Facts:

The suit property originally belonged to 'PG,' who executed a will in 1971, bequeathing life interest to his sons 'K' and 'B,' and subsequently to the male heirs of his sons. 'B,' on behalf of himself and his minor son 'P,' sold a portion of the property to the defendants-respondents in 1981-82.

Issues:

The plaintiffs filed a suit in 1992, challenging the authority of 'B' to execute sale deeds on behalf of his minor son 'P,' contending that the deeds were void. The defendants raised the defense of limitation, arguing that the suit should have been filed within three years from the death of 'P' in 1986.

Held:

The judgment clarifies that Article 60(b)(ii) of the Limitation Act is applicable in cases where a ward dies before attaining majority, and the limitation to avoid an instrument made by the guardian of the ward is three years from the ward's death.

The period of limitation under Article 65 is relevant when seeking possession of immovable property based on title. However, since the sale deeds were voidable and not void, Article 60 governs the limitation for the suit, and it was rightly held as time-barred.

Sale deeds executed without the court's permission, in violation of Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 1956, are voidable. The suit, lacking a prayer for setting aside these deeds, was improperly framed and couldn't be decreed.

The release deed executed in 1986 does not repudiate the sale deeds by 'B' on behalf of the minor, and Section 8(3) of the 1956 Act allows the minor or their legal heirs to avoid such alienations.

Decision: Dismissing the appeal, the court affirmed that the sale deeds executed by 'B' were not repudiated or avoided within the prescribed limitation period, rendering the suit time-barred.

Facts:

Five individuals were tried for the murder of Kaushalya Devi in 1992.

Kanhai Prasad Chourasia was convicted under Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, sentenced to life imprisonment.

The other four were acquitted of murder but convicted under Section 27 of the Arms Act.

Appeals were filed by Kanhai Prasad Chourasia (Criminal Appeal No. 112/1994) and the other four collectively (Criminal Appeal No. 77/1994).

The High Court, under a misconception, treated all accused as convicted under Section 302/149 IPC, leading to a common judgment convicting all five.

Issues:

Misinterpretation by the High Court regarding the nature of convictions.

Imposition of Section 302/149 IPC without appeal by the State or notice of enhancement.

Failure to consider the acquittal under Section 149 IPC by the trial court.

Absence of sentencing for those convicted under Section 302/149 IPC.

Held:

The Division Bench found fundamental errors in the High Court's judgment.

The misconception of all accused being convicted under Section 302/149 IPC was identified as a primary error.

The High Court failed to consider the acquittal under Section 149 IPC and imposed Section 302/149 IPC without any appeal by the State.

The Bench, invoking Article 136, decided to set aside the entire impugned order against all accused.

Emphasized that an order based on wrong factual premises cannot be perpetuated against non-appealing accused.

Remanded the case to the High Court for re-hearing, directing separate consideration for each accused.

Noted that the appellant, Deep Narayan Chourasia, had already served a significant portion of the sentence and granted bail pending the High Court's decision.

Facts:

In SLP (Crl.) No.9859/13, an FIR was lodged against the accused under Sections 307, 294, and 34 of the IPC. Simultaneously, in SLP (Crl.) No.9860/13, an FIR was filed for offenses under Sections 394 of the IPC and 25/27 of the Arms Act. The accused sought the quashing of these proceedings based on compromises with the complainants.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in quashing criminal proceedings without considering the non-compoundable nature of the offenses, the seriousness of the charges, and the distinction between personal and social wrongs.

Held:

The High Court failed to consider that the alleged offenses were non-compoundable under Section 320 of the CrPC. It mechanically quashed the FIRs without assessing the gravity of the charges and their social impact, contrary to established legal principles.

The High Court should have recognized that a compromise doesn't necessarily preclude a conviction. In certain cases, the prosecution can still establish guilt with cogent evidence, particularly in disputes not of a commercial or civil nature.

The High Court erred in mechanically quashing the FIR in SLP(Crl.) No.9860/2013, where the accused were absconding. It neglected the antecedents of the accused facing multiple trials for serious offenses, showing a lack of vigilance. The court set aside the impugned judgments, allowing the respective criminal proceedings to continue.

Facts:

The Appellant was convicted under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC for his involvement in a gang rape incident.

The Appellant claimed juvenility at the time of the offense and presented school transfer certificates as evidence.

Issues:

Whether the claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage, even after the final disposal of the case.

Whether an inquiry conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) of the Supreme Court takes precedence over the view of the High Court.

The admissibility and veracity of school transfer certificates in determining the age of the accused.

Held:

The claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage, even after the final disposal of the case, as per Sections 7A and 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act.

An inquiry conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) upon the direction of the Supreme Court is deemed as an inquiry conducted by the Court itself.

The certificates presented by the Appellant were found admissible and conclusive proof of age under Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules.

The High Court's failure to follow the prescribed procedure for age determination under Section 7A was noted.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's order. The Appellant is released from custody, considering the time served and the juvenile justice provisions.

Facts:

Government of Bombay acquired disputed property, now Worli Estate Scheme No. 58, before 1945.

Appellants claim leasehold rights based on an application submitted in 1965.

Slum rehabilitation scheme initiated in 1996, with slum dwellers forming a housing society (respondent no. 4) seeking rehabilitation.

Appellants challenge the scheme, alleging a lease in their favor.

Litigation ongoing since 2008, with multiple orders and appeals.

Issues:

Existence of leasehold rights in favor of appellants.

Validity and compliance of slum rehabilitation scheme.

Balance of convenience between appellants and slum dwellers.

Held:

Existence of leasehold rights is disputed; subject to trial court decision.

Slum rehabilitation scheme governed by the Slum Act; balance of convenience favors ongoing scheme.

Appellants fail to prove irreparable injury; no injunction against ongoing redevelopment.

Appellants granted liberty to seek damages in the trial court if successful.

High Court's observations set aside due to pending civil suit.

Facts:

The appellant's father's house was fully demolished due to the Ara-Sasaram Railway Project.

The Collector recommended the appellant's case for employment per Railway Board's circular dated 19 April 2006.

The appellant's representation for appointment was rejected, citing a small land acquisition of 0.06 acres in 2006.

Appellant filed a writ petition challenging the rejection.

Issues:

Whether the Railway Board's policy circular dated 19 April 2006 applied to the appellant's case.

Validity of the rejection based on the small land acquisition.

Held:

The circular dated 19 April 2006 applied, allowing consideration for Group 'D' posts when a "large area, house or substantial livelihood has been taken away."

The rejection based on small land acquisition was incorrect, as the circular did not limit benefits only to cases of extensive land acquisition.

Decision: The rejection of the appellant's claim was contrary to the policy circular, and the appeal was allowed. The High Court's judgment was set aside. The appellant's claim for appointment to a Group 'D' post was directed to be implemented within two months.

Facts:

The case involves an incident on March 13, 1994, where the appellants, among others, were accused of attacking and ultimately causing the death of the father-in-law of the complainant. The charges were framed under various sections of the Penal Code, including s.141, s.149, s.302, and s.326.

Issues:

The appellants' alleged participation in the unlawful assembly, the common object of the assembly, and their roles in the attack on the deceased.

Held:

The statement of PW1, recorded soon after the incident, supported by PW2 and PW3, detailed the accused's presence and actions. Both trial and high courts found no reason to doubt this account. Discrepancies were attributed to the lapse of time since the occurrence.

The FIR, lodged promptly after the incident by residents (PW2 and PW3), validated PW1's account, and minor discrepancies in recalling accused details did not undermine the prosecution's case.

The "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" maxim was deemed inapplicable in India. The court emphasized that rejecting part of a witness's statement doesn't discredit the entire testimony, especially when the witness is found reliable overall.

Confessional statements (Ex.P.6 and Ex.P.8) were used to recover weapons, and while DW4 suggested a different timeline for injuries, it didn't dispute the core events. The active roles of A-1 and A-2 were proven, with the presence of other accused established by multiple witnesses.

The argument that appellants other than A-1 and A-2 lacked a common object was dismissed. The court held that the evidence showed a collective attack on the deceased due to his role in Panchayat affairs against caste Hindus.

Judicial orders, it was emphasized, are case-specific. The cumulative effect of facts led both courts to conclude that all appellants, as part of an unlawful assembly, shared the common object leading to the deceased's murder.

Facts:

The appellant, Jagdish, was convicted for the murder of his wife and five children. The trial court, High Court, and Supreme Court confirmed the death sentence. The mercy petition, filed on 13.10.2009, was rejected by the President of India on 16.07.2014. The appellant challenged the rejection on the grounds of a nearly 5-year delay in deciding the mercy petition.

Issues:

Whether the delay in deciding the mercy petition justifies the commutation of the death sentence?

Is this case one of the "rarest of rare" instances for awarding a death sentence?

Held:

The Review Petition is not entertained on the merits of the case, as three courts had a concurrent finding of the appellant's guilt.

The issue of the delay in deciding the mercy petition is considered separately. The Court refers to V. Sriharan's case, emphasizing that an exorbitant delay renders the execution arbitrary and inexecutable. The delay in this case is deemed unreasonable.

The State of Madhya Pradesh's unexplained delay of more than 4 years in forwarding the mercy petition is criticized. The Court cannot condone such unexplained delays, especially in death penalty cases.

The Court takes into consideration the appellant's 14-year incarceration and the nature of the crime. Despite the brutal nature of the crime, the Court commutes the death sentence to life, specifying that life imprisonment means the entire remaining life, with no possibility of release until death.

The Review Petition and Writ Petition are partly allowed in the aforementioned terms.

Facts:

The accused, Dattatraya @ Datta Ambo Rokade, was convicted by the trial court for the rape and murder of a minor child. The high court affirmed the conviction and the death sentence imposed by the trial court. The Supreme Court heard the appeal challenging the conviction and sentence.

Issues:

Validity of the conviction for offenses under various sections, including rape and murder.

Appropriateness of the death sentence imposed by the trial court.

Held:

The forensic reports, coupled with the extrajudicial confession made by the accused, substantiate the guilt. The DNA analysis establishes the accused's involvement in the rape of the victim, confirming the convictions under Sections 302, 376(2)(f), 377 of the IPC, and Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the POCSO Act (Paras 85, 86, and 96).

While the accused's actions were heinous and cruel, there is no evidence of premeditated murder or diabolic planning. The absence of intent to kill the minor child led the court to commute the death sentence to life imprisonment (Paras 122, 125, 126, 127, and 128).

The court highlighted the inadequate defense representation and the denial of an effective hearing on the question of sentence under Section 235(2) of the CrPC. The accused was not given the opportunity to present mitigating circumstances, leading to the commutation of the death sentence (Paras 136, 137, 138, and 139).

The court emphasized that Section 235(2) of the CrPC is not a mere formality and must be obeyed in letter and spirit. The trial judge's failure to elicit relevant facts and provide an opportunity to present mitigating factors led to the commutation of the death sentence (Paras 103, 105, 139, 140, and 141).

The court exercised its authority to prescribe the length of incarceration, directing that the accused should undergo imprisonment for life till his natural death, with no remission of sentence due to the heinous nature of the crime (Paras 143 and 144).