Facts:

Ghanshyam Sharma claimed to have worked as a casual helper for Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. from June 10, 1976, to July 30, 1977.

He alleged that his services were orally terminated on July 31, 1977.

The dispute led to a reference to the Labour Court under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The Labour Court ruled in Sharma's favor, ordering his reinstatement with continuity of service.

Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. challenged this decision in the High Court, leading to conflicting judgments at the Single Judge and Division Bench levels.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in reinstating the Labour Court's award.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the facts and circumstances, modified the Labour Court's award.

It found that reinstating Sharma with back wages and continuity of service was not appropriate due to the short duration of his employment and lack of evidence regarding his subsequent employment status.

Instead, the Court directed Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. to pay Sharma a lump sum compensation of Rs. 50,000 under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.

This compensation was deemed reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case, including the monthly salary paid to Sharma during the legal proceedings.

The company was instructed to pay the compensation within three months from the date of the Supreme Court's order.

Facts:

The case involved the allotment of land by the State to a private educational institution to facilitate its relocation from a Waqf property, following an eviction order by the Waqf Authority.

Out of the total 4 kanals of land allotted, the State charged the institution for 2 kanals at a specified rate, while granting the remaining 2 kanals free of cost.

Writ petitions challenging this allotment were initially dismissed by a Single Judge but were later quashed by a Division Bench of the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the State's allocation of land to the educational institution was in line with constitutional principles, particularly Article 14 and Article 39(b).

Whether the free allotment of 2 kanals of land by the State was justified.

Held:

The Court held that while the usual practice involves auctioning or tendering for land allocation, deviations from this practice may be warranted in certain circumstances, especially when public interest and welfare are at stake.

An executive action is not deemed arbitrary solely due to a lack of explicit reasoning, as long as a reasonable underlying principle is discernible.

The Court emphasized that the State's action was backed by a welfare purpose, evident from the urgent need to ensure continuity of education for children and maintain peace in the locality.

Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution emphasize the State's obligation to promote the welfare of its people, including aspects like education.

The Court acknowledged the importance of education as a fundamental aspect of democratic governance, underscoring the need for state support in this realm.

While the Court upheld the overall allocation of land, it found the free allotment of 2 kanals unjustified, causing a loss to the public exchequer.

Consequently, the appellant was directed to compensate for the free allotment by paying for the two kanals at the prevailing auction price, along with interest.

Facts:

The Medical Council of India (MCI) inspected certain medical colleges and found deficiencies. The Government of India directed the MCI to review the recommendations and consider compliance reported. The MCI declined to review its recommendation, leading to the denial of renewal/recognition. Writ petitions were filed challenging this denial. The High Court quashed the denial orders and directed admissions for the academic year 2018-19.

Issues:

The interpretation of regulations governing medical colleges, the binding nature of MCI recommendations, and the legality of the High Court's intervention in denying admissions.

Held:

The MCI is established to maintain the standard of medical education and has the authority to supervise qualifications and eligibility standards for medical institutions.

Regulations, particularly the Establishment of Medical Colleges Regulations 1999, are binding concerning teaching faculty, infrastructure, and other facilities. Compliance becomes more stringent with each subsequent batch.

Specific thresholds for deficiencies are outlined in the regulations. If deficiencies exceed these thresholds, colleges cannot be given an opportunity for compliance in the same academic year.

Recommendations made by the Hearing Committee to review and consider compliance are not binding. Instead, regulations 8(3)(1)(a) and (b) are binding on the Hearing Committee, Government of India, and MCI.

Interference with decisions based on expert recommendations is only permissible in cases of jurisdictional errors, perversity, or mala fide intentions.

The High Court erred in quashing the Government's order and allowing admissions without the necessary permissions and recommendations from the MCI.

Both the MCI and Government of India are urged to make decisions earlier in the year to allow for judicial review before the start of the academic session.

Compliance submitted by colleges should be considered separately for recognition purposes, apart from admission permissions.

Facts:

LT. GEN. Manomoy Ganguly, VSM, was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and became eligible for the post of DGMS (Army). Despite being the senior-most person in the feeder rank, another Lieutenant General 'S' was recommended for the post by the Director General, Armed Forces (Medical) Services (DGAFMS). LT. GEN. Ganguly approached the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), which ruled in his favor. However, the Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court directed the matter to be placed before the Raksha Mantri for consideration. The Raksha Mantri decided against appointing LT. GEN. Ganguly to the post. Subsequently, a Miscellaneous Application was filed by LT. GEN. Ganguly, but before its listing, DGMS (Air) was recommended and appointed to the post of DGMS (Army).

Issues:

Whether the lateral shifting of DGMS (Air) and considering his candidature for the post of DGMS (Army) was justified.

Whether the decision-making process followed the guidelines dated July 10, 1992.

Whether the criteria of 'inter se suitability' were appropriately applied in the decision-making process.

Whether fair and objective consideration was given to LT. GEN. Ganguly's suitability for the post of DGMS (Army).

Whether the appointment of DGMS (Air) as DGMS (Army) should be set aside.

Held:

The court found that the lateral shifting of DGMS (Air) and considering his candidature for the post of DGMS (Army) was contrary to the policy guidelines dated July 10, 1992. Such lateral shifting is permitted only in exceptional circumstances, which were not demonstrated in this case.

It was observed that DGAFMS/COAS had previously not included DGMS (Air) in the panel for the post of DGMS (Army) due to his assumption of the DGMS (Air) post at that time. No exceptional circumstances were presented to justify his inclusion later.

The court emphasized that 'inter se suitability' should be judged based on the attributes, skills, and experience of the eligible persons. The criteria of 'comparative merit' should not be used, and seniority should be given due weightage.

The decision-making process was criticized for not objectively considering LT. GEN. Ganguly's suitability for the post of DGMS (Army). Extraneous reasons were cited, and the norm of Overall Assessment Purpose (OAP) was applied, which was inconsistent with the guidelines.

Consequently, the appointment of DGMS (Air) as DGMS (Army) did not stand judicial scrutiny. The court set aside this appointment and directed the respondents to appoint LT. GEN. Ganguly as DGMS (Army).

Facts:

Kalpana Vyas, the landlady, filed an eviction petition against Raj Kumar Rangwani, the tenant, under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001.

Vyas claimed eviction for her personal bona fide need to construct additional space for her children and for accommodating guests.

The Rent Tribunal initially dismissed Vyas's petition, stating that her need could be met with alternative accommodation available to her in the city.

Vyas appealed this decision to the Appellate Tribunal, which ruled in her favor and granted the eviction decree against the tenant.

Dissatisfied with this decision, the tenant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Rajasthan, which set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal and reinstated the decision of the Rent Tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in allowing the tenant's writ petition and setting aside the appellate order of the Rent Appellate Tribunal.

Whether the High Court properly considered the factual and legal aspects of the case in its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in not examining the issue on merits and simply reinstating the Rent Tribunal's decision without proper consideration. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, could not delve into factual details like an Appellate Court.

The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court had two options: either to remand the case to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for fresh consideration on merits in accordance with the law, or to decide the matter itself on merits. Since the High Court didn't choose either option and merely restored the Rent Tribunal's order, the Supreme Court deemed it necessary to remand the case to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for a fresh decision on merits.

The Supreme Court directed the Rent Appellate Tribunal to decide the appeal within six months strictly in accordance with the law and without being influenced by any observations made by the Supreme Court or the High Court. The appeal was allowed, and the case was remanded to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for fresh consideration.

Facts:

The respondent college applied to the appellant university for the grant of a No Objection Certificate (NOC) to commence the D.Pharma course during the academic year 2018-2019. The university declined the NOC, citing the government's policy and perspective plan, which discouraged the establishment of new institutions or courses. The respondent challenged this decision, leading to litigation. The High Court initially ruled in favor of the respondent, holding that the university was obligated to issue the NOC.

Issues:

Whether the refusal to grant NOC by the university was justified under Section 20 of the Telangana Education Act, 1982.

Whether the university's regulations regarding NOC were consistent with relevant Acts and regulations.

Whether the policy decision of the State Government regarding the establishment of new educational institutions was legal and rational.

Held:

The provisions of Section 20 of the Telangana Education Act, 1982 aim to identify educational needs and prevent the mushroom growth of institutions and courses. The competent authority is tasked with conducting a survey to ascertain the educational requirements of the locality and may decline NOC if there is already a significant number of institutions offering similar courses.

The regulations of the university concerning NOC, as outlined in Jawaharlal Nehru Affiliation Procedure and Regulations, 2017, are in line with the provisions of the Act. The High Court erred in holding otherwise.

The State Government's policy decision, supported by surveys and data indicating vacancies in existing courses, was deemed legal and rational. It aimed to prevent the proliferation of educational institutions and maintain educational standards.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the decision of the High Court. It upheld the University's refusal to grant NOC and affirmed the legality of the State Government's policy decision regarding the establishment of new educational institutions.

Facts:

The dispute arose from a document titled "Multimodal Transport Document/Bill of Lading" dated 25.10.2008, where Premier Sea Foods Exim Pvt Ltd was the shipper and Caravel Shipping Services Pvt Ltd acted as the agent facilitating transport. Caravel Shipping Services Pvt Ltd (the appellant) filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, stating that an arbitration clause was included in the printed terms annexed to the Bill of Lading. The Sub-Judge's Court in Kochi dismissed the application, and the High Court also dismissed the Original Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, affirming the lower court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the arbitration clause contained in the Bill of Lading, even though it was a printed condition annexed to the document and not signed by the respondent, should be enforced.

Held:

The Court held that the arbitration clause contained in the Bill of Lading should be enforced, despite the respondent's argument that it was not signed by them.

The Court emphasized that the Bill of Lading explicitly mentioned that the Merchant (which included the respondent) agreed to be bound by all the terms, conditions, clauses, and exceptions on both sides, whether typed, printed, or otherwise. The Court clarified that an arbitration agreement need not necessarily be signed but must be in writing, as specified in Section 7(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Therefore, the Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgments of the High Court, and upheld the arbitration clause contained in the Bill of Lading.

Facts:

The appellant was appointed by Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. as a Diploma Engineer Trainee Grade II (Electrical).

He informed the Corporation about difficulties in obtaining the original caste certificate and requested to be treated as a general category candidate.

Despite this, the Corporation initiated disciplinary proceedings against him, alleging submission of a false caste certificate.

Legal actions were taken by both parties, leading to a writ petition filed by the appellant in the Madras High Court.

Issues:

Whether the Corporation's actions regarding the appellant's appointment and subsequent disciplinary proceedings were justified.

Whether the orders passed by the Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court were legally sound.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Corporation's actions were arbitrary, unreasonable, and legally unsustainable. The Court found that:

The appellant had informed the Corporation about the caste certificate issue before joining and had requested to be treated as a general category candidate.

The Corporation had multiple opportunities to address the issue but chose to proceed with the appellant's appointment and subsequent promotions.

The Corporation's actions, including initiating disciplinary proceedings and declaring the appellant's appointment void, were unjustified and excessive.

Procedural irregularities, such as the delay in taking action and the violation of rules regarding the enhancement of punishment, were noted. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Division Bench's decision and restoring the Single Judge's order. As a result, the Corporation's order declaring the appellant's appointment void was quashed.

Facts:

Respondents were appointed as Adult Education Supervisors under the Non-Formal Education Scheme.

The scheme was abolished, resulting in the termination of respondents' employment.

A policy decision was made by the State Government on May 20, 2005, to adjust all retrenched employees.

Respondents were appointed pursuant to a letter dated March 16, 2007.

The respondents filed a writ petition in 2013 seeking payment of salary for the period from October 1, 2001, to July 3, 2007, and continuity of past services.

Issues:

Whether the respondents are entitled to back wages following the abolition of the Non-Formal Education Scheme.

Whether the delay in filing the writ petition constitutes laches.

Held:

The respondents neither challenged their termination nor the policy decisions regarding their employment until 2013. This delay in seeking legal remedy constitutes laches.

The appointment

letter dated March 16, 2007, clearly stated that the appointment was fresh and that past services would only be considered for pension benefits, not for reinstatement or back wages.

Without reinstatement, the question of awarding back wages did not arise. Back wages could only be linked to reinstatement, not awarded in isolation.

Since the respondents did not work during the period for which they claimed back wages and because the scheme they were employed under had been abolished, they are not entitled to back wages.

The principle of 'no work, no pay' disentitles the respondents from back wages.

The decision in Smt. Ram Laxmi Mishra case, which might have granted similar relief, is distinguishable on facts.

Finally, the respondents are not entitled to the reliefs they claimed based on the terms and conditions of their appointment.