Facts:

The appellant (defendant) entered into an agreement for sale with the respondent (plaintiff) regarding a property.

The respondent alleged that the appellant breached the agreement by refusing to sell the property as agreed upon.

The trial court decreed the respondent's suit, which was confirmed by the High Court on appeal.

Issues:

Whether the suit for specific performance was maintainable.

Whether the respondent was ready and willing to perform her part of the agreement.

Whether the respondent came to court with clean hands.

Whether the respondent breached the agreement by insisting on additional terms.

Held:

The Supreme Court rejected all of the appellant's arguments:

The objection regarding the maintainability of the suit was not raised in the written statement or in the appeal before the High Court, and therefore, could not be considered at this stage (Para 35-38).

The respondent had pleaded the necessary requirements for specific performance in the plaint and had proven readiness and willingness to perform her part of the agreement (Para 43).

There was no evidence to suggest that the respondent did not come to court with clean hands, and the appellant's refusal to execute the sale deed constituted a breach of the agreement (Para 46-47).

The respondent had not claimed any relief beyond the scope of the agreement, and her insistence on specific performance related only to the subject matter of the agreement (Para 48).

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court and the High Court, dismissing the appeal and directing the appellant to pay costs to the respondent (Para 50).

Facts:

The case involved the dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal by the High Court, followed by the filing of a review petition under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). However, this review petition was barred by limitation and eventually not entertained on merits.

Issues:

The delay in disposing of the review application, which had been pending for almost four years.

Held:

The Court emphasized the importance of timely disposal of review applications and cautioned against using review petitions as a delay tactic. It directed the High Courts to ensure expeditious disposal of review applications and urged litigants and their counsel to file review petitions without defects and to promptly cure any defects that arise. The Court also emphasized the duty of High Court registries to alert judges about pending review petitions and to issue pre-emptory orders for defect removal.

The court concluded by dismissing the special leave petition both on grounds of delay and lack of merit. Additionally, the Court ordered that a copy of the order be sent to the Registrar General of each High Court for necessary action.

Facts:

Anna Juhi John appeared in the All India Common Entrance Test, 2015 conducted by the English and Foreign Languages Universities for B.A. (Hons.) in English. Despite securing 68 marks, she was ineligible for admission to the Hyderabad Campus due to her rank and had to join the Lucknow Campus instead. Anna later sought transfer to the Hyderabad Campus citing reasons such as language problems and proximity to home. Her requests were denied by the university, leading to litigation.

Issues:

Whether the refusal of the university to allow transfer from one campus to another was consistent with its policies and legal principles.

Whether the university's admission process and policies were subject to judicial review.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, ruling that the university's refusal to allow Anna's transfer was consistent with its policies and did not amount to arbitrariness.

The Court emphasized the importance of maintaining the integrity of the university's admission process and the need for clear and consistent policies. It noted that while there may have been exceptional cases of transfer, such as in instances of serious illness, these cases were treated as exceptions rather than precedents.

The Court stated that the university's policies regarding campus transfer, as outlined in various documents including admission instructions and confirmation letters, prohibited transfer under any circumstances.

The Court refrained from considering allegations against another student, Tirna Chandra, as she had not been made a party to the writ petition. Thus, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

Canara Bank provided financial assistance to M/s Eversure Aqua Solutions Pvt. Ltd., with the respondent no.1 being one of the guarantors.

Default occurred, and Canara Bank issued demand and possession notices under Section 13(2) and Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.

After taking symbolic possession, Canara Bank determined the upset price of the secured asset and issued a notice of sale (e-auction notice).

Respondent no.1 challenged the legality of the e-auction notice, contending it was in contravention of the SARFAESI Act and its rules.

Issues:

Whether Rule 8(6) and Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 mandate separate notices to the borrower before deciding on the mode of sale and prior to publication of sale notice in newspapers.

Whether the simultaneous issuance of notices to the borrower and public notice for sale is permissible under the SARFAESI Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's interpretation of Rule 8(6) and Rule 9 was incorrect. The High Court's view that separate notices to the borrower and a public notice for sale cannot be simultaneously issued was overturned.

The Court emphasized that the only requirement is to serve a notice of 30 days on the borrower regarding the intention to sell the secured asset and the mode and date of sale, followed by a public notice if the sale is by inviting tenders or holding a public auction.

There is no need to wait for the expiry of 30 days from the issuance of the borrower notice to publish a public notice. Thus, the appeal succeeded, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

Bhagwati @ Reena (appellant) appealed against the decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, which upheld the Family Court's declaration of her marriage with Anil Choubey (respondent) as void ab initio due to her alleged minority at the time of marriage.

Anil Choubey filed a civil suit seeking annulment of the marriage, alleging that Bhagwati was underage at the time of their marriage and that it was conducted under coercion and fraud.

Issues:

Whether Bhagwati was a minor at the time of her marriage.

Whether the High Court erred in solely focusing on Bhagwati's age rather than addressing other grounds raised by Anil Choubey.

Held:

The Supreme Court found fault with the High Court's approach and remanded the case for fresh consideration. The court emphasized that only a minor spouse has the right to seek annulment of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, and since Anil Choubey, the respondent, was an adult at the time of marriage and sought annulment, the focus should have been on his claims of coercion and fraud rather than solely on Bhagwati's age.

Therefore, the High Court's decision was set aside, and the case was directed to be reconsidered focusing on the primary issue of annulment sought by Anil Choubey and in accordance with the law. The court urged expeditious disposal of the case considering its age.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over commercial premises in Mumbai, initially leased under a conducting agreement.

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff for eviction of the defendants, which was upheld in subsequent proceedings.

The defendants filed a First Appeal before the High Court, offering an undertaking to vacate the premises by a specified date during the appeal process.

The defendants later sought extensions of time to vacate the premises, citing various reasons, including educational pursuits of family members.

Issues:

Whether the defendants abused the legal process by repeatedly seeking extensions to delay vacating the premises.

Whether the undertaking provided by the defendants during the appeal process precluded them from questioning the judgment on its merits.

Held:

The court held that the defendants' repeated attempts to delay vacating the premises constituted an abuse of the legal process. Despite earlier undertakings, the defendants utilized various legal avenues to prolong their occupation, disregarding clear findings against them. The court condemned such abuse and emphasized the importance of deterring frivolous litigation.

The court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions filed by the defendants and directed them to vacate the premises by a specified date. It warned of civil and criminal consequences for non-compliance. Additionally, the defendants were ordered to pay arrears for the use of the premises and substantial costs to the respondents.

This judgment reaffirmed the principle of deterring abuse of the legal process and emphasized the duty of courts to firmly deal with frivolous filings. It underscored the importance of expeditious resolution of disputes and maintaining the integrity of the legal system.

Facts:

The case concerns two Civil Appeals arising from a Special Leave Petition filed against a judgment of the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court.

The dispute arose over the awarding of a contract for mechanization of berths at Paradip Port Trust.

The appellants contested the judgment of the High Court, which allowed a Writ Petition filed by the second consortium of bidders.

Issues:

The interpretation of a clause in the tender documents regarding the eligibility of bidders, specifically concerning the participation of the first consortium in the bidding process.

Held:

The Court held that the clause in question applies only when there is a single private operator in a port. It emphasized the importance of giving weightage to all words in the clause, including "only one private operator." The Court reiterated the principle of judicial restraint in reviewing administrative actions and contractual matters, emphasizing that courts should not interfere unless the decision is arbitrary, perverse, or mala fide. It also stressed that the owner or employer of a project, having authored the tender documents, is best qualified to understand and interpret them.

Decision: The High Court's interpretation of the clause was deemed erroneous, and its decision was set aside. The Court allowed the Civil Appeals, thereby upholding the decision of the Paradip Port Trust to award the contract to the first consortium. The writ petition filed by the second consortium was dismissed.

Facts:

The first respondent borrowed Rs. 64,000/- from the appellant and issued cheques in lieu of the borrowed amount.

The cheques were dishonored, and the appellant followed the procedure under Section 138 of the N.I. Act by issuing legal notices to the first respondent.

The notices were returned with postal endorsements indicating non-service or refusal.

The Trial Court convicted the first respondent under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, a decision upheld by the Appellate Court.

The High Court reversed these judgments on the grounds that the statutory notice was beyond the prescribed limitation period.

Issues:

Whether the notices issued by the appellant to the first respondent complied with the requirements of Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

Whether the High Court's decision to set aside the conviction under Section 138 was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the provisions of Section 138 of the N.I. Act and emphasized the importance of the notice requirement within fifteen days of receiving intimation of dishonor from the bank.

The Court held that the first notice sent by the appellant was effective and deemed to have been served on the first respondent. The second notice, although sent beyond the stipulated period, was deemed as a reminder of the respondent's obligation to discharge the liability. Since the complaint was filed within the stipulated time under Clause (b) of Section 142 of the N.I. Act, Section 138 read with Section 142 of the N.I. Act was attracted.

The Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and disposed of the appeal with directions for the first respondent to deposit a specified amount in lieu of suffering imprisonment.

Facts:

The appellant, Oil & Natural Gas Corp. Ltd. (ONGC), filed an appeal challenging a decision of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity.

The appeal was presented to the Supreme Court after a delay of 71 days, which was previously condoned by the Court.

During the hearing, the respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the condonation of the delay.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the appeal can be condoned under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, and if so, to what extent.

Whether the delay can be condoned using provisions like Section 5 of the Limitation Act or Article 142 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court examined the provisions of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, which provide for a limitation period of 60 days for filing an appeal to the Supreme Court. The proviso to Section 125 allows for an additional period of 60 days if sufficient cause is shown. However, the Court emphasized that this additional period cannot exceed 60 days. Referring to previous judgments, the Court held that the statutory limitation provided in Section 125 is mandatory and cannot be extended using provisions like Section 5 of the Limitation Act or Article 142 of the Constitution.

The Court further noted that the delay in filing a review application before the tribunal was also beyond the statutory limitation period, indicating a lack of due diligence on the part of the appellant.

Ultimately, the Court upheld the preliminary objection raised by the respondent and dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that when the delay is statutorily not condonable, it cannot be condoned. There is no impediment to considering the preliminary objection at a later stage.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.