Facts:

Lal Singh Marabi, the appellant, suffered severe injuries in a motor accident, leading to the amputation of his left leg. He filed a claim seeking compensation for permanent disability.

Issues:

The assessment of compensation for the appellant's permanent disability, considering factors like loss of livelihood and medical expenses.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the lower courts erred in reducing the permanent disability factor from 90% to 60%. The Court considered the appellant's inability to pursue his livelihood as a driver or daily wage laborer due to the amputation. Based on medical certificates and the appellant's circumstances, the Court determined the permanent disability to be 90%.

The Court recalculated compensation based on the appellant's annual income and the multiplier method, awarding Rs. 5,20,200 instead of the Rs. 3,57,800 awarded by the High Court. Additionally, the Court increased the compensation for the cost of an artificial limb from Rs. 60,000 to Rs. 1,00,000.

The Court ordered the insurer to pay the enhanced compensation amount along with interest accrued, and allowed them to recover it from other responsible parties.

Facts:

The incident occurred on 19th November 2006 when the deceased, Ayodhya Prasad @ Rahasu, along with other laborers, went to cut trees on his land. The appellants confronted them, leading to a quarrel during which the deceased was attacked and subsequently died due to his injuries.

The trial court convicted the appellants under Section 302 IPC or 302/34 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The High Court affirmed this decision.

Issues:

Whether the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 IPC was sustainable.

Held:

The court analyzed the evidence and applied legal principles regarding the conviction. It noted that the incident arose from a sudden fight without premeditation, falling under exception (4) of Section 300 IPC.

Therefore, the court modified the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC. The court partly allowed the appeals, modifying the conviction and reducing the sentence to the period already served. The appellants were ordered to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.

Facts:

The case involved the appellants appealing against their conviction and sentence of life imprisonment for the murder of Ayodhya Prasad @ Rahasu. The incident occurred when the deceased and his laborers were cutting a tree on his land. The appellants, according to the prosecution, stopped them, leading to a quarrel during which the deceased was fatally assaulted.

Issues:

Whether the conviction under Section 302 IPC was sustainable considering the circumstances of the case, particularly whether the incident fell under Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC.

Held:

The court examined the evidence presented by the prosecution, including eyewitness testimonies and medical evidence. Despite some witnesses turning hostile, their testimonies regarding the presence and involvement of the appellants were considered credible to a certain extent.

The court also considered whether the incident fell under Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC, which pertains to sudden fights without premeditation and without taking undue advantage or acting cruelly. After a meticulous analysis, the court found that the incident indeed arose from a sudden fight without premeditation and that the injuries sustained by the deceased suggested no undue advantage or cruelty by the appellants.

Consequently, the court modified the conviction from Section 302 IPC (murder) to Section 304 Part I IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder), considering the intention and knowledge of the appellants in causing the injuries. The appellants were sentenced to the period already undergone, taking into account the time spent in jail.

The appeal thus succeeds and is accordingly allowed.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the allotment of land by the Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation to M/S. MESCO KALINGA STEEL LTD. and others for establishing a steel plant. The Corporation requested the State Government's approval, which was granted subject to certain terms and conditions, including the execution of a lease deed. Despite receiving advance possession, the proposed allottee failed to execute the lease deed. The Corporation eventually cancelled the possession and resumed the land.

Issues:

The non-execution of the lease deed, the Corporation's authority to cancel possession, forfeiture of amounts deposited by the proposed allottee, and the applicability of promissory estoppel.

Held:

The court held that the execution of the lease deed was a condition precedent for the allotment of land. As the lease deed was never executed, the relationship of lessor-lessee never came into being. Thus, certain clauses, such as Clause 18 regarding notice before resumption of land, did not come into force. (Para 12-13)

It was found that the proposed allottee failed to remedy the breach despite receiving advance possession and ample time. The transaction became void due to the proposed allottee's own lapse and negligence, justifying the cancellation of possession. (Para 14)

Forfeiture of the amount deposited by the proposed allottee was deemed appropriate under Section 70 of the Contract Act for the use and occupation of the land. (Para 16)

The court rejected the proposed allottee's claim of promissory estoppel as no assurance was given by the Corporation. The Corporation acted as per the prescribed mode, informing the proposed allottee of the lease deed requirement. (Para 21)

The High Court's direction to lease out the balance land was deemed misdirected due to the proposed allottee's failure to fulfill obligations and intervening events. The Corporation's action of resuming the land was deemed lawful. The appeals are allowed. (Para 23-24)

Facts:

The appellant, a tenant, appealed against the High Court's decision directing eviction.

The appellant's tenancy in a rural area was terminated by the landlord under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's tenancy was protected by the Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.

Whether the notification dated 31st March, 1949, which applied the provisions of the Act of 1947 to the Doiwala area, continued to be in force by virtue of Section 24 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904.

Whether there was inconsistency between the protection provided to tenants under the Act of 1947 and the re-enacted provisions of the Act of 1972.

Held:

The Court held that the notification dated 31st March, 1949, continued to be in force by virtue of Section 24 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904. There was no inconsistency between the protection provided to tenants under the Act of 1947 and the re-enacted provisions of the Act of 1972.

The appellant's tenancy in the Doiwala area was protected by the Act of 1947, and the suit for eviction was untenable. However, considering the circumstances and in the interest of justice, the appellant was directed to hand over possession of the premises to the respondent after a period of three years from the date of the judgment. Until then, the appellant was ordered to pay a monthly rent of Rs. 4,000 to the respondent.

Facts:

The case involves allegations of manipulation and fraud in the entrance examination for admissions into medical colleges conducted by the Madhya Pradesh Professional Examination Board under the Madhya Pradesh Professional Examination Board Act, 2007.

The appellants were found to have obtained admission to the MBBS course through deceitful means, which included breaching the computer system, procuring assistance from others to answer exam questions, and manipulating seating arrangements and exam centers.

Issues:

The fraudulent practices employed by the appellants to secure admission to the MBBS course and the invocation of Article 142 of the Constitution to determine the appropriate course of action.

Held:

The court observed that the appellants' admission was based on a well-orchestrated plan of fraud and deception, commonly referred to as a scam. Despite the appellants' arguments that they were young and immature and should not be held accountable for their actions, the court rejected this defense, emphasizing that even juveniles face consequences for wrongdoing.

Furthermore, the court highlighted that the invocation of Article 142 of the Constitution must consider the larger interest of the administration of justice and prevent manifest injustice. In this case, the court found that upholding the cancellation of the appellants' admissions was not unjust, as their admissions were improper due to fraud.

The court emphasized that nothing obtained by fraud can be sustained, and it cannot allow fraudulent acts to prevail over the principles of fairness and legitimacy. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeals and upheld the cancellation of the appellants' admissions to the MBBS course, emphasizing the importance of truth, honesty, and fairness in the administration of justice.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, and the cancellation of the appellants' admissions to the MBBS course was upheld.

Facts:

The case involved two Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) arising from the ongoing elections to the Municipal Corporation of Pune. The petitioners challenged actions taken by the respondents, including the rejection of Reena Suresh Alhat's nomination and a dispute over the allotment of a symbol to another candidate.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court should entertain the petitions considering the importance of grassroots level elections in the civic administration of Pune.

Whether the High Court's decisions deprived the petitioners of their electoral rights and if the Supreme Court should examine the cases on merits.

Held:

The Supreme Court declined to entertain the petitions for several reasons:

The elections pertained to a local body under state law, with minimal impact beyond Pune City (Para 10, point i).

The High Court, being a constitutional court, was competent to adjudicate such matters, subject to appellate jurisdiction (Para 10, point ii).

The petitioners still had recourse to a forum for adjudication of their rights (Para 10, point iii).

The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 was discretionary (Para 10, point iv).

Considering the substantial number of pending cases and the relatively minor nature of the grievances compared to national issues, the Court deemed it inappropriate to entertain the applications (Para 10, point v).

The Court cited the cautionary words of Justice Frankfurter, emphasizing the importance of adhering to criteria for granting case reviews to avoid accumulation of arrears or hasty disposals of essential business (Para 11).

The Court expressed regret for its inability to examine the issues raised in the petitions and dismissed the Special Leave Petitions. (Para 12)

Facts:

The case involves a custody dispute over a minor daughter. The mother filed an application seeking custody and the appointment of a guardian for the child. The Family Court dismissed the application, but the High Court granted it. The child expressed a desire to continue living with her father, who had been caring for her since she was 21 months old. However, the mother had nursed the child during her early years before being forcibly deprived of custody. The court considered the welfare of the child as paramount and weighed various factors before reaching a decision.

Issues:

Whether the principle of the welfare of the minor child, as provided under Section 13 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, should prevail in this custody dispute.

Whether the child's best interests are served by granting custody to the mother or the father.

Whether the child's preference to continue living with the father should be given primary consideration.

Held:

The principle of the welfare of the minor child, as enumerated in Section 13 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, aims to ensure the optimal growth and development of the child.

The welfare principle serves two objectives: ensuring the child's growth in the best environment and serving the public interest by fostering the child's development as a future asset of the nation.

While the child expressed a preference to continue living with the father, the court considered the mother's role during the child's early years and the potential negative impact of the father's feelings towards the mother on the child's psyche.

It is crucial for the child to have regular contact with both parents and to be shielded from parental hostility for her personality development.

The mother, being a teacher in a prestigious school, can provide the child with better care, protection, education, and guidance. Therefore, custody is granted to the mother for one year, with provisions for further review and variation if necessary.

The court directs the father to cooperate in the child's admission to the school where the mother teaches, and custody shall be handed over to the mother one week before the next academic session starts.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction, claiming ownership of a piece of land, which was contested by the defendant, a temple trust. The trial court dismissed the suit, stating that the plaintiff failed to prove ownership and possession and that the suit was not maintainable as it only sought declaratory relief without seeking recovery of possession. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision. However, the High Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff had established ownership and possession of the property.

Whether the suit was maintainable considering it only sought declaratory relief without seeking recovery of possession.

Whether the High Court's decree was legally sustainable.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in reversing the lower courts' judgments. It found that the plaintiff failed to prove ownership and possession of the property. Moreover, the suit was not maintainable as it only sought declaratory relief without seeking recovery of possession, which was a necessary relief given the plaintiff's lack of possession.

The High Court's decree was contradictory as it affirmed the temple trust's ownership of part of the property while ordering the correction of records in favor of the plaintiff. The High Court's reasoning was legally unsustainable, as it did not address the trial court's findings on the lack of plaintiff's ownership and possession or the issue of non-joinder of a necessary party.

Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the judgments of the trial court and the appellate court.