Facts:

The dispute revolves around a landlord-tenant disagreement concerning the termination of a lease. An arbitrator was appointed based on the petition filed by the respondent-landlord. The appellant-tenant objected to the arbitrability of the dispute, citing the Himangni Enterprises case, which held that disputes between landlords and tenants governed by the Transfer of Property Act would not be arbitrable.

Issues:

Whether the Transfer of Property Act provisions render disputes between landlords and tenants non-arbitrable.

Held:

Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act maintains a balance between the rights of landlords and tenants, indicating that it is not solely for the relief of tenants. The discretion granted to the court in ejectment cases demonstrates this balance. The same rationale applies to Section 114A, providing limited rights to tenants for remedy breach of an express condition.

The Himangni Enterprises case needs reevaluation. The decision erroneously claimed that Natraj Studios and Booz Allen had resolved the issue. However, a closer look reveals that these cases did not address the Transfer of Property Act situations between landlords and tenants.

None of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act were considered in Himangni Enterprises. The Act is silent on arbitrability, and the judgment will require reconsideration by a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges.

The reasoning in Himangni Enterprises that the mere availability of exemption from the Rent Act doesn't make the matter non-arbitrable is questioned. The withdrawal of exemption leading to the application of the Rent Act should not affect the arbitrability under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act.

Decision: The matter is referred to a larger bench for a comprehensive examination of the arbitrability of landlord-tenant disputes under the Transfer of Property Act.

Facts:

The appellants were charged under Sections 409 and 477A read with Section 120B of the IPC and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.

The prosecution alleged a conspiracy to misappropriate 540 bags of urea, which expanded to the misappropriation of the entire quantity of 1040 bags of urea.

The appellants were accused of falsifying accounts and making false entries to show the arrival of 500 bags of urea, which were not actually delivered.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the misappropriation extended to the entire quantity of 1040 bags.

Whether the entries made in F.C.I. records were falsified.

Held:

The initial complaint mentioned misappropriation of 540 bags, but the subsequent charge-sheet revealed the misappropriation of the entire quantity of 1040 bags. The specific case of conspiracy and falsification of accounts was established.( Para 19)

The appellants, especially Shiv Shankar Prasad Singh, were responsible for making false entries in F.C.I. records, showing the arrival of 500 bags of urea that were not delivered.( Para 20)

The evidence, including the deposition of owners, drivers, and khalasis of the trucks, clearly proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Trial Court and the High Court rightly relied on such evidence.( Para 21)

The prosecution successfully proved the conspiracy and criminal breach of trust. The findings of the lower courts were not perverse or erroneous.( Para 22)

The appeals lack merit and are dismissed. Bail bonds are canceled, and the appellants are directed to surrender within four weeks.( Para 23)

Facts:

The establishments, covered under the Act, contested the inclusion of special allowances in the "basic wages," arguing that these allowances were not universally applicable and were linked to specific conditions.

Issues:

Whether the special allowances had a direct nexus with extra output, making them eligible for exclusion from "basic wages."

Whether the allowances were universally, necessarily, and ordinarily paid to all employees.

Held:

The court, relying on Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. vs. Union of India, held that allowances not payable by all concerns or not earned by all employees of a concern should be excluded from basic wages. Dearness allowance, an exception in the definition, was included for contribution under Section 6. The court emphasized that the Act is a social welfare legislation meant to protect workmen and should be interpreted accordingly.

The court considered the definition of "basic wages" and the exceptions under Section 2(b)(ii), emphasizing that exclusions were based on universality. Dearness allowance was considered an exception but was included for contribution under Section 6.( Para 8)

Citing Muir Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur vs. Its Workmen, the court held that variable earnings dependent on efficiency and diligence would be excluded from "basic wages."( Para 10)

Referring to Kichha Sugar Company Limited vs. Tarai Chini Mill Majdoor Union, the court considered the dictionary meaning of "basic wages" and reiterated that universally, necessarily, and ordinarily paid wages are considered basic.( Para 12)

The establishments failed to demonstrate that the allowances were variable or linked to specific incentives for extra work. The court upheld the factual conclusions of the authorities that the allowances were essentially part of the basic wage, dismissing the appeals by the establishments.( Para 14)

Facts:

The case involves a petition filed under Article 226 challenging a communication by the appellant regarding the superannuation of an employee working in the hospital run by the appellant.

Issues:

The maintainability of the petition under Article 226, with a preliminary objection raised regarding whether the appellant or the hospital falls within the definition of the State under Article 12.

Held:

The hospital, being a branch of Ramakrishna Mission, is subject to its control, and the activities undertaken by the Mission are voluntary, charitable, and non-profit making. These activities are not closely related to those performed by the State in its sovereign capacity.[Para 19]

The Governing Body of the Mission manages the organization without any governmental control. The conditions of service for hospital employees are governed by service rules framed by the Mission without governmental intervention.[Para 20]

The hospital, even if performing public functions, does not involve a public law element in enforcing private contracts of service. The nature of the work rendered by the Mission, including hospital activities, is purely voluntary.[Para 30]

Before an organization can be considered to discharge a public function, it must be closely related to functions performed by the State in its sovereign capacity. The hospital, in the absence of State control, does not fall within the ambit of a public authority.[Para 31]

Contracts of a purely private nature are not subject to writ jurisdiction unless governed or regulated by a statutory provision.[Paras 32, 33]

The Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act 2010 does not govern contracts of service entered into by the hospital with its employees, preserving the distinction between private contracts and those subject to writ jurisdiction.[Paras 32, 34]

The Division Bench of the High Court erred in concluding that the appellants are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, as neither Ramakrishna Mission nor the hospital constitutes an authority within the meaning of the Article.[Paras 35, 36]

Facts:

The appellant, Mrs. Neeraj Dutta, was convicted under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The complainant received a demand for a bribe from the appellant for the installation of an electricity meter. The complainant reported the incident to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, leading to a pre-raid operation and the appellant's conviction.

Issues:

The absence of direct evidence of demand due to the complainant's death, leading to the appellant's contention that the conviction cannot stand solely on proof of receipt of money.

Held:

The court noted that direct proof of illegal gratification may not be available in all instances.

The court considered the evidence of the panch witness, acceptance of money proved by the Phenolphthalein Test, and the permissibility of drawing inference to prove demand.

The appellant argued that the Satyanarayana case emphasized the necessity of direct evidence of demand, while the respondent contended that inference can be drawn from other evidence.

The court expressed reservations about the observations in Satyanarayana and referred the question to a larger bench: whether, in the absence of direct evidence of demand, inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant is permissible based on other prosecution evidence.

Decision: The matter was directed to be placed before the Chief Justice for appropriate orders.

REFERRED CASES:

Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Administration) (1980) 2 SCC 390

KishanChand Mangal v. State of Rajasthan (1982) 3 SCC 466

M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P. (2001) 1 SCC 691

P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh and another (2015) 10 SCC 152

Facts:

The Appellants, traders in cotton fabrics and made-ups, supplied raw materials to over 70 job workers. The total clearances amounted to more than Rs. 1.45 crore. Only one job worker exceeded the limit of Rs. 25 lakhs, while the individual clearances of the rest were below this threshold.

Issues:

Whether the Appellants' liability extended to the entire aggregate value of clearances or only to the clearance value of the job worker exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs.

Held:

The Court held that Rule 12B treated the person as an assessee if conditions were met, and the Exemption Notification focused on the aggregate value of clearances. The Circular clarified that once any job worker crossed the exemption limit, duty applied to the aggregate value. The second illustration in the Circular emphasized that the entire clearance value became dutiable when it exceeded the limit. The Court affirmed that it was not the individual clearance of one job worker alone but the aggregate of all clearances by the Appellant that was liable to duty. The appeals were dismissed.

FACTS:

The case involves a dispute governed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, wherein the Adjudicating Officer is tasked with determining the quantum of penalty. The provisions in question are found in s.15-J, Cl. (a), (b), and (c), alongside other related sections (ss.15-A to 15-HA).

ISSUES:

Whether conditions stipulated in Clauses (a), (b), and (c) of s.15-J are exhaustive or illustrative.

Whether the conditions in Clauses (a) to (c) of s.15-J are mandatory for imposing penalties under ss.15-A to 15-HA.

HELD:

The court holds that the provisions of Clauses (a), (b), and (c) of s.15-J are illustrative and must be considered whenever relevant. However, the Adjudicating Officer is not precluded from considering other circumstances beyond those enumerated in Clauses (a), (b), and (c) while determining the penalty.

The court clarifies that the conditions in Clauses (a), (b), and (c) of s.15-J are not exhaustive. There may be circumstances beyond these clauses that the Adjudicating Officer can consider while deciding the quantum of penalty, especially in cases not covered by certain provisions like s.15-A, 15-B, or 15-C.

The court further explains that Clause (c) of s.15-J, which mentions the "repetitive nature of default," refers specifically to a recurring or successive default. However, this does not exclude the consideration of a continuing default as a relevant factor, as Clauses (a) to (c) are illustrative and not exhaustive.

The court addresses the argument that the power and discretion vested by s.15-J are eclipsed by penalty provisions in ss.15-A to 15-HA. It emphasizes that these sections must be read harmoniously to avoid inconsistency. The Explanation to s.15-J, added by Amendment Act No.7 of 2017, reinforces the Adjudicating Officer's discretion in determining penalties.

The court delves into the applicability of s.15-J in the context of s.15A(a) between 29th October 2002 and 7th September 2014. It highlights that the legislative intent, clarified by the Explanation to s.15-J, was not to curtail the Adjudicating Officer's discretion during that period.

REFERRED CASES:

Securities and Exchange Board of India through its Chairman vs. Roofit Industries Limited, (2016) 12 SCC 125

Securities and Exchange Board of India vs. Kishore R. Ajmera, (2016) 6 SCC 368

Securities and Exchange Board of India vs. Rakhi Trading (P) Ltd, (2018) 13 SCC 753

Siddharth Chaturvedi vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India, (2016) 12 SCC 119.

State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi & Ors., (1972) 2 SCC 890

Union of India & Anr. Vs. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648

Facts:

The appellants, lecturers/professors in engineering disciplines, challenged the order treating their appointments as temporary. The University contended that its statutes did not apply to teachers in Self Financing Institutions. The Single Judge allowed the petition, but the Division Bench held in favor of the University, asserting that appellants were not University teachers.

Issues:

Whether the appointments were temporary or against substantive posts.

The applicability of University statutes to teachers in Self Financing Institutions.

Entitlement of lecturers to pay revision benefits.

Held:

The appointment orders did not indicate temporary or part-time positions, governed by University statutes, indicating permanency through regular selection.

The benefits extension discrepancy was based on the erroneous claim of temporary appointments. The facts established the substantive nature of appellants' posts, justifying benefit extension.

AICTE's Progress Profile affirmed appellants as permanent faculty, disputing the University's claim of temporary status.

Despite initial rulings against appellants, subsequent contradictory decisions highlighted the inconsistency in the University's stance.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, and Special Leave Petitions were segregated based on the clarity in the appointment order.

Facts:

The dispute arising from the interpretation of Section 24(1)(b) and Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, relating to compensation and lapsing of land acquisition, respectively.

Issues:

Whether the proviso in Section 24 applies to Section 24(1)(b) or Section 24(2).

Held:

The court establishes that Section 24(1) deals with compensation, while Section 24(2) deals with the lapsing of land acquisition. The proviso, accordingly, pertains to Section 24(1)(b) and not Section 24(2) [Para 9].

The court highlights the scheme of Section 24(1), emphasizing enhanced compensation even in cases under the repealed Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The proviso acts as an exception to Section 24(1)(b) in cases where compensation for a majority of land holdings has not been deposited, allowing the application of more favorable provisions of the 2013 Act [Para 10].

Reading the proviso as applicable to Section 24(2) would lead to anomalies, arbitrary results, and potential violation of Article 14 of the Constitution [Paras 11, 12, 13].

The language of the proviso makes it clear that it does not refer to the award under Section 24(2). Reading it as a proviso to Section 24(1)(b) ensures compatibility with awards made under Section 11, irrespective of the timeline [Para 14].

Emphasizing the beneficial nature of the 2013 Act, the court advocates a construction that furthers its purpose. The preferred view is the one aligned with the legislation's objectives [Para 15].

Due to the referral of the Indore Development Authority case to a Bench of five Judges, the present judgment is also referred to the same Bench for further consideration [Para 17].