bhajan Lal's case, the court found the criminal proceedings to be an abuse of the court process.

Emphasizing the absence of criminal intent, the court quashed the prosecution against the appellant.

Accordingly, the appeal succeeds. The prosecution is quashed.