Facts:

The case involved a suit seeking eviction, rent, and damages initially filed before the Small Causes Court. It was later transferred to the Additional District Judge due to the property's value exceeding the Small Causes Court's pecuniary jurisdiction. Subsequently, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court was raised. Defendants did not object to the jurisdiction of the Additional District Judge post-amendment.

Issues:

Whether the Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to decide the suit after the pecuniary jurisdiction amendment.

The interpretation of relevant statutes regarding the jurisdiction of Small Causes Courts and Additional District Judges.

The applicability of Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) regarding objections to jurisdiction.

Held:

The legislative scheme delineates that small cause cases up to the value of Rs. 1 lakh should be taken cognizance by Small Cause Courts presided by Civil Judges, and cases exceeding this value by District Judge or Additional District Judge.

Despite the District Judge or Additional District Judge having unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction, suits up to Rs. 1 lakh should be instituted in Small Cause Courts presided by Civil Judges. The legislative intent and scheme should be followed to avoid confusion and inconsistency.

Following the amendment, the Small Causes Court presided by the District Judge or Additional District Judge lacked jurisdiction to decide suits valued below Rs. 1 lakh.

The proviso to Section 15(2) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, specifies that suits up to Rs. 25,000 (later amended to Rs. 1 lakh) shall be cognizable by Small Causes Courts. The use of the word "cognizable" encompasses the institution, hearing, and decision of a case.

The statement of objects and reasons for the amendment cannot override the express language of the statutory provisions. The amendment aimed to increase pecuniary jurisdiction but does not affect the legislative intent regarding the jurisdiction of Small Cause Courts.

Section 21 of the CPC precludes a party from raising objections to the competence of the court regarding pecuniary limits if not raised earlier, unless it resulted in a failure of justice.

The High Court erred in allowing the Revision without considering Section 21 of the CPC, which aims to avoid retrial of cases on merit based on technical objections.

Decision: Despite lacking jurisdiction post-amendment, no interference was warranted in the judgment of the Additional District Judge due to the application of Section 21 of the CPC.

Facts:

The petitioner, President of the Madhya Pradesh Congress Committee, sought reliefs related to VVPAT verification and the format of draft electoral rolls.

Allegations were made regarding discrepancies in voter lists, including duplicate or fake entries.

The petitioner demanded draft electoral rolls in searchable text format to facilitate scrutiny for errors.

Issues:

Whether the Election Commission is obligated to provide draft electoral rolls in a searchable text format.

Whether VVPAT verification should be conducted at random polling stations.

Held:

The Court interpreted the Election Manual's provision on draft electoral rolls, finding no requirement for them to be in a searchable format.

The decision to provide draft electoral rolls in non-searchable image format was upheld, considering voter privacy and prevention of data mining.

The petitioner's request for VVPAT verification was dismissed, citing previous rulings and the Election Commission's assurances.

The writ petitions were consequently dismissed.

Facts:

The case revolves around the classification of the Urban Improvement Trust (the assessee) under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The Urban Improvement Trust was constituted under the Rajasthan Improvement Act, 1959, to undertake development activities in urban areas.

Issues:

Whether the Urban Improvement Trust qualifies as a "local authority" under clause (iii) of Explanation to Section 10(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Whether the Trust can be considered a "Municipal Committee" as per the provisions of the Acts mentioned.

Held:

The court examined the provisions of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, and the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, to determine the nature and functions of the Urban Improvement Trust. It observed that the Trust undertakes development activities in urban areas but is not constituted in place of municipalities or municipal boards.

The court noted that while the Trust may perform certain limited powers of the municipal board, it does not transform into a municipality or municipal board itself.

The assessee claimed to be a "Municipal Committee" under clause (iii) of Explanation to Section 10(2). However, the court observed that the Trust's functions and powers do not align with those of a Municipal Committee.

Provisions such as Sections 47, 48, 61 to 64, and 105 of the Rajasthan Improvement Act grant certain powers to the Trust but do not change its classification as a Municipal Committee.

Decision: The court concluded that the Urban Improvement Trust did not qualify as a Municipal Committee within the meaning of Section 10(20) Explanation (iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, the assessee's claim was rejected.

Facts:

Contracts were entered into between Vedanta Ltd (Appellant) and Shenzhen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co Ltd (Respondent) for the construction of a power plant.

Disputes arose, leading to the termination of contracts by the Respondent.

The disputes were referred to arbitration, and the arbitral tribunal awarded various amounts to the parties.

Vedanta Ltd filed objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act before the Delhi High Court, which were rejected.

Vedanta Ltd filed an appeal under Section 37 of the Act before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, which was also dismissed.

Vedanta Ltd filed a Special Leave Petition to challenge the judgment of the Division Bench, primarily focusing on the interest rate awarded by the arbitral tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the interest rate awarded by the arbitral tribunal was justified.

Whether the imposition of a higher interest rate after 120 days was arbitrary.

Whether the interest rate on the EUR component should be based on LIBOR + 3 percentage points.

Held:

The interest rate of 15% post-120 days on the entire sum awarded was deleted.

A uniform rate of 9% interest was applied to the INR component until realization.

For the EUR component, interest was to be calculated based on LIBOR + 3 percentage points on the date of the award until realization.

The appeal was disposed of in accordance with the modifications made to the interest rate awarded by the arbitral tribunal.

Facts:

The appellant, Uppala Bixam @ Bixmaiah, was convicted under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. The case rested on circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of the deceased's body and the sale of sheep allegedly belonging to the deceased by the appellant.

Issues:

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt.

Held:

The Court held: "The circumstance of recovery of the dead body allegedly based on the alleged confessional statement may raise a suspicion against the appellant-accused that he might be involved in the incident but mere suspicion itself cannot take itself the evidence of proof. In our view conviction under Section 302/201 I.P.C. cannot be sustained, more so, when the motive attributed for the murder has been theft of the sheep, and the accused-appellant has been acquitted of the charge of theft."

Therefore, the Court set aside the previous conviction and acquitted the appellant of all charges, ordering their immediate release unless required in another case. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which was inserted by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018. The dispute centers on whether this section is retrospective in nature. Additionally, the case delves into the application of the Limitation Act, 1963 to applications filed under Sections 7 and 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Issues:

Whether Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is retrospective.

Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to applications filed under Sections 7 and 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Held:

The Court held that Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 must be construed as retrospective. This is because the section is clarificatory of the law and procedural in nature. Construing it as retrospective is essential to serve its object, as otherwise, applications attempting to resurrect time-barred claims would not be governed by the law of limitation.

Referring to the Insolvency Law Committee Report of March 2018, the Court emphasized that the legislature did not intend to enable creditors to revive claims that had become time-barred. The Code cannot be triggered for debts that were time-barred, as it could lead to absurd consequences, such as the removal of the present Board of Directors of the corporate debtor and potential liquidation. Thus, the expression "debt due" in the Code refers only to debts that are not time-barred.

The Court clarified that the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to applications filed under Sections 7 and 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code from its inception. Article 137 of the Limitation Act is attracted, and the right to sue accrues when a default occurs. Applications filed beyond three years from the date of default are barred under Article 137, except where Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applied to condone the delay.

Decision: The Court remanded the appeals to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) for further proceedings consistent with the interpretation provided in this judgment.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal by Pradeep Bisoi against his conviction under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code.

The incident pertains to an attack on the brother of PW-1, the informant, by the appellant-accused, resulting in the victim's death later in the hospital.

The appellant contended that the statement of the injured-deceased, recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be treated as a dying declaration since his death occurred after more than three months.

Issues:

Whether a statement recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC can be treated as a dying declaration after the death of the person who made the statement.

Held:

Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 deals with cases where statements of relevant facts by a deceased or unavailable person are relevant. Sections 161 and 162 of the CrPC deal with the examination of witnesses by police and the use of statements made to the police in evidence, respectively.

Sub-section (2) of Section 162 of the CrPC provides an exception to what is laid down in sub-section (1). The statement recorded by the police under Section 161, falling within the provisions of clause (1) of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, is relevant and admissible. In this case, the statement recorded by the Investigating Officer on December 5, 1990, was found to be relevant and admissible by both the trial court and the High Court.

The injuries on the body of the deceased fully supported the prosecution's case. The statement made by the deceased on December 5, 1990, was corroborated by the injuries on his body and the sequence of events as claimed by the prosecution.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the judgment of the trial court as well as the High Court in relying on the statement of the injured-deceased recorded by the Investigating Officer. The evidence presented, including the statement and the injuries, supported the prosecution's case.

Facts:

Respondent No.1 filed a Civil Suit against the appellants for cancellation of sale deeds and relief of permanent injunction.

The suit was decreed against the appellants, who subsequently filed an appeal.

The appeal was allowed by the First Appellate Court, remanding the matter back to the trial court.

Respondent No.1 filed a Writ Petition against the appellate court's order, which was dismissed after nearly fifteen years.

Despite several opportunities, the appellants did not appear in the trial court, and the suit was decreed ex-parte.

The appellants filed an appeal against the decree, seeking condonation of a delay of 349 days under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Issues:

Whether the delay of 349 days in filing the appeal should be condoned.

Whether the appellants had full knowledge of the proceedings and the disposal of the Writ Petition.

Held:

The Court held that the delay in filing the appeal could not be condoned due to the appellants' negligence and incorrect facts presented in their application. Both the First Appellate Court and the High Court had correctly refused to condone the delay. The Court noted that the appellants had full knowledge of the proceedings and the disposal of the Writ Petition, as evidenced by the order sheets and other materials on record. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved the appellant and eight other accused who were tried for various offenses including criminal conspiracy, murder, and other sections of the IPC. The incident arose from threats made through posters found in Coimbatore, leading to the murder of an individual named Siva.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was rightly convicted for the offense of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B of the IPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined the evidence presented by the prosecution, particularly the testimony of two witnesses, PW-3 and PW-4, who provided crucial information about a meeting held at the appellant's house where the plan to kill Siva was discussed.

The Court discussed the legal principles related to criminal conspiracy as defined under Section 120-A and Section 120-B of the IPC. It was established that the appellant was a member of the conspiracy to murder Siva, as evidenced by the meeting held at his house where the plan was formulated.

The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the testimony of the witnesses was unreliable due to alleged contradictions, finding their evidence consistent and credible. The Court emphasized that the appellant had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses but failed to do so, undermining his ability to challenge their testimony on appeal. Based on the evidence presented, the Court concluded that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was part of the criminal conspiracy to kill Siva.

The Court upheld the appellant's conviction and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him under Section 120-B read with Section 302 of the IPC. The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's arguments.