Facts:

The case involves the dismissal of writ petitions by the Delhi High Court concerning the competence of the CO to convene, constitute, and complete SCMs. The CO in question was from a unit other than the one to which the accused was attached. The Rajasthan High Court also dismissed cases on merit.

Issues:

The primary issue revolves around the competence of the CO in convening an SCM, specifically whether the CO of the accused's regular unit or the CO of the unit to which the accused is attached is permissible.

The challenge involves interpreting Sections 116 and 120 of the Army Act, 1950, along with relevant Army Rules and Defence Service Regulations.

Held:

The Army Act grants significant power to the CO to constitute a Court, emphasizing the need for rare exercise and articulation of reasons for immediate action. The Delhi High Court's observation that such power should be exercised sparingly aligns with maintaining discipline in the military.( Para 19-20)

Offenses under Sections 34, 37, and 69 of the Army Act are recognized as special categories requiring a reference to a superior authority. Deviation from this requirement must be justified on record, highlighting the gravity of the offenses.( Para 22-23)

The judgment clarifies three situations regarding the competence of the CO to convene an SCM based on the accused's association with a unit. It distinguishes scenarios based on the accused's regular unit, attachment to a different unit, or attachment after the offense was committed.( Para 24-25)

In the third category, where an accused is attached to another unit after committing an offense, the appropriateness of the former unit or considerations of fairness may determine the competent CO.( Para 26-27)

Regulation 9 of Defence Service Regulations is identified as a guiding factor, rejecting the High Court's finding that only the CO of the accused's unit is competent. The expression "to which the accused belongs" is discussed in the context of fairness and impartiality.( Para 29-30)

The judgment concludes that it is not imperative for the CO of the accused's regular unit to convene an SCM. The CO of the attached unit can be competent, provided legal requirements are met, and immediate action is justified.( Para 31-33)

The appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

The company was directed to be wound up by the Company Court, leading to the possession of its assets by the Official Liquidator. The Lender-Bank sought permission from the Company Court to initiate recovery proceedings under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. The Company Court granted permission on March 10, 2000, with the condition that no coercive steps should be taken against the company's assets during or after the proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Subsequently, recovery proceedings were initiated, objections were raised, and the Recovery Officer proceeded with the sale of the company's properties.

Issues:

The recovery proceedings, the authority of the Company Court's order dated March 10, 2000, and the compliance of the Recovery Officer with the conditions imposed.

Held:

The Court held that the condition imposed by the Company Court was binding on the Recovery Officer, and the sale conducted in violation of this order lacked the authority of law. The acceptance of the bid and confirmation of the sale were impermissible, requiring them to be set aside (Para 39, 42).

Emphasizing that the Company Court had jurisdiction to pass the order dated March 10, 2000, the Court declared that it was neither invalid nor void (Para 44).

The Court reiterated that an order/judgment, until set aside by a competent court, has the force of law, and parties cannot consider it void or non-existent. Disobeying such an order may have disastrous consequences (Para 45).

The Court rejected the claim of equity regarding the sale, emphasizing that objections were raised, and challenges were made before the Recovery Officer. The fact that only two bids were received, with both bidders having a connection, added weight to the lack of fairness in the sale (Para 47).

It was deemed justifiable for the concerned parties to approach the High Court to enforce the order dated March 10, 2000, as the sale was in violation of this order (Para 48).

The Court clarified that the order dated March 10, 2000, was binding on the appellant, and therefore, the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer was equally binding on the appellant (Para 49).

Facts:

The appellant, R.K. Roja, faced an Election Petition challenging her election to the 289 Nagiri Assembly Constituency.

The appellant filed an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC seeking the rejection of the Election Petition.

The court initially declined to consider the application due to the absence of a formal application and proceeded with the trial.

Subsequently, the appellant filed a formal application for rejection of the Election Petition.

Issues:

Whether the court can proceed with the trial without disposing of an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC?

Whether an application under Order 7, Rule 11 can be filed at any stage of the suit?

Held:

The court held that an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC can be filed at any stage before the conclusion of the trial.

The court emphasized that the consideration of the application should not be based on the allegations made by the defendant in the written statement.

Once an application is filed under Order 7, Rule 11, the court must dispose of it before proceeding with the trial.

The impugned order, which delayed the consideration of the application, was set aside.

The appellant was granted an opportunity to file a written statement within two weeks.

The High Court was directed to dispose of the Election Petition before the end of the year.

Facts:

Ramachandraiah, the deceased, was accused of misappropriation under IPC Sections 409, 468, and 471.

Ramachandraiah died during the trial, and the co-accused Subbarayudu was acquitted.

The trial court found Ramachandraiah responsible for the offenses, but he could not be adjudged guilty due to his demise.

The State applied for attachment of Ramachandraiah's property under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944.

Issues:

Validity of continuing proceedings against a deceased person.

Legality of the attachment of the deceased's property under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance.

Held:

The law authorizes the State to make an application for attachment even if proceedings have not resulted in a conviction. However, the Court emphasized that orders of attachment must be withdrawn if the prosecution abates or cannot result in a conviction due to the death of the accused.( Para 6)

Emphasized the presumption of innocence until conviction and rejected the contention that the presumption vaporizes upon the death of the accused.( Para 7)

Found a gross miscarriage of justice, as the trial court's finding that Ramachandraiah was solely responsible for the offenses was considered null and void due to his demise.( Para 8)

Concluded that the District Judge could not have proceeded with attachment proceedings against a dead person under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944.( Para 10)

Declared the orders of the Criminal Court and the impugned judgment as illegal, setting them aside. The appeal succeeded in favor of the legal representatives.( Para 11)

Facts:

Pawan Kumar was set on fire, and appellants were accused.

Dying declaration by Pawan Kumar implicated the appellants.

Trial Court and High Court convicted the appellants; the appeal challenged this decision.

Issues:

Reliability of the dying declaration.

Claim of grave provocation based on victim's presence in the appellant's brother's house.

Juvenility claim of one of the appellants.

Held:

The court found the dying declaration to be reliable and consistent with circumstantial evidence, rejecting arguments of discrepancies.

The defense's argument of grave provocation was rejected, stating that the victim's presence in the house did not support the theory, especially considering the victim was found with tied hands.

The court conducted an inquiry and accepted the claim of juvenility for one of the appellants, remitting the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board for determining an appropriate quantum of fine.

In accordance with Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, the court clarified that proceedings in pending cases involving juveniles above 16 but below 18 years would continue, and upon finding guilt, the case would be referred to the Juvenile Justice Board.

Facts:

The case involved the assessment of sales tax exemption for one of Hindustan Lever Limited's manufacturing units under a 1991 Notification. The revenue contended that the exempted unit had included the tax component in the sale price, thus violating the conditions outlined in the Notification. The assessing authority, appellate authority, and the Appellate Tribunal supported the revenue's view.

Issues:

The uniform pricing of products across multiple manufacturing units, the statutory requirements of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, and the allegation of the exempted unit adding the tax component to the sale price.

Held:

The Court held that an assessee is entitled to fix a uniform price for its products throughout India, even if there are differences in sales tax payable at different locations (Para 20).

The Court emphasized the statutory requirement under Rule 2 of the Standards of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977, that the maximum sale price should be inclusive of all taxes. This, however, should not be construed as an admission that the assessee charged sales tax (Para 17).

The Court considered substantial evidence provided by the assessee, including invoices and price circulars, demonstrating the non-collection of sales tax (Para 19).

Uniform pricing across India, according to the Court, serves various purposes, and it cannot be a ground to conclude that the assessee was collecting sales tax on goods from the exempt unit (Para 20).

The Court rejected the idea of bifurcating sale consideration based on an assumption that it included tax, emphasizing that such a fiction has no application in this case (Paras 22, 23).

Facts:

Outlook Magazine published an article on 10.11.2008 regarding the Provident Fund Scam, naming judges allegedly involved.

Advocates from the High Court of Allahabad filed an application on 18.11.2008, seeking contempt proceedings against the appellants, citing insult to the Higher Judiciary.

High Court took suo motu action on 28.04.2015, initiating contempt proceedings against the appellants.

Issues:

Whether the initiation of contempt proceedings by the High Court after four years is within the limitation prescribed by Section 20 of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Held:

The Supreme Court rejected the High Court's argument, emphasizing that contempt proceedings, whether suo motu or otherwise, should comply with The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Interpreting Section 20, the Court stated that the action for contempt must be initiated, either by filing an application or by the court issuing notice suo motu, within one year from the date of the alleged contempt.

Since the High Court initiated suo motu action only on 28.04.2015, beyond the one-year limitation, the proceedings were held to be barred by limitation.

The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside.

Facts:

The petitioners, persons with disabilities employed with Prasar Bharati, challenged two office memoranda issued by the Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India, dated 18.02.1997, and 29.12.2005. The memoranda were alleged to deprive them of the statutory benefit of reservation under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, concerning Group A and Group B posts in Prasar Bharati.

Issues:

Legality of denial by the impugned memoranda of the statutory benefit of three percent reservation in identified posts falling in Groups A and B.

Applicability of the embargo on reservation in promotions as laid down by the court in Indra Sawhney.

Held:

The Court declared the impugned memoranda as illegal and inconsistent with the 1995 Act. It directed the Government to extend three percent reservation to persons with disabilities in all identified posts in Group A and Group B, irrespective of the mode of filling up such posts. The judgment emphasized the crucial nature of the identification exercise under Section 32 and the obligation to reserve not less than three percent in identified posts as per Section 33 of the 1995 Act.

Facts:

Diler Singh, a constable in CRPF, faced charges of leaving the campus without permission, consuming liquor, and quarreling with civilians.

A departmental enquiry resulted in the finding of guilt by the disciplinary authority.

The respondent initiated a civil suit challenging his dismissal.

Issues:

Whether the punishment of dismissal under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act is valid.

Jurisdiction of the trial court in deciding the suit.

Held:

The Court held that the punishment of dismissal could be imposed under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act. The Court disagreed with the Calcutta High Court's decision in Akhilesh Kumar, emphasizing the power to award dismissal as a punishment. The Court noted that leaving the camp without permission and engaging in misconduct was a serious breach of discipline, justifying the dismissal. The High Court's failure to frame substantial questions of law was criticized.