Facts:

The Sri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee filed a claim for recording the lands in favor of the Temple, which were previously vested in the State Government under the Orissa Estate Abolition Act, 1951.

The Math challenged this claim, asserting that the lands were accorded the status of 'amrutamanohi' and recorded as Trust Estate under Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act. The dispute arose due to conflicting provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, and the OEA Act, 1951.

Issues:

Whether the lands belonging to the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri were vested in the Temple Management Committee under the Sri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955?

Whether the provisions of the Orissa Estate Abolition Act, 1951, could divest the Temple Committee of its vested lands?

What was the effect of the conflicting provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, and the OEA Act, 1951, on the status of the Temple lands?

Held:

The Court struck down the first part of the proviso of Section 2(oo) of the Orissa Estate Abolition Act, 1951, which pertained to the properties of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri.

It quashed the notification issued by the State Government under Section 3A of the OEA Act, 1951, to the extent it applied to the lands and estate of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri.

The Court clarified that the decision in the previous case of Lord Jagannath did not bar the instant case by res judicata.

The Court also deemed the previous judgment to be per incuriam, as it was passed without considering the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955.

The Court emphasized the primacy of the Temple Act, 1955, over any other legislation concerning the Jagannath Temple lands, stating that the Temple lands were already vested in the Temple Management Committee under this Act.

The Court held that the conflicting provisions of the OEA Act, 1951, and the Temple Act, 1955, could not coexist, and struck down the first part of the proviso to maintain the effectiveness of both acts.

Additionally, the Court ruled that the lands of the Jagannath Temple at Puri were already vested in the Temple Committee under the Temple Act, 1955, and could not be divested by applying the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951.

The Court concluded that since the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951, had no application to the lands of the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri, there was no need to pass an order in favor of the Temple under the OEA Act, 1951.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal against the acquittal of two accused persons, the husband and mother-in-law of the deceased, by the High Court of Bombay.

The deceased, Asha Hemant Chauriwal, suffered burn injuries and subsequently died due to septicemia.

The prosecution's case relied on a dying declaration made by the deceased and alleged letters written by her to her father, indicating cruelty by her in-laws.

Issues:

The Trial Court convicted the accused based on these evidences, but the High Court acquitted them, citing lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court examined the arguments presented by both sides.

It observed several discrepancies and lapses in the investigation and handling of evidence by the prosecution.

Held:

The Court upheld the High Court's judgment of acquittal, finding no compelling reasons to interfere.

The dying declaration lacked proper corroboration, and the circumstances surrounding its recording raised doubts about its reliability.

The alleged letters were not adequately proven to be written by the deceased, and contradictions in witness testimonies further weakened the prosecution's case.

The Investigating Officer failed to conduct a thorough investigation, which could have clarified important aspects of the case.

Therefore, the appeals filed by the State of Maharashtra were dismissed.

Facts:

The incident occurred on 9th October 2002, involving the accused persons allegedly assaulting and causing the death of Ashok Kumar.

Eyewitnesses provided testimony, and circumstantial evidence was presented by the prosecution.

The Trial Court convicted the accused, but the High Court later acquitted them due to gaps and discrepancies in the evidence.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the High Court's decision to acquit the accused was justified based on the evidence presented.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined the testimonies and evidence presented before it and found that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. Key eyewitnesses, including the complainant and another witness, turned hostile during the trial, casting doubt on the reliability of their testimonies.

The Court noted inconsistencies in witness statements and highlighted deficiencies in the medical evidence provided by the prosecution. While a motive was established through witness testimony, it was not substantive evidence and could not alone support a conviction.

Based on the above analysis, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to acquit the accused persons. It found no grounds to interfere with the judgment and dismissed the appeals.

Facts:

Various writ petitions and transfer petitions were filed concerning the "collegium system" for the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary.

Suggestions were received from stakeholders regarding improvements to the collegium system.

A committee was formed to compile these suggestions.

The Government of India was involved in the process, particularly regarding the finalization of the Memorandum of Procedure for judicial appointments.

Issues:

Whether additional measures could be incorporated to improve the functioning of the collegium system.

Whether the responsibility of amending the Memorandum of Procedure lies with the judiciary or the executive.

Held:

The court held that the responsibility of amending the Memorandum of Procedure for the appointment of judges lies with the executive, in consultation with the Chief Justice of India.

The court directed the Government of India to finalize the Memorandum of Procedure, supplementing it based on suggestions and consultation with the Chief Justice of India.

The Memorandum of Procedure should consider factors such as eligibility criteria, transparency in the appointment process, establishment of a secretariat for managing appointments, procedures for handling complaints against appointees, and any other relevant matters. These directives aim to ensure transparency, accountability, and the faithful implementation of principles laid down in previous judgments.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the inclusion of PD/ charges and ASS charges in the assessable value for the purpose of paying excise duty. The expenses for these services were borne solely by the dealer, not the manufacturer.

Issues:

Whether PD/ charges and free ASS charges should be considered part of the assessable value under Section 4 of the Central Excise Act.

Held:

The court held that expenses incurred by the dealer for PD/ and ASS charges, which were not borne by the manufacturer, should not be included in the assessable value under Section 4. The reimbursement of these charges by the manufacturer to their dealers was claimed as abatement in relation to the normal transaction value. Therefore, PD/ charges and free ASS charges were not to be included in the assessable value for the purpose of paying excise duty.

Decision: Based on the above reasoning, the court decided that PD/ charges and free ASS charges would not be included in the assessable value under Section 4 for the purpose of paying excise duty.

Facts:

Dr. Janet Jeyapaul, the appellant, was a lecturer at SRM University.

She was promoted to Senior Lecturer but faced disciplinary action for alleged failure to take classes for certain degree courses.

Dr. Jeyapaul challenged the termination notice issued to her by filing a writ petition in the High Court.

Initially, the Single Judge allowed her petition, but SRM University appealed against this decision.

The Division Bench of the High Court held that the writ petition filed by Dr. Jeyapaul was not maintainable.

Issues:

Whether SRM University falls under the definition of "authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution.

Whether the writ petition filed by Dr. Jeyapaul is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court held that SRM University, being engaged in imparting education and declared as a "Deemed University" by the Central Government under the University Grants Commission Act, fell under the definition of "authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution.

Therefore, it was subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The Court also decided not to direct Dr. Jeyapaul to approach the Tribunal at this stage and instead remanded the case to the Division Bench of the High Court to decide the appeal on merits. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The Wakf Act, 1995, initially established a single-member tribunal to handle disputes related to waqf properties.

In 2013, the Act was amended to require the constitution of a three-member tribunal by the State Government through an official notification.

Despite the amendment, the State Government failed to issue a notification constituting the three-member tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the one-member tribunal, established under the Wakf Act, 1995, continued to have jurisdiction following the 2013 amendment until the constitution of a three-member tribunal by the State Government.

Whether the doctrine of implied repeal applies to the substitution of Section 83(4) of the Wakf Act, 1995, by the amendment.

Held:

The court held that the one-member tribunal would continue to exercise jurisdiction until the State Government constituted a three-member tribunal through an official notification, as mandated by Section 83(4) of the Act.

The court rejected the application of the doctrine of implied repeal to the substitution of Section 83(4) by the amendment, emphasizing the coexistence of both the old and amended provisions until the new provision was implemented.

Decision: The court partly allowed the appeals, affirming the continuation of the one-member tribunal until the constitution of a three-member tribunal by the State Government. It directed the States to promptly fulfill their obligations by constituting the three-member tribunal and issuing a notification to that effect.

Facts:

Shakti Kumar Gupta was selected for the Kashmir Civil Service (Judicial) in 1987.

His performance was evaluated through Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs).

Discrepancies were found in the assessment process, particularly in the ACR for the year 2009.

Complaints were lodged against Gupta's conduct, including allegations related to financial matters and behavior during court proceedings.

The decision for Gupta's premature retirement was made by the Full Court based on recommendations from the Administrative Committee.

Issues:

Whether the assessment process, especially the ACR for the year 2009, was reliable.

Whether complaints against Gupta's conduct justified his premature retirement.

Whether the Full Court's decision to retire Gupta was justified.

Held:

The court found discrepancies in the assessment process, particularly regarding the ACR for the year 2009, which was unreliable due to Gupta's non-submission of a self-assessment report. However, complaints against Gupta's conduct, including allegations related to financial matters and behavior during court proceedings, were considered significant. The Full Court's decision to retire Gupta was upheld based on various factors, including complaints against him and his behavior.

Decision: The court upheld Gupta's premature retirement, citing various factors, including complaints against him, and his behavior during court proceedings. The writ petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Sections 80-IA, 80-18, and 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether an assessee could claim deductions under both Sections 80-IA or/and 80-18, and Section 80HHC for the same profits and gains.

Held:

Majority Opinion (Justice Anil R. Dave): The majority opinion, as expressed by Justice Anil R. Dave, emphasized that if an assessee claims deductions under Sections 80-IA or/and 80-18, they are not entitled to claim deductions under Section 80HHC for the same profits and gains. This restriction is explicitly provided in Section 80-IA(9) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Dissenting Opinion (Justice Dipak Misra): Justice Dipak Misra dissented from the majority opinion, stating that the deductions under Section 80HHC are computed separately and should not be restricted by the provisions of Section 80-IA(9). He argued that including profits and gains allowed under Section 80-IA in the gross total income for computing deductions under Section 80HHC ensures the proper calculation of deductions without rendering the formula under Section 80HHC ineffective.

Decision: The matter was referred to a larger bench due to the difference of opinion between the two judges.