Facts:

ECL Finance Ltd. filed a contempt petition against Harikishan Shankarji Gudipati for allegedly not honoring a consent decree.

The contempt petition was admitted by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay, and notice was issued to the respondents.

Respondents filed an intra-court appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, against the admission of the contempt petition.

Issues:

The maintainability of the intra-court appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Held:

The Court clarified that an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is maintainable only against an order imposing punishment for contempt.

Orders declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, initiating proceedings for contempt, dropping proceedings for contempt, or acquitting/exonerating the contemnor are not appealable under Section 19.

The Court rejected the contention that the learned Single Judge had already made up his mind to punish the respondents, clarifying that issuing notice in a contempt petition is only a preliminary stage to consider the case on its merits.

The impugned order passed by the Division Bench was set aside.

The Court requested the learned Single Judge to consolidate the execution petition and contempt proceedings to determine the amount payable by the respondents in terms of the decree.

The parties were encouraged to settle their disputes.

Facts:

Consent agreements were entered into in 1989 for land acquisition, but the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued in 1996.

Consent awards were passed in 1997, based on consent forms obtained in 1989.

Allegation of fraud by the appellants, stating that signatures were obtained on blank consent forms.

Dispute arose over the validity of the consent agreements and the determination of compensation.

Issues:

Validity of consent agreements signed in 1989.

Determination of compensation based on the prevailing market rate in 1997.

Held:

The Court held that it would be unfair to enforce consent agreements from 1989, given the significant delay in issuing the acquisition notification.

Compensation should be determined based on the prevailing market rate in 1997, not the date of the original consent agreements.

The relevant date for compensation calculation is the issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act.

The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the reference court's determination of compensation at the rate prevailing in 1997 was restored.

The appellants were awarded costs, to be paid by the respondents. The appeals are allowed.

Facts:

The landlord appealed against the High Court's judgment upholding the tenant's right to purchase land under Section 32G of the Act.

The tenant was in possession of the land since 01.04.1957, and the landlord retired from the Armed Forces on 10.12.1959.

The tenant failed to purchase the land within the specified period, but the High Court held the right to purchase still valid.

Issues:

Whether the tenant's right to purchase the land under Section 32G was valid despite the landlord's failure to terminate the tenancy within the prescribed period.

Applicability of Chapter IIIAA introduced by an amendment in 1964 to the rights of the parties.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its interpretation and application of the law. It was ruled that Chapter IIIAA introduced in 1964 did not apply to the case as the landlord's retirement predated its introduction. Therefore, the tenant's right to purchase the land was not valid, and the landlord had the right to terminate the tenancy under Section 32P of the Act. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Six FIRs were registered against various Cooperative Housing Societies in Gujarat for alleged offenses under multiple sections of the Indian Penal Code. The accused, members of these societies, filed Criminal Applications in the High Court seeking to quash five of the FIRs, arguing that they were repetitive and identical to the first FIR. The High Court quashed the five FIRs, considering them overlapping with the first FIR. The appellants, feeling aggrieved by this decision, appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the five FIRs.

Whether the FIRs were indeed repetitive and identical to the first FIR.

Whether there was sufficient ground to quash the FIRs at the investigation stage.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision to quash the five FIRs was not justified. The Court disagreed with the reasoning of the High Court and emphasized the need for thorough investigation into each Cooperative Society's affairs. The Court noted that while there were overlapping allegations, they were insufficient to warrant quashing the FIRs at the investigation stage. It was stated that detailed investigation was necessary to determine the nature of the offenses and the involvement of individuals. The Court cited previous judgments to support its position that police investigation should proceed unless there's sheer absurdity in the allegations or the FIR doesn't prima facie disclose a cognizable offense. Consequently, the appeals filed by the appellants were allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside.

Facts:

The case concerns the interpretation of certain provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, specifically focusing on the interplay between sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 24 and the proviso appended to sub-section (2).

Issues:

The determination of whether the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 24 extends its applicability to sub-section 24(1)(b) or if it is limited solely to sub-section 24(2).

Held:

The court established that sections 24(1) and 24(2) of the Act operate in distinct realms. The proviso to sub-section (2) functions as an exception to the main provision and is not applicable to sub-section 24(1)(b) .

It was clarified that the proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 24 serves the purpose of ensuring compensation to all landholders and preserving land acquisition proceedings. Consequently, it is construed as a proviso to sub-section (2) and not to sub-section 24(1)(b) .

Decision: The court concluded that the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, should be treated as part of sub-section (2) and not sub-section 24(1)(b), based on its intended purpose and legislative intent.

Facts:

The dispute involved two cases filed by the respondents under Section 8 of The Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, against the appellant, concerning possession of a portion of land in Banjara Hills, Hyderabad.

The cases, referred to as LGC No.41/1998 and LGC No.50/2004, were filed with similar claims but resulted in conflicting decisions by the Special Court.

The High Court allowed the respondents' writ petition, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Unsatisfactory trial leading to conflicting decisions.

Failure to club related cases.

Lack of impleading relevant State authorities.

Inadequate consideration of procedural matters.

Misapplication of jurisdiction under Article 227.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals in part and remanded both cases to the Special Court for fresh disposal on merits. The court directed the clubbing of the cases, addition of relevant State authorities as non-applicants, and afforded the parties an opportunity to amend pleadings and submit additional evidence.

The Supreme Court clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case but identified procedural and substantive flaws in the trial process, necessitating a fresh examination of the issues. The Special Court was instructed to render factual and legal findings in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act and without reference to previous judgments.

Facts:

The case involved a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution by the Commission for Judicial Accountability and Reforms (CJAR) on November 8, 2017. The petition raised concerns about an FIR alleging criminal conspiracy and illegal gratification to influence a pending case before the Supreme Court. Another similar writ petition, filed by Kamini Jaiswal, a member of CJAR, was filed on November 9, 2017. Both petitions sought the same relief and were represented by the same set of counsels. The Court, in response to these petitions, had to address issues related to the allocation of benches, forum hunting, and allegations against the judiciary.

Issues:

Whether the Chief Justice of India has the administrative authority to constitute benches.

Whether the filing of two successive petitions with similar reliefs amounts to forum hunting.

Whether requests for recusal of judges are justified.

Held:

The Constitution Bench had previously ruled that the Chief Justice of India is the master of the roster, and any order contrary to this principle is ineffective and not binding. Therefore, the Chief Justice has the authority to constitute benches, as done in this case.( Para 15)

Articles 142 and 144 of the Constitution were deemed not applicable in the present case. The decision of the Constitution Bench, which affirmed the Chief Justice's authority, prevails. The Chief Justice's administrative decision in constituting the bench is binding.( Para 16)

The filing of two successive petitions with similar reliefs was considered a misconceived venture and forum hunting. There was no urgency to file the second petition, and it aimed to manipulate the system, which brought disrepute to the judiciary.( Para 17)

There was a contradiction in the petitioner's plea regarding the involvement of the Chief Justice of India in hearing the matter. The Court emphasized the need to uphold the Chief Justice's authority in assigning cases.( Para 18)

Even when there are allegations against the Chief Justice, it is within his authority to assign cases appropriately. The attempt to avoid the Chief Justice's involvement amounted to forum hunting and was deprecated.( Para 19)

The petitions were considered misconceived as they presupposed that the investigation involved higher judiciary officials, which was not the case. Making unfounded allegations tarnished the judiciary's reputation.( Para 22)

Allegations of conflict of interest and requests for recusal were strongly condemned as attempts at forum hunting and interference with the administration of justice.( Para 23)

The Constitution Bench affirmed the Chief Justice's authority in roster making, and judicial orders cannot override this principle. Attempts to manipulate bench assignments were deemed unethical and unwarranted.( Para 30)

Requests for recusal without reasonable grounds were considered contemptuous and detrimental to the judicial system's integrity. Upholding the dignity of the judiciary was emphasized.( Para 31)

Facts:

The accused, Anil Kumar Yadav, filed a bail application in a case involving charges under Sections 302 and 308 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The Sessions Court granted bail to the accused. Subsequently, the High Court canceled the bail, leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the Sessions Court's grant of bail was justified?

Whether the High Court's decision to cancel the bail was appropriate?

Held:

The Sessions Court considered both the framing of charges and the grant of bail through a common order. However, the considerations for framing charges and granting bail are different. The court opined that it's not desirable to combine these considerations into one order.

While considering the grant of bail, the court should avoid delving into the details of evidence. Instead, it should focus on whether there is a prima facie case against the accused. An exhaustive exploration of the merits of the case should be avoided.

Relevant considerations for granting bail include the seriousness of the offense, the nature of evidence, the likelihood of the accused fleeing, impact on witnesses and society, and the possibility of tampering with evidence.

Mere incarceration duration may not justify bail, especially in serious crimes like murder.

The trial court was at a crucial stage, yet to record the testimony of material witnesses. To ensure a fair trial, the accused should not be enlarged on bail.

The liberty of the accused is a relevant consideration, but it's equally important to consider the impact of their release on witnesses and society.

Decision: The High Court was right in canceling the bail granted by the Sessions Court. The Sessions Court's grant of bail suffered from serious infirmities and was based on irrelevant considerations.

Facts:The appellant, Indian Oil Corporation Limited, imports crude oil into Bihar and converts it into petroleum products. When these products enter the local area of Patna, Entry Tax is paid. The appellant sells some products to other oil marketing companies (OMCs) like BPCL and HPCL from its Patna branch.

Issues:

The appellant's claim for set off of VAT against Entry Tax paid upon sales to OMCs.

The interpretation of Section 3(2) of the Bihar Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use, or Sale Therein Act, 1993 is central to the dispute.

Held:The five conditions necessary for the claim of set off under Section 3(2). These conditions include the liability to pay tax under the VAT Act, incurring tax liability at specified rates, and the reduction of tax liability to the extent of tax paid under the Act.

Confirms the fulfillment of Condition (i) as the appellant is a registered dealer liable to pay tax under the VAT Act.

Discusses the non-fulfillment of Condition (ii), stating that the appellant, though an importer of scheduled goods, is not liable to pay VAT as per Bihar's notification.

onfirms the non-fulfillment of Condition (iii) due to the absence of a VAT levy on the appellant.

Elaborates on Condition (iv), highlighting the requirement for the sale of imported scheduled goods by the appellant, which is not met when sales are made to BPCL and HPCL.

Addresses Condition (v), emphasizing that the set off is person-specific, not goods-specific, which the appellant fails to meet.

Dismisses the appellant's argument of discriminatory treatment, clarifying that differential treatment between VAT set off and Entry Tax does not constitute clear and hostile discrimination.

Directs the appellant to approach the Appellate Tribunal with relevant documents to challenge the demand notices issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.

Decision:The Court rules against the appellant's claim for set off of VAT against Entry Tax and provides an opportunity to challenge the demand notices concerning Entry Tax payments.