Facts:

The appellant, Standard Chartered Bank (SCB), filed a suit against Andhra Bank Financial Services Ltd. (ABFSL) seeking the recovery of the principal amount paid for the purchase of NPCL bonds. SCB later sought an amendment to include Hiten P. Dalal and Canara Bank Mutual Fund (CMF) as party respondents. The Special Court found SCB had purchased the bonds, but declined relief on grounds of limitation.

Issues:

The interpretation of the term "first learns" as provided under Article 91(a) of the Limitation Act.

Additionally, the court addresses whether SCB's claim is time-barred and if interest should be awarded.

Held:

The period of limitation starts running from the date when the person 'first learns' about the conversion of the movable property, as stipulated under Article 91(a) of the Limitation Act.

The knowledge requirement necessitates identifying a specific person in possession of the property and the possession constituting wrongful conversion .

SCB first learned about the misappropriation of the bonds and their transfer to CMF during a meeting on 07.11.1992. Thus, the limitation period started on this date.

SCB is entitled to interest pendente lite and future interest at 6% per annum from 10.01.1996 till realization, as per Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Decision: The finding that the suit was barred by limitation is set aside. SCB is entitled to the principal amount along with interest and costs from respondents 2-10.

Facts:

The case involves the promotion and determination of seniority of reserved category accelerated promotees in the Tamil Nadu Engineering Service. Reserved category Assistant Engineers and Junior Engineers were promoted as Assistant Divisional Engineers much earlier than general category candidates due to their accelerated promotion following the rule of reservation (Para 25-26).

Issues:

The applicability of Article 16(4A) of the Constitution regarding consequential seniority for reserved category accelerated promotees in the absence of specific provisions or policy decisions by the State.

Held:

The Court clarified that Article 16(4A) of the Constitution is an enabling provision and does not automatically apply without specific provisions or policy decisions by the State .

In the absence of rules conferring consequential seniority, the 'catch-up rule' is applicable, where reserved category promotees cannot count seniority from the date of promotion, and senior general candidates regain their seniority if they later reach the promotional level .

Rule 12 of Tamil Nadu Engineering Service Special Rules does not provide for consequential seniority for reserved category promotees, and hence, the 'catch-up rule' should be applied .

Rule 35(aa) of Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service (General) Rules is not applicable to reserved category promotions and does not provide for consequential seniority to accelerated promotees .

The Court directed the State Government to revise the seniority list applying the 'catch-up rule' .

Decision:The Court allowed the appeals and directed the State Government to revise the seniority list of Assistant Divisional Engineers applying the 'catch-up rule' .

Facts:

The original suit for permanent injunction was filed on March 9, 1990.

In the original written statement filed on May 16, 1990, the defendant denied the plaintiff's title to the property.

The plaintiff sought an amendment to the plaint to include a declaration of title to the suit property, which was allowed by the court's order dated March 28, 2002.

The defendant raised a plea in an additional written statement that the plea for declaration of title was time-barred.

Issues:

Whether Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applied to the amended plaint seeking a declaration of title.

Whether the amendment to the plaint was time-barred.

Whether the doctrine of relation back applied to the amendment.

Held:

Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the amended plaint as it sought to add the relief of declaration of title to the existing relief for permanent injunction.

The right to sue for declaration of title arose on May 16, 1990, when the defendant first denied the plaintiff's title in the written statement. Therefore, any amendment done after May 16, 1993, would be time-barred.

The doctrine of relation back does not apply in this case as the court allowed the amendment subject to the plea of limitation, indicating no extraordinary circumstances to warrant its application.

Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision that the amended plea for declaration of title was time-barred under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Facts:

Ex-Naik Vijay Kumar, a former soldier, sustained injuries in an accident during his annual leave.

The injuries occurred while he was visiting his sister's house during the leave period.

The accident resulted in multiple injuries, and he was subsequently admitted to a military hospital for treatment.

Despite the injuries sustained during his leave, Vijay Kumar was seeking disability pension benefits.

Issues:

Whether the injuries sustained by Vijay Kumar during his annual leave were attributable to or aggravated by military service, thus entitling him to disability pension benefits.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the injuries suffered by Vijay Kumar during his annual leave lacked a causal connection with his military service.

It is apparent that the injury sustained by Vijay Kumar was accidental in nature and nobody can be blamed for the same. Respondent's act of going towards the roof for smoking at his sister's house and falling down at no stretch of imagination can be attributed to military service.

"After the accident, when the Respondent was not actually performing his duties and therefore disability cannot be attributed to military service nor can it be said to have been aggravated due to stress and strain of military service.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the tribunal failed to appreciate that the accident resulting in injury to the Respondent was not even remotely connected to his military duty and it falls in the domain of an entirely private act and therefore the impugned orders cannot be sustained.

Consequently, the tribunal's decision to grant disability pension benefits to Vijay Kumar was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Facts:

Balbir Singh filed a suit against Banwari Lal and Swaraj regarding ownership of a parcel of land.

During the legal proceedings, Banwari Lal and Swaraj passed away, but their legal representatives were not brought on record.

The second appeal filed by the legal representatives was dismissed for non-prosecution, and subsequent attempts to restore the appeal faced procedural hurdles.

The High Court ultimately dismissed the second appeal as abated due to the failure to bring the legal representatives on record.

Issues:

Whether the failure to bring the legal representatives of deceased parties on record in a civil appeal leads to abatement.

Whether procedural irregularities can be overlooked in the interest of justice.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized that procedural rules should not be used to defeat the substantial rights of parties. It stated, "Provisions of Order XXII Code of Civil Procedure are not penal in nature. It is a rule of procedure and substantial rights of the parties cannot be defeated by pedantic approach by observing strict adherence to the procedural aspects of law."

The Court referred to previous judgments to support its stance, highlighting that the purpose of legal procedures is to facilitate justice and not to penalize parties for procedural errors. It stated, "Procedure is meant only to facilitate the administration of justice and not to defeat the same."

Conclusion, the Court allowed the appeal and issued directions to restore the second appeal and include the legal representatives of the deceased parties. It emphasized the importance of balancing procedural rules with the fundamental principles of justice and fairness.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as amended in 2000, concerning the determination of assessable value of excisable goods. The specific question pertains to whether sales tax, cash discount, and volume discount are deductible for arriving at the assessable value.

Issues:

Whether cash discount is deductible from the sale price to determine the value of excisable goods at the time of their removal.

Whether the matters concerning volume discount and sales tax were rightly remitted back to the Tribunal for further consideration.

Held:

The court observes that the fundamental principle under Section 4 remains unchanged despite amendments. The value of excisable goods must be determined only at the time of removal. This principle has been consistent even after amendments, with changes made only to the definition of "place of removal.

The concept of "transaction value" introduced by the amendment means that the value of goods is determined individually for each transaction but still at the time of removal. The expression "when sold" refers to the agreement of sale, not the actual time of sale. Cash discount, being known at or before the clearance of goods, must be deducted from the sale price to determine the value of excisable goods at the time of removal.

Decision: The court holds that cash discount is deductible from the sale price to determine the value of excisable goods at the time of removal. However, the matters concerning volume discount and sales tax were rightly remitted back to the Tribunal for further consideration.

Facts:

A plot of land was allotted to the appellant's mother by respondent no. 4-Society.

After her death, respondent no. 4-Society unilaterally executed a Deed of Extinguishment canceling the allotment.

Subsequently, the society executed a registered sale deed in favor of other parties.

The appellant sought cancellation of the Deed of Extinguishment, but the Sub-Registrar and the Inspector General (Registration) rejected his requests, citing their limited jurisdiction under the Registration Act.

Issues:

Whether the authorities under the Registration Act had jurisdiction to cancel the Deed of Extinguishment and subsequent sale deeds.

Whether the High Court appropriately exercised its jurisdiction in this matter.

Held:

The Supreme Court, through Justice Dipak Misra, referred to the Thota Ganga Laxmi case, which held that a cancellation deed cannot be executed or registered based on a specific rule. However, since there was no such rule in Madhya Pradesh, he suggested a larger bench consider whether the principle laid down in Thota Ganga Laxmi should apply.

Justice V. Gopala Gowda criticized the High Court for not properly examining the documents and stated that the extinguishment deed could not have been registered by the Sub-Registrar. He emphasized the need for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to annul the extinguishment deed and subsequent transactions.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and quashed the extinguishment deed and subsequent sale deeds. Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were directed to vacate the property and compensate the appellant with Rs.10 lakhs for the injustice caused.

Facts:

The case revolved around an auction notice issued by the Managing Director, Punjab State Leather Development Corporation Ltd., concerning several properties, with two being the subject of contention.

The Respondents/Writ Petitioners had deposited earnest money and bid amounts marginally above the reserve prices set by the Competent Authority.

Despite the highest bids, the Appellant decided to re-auction the properties, citing marginal difference from the reserve prices and complaints from a third party.

Issues:

Whether the decision to re-auction the properties was justified.

Whether the government is obligated to accept the highest bid above the reserve price in every case.

Held:

The court held that every administrative decision must be comprehensive and self-sustaining, with reasons clearly stated.

The decision to re-auction lacked sufficient justification and rationalization.

While the government is not bound to accept the highest bid, reasons must be provided for any deviation.

The court balanced the interests of both parties and directed the respondents to pay the price of the land at prevailing circle rates, minus the sums already paid, within ninety days, with the appellant to convey the land accordingly.

The appeals were disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.