Facts:

Appellant (Kamal Kumar) filed a civil suit for specific performance against the respondents (Premlata Joshi and Others) regarding the suit land.

Trial Court dismissed the suit, and the High Court affirmed the decision in the first appeal.

Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court under Article 136.

Issues:

Whether a valid and concluded contract existed between the parties.

Whether the appellant was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

Whether the appellant was entitled to specific performance or any alternative relief.

Held:

The grant of specific performance is discretionary and equitable.

The two Courts below held that the appellant failed to prove readiness and willingness, a crucial factor for specific performance.

Concurring findings of facts by the lower Courts are binding, and no perversity or illegality was identified.

The material questions for specific performance, as per Sections 16(c), 20, 21, 22, and 23 of the Specific Relief Act, were duly considered by the lower Courts.

The appellant did not establish readiness and willingness, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.

Facts:

The appellant was granted permission under Rule 11C of the Cable Television Network (Amendment) Rules, 2012, to operate as an MSO in the DAS notified areas.

The permission was revoked on 03.09.2014, citing denial of "security clearance" by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The appellant challenged the cancellation through a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the cancellation of permission was justified based on the denial of "security clearance"?

Whether the principles of natural justice were violated by not providing prior notice before the cancellation?

Held:

The cancellation order was passed in conformity with Rule 11C of the Rules, as security clearance was a mandatory requirement for permission.

The principles of natural justice were not violated, and the appellant was not entitled to claim prior notice before the cancellation.

The appeal was found devoid of merit and dismissed. The appellant was given the liberty to apply for fresh permission in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The respondent worked as a daily wager in the R & B Department of the State for approximately 18 years.

The State terminated the respondent's services without following the due procedure prescribed in law.

The respondent raised a dispute almost 15 years after his alleged termination before the Labour Court.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the daily-wage worker was illegal, and if so, what relief is appropriate, considering the nature of the employment and the circumstances surrounding the termination.

Held:

After hearing counsels, the court is inclined to allow the appeal in part and modify the impugned order.( Paragraph 8)

The court determines that the case falls within the parameters set by previous decisions in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs Bhurumal and District Development Officer vs. Satish Kantilal Amerelia.( Paragraph 9)

The court quotes the rationale from Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, emphasizing that automatic reinstatement with back wages is not applicable when the termination is due to procedural defects, such as the violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.( Paragraph 10)

Highlights reasons for the decision: respondent worked as a daily wager for a few years, had no right to claim regularization, no right to continue as a daily wager, and raised the dispute after a significant gap.( Paragraph 11)

Concludes that lump sum monetary compensation is just, proper, and reasonable in full and final satisfaction of the claim of reinstatement and other consequential benefits under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.( Paragraph 13)

Specifies the amount of compensation as Rs. 1,00,000/- to be paid by the appellant (State) to the respondent within three months.( Paragraph 14)

The appeal succeeds, and the impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The Labour Court's Award is modified accordingly.( Paragraph 15)

Facts:

Birla Institute of Technology (BIT) is the appellant, and the State of Jharkhand and Others are the respondents.

Respondent No.4, a teacher, claimed gratuity from BIT under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

The controlling authority ordered BIT to pay gratuity to respondent No.4.

BIT appealed, but both the appellate authority and the High Court upheld the order.

Issues:

Whether the appellant (BIT) is liable to pay gratuity to a teacher under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

Held:

The Supreme Court relied on the precedent set in Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association (2004) 1 SCC 755, which held that teachers are not employees under Section 2(e) of the Act.

The High Court erred in distinguishing the precedent on the grounds of applicability to primary teachers only. The Supreme Court clarified that the distinction is not valid, emphasizing that teachers, in general, are not intended to be covered by the Act.

The Court reiterated that the definition of "employee" under the Act does not include teachers, irrespective of the type of educational institution they work in.

The High Court's decision was set aside, and the appeal by BIT was allowed.

The application made by respondent No.4 before the controlling authority under the Act was dismissed as not maintainable.

Facts:

M/S Paulbro Leathers Private Limited defaulted on a loan from Punjab Financial Corporation.

The matter was settled as per the one-time settlement policy on 01.04.2003, with a Chartered Accountant determining the outstanding balance.

A dispute arose post-settlement regarding the precise liability and the amount paid by the respondent.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the demand raised by Punjab Financial Corporation.

Whether the dismissal of the application for review by the High Court was justified.

Held:

The appeals are allowed, and the case is remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision on the writ petition. (Paragraph 13)

Disagreement with the High Court's reasoning for allowing the writ petition, emphasizing the need to examine the dispute arising from the settlement terms. (Paragraph 14)

Suggestion that if there are disputes or ambiguities in the Chartered Accountant's report, they should be addressed separately. (Paragraph 17)

Emphasis on examining the issue on its merits before quashing the demand, highlighting the necessity for a categorical finding on how the respondent fulfilled the settlement terms.( Paragraph 18)

FACTS:

Charge sheet dated 18.09.2015 and 22.09.2017 framed by the Additional Sessions Judge.

Appellant challenges the charge sheet under Sections 420, 498A, 323, 376, 506 IPC, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

ISSUES:

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the appellant's application filed under Section 482 of the Code?

HELD:

The Single Judge's order dismissing the application is set aside.

The case is remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits.

High Court's casual disposal without examining the challenge and without setting out the brief facts is not acceptable.

The Single Judge should consider the principles of law laid down by this Court and record findings on the grounds urged by the appellant.

The appeal succeeds, and the impugned order is set aside.

Facts:

Appellants claimed to hold licenses under the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, 1949, engaged in selling liquor in Mumbai suburb. Sealing of shops occurred due to an FIR for home delivery of liquor.

Issues:

Legality of sealing orders, violation of license conditions, bias concerns against the Commissioner State Excise.

Held:

The High Court quashed sealing orders and an interim order, directing the Commissioner State Excise to decide appeals on merits. However, it made adverse remarks against the Commissioner.

The Supreme Court held that while the High Court rightly declined to transfer appeals, it should have confined its reasoning to legal grounds and not made adverse remarks.

Adverse remarks against the Commissioner were expunged.

The High Court's directions anticipating adverse orders and removing seals were set aside, respecting the appellate authority's independence.

The pending appeals (212/2018 and 221/2018) should be heard and decided by the Commissioner State Excise within three months without influence from the Supreme Court or High Court remarks.

Facts:

The appellant was accused of dowry death under Sections 498(A) and 302 of IPC.

The Sessions Judge acquitted the appellant, finding insufficient evidence of dowry demand.

The High Court reversed the acquittal, convicting the appellant based on prosecution evidence.

The deceased's family alleged ill-treatment, dowry demands, and accused the appellant of setting her on fire.

Issues:

Whether the evidence supported charges under Sections 498(A) and 302 IPC.

Whether the High Court correctly reversed the Sessions Judge's acquittal.

Held:

The High Court rightly convicted the appellant under Sections 498(A) and 302 IPC.

The evidence, including testimonies of the deceased's family, established dowry demands, ill-treatment, and the appellant's culpability.

The appellant's actions leading to the death were deemed homicidal, not accidental.

The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's judgment.

Facts:

Partition suit (154/1985) filed by Smt. Saroja Rani in Ranchi, challenged on jurisdiction.

Preliminary decree passed on 13 June 1990; final decree on 5 April 1991.

Respondent raised objections to execution based on lack of territorial jurisdiction.

Issues:

Whether an objection to territorial jurisdiction can be entertained in execution proceedings?

Application of Sections 21A and 47, Order 7 Rule 11, and Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC.

Held:

Jurisdiction objection doesn't go to inherent lack but must be raised at the earliest opportunity.

Conditions for raising jurisdiction objection: earliest opportunity and consequent failure of justice.

Execution court cannot go behind the decree; objections must be raised before the court of first instance.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the High Court's judgment is set aside. The executing court is directed to conclude the execution proceedings expeditiously.