Facts:

The appellant raised concerns regarding the considerable duration of Tribunal proceedings under the M.P. Act, 1983, sometimes extending up to five years or more. This prompted the court to consider whether directions were necessary to ensure timeliness in such proceedings.

Issues:

Whether any direction was required to expedite the disposal of proceedings under the M.P. Act, 1983, in line with its objective of providing a speedy dispute resolution mechanism.

Held:

The court held that while the suggested timelines were not mandatory, they should be considered by all parties involved. The State was instructed to monitor the timeliness of proceedings and take prompt action to address any delays. The Chairman of the Tribunal was tasked with ensuring no unreasonable delays occurred and to communicate any shortage of benches to the State Government. If unreasonable delays persisted, either party could approach the Chief Justice of the High Court for necessary intervention.

Additionally, the court emphasized the need for expeditious disposal of revision petitions before the High Court, not exceeding two years. Finally, if the suggested timelines could not be achieved, the court suggested considering statutory amendments to provide remedies through alternative forums.

Facts:

Late T.G. Basuvan left behind three properties - agricultural land and a dwelling house.

Dispute arose between the appellants (daughters of T.G. Basuvan) and respondent No. 1 (brother of the appellants) over the partition of these properties.

The trial court, district court, and High Court dismissed the appellants' suit for partition.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were entitled to partition of ancestral property.

Applicability of the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989, granting equal rights to daughters in coparcenary property.

Held:

The Court held that the appellants were not entitled to a share in coparcenary property due to being married before the 1989 amendment. However, they would inherit through succession upon the death of their parents. The division of property and entitlements of each party were outlined by the Court. Any sales made to respondents would not be disturbed, but the appellants would be entitled to their legitimate share. The appeal was partially allowed, and the parties were left to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The appeal was filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr against Ashoka Infraways Ltd & Anr. The impugned order relied on a judgment which had been overruled by a larger bench of the High Court.

Issues:

The validity of the impugned order in light of the subsequent overruling of the judgment it relied upon.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the impugned order was set aside because the judgment it relied upon had been overruled by a larger bench of the High Court, as stated in the case of Viva Highways Ltd. vs. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation, (2017) 2 MPLJ 681.

The Court further clarified that any pending arbitration proceedings would now be governed by the judgment of the High Court in the aforementioned case.

Facts:The appellant society initially established a college as a secular institution. Later, it sought minority status for the college. The National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (NCMEI) declared the college as a minority educational institution and issued a minority status certificate. Subsequently, the Society and the Governing Body of the College filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the declaration and the issuance of the certificate.

Issues:

Whether the NCMEI had jurisdiction to make the declaration of minority status to the educational institution.

Whether the orders issued by the NCMEI were valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court interpreted Section 11(f) of the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004 broadly, empowering the NCMEI to decide any question related to the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions. This includes the power to declare an institution as a minority educational institution. (Para 16)

While the Amendment Act, 2006 introduced Section 10(1) for granting a no objection certificate to minority educational institutions at their inception, Section 11(f) retains the power for the declaration of minority status to educational institutions at any stage post-establishment. (Para 17)

The fundamental right under Article 30 cannot be waived. The court observed that the acceptance of NCMEI's order by the University of North Bengal binds the parties, and there's no need for a fresh hearing. (Para 22)

The court declared the orders by NCMEI as valid, affirming its jurisdiction to issue a certificate regarding the status of a minority educational institution. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the judgment of the Calcutta High Court is set aside. In view of the above, the present batch of appeals is disposed of. (Para 23 - 24)

Facts:

The case involved an incident where the appellants, along with others, were accused of assaulting the victim, resulting in his death. The prosecution's case relied primarily on the testimony of two key witnesses, PW1 and PW5. However, the Supreme Court found significant contradictions and discrepancies in their testimonies, particularly regarding the genesis of the FIR and the roles attributed to the accused.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the trial court and the High Court erred in convicting the appellants based on assumptions and presumptions rather than credible evidence.

Held:

In view of the contradictions and discrepancies in the testimonies of the key witnesses, as well as the lack of corroborative evidence and support from other prosecution witnesses, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court and the High Court were criticized for convicting the appellants based on assumptions and presumptions rather than credible evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and acquitted the appellants of all charges, overturning their convictions and sentences.

Facts:

The appellant's daughter married respondent No. 2, but due to societal non-acceptance, she lived with the appellant.

The daughter died during a trip with respondent No. 2, allegedly due to a car accident.

The appellant filed an FIR under sections 498-A, 302, and 120-B IPC.

The State Government transferred the case to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

Respondent No. 2 was arrested but granted bail by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to grant bail to respondent No. 2 was appropriate considering the seriousness of the charges against him.

Held:

The Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail to respondent No. 2.

The Court emphasized the limited scope of interference with an order granting bail and the parameters on which such an order can be challenged.

It was noted that the reasons provided by the High Court for granting bail were reasonable and not perverse.

The Court emphasized that the seriousness of the offense alone cannot be the sole ground for denying bail if other compelling circumstances justify its grant.

Reports from agencies such as CRRI, AIIMS, CFSL, and IIT were mentioned, but their evidentiary value was yet to be tested in trial.

The burden of proof lies on the prosecution to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the death was a result of murder and that respondent No. 2 committed the crime.

Relevant factors were considered by the High Court while granting bail, and the order was supported by reasoning.

The Court highlighted that initially, there was no suspicion after the incident, as postmortem was conducted in the presence of family members and doctors who did not raise any doubts.

The delay in lodging the FIR (nine days after the incident) was also considered.

Material collected by the CBI during investigation was primarily documentary and based on photographs, which needed to be tested during trial.

Decision: The appeals challenging the grant of bail to respondent No. 2 were dismissed by the Court.

Facts:

An agreement was made between Puri Constructions Pvt Ltd and the State of Madhya Pradesh for the construction of an Assembly building in Madhya Pradesh.

Disputes arose from this agreement, leading to arbitration proceedings and the issuance of an award.

Execution proceedings were initiated by Puri Constructions Pvt Ltd, and the matter was taken up before the High Court of Delhi.

Issues:

The enforceability of the decree depended on the outcome of another pending appeal (FAO (OS) No. 23/1998) between the parties.

Treatment of the arbitration proceedings and their transfer under the M.P. Act.

Held:

The Division Bench, in an order dated 5th July 2012, stated that the enforceability of the decree would depend on the outcome of another pending appeal between the parties.

Given that the award had been issued long ago and not challenged by the respondents, and the matter was still at the execution stage, the Court directed that the award should be treated as if rendered under the M.P. Act.

Therefore, the Court ordered that the pending arbitration proceedings be transferred to the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal under the M.P. Act, to be handled according to its provisions and the law.

Decision: The appeal was disposed of accordingly, and the parties were instructed to appear before the High Court/Tribunal for further proceedings on 9th July 2018.

Facts:

The dispute centered around 500 square yards of land in Survey No.87 of Lingampally Village, Chikkadapally Mandal, Hyderabad District. The appellants claimed ownership of the land, while the respondents were accused of land grabbing. Litigation ensued over several decades, spanning multiple suits and proceedings in civil courts and eventually before the Special Court established under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.

Issues:

Jurisdiction of civil courts versus Special Courts under the Act.

Ownership of the disputed land.

Allegations of land grabbing against the respondents.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellants' repeated litigation over several decades, despite the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, was unwarranted. The Court found that the appellants failed to establish their ownership of the disputed land and could not prove the respondents' involvement in land grabbing. Additionally, there was ambiguity regarding the location, extent, and boundaries of the alleged grabbed land.

The Court emphasized that the appellants' persistence in pursuing litigation in civil courts, even after the enactment of the Act, was misguided. The Court opined that the appellants should have approached the Special Court under the Act if they believed that civil courts lacked jurisdiction. The Court dismissed the appeal and imposed costs of Rs. 50,000 on the appellants for engaging in continuous and fruitless litigation.

Facts:

The case involved Gangotri Enterprises Ltd. as the appellant and Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation and another as the respondents. The matter pertained to the interpretation of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 ("1983 Act").

Issues:

The interpretation of the term "dispute" as defined in Section 2(d) of the 1983 Act and the eligibility criteria for arbitrators under Section 4(3)(iii) of the same Act.

Held:

The judgment clarified the definition of "dispute" under Section 2(d) of the 1983 Act, stating that it includes a claim of ascertained money valued at Rupees 50,000 or more arising from the execution or non-execution of a works contract. It further clarified that "ascertained money" encompasses both the amount already determined and the amount that may be determined during proceedings based on the claims or counterclaims of the parties.

Additionally, the judgment referred to Section 4(3)(iii) of the 1983 Act, stating that an employee of a party to the dispute cannot act as an arbitrator. The provision specifies qualifications for appointment as a member of the Tribunal, excluding employees of the concerned department to which the dispute relates.

The appeal was disposed of accordingly. Delay in related special leave petitions was condoned, and they were disposed of in line with the order in another related special leave petition. Pending applications were also disposed of.