Facts:

Suits for specific performance were filed by the appellants against Charanjeet Singh Rekhi and his wife, Manjit Kaur. Two individuals from Moradabad and Uttarakhand, claiming to be Charanjeet Singh Rekhi and his wife, filed intervention applications (I.As.), asserting their identity as the actual defendants in the suits.

Issues:

Whether the individuals claiming to be Charanjeet Singh Rekhi and his wife from Moradabad and Uttarakhand should be considered as necessary parties in the specific performance suits.

Whether the question of mistaken identity can be addressed in a specific performance suit.

Held:

The Court held that the individuals claiming to be Charanjeet Singh Rekhi and his wife from Moradabad and Uttarakhand were not necessary parties in the specific performance suits.

The suits were based on the identification of Charanjeet Singh Rekhi and Manjit Kaur from Delhi as defendants. If it turns out that the defendants named in the suits are not the actual parties, the suits would fail, and the plaintiff would bear the consequences.

Therefore, the individuals in the I.As. were neither necessary nor proper parties to the suits, and their claims should be addressed separately.

Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and the Division Bench's judgment was set aside, restoring the judgment of the single Judge.

Facts:

The case involved a complaint against Gurvinder Singh, a Chartered Accountant, regarding the sale of shares in 1999, which were transferred to his own name. The Disciplinary Committee found him guilty of 'Other Misconduct' under Section 22 read with Section 21 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.

Issues:

The interpretation of Sections 21(3), 21, and 22 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949,

Whether the actions of the Chartered Accountant, not related to his professional work, could be considered as professional misconduct.

Held:

The Court pointed out that the High Court had failed to correctly interpret Section 21(3) of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, which includes provisions regarding professional misconduct. The Disciplinary Committee was entitled to find the Chartered Accountant guilty of misconduct, even if it was not related to his professional work, if it brought disrepute to the profession.

Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration, leaving all contentions open to both parties.

Facts:

Dr. Sunil Purushottam Bhamre was transferred from the post of Civil Surgeon, Jalgaon, to Assistant Director, AIDS Control Society, Wadala, Mumbai.

Various allegations were made against Dr. Bhamre regarding his functioning, including financial irregularities and insubordination.

Past instances were noted where Dr. Bhamre did not join transferred positions promptly.

Dr. Nagorao Shivaji Chavan was transferred to replace Dr. Bhamre as Civil Surgeon, Jalgaon.

The transfer order was challenged before the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, which ruled in favor of Dr. Chavan.

Issues:

Whether the transfer order of Dr. Bhamre was valid.

Whether the statutory provisions related to transfers applied in this case.

Held:

The Court held that while the normal tenure for a post was three years according to Section 3, Section 4 allowed for departures from this norm in cases of administrative exigencies. It emphasized that transfer is an incident of government service and must be exercised reasonably and in public interest.

The Court found no absolute bar on transfer, especially in cases of exceptional circumstances or administrative exigencies. Considering the allegations against Dr. Bhamre and his past record of not joining transferred positions promptly, the Court found no grounds for interference with the transfer order.

Consequently, the Court allowed Dr. Chavan's appeal, setting aside the orders of the tribunal and the High Court. It directed Dr. Bhamre to join his new post in Mumbai within 15 days, failing which the state government would initiate disciplinary proceedings against him.

Facts:

The case revolved around disputes arising from a development agreement dated 03.06.1993 between the appellants and the complainant, Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Ltd. The appellants were accused of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the IPC for allegedly retaining a sum of Rs. One crore advanced by the complainant. The dispute primarily concerned contractual obligations and ownership of the property.

Issues:

Whether the dispute between the parties constituted a criminal offense under Section 406 IPC or a civil dispute?

Whether the FIR and charge sheet filed against the appellants should be quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC?

Held:

The court quashed the FIR and charge sheet against the appellants, emphasizing that the dispute was civil in nature and did not constitute a criminal offense. It found that the amount in question was paid as a deposit under the development agreement and was subject to specific conditions regarding its refund. The court held that there was no prima facie case of criminal breach of trust against the appellants and characterized the criminal proceedings as mala fide and intended to harass them.

The court emphasized the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC to prevent abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. It held that the High Court erred in dismissing the appellants' petition under Section 482 of the CrPC and emphasized the need to prevent criminal proceedings from being misused as a tool for harassment.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding appointments made to engineering posts in U.P. Jal Nigam.

The appointments were found to be void ab initio due to irregularities in the selection process.

The High Court set aside the Chief Engineer's order declaring the appointments void ab initio, citing a violation of principles of natural justice.

The High Court directed U.P. Jal Nigam to distinguish between tainted and untainted candidates and pass a fresh order after providing an opportunity for hearing.

Issues:

Whether the appellants can challenge the High Court's judgment dated 28th November, 2017, afresh.

What course of action should U.P. Jal Nigam take regarding the appointments made under the same selection process.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellants cannot challenge the High Court's judgment dated 28th November, 2017, afresh. The limited plea granted earlier was only to rework the answer sheets, not to challenge the judgment itself. The Supreme Court clarified that U.P. Jal Nigam must comply with the High Court's decision to pass a fresh, reasoned order after distinguishing between tainted and untainted candidates. The option to take action against other appointees under the same selection process is left open, without expressing any opinion on the merits of such action. The appeals and interlocutory applications were disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The case involves leases granted to the predecessor in title of the plaintiff by the erstwhile Zamindar for land forming part of the Tank Bund Side-Waste dry and Tank Bund-Upper dry.

The leases were for the period from November to June, aimed to expire before the rainy season due to the submergence of the land.

Plaintiff's predecessor claimed continued possession when the 1948 Act came into force, seeking Ryotwari Patta under Section 11.

Applications for Ryotwari Patta were rejected, and later, the land was handed over to the appellant (Salem Municipality) for constructing a new bus stand.

Plaintiff filed suits against the State Government, transport corporation, and the appellant seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction.

Issues:

• Whether the disputed land qualifies as ryoti land under the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, and thus entitles the plaintiff to Ryotwari Patta.

• Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish continuous possession by the plaintiff's vendor or the plaintiff themselves after the abolition of the estate.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the disputed land did not meet the criteria of ryoti land under the Act, rendering the plaintiff or their predecessor ineligible for Ryotwari Patta.

There was a lack of evidence to establish continuous possession post the estate's abolition, weakening the plaintiff's claim.

Section 64 of the Act, dealing with temporary dispossession or discontinuance of possession, did not support the plaintiff's case.

The High Court's conclusion in favor of the plaintiff was deemed impermissible, unsustainable, and illegal, leading to the setting aside of its judgment.

The judgment of the first appellate court, which set aside the trial court's decree, was restored.

Due to the multiplication of proceedings, a cost of Rupees One Lakh was imposed upon the plaintiff, to be deposited with the Welfare Fund of Supreme Court Advocate-on-Record Association.

Facts:

P.E.C. Limited chartered MV "Rubin Halycon" from Austbulk Shipping Sdn Bhd for transportation of chickpeas from Australia to India. Disputes arose regarding demurrage charges, leading to arbitration.

Issues:

Validity of the arbitration agreement.

Interpretation of Section 47 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, regarding the production of documents for enforcement.

Effect of non-signing of the Charter Party by P.E.C. Limited on the arbitration agreement.

Held:

The arbitration agreement between the parties was found to be valid, even though P.E.C. Limited did not sign the Charter Party.

The interpretation of Section 47 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, regarding the production of documents for enforcement was that the word "shall" should be read as "may", allowing flexibility in the production of documents.

Non-signing of the Charter Party by P.E.C. Limited did not invalidate the arbitration agreement, as it could be inferred from correspondence and conduct between the parties.

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the High Court, dismissing P.E.C. Limited's appeal and ordering the payment of the awarded amount to Austbulk Shipping Sdn Bhd.

Facts:

The complainant filed an FIR alleging abduction under Sections 363 and 366 IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act against Natuji Bachuji Thakor.

During the trial, an application was filed under Section 319 Cr.P.C to proceed against additional accused (appellants) based on the victim's statement.

The trial court rejected the application, suspecting mala fide intentions behind naming the appellants.

The High Court allowed the revision, setting aside the trial court's order and directing to proceed against the appellants.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the trial court's order rejecting the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C?

What is the standard for summoning additional accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C?

Held and Decision: The Supreme Court held that:

The power under Section 319 Cr.P.C is discretionary and extraordinary, to be exercised sparingly and only when circumstances warrant it.

The threshold for invoking this power is more than establishing a prima facie case but falls short of satisfaction to the extent that unrebutted evidence would lead to conviction.

The evidence on record, including statements of the victim and her mother, lacked sufficient substance to implicate the appellants in the offence under the POCSO Act.

The High Court erred in setting aside the trial court's order without providing sufficient reasons for summoning the appellants under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the appeal was allowed in favor of the appellants.

Facts:

The case involves allegations of fake encounters and extra-judicial executions by Manipur Police and Armed Forces. The Supreme Court previously directed investigations by the CBI into these allegations. Subsequently, police personnel from Manipur Police filed writ petitions seeking to quash certain oral observations made by the court and requested recusal of the bench from hearing the case.

Issues:

Whether the bench should recuse itself from hearing the case due to alleged bias or violation of rights guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution.

Held:

The court dismissed the recusal petitions, finding no merit in them. It emphasized the need for fair investigations by the CBI and integrity in the judicial process. The court clarified that its observations during the continuing mandamus proceedings were not intended to compromise the independence, integrity, and fairness of the investigations or the judiciary.

The court held that there was no reason for the petitioners to doubt the fairness of the investigations or the judiciary. It reaffirmed the importance of maintaining institutional integrity and dismissed the recusal petitions.

The court also emphasized the role of continuing mandamus in ensuring fair investigations and judicial independence. It stated that any observations made during such proceedings should not be construed as compromising the integrity of the investigative process. We see no merit in these applications and they are accordingly dismissed.