Facts:

The case involved the kidnapping of a seven-year-old boy named Anurag from a marriage reception. Ransom calls were made demanding Rs. 10,00,000. The police investigation led to the recovery of the boy and the arrest of the appellant and another accused in Dausa, Rajasthan. During the trial, several witnesses testified, including the complainant, the child witness (Anurag), police personnel, and others.

Issues:

The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 364(A) read with Section 114 IPC, raising various arguments, including discrepancies in witness testimonies, acquittal in related cases, and lack of evidence regarding the SIM card used for ransom calls.

Held:

The Supreme Court carefully analyzed the evidence presented and rejected the appellant's arguments. It found that the testimony of the child witness was natural and credible, corroborated by other evidence.

The court also addressed discrepancies in statements and highlighted the minor nature of these inconsistencies, emphasizing that they did not undermine the prosecution's case. Additionally, the court noted that acquittals in related cases did not affect the appellant's conviction in the present case. It found that the prosecution had successfully proved the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the appellant's conviction under Section 364(A) read with Section 114 IPC. The court commended the assistance provided by the senior advocate and amicus curiae in the case.

Facts:

Unichem Laboratories Ltd., the appellant, owned industrial quarters allotted under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Housing Act, 1955.

Rani Devi, the respondent, occupied one such quarter initially allotted to her husband, Dharam Dev Yadav, who was an employee of the appellant.

Appellant filed a civil suit seeking eviction of the respondent from the quarter after Dharam Dev Yadav's retirement.

Issues:

Jurisdiction of Civil Court to try eviction suits concerning quarters allotted under the Act.

Interpretation of Section 13 of the Act regarding the bar on civil suits.

Existence of a tenancy agreement between the employer and the employee regarding the quarter.

Effect of retirement on the employee's occupancy rights and the right of the respondent to occupy post-retirement.

Held:

The Supreme Court held the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try eviction suits concerning quarters allotted under the Act, as Section 21 was deleted in 1972.

Section 13 of the Act does not bar civil suits filed by employers for eviction; it only restricts workers from challenging orders passed under the Act in civil courts.

A contractual relationship akin to a tenancy existed between the employer and the employee regarding the quarter.

Upon retirement, the employee's tenancy ended, and he was obligated to vacate the quarter. The respondent, not being an employee or an allottee, had no independent right to occupy the quarter post-retirement.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the trial court's decree for eviction. The respondents were given three months to vacate the quarter and were required to deposit the decreetal amount and three months' rent as damages for use and occupation.

Facts:

The respondents filed a civil suit against the appellants concerning a piece of land, seeking relief through a permanent injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, but this decision was reversed by the first appellate court. The respondents then appealed to the High Court, which ruled in their favor. Dissatisfied with this decision, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the issue of title to the property was relevant to the grant of permanent injunction.

Whether the High Court erred in framing substantial questions of law and in its subsequent examination of the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the issue of title to the property was relevant to the grant of permanent injunction, as indicated by the prayers for relief made by the plaintiffs in the suit.

The Court found that the High Court had erred in framing the substantial questions of law and in its examination of the case. Therefore, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case back to the High Court for reconsideration.

The High Court was directed to reframe the substantial questions of law and to consider the case afresh in light of the pleadings and the findings of the lower courts. Additionally, the Supreme Court urged the High Court to expedite the proceedings due to the age of the appeal.

Facts:

Cooperative Housing Societies 'B' and 'S' were placed under liquidation for non-compliance with the Registrar of Cooperative Societies (RCS) directives.

Revival applications for both societies were submitted by individuals not originally associated with them.

Delhi Development Authority (DDA) provisionally allotted land to society 'B' but failed to hand over possession.

Subsequent writ petitions by societies 'B' and 'S' sought direction for possession of allotted plots.

DDA contended that the revival of societies was fraudulent and memberships were not genuine.

Issues:

Whether the revival of Cooperative Housing Societies 'B' and 'S' was legal and memberships genuine.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the builder mafia played a role in reviving the societies. Investigations by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) revealed triable cases against office bearers and officials of RCS.

The revival of societies was initiated by individuals not affiliated with the original societies and funded by builders. The Court deemed this revival illegal as there was no evidence of RCS satisfaction or genuine reasons for liquidation cessation.

The Court concluded that the revival was illegal and memberships not genuine, but acknowledged the possibility of some members being deceived. DDA was directed to refund deposited money to societies with interest, and societies instructed to return this to members to alleviate hardships.

Facts:

The appellants, who were Social Security Assistants (SSAs) transferred from Karnataka/Tamil Nadu regions to Kerala, were challenged by private party respondents regarding their inclusion in the promotion list for the post of EO/AO in the EPFO Kerala region. The dispute revolved around the interpretation of the eligibility rule, which required candidates seeking promotion through departmental competitive examination to have served for five years "in the respective regions."

Issues:

The interpretation of the eligibility rule: whether candidates needed to have served specifically five years in the region where they sought promotion or whether total experience in various regions would suffice.

Held:

The Supreme Court interpreted the rule to mean that candidates must have served a total of five years, inclusive of service in both their earlier and present place of postings. It emphasized that in All India Services, officers are routinely transferred across regions, and the purpose of the rule was to ensure that such officers are not deprived of their experience in the feeder cadre due to transfers. Referring to previous judgments, the Court held:

"In All India Service, the officers are posted from one region to the other in a routine manner. The purpose of the rule is that such officers are not deprived of their experience in the feeder cadre merely because they have been transferred from one place to another."

The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and the Tribunal, and held that the appellants were indeed eligible and qualified for promotion to the post of EO/AO in the Kerala region of the EPFO.

Facts:

The appellant, Power Machines India Limited, was directed by an arbitral award under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, to pay a certain sum to respondent No.3.

Issues:

The main issue revolved around the validity of Rule 5 of the Enterprises Facilitation Council Rules, 2006, which allowed for the recovery of the awarded amount as arrears of land revenue.

The appellant contended that this rule was ultra vires and repugnant to Section 36(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Held:

The court acknowledged the inconsistency between Rule 5 and Section 36(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

However, it held that providing plural remedies is valid, and it's up to the award-holder to choose the preferred remedy.

Both Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and Rule 5 of the Enterprises Facilitation Council Rules intend to achieve the same objective of recovery, albeit through different procedures.

The court upheld the validity of Rule 5, noting its enactment to ensure speedy recovery and prevent small, micro, and medium industries from suffering due to delays in payment.

It also ruled that the procedure for recovery of land revenue under Rule 5 is reasonable and furthers the mandate of the Act.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the validity of Rule 5 of the Enterprises Facilitation Council Rules, 2006, allowing for the recovery of awarded amounts as arrears of land revenue under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006.

Facts:

The dispute arose from the acquisition of land for the expansion of a marketing yard. The acquisition proceedings faced challenges due to non-compliance with statutory requirements such as publication in newspapers and consideration of objections.

Both the Appellant and the landowners appealed against the High Court's decision, which declined to quash the acquisition but adjusted the date of notification for determining compensation.

Issues:

Whether the acquisition proceedings could be sustained despite procedural irregularities, and whether the larger public interest justified upholding the acquisition.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after reviewing the submissions and considering the judgment in Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory, upheld the acquisition proceedings. Despite the infirmities, the Court concluded that the acquisition should not be quashed, taking into account practical difficulties and the rising trend in land prices.

The Court dismissed all appeals, leaving open the option for aggrieved parties to pursue remedies under the 2013 Act before the appropriate forum.

Facts:

The appeal was filed by Steel Authority of India Ltd. against the imposition of anti-dumping duty on imports of graphite electrodes from China. The Designated Authority, Directorate General of Anti-Dumping and Allied Duties, recommended the imposition of the duty based on its findings that the domestic industry was suffering material injury due to dumping of graphite electrodes from exporters in China.

Issues:

The court was to determine the scope and applicability of the appellate jurisdiction under Section 130E(b) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Held:

The court outlined the history of the taxation regime under the Customs Act and discussed the evolution of appellate provisions. It clarified the conditions for admitting an appeal under Section 130E(b), emphasizing that the question raised must have a direct or proximate nexus to the determination of the applicable rate of duty or the value of goods for assessment purposes. Additionally, the question must involve a substantial question of law and the tribunal's decision must not be based on a gross violation of procedure or principles of natural justice.

The court found that the findings of the appellate tribunal were based on due consideration of relevant materials and were factual in nature. Therefore, the court declined to interfere with the tribunal's decision and dismissed the appeal.

Facts:

The appellant, who was elected as Chairman of District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. for a term of three years, continued to hold office beyond the prescribed period.

Issues:

The main issues included the validity of the actions taken by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Sections 76B and 81 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961.

The interpretation of the provisions regarding removal and disqualification of officers from cooperative societies.

Held:

The Court upheld the removal of the appellant from office as per the action initiated under Section 76B(1) of the Act. The removal was based on the Registrar's satisfaction regarding the appellant's misconduct and breach of duties.

The Court declined to act as an appellate court to examine the correctness of the conclusions drawn by the Registrar regarding the charges framed against the appellant. Such an exercise is generally not undertaken, neither by High Courts nor by the Supreme Court.

The Court clarified the distinction between Sections 76B and 81 of the Act, stating that action could be taken against individual officers or the entire committee of a cooperative society. The Registrar has discretionary power to decide which course of action to take.

The Court discussed the provisions of Section 76B(2) regarding the disqualification of officers from holding office. It emphasized that such disqualification can only be imposed after the removal of the officer under Section 76B(1) and that the factual basis for both actions must be the same.

Regarding the disqualification period, the Court noted that while Section 76B(2) allowed for a maximum disqualification period of six years, in this case, the acts leading to the action occurred before the amendment extending the disqualification period. Therefore, the six-year disqualification was not applicable retroactively.