Facts:

The National Highway Authority of India awarded a contract for the maintenance of a Project Highway on a BOT basis to M/s. T.K. (Concessionaire).

Subsequently, the Concessionaire awarded the work to M/s. UE (EPC Contractor), who then entered into a Construction agreement with the respondent (M/S. Teachtrans Construction India Private Limited) to execute the works.

A dispute arose between the appellant (Elite Engineering and Construction) and the respondent regarding the execution of the work.

The appellant invoked arbitration, contending that the arbitration clause from the agreement between the EPC Contractor and the respondent was implicitly incorporated into their contract.

The respondent contested the existence of an arbitration agreement between them.

Issues:

Whether the arbitration clause from the agreement between the EPC Contractor and the respondent was incorporated into the contract between the appellant and the respondent.

The proper interpretation of the relevant clauses in the contract between the parties.

Held:

The Supreme Court cited Section 7(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which allows an arbitration clause in an independent document to be imported into a contract by reference. However, such incorporation is valid only if the reference clearly makes the arbitration clause a part of the contract.

The Court agreed with the High Court's interpretation, stating that the intention was not to make the arbitration clause a part of the contract between the appellant and the respondent. The clauses referenced in the contract only incorporated specific conditions and sub-conditions related to the works and quality, not the arbitration clause.

The Court emphasized that clauses referring to termination are distinct from those related to dispute resolution. Disputes may arise independently of contract termination and are a separate matter. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that the arbitration clause was not incorporated into the contract between the appellant and the respondent.

Facts:

The Supreme Court issued an interim order on 9 February 2018, regarding the composition of the Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC) and the terms of office for members of various tribunals.

Suggestions were filed during the hearing, and modifications were suggested by the Attorney General, which were accepted by the Court.

The Court analyzed the status of the selection process for various tribunals based on information provided by the Attorney General.

Issues:

Whether the interim directions issued by the Supreme Court on 9 February 2018 regarding the selection process for tribunals should be upheld.

How the selection process for various tribunals should proceed in light of the interim directions.

Held:

The Court held that the interim directions regarding the composition of SCSC and appointment terms for members of tribunals, as issued on 9 February 2018, shall be upheld.

The selection process for tribunals where substantial progress has been made, such as the Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT), and the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), shall proceed unhindered by the interim directions.

The selection process for the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) shall proceed for judicial members unhindered, while directions of the previous order shall apply for administrative members.

The selection processes for the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC), and other tribunals shall continue unaffected by the interim directions.

Recommendations made by SCSCs for the appointment of Chairpersons and members of tribunals shall be processed further without being affected by the interim directions.

Facts:

The State Government issued a notification for the expansion of port limits under Section 5 of the Indian Ports Act, 1908, citing public interest.

The appellant company, utilizing a captive jetty, challenged this expansion, arguing it would adversely affect lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed by them.

The High Court dismissed the appellant's petition, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the notification for the expansion of port limits under Section 5 of the Indian Ports Act, 1908, was valid.

Whether the appellant company had a legitimate expectation regarding the reclaimed lands.

Whether the appellant company had any rights to the reclaimed lands.

Held:

The Court held that the notification for the expansion of port limits was valid under Section 5 of the Indian Ports Act, 1908.

The appellant company did not have a legitimate expectation regarding the reclaimed lands based on the correspondence between the parties.

The appellant company did not have any rights to the reclaimed lands, as they were reclaimed illegally without prior permission under the Gujarat Maritime Board Act, 1981.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, upholding the validity of the notification for the expansion of port limits and rejecting the appellant company's claims regarding legitimate expectation and rights to reclaimed lands.

Facts:

The case involved commissioned officers of the Army, Air Force, and Navy who had retired before January 1, 1996, seeking the grant of a higher pay scale based on a government order dated November 21, 1997.

Issues:

Interpretation of government orders regarding pay scales and allowances for Armed Forces officers.

Determination of entitlement to pensionary benefits for officers who retired before January 1, 1996.

Held:

The government order dated November 21, 1997, sanctioned the improvement of pay scales for officers still in service as of January 1, 1996. It did not provide for benefits to officers who had retired before that date.

Specific provisions of the orders indicated that the benefits were not applicable to officers who retired before January 1, 1996.

Subsequent orders, including one dated June 7, 1999, relating to pensionary benefits for commissioned officers, did not support the interpretation that retired officers before January 1, 1996, were entitled to the benefits provided in the November 21, 1997 order.

There was no discrimination in pensionary benefits between pre-January 1, 1996, and post-January 1, 1996, retirees.

Decision: The court upheld the orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal that retired officers before January 1, 1996, were not entitled to pensionary benefits under the November 21, 1997 order. It set aside any decisions by the Tribunal that extended such benefits to retired officers.

Facts:

Advanta India Ltd. filed a complaint against B.N. Shivanna, accusing him of various acts of misconduct.

The State Bar Council of Karnataka found Shivanna guilty and debarred him from practicing for life.

Shivanna appealed to the BCI, which reduced the punishment to a temporary debarment of 18 months and imposed a fine.

Shivanna filed a review petition under Section 48AA of the Advocates Act, 1961, seeking a review of the BCI's order.

Issues:

Whether the BCI had the authority to review its earlier decision.

Whether Shivanna was denied adequate opportunity to cross-examine a witness during the initial proceedings.

Held:

The Court reinstated the original order of the BCI, which imposed a temporary debarment on Shivanna. The Court found that the BCI's decision to review its earlier order exceeded the scope of its review powers. The Court emphasized that while the review powers of the Disciplinary Committee/BCI are not limited to those of a civil court, they cannot extend to becoming an appellate authority over its own previous orders. Therefore, the BCI's decision to review its previous findings and overturn them without sufficient grounds was deemed unsustainable.

The Court held that revisiting the issue on merits again on the pretext that Shivanna was not granted proper opportunities to cross-examine a witness was beyond review jurisdiction.

The Court also noted that Shivanna's deliberate delays in the proceedings further supported the reinstatement of the original order. Any modification of the punishment would be subject to the outcome of another appeal related to the case (Civil Appeal No. 273 of 2012).

Facts:

Title Suit No. 406/1973 was filed seeking partition of joint family properties. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, but the defendants filed a first appeal against this judgment. During the appeal, the defendants filed applications under Order LXI Rule 27 CPC for acceptance of additional evidence. The High Court allowed these applications and proceeded to hear the appeal, ultimately setting aside the trial court's judgment.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in admitting additional evidence without granting the opposing party an opportunity to rebut it.

Held:

The Court emphasized the importance of procedural fairness, highlighting the necessity of granting the opposing party an opportunity to rebut new evidence admitted in appellate courts. Referring to previous judgments, the Court held that the High Court erred in not granting the plaintiffs an opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal or explain alleged admissions contained in the additional evidence.

The Court directed the High Court to reconsider the appeal afresh, ensuring procedural fairness and expeditious resolution of the matter. It urged the High Court to conclude the proceedings within six months from the date of the judgment.

Facts:

The respondents, unsuccessful candidates in the Civil Services (Preliminary) Examination, 2010, sought disclosure of marks awarded to them, including raw and scaled marks, cut-off marks, scaling methodology, model answers, and complete results of all candidates. The High Court directed the UPSC to provide the requested information within fifteen days. UPSC appealed against the High Court's decision, arguing that the court didn't correctly interpret the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) and the binding decisions of the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court correctly interpreted the RTI Act and Supreme Court decisions regarding the disclosure of marks in the Civil Services Examination.

Whether the information sought by the respondents can be mechanically furnished or if there are inherent limitations based on public interest and the integrity of the examination system.

Held:

The Court acknowledged the need to balance the right to information with other public interests, particularly in sensitive matters such as the disclosure of examination marks. It emphasized that while the RTI Act confers the right to information, exemptions under Sections 8, 9, and 11 should be interpreted purposively to harmonize conflicting interests.

The Court recognized UPSC's concerns regarding the potential negative implications of disclosing evaluated answer sheets, including challenges to evaluation and erosion of faith in the system. Therefore, it held that the information sought could not be mechanically furnished but left open the possibility for the respondents to establish a case for disclosure based on public interest and other relevant parameters.

The Court set aside the High Court's orders and dismissed the writ petitions, affirming that the discretion of the courts to determine disclosure based on the specific circumstances of each case. This decision aligns with the principles laid down in earlier cases such as Central Board of Secondary Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay and Ors., (2011) 8 SCC 497, and Prashant Ramesh Chakkarwar v. UPSC, (2013) 12 SCC 489, where the Court emphasized the balance between the right to information and other public interests.

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) against an order passed in a Writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The appeal stemmed from an order of the Appellate Officer (District Judge) under the Public Premises Act, which was initially challenged through a Writ petition.

Issues:

The maintainability of the LPA against the order passed in the Writ petition under Articles 226/227, especially concerning orders under the Public Premises Act.

Held:

The Court ruled that the Writ petition against the order of the Appellate Officer (District Judge) under the Public Premises Act is essentially a petition against the order of a civil judge. Such orders are subject to scrutiny by the High Court only under Article 227 and not under Article 226.

The power exercised by the Appellate Officer under Section 9 of the Public Premises Act is judicial and not executive. The Appellate Officer, being the District Judge or designated judicial officer, acts as a pre-existing judicial authority in the district and not as a persona designata.

An order passed by a Civil Court is subject to scrutiny by the High Court only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, not under Article 226. Therefore, no writ can be issued against an order passed by the Civil Court, and hence, no Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable.

The Division Bench of the High Court should have dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal as not maintainable. Without proper analysis, it could not assume jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. However, the respondents were given liberty to challenge the decision of the Single Judge through appropriate remedy.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over land between Murti Devi and Siri Bhagwan.

The trial court dismissed the suit filed by Murti Devi and her daughter.

The first appellate court reversed this decision and decreed in favor of Murti Devi and her daughter.

Siri Bhagwan filed a second appeal in the High Court, where Surat Singh, a subsequent purchaser of the land, had become a party to the proceedings.

The High Court allowed the second appeal without hearing Surat Singh.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in allowing the second appeal without hearing all parties involved.

Whether the High Court violated the procedure laid down in Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code by framing a substantial question of law for the first time in its final judgment.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed procedural irregularities in allowing the second appeal and framing a substantial question of law in its final judgment without hearing all parties involved.

The Court emphasized the mandatory nature of the requirements under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, which includes framing substantial questions of law at the time of admission of the appeal.

Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case back to the High Court for fresh consideration.

The High Court was directed to hear the appeal afresh, framing proper substantial questions of law after hearing the appellant, and decide the appeal on those questions.

The Court urged the High Court to expedite the proceedings, ideally completing them within six months from the date of receipt of the Supreme Court's judgment.