Facts:

Respondent No.1 was initially appointed as an Assistant Engineer and subsequently promoted to higher positions within the Public Works Department (PWD) in Assam.

Allegations of favoritism and fraudulent actions were raised against respondent No.1's promotions, including the creation of an ex-cadre post specifically for him and discrepancies in vacancy calculations.

Issues:

Whether respondent No.1's promotions, particularly to the post of Superintending Engineer, were irregular and contrary to service rules.

Whether the dismissal of writ petitions challenging respondent No.1's promotions based on delay and laches was justified.

Whether the involvement of the Chief Minister and subsequent inquiry provided a reasonable explanation for any delays in legal action.

Held:

The Supreme Court scrutinized respondent No.1's promotions and found significant irregularities, including the creation of an ex-cadre post specifically for him and discrepancies in vacancy calculations. The Court rejected the dismissal of writ petitions based on delay and laches, emphasizing the gravity of the irregularities involved. The Court reinstated the earlier judgment that deemed respondent No.1's promotions illegal and contrary to service rules. The involvement of the Chief Minister and subsequent inquiry provided a reasonable explanation for any delays in legal action.

Therefore, the Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the Division Bench's judgment, and reinstated the judgment of the learned Single Judge.

Facts:

The case revolves around the classification of the Urban Improvement Trust (the assessee) under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The Urban Improvement Trust was constituted under the Rajasthan Improvement Act, 1959, to undertake development activities in urban areas.

Issues:

Whether the Urban Improvement Trust qualifies as a "local authority" under clause (iii) of Explanation to Section 10(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Whether the Trust can be considered a "Municipal Committee" as per the provisions of the Acts mentioned.

Held:

The court examined the provisions of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, and the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, to determine the nature and functions of the Urban Improvement Trust. It observed that the Trust undertakes development activities in urban areas but is not constituted in place of municipalities or municipal boards.

The court noted that while the Trust may perform certain limited powers of the municipal board, it does not transform into a municipality or municipal board itself.

The assessee claimed to be a "Municipal Committee" under clause (iii) of Explanation to Section 10(2). However, the court observed that the Trust's functions and powers do not align with those of a Municipal Committee.

Provisions such as Sections 47, 48, 61 to 64, and 105 of the Rajasthan Improvement Act grant certain powers to the Trust but do not change its classification as a Municipal Committee.

Decision: The court concluded that the Urban Improvement Trust did not qualify as a Municipal Committee within the meaning of Section 10(20) Explanation (iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, the assessee's claim was rejected.

Facts:

The appellant-assessee claimed input tax credit on purchases but initially couldn't do so due to the lack of tax invoices.

Subsequently, the appellant filed revised returns claiming input tax credit upon receipt of the tax invoices from the dealer.

Issues:

Whether Section 19(11) violates Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, and whether it's inconsistent with Section 3(3) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006.

Whether Section 19(11) is a directory provision, and if non-compliance can be a ground for denial of input tax credit.

Whether assessing authorities could extend the period for claiming input tax credit beyond what is prescribed in Section 19(11) of the Tamil Nadu VAT Act, 2006.

Held:

The Court found that Section 19(11) does not violate constitutional rights and is consistent with the overall scheme of the Act. It provides an additional benefit to dealers for claiming input tax credit within an extended period.

The conditions for claiming input tax credit must be strictly construed. Section 19(11) mandates a specific time period for making claims, which cannot be extended beyond what is prescribed .

There is no provision in the Act empowering authorities to extend the period for claiming input tax credit beyond what is provided in Section 19(11). Taxing statutes must be strictly construed, and benefits are to be extended only as per the restrictions outlined therein.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, upholding the validity of Section 19(11) and affirming that the prescribed conditions and timelines for claiming input tax credit must be adhered to under the Tamil Nadu VAT Act, 2006.

Facts:

The case involves M/S. TVS MOTOR COMPANY LTD. challenging the constitutional vires of Section 19(5)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006, and Rule 10(9)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Rules, 2007. The dispute arises from the denial of input tax credit by the Revenue on the grounds that Form C, as prescribed, was not filed for certain transactions, leading to the reversal of credit on inter-State sales.

Issues:

The constitutionality and validity of Section 19(5)(c) of the TNVAT Act and Rule 10(9)(a) of the TNVAT Rules. Specifically,

The court must determine whether these provisions are discriminatory and whether they serve a legitimate purpose.

Held:

The court held that Section 19(5)(c) of the TNVAT Act is constitutionally valid. The provision aims to prevent tax evasion and protect revenue, justifying the requirement of filing Form C for claiming input tax credit on inter-State sales (Para 41, 42).

The court analyzed Section 19 of the TNVAT Act and noted that it provides for the grant of input tax credit under certain conditions. It found that the classification made under Section 19(5)(c) based on sales to registered or unregistered dealers, inside or outside Tamil Nadu, is reasonable and serves a legitimate purpose (Para 43).

Regarding sales to state governments, the court observed that while these entities are exempt from TNVAT Act registration and cannot issue Form C, there is no risk of tax evasion. Therefore, it ruled that sales to state governments should be treated as sales to registered dealers for the purpose of availing input tax credit (Para 47, 48).

Upholding the High Court's judgment, the court stated that in cases where sales are exclusively made to other state governments, input tax credit would be allowed without insisting on the furnishing of Form C. However, dealers must obtain a certificate from the respective state government to claim this benefit (Para 49).

Decision: The court upheld the judgment of the High Court, affirming the validity of Section 19(5)(c) of the TNVAT Act. It provided clarification regarding sales to state governments, allowing input tax credit without Form C under certain conditions.

Facts:

The appellants contested against the reduction of compensation awarded to them by the High Court, which stemmed from a fatal accident. The appellants were awarded compensation by the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal, which was subsequently reduced by the High Court. The main contention was regarding the deduction of the amount received by the claimants under the Employees Family Benefit Scheme.

Issues:

Whether deductions could be allowed from the compensation amount on account of payments received by the claimants under various schemes or contracts unrelated to the accident.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering arguments from both parties and relevant case laws, emphasized that deductions cannot be allowed from the amount of compensation on account of insurance, pensionary benefits, gratuity, or other benefits received by the deceased or their family members. Such amounts are earned by the deceased through contractual relations and do not accrue to the claimants solely because of the death in a motor vehicle accident.

The Court distinguished the Employees Family Benefit Scheme from statutory rules and held that the amount received under this scheme cannot be deducted from the compensation. However, considering the substantial benefits received under the scheme, the Court decided not to award an additional amount for future prospects.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 50,00,000 along with 9% interest from the date of filing the petition. The insurance company was permitted to deduct or adjust the amounts already paid by it.

Facts:

The Maharashtra Housing Area Development Authority (MHADA) advertised the sale of flats at Powai Project.

Three cooperative housing societies and the appellant (Powai Panchsheel Co-op Hsg Society) submitted offers to purchase the flats.

The Board accepted the offers from the three societies but did not consider the appellant's offer.

The appellant challenged this decision in the High Court, alleging mala fides and legal grounds.

The High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition, upholding the Board's decision.

Issues:

Whether the Board's decision to exclude the appellant's offer was justified.

Whether the Board's decision violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Whether there were any grounds for alleging mala fides against the Board officials.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Board's decision to exclude the appellant's offer was unjustified and violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Court found the decision to be unreasonable, arbitrary, and inconsistent with established legal principles.

Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's decision, and quashed the Board's resolution related to the sale of flats to the three societies. The Board was directed to reconsider all offers, including the appellant's, in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The case involved a suit seeking eviction, rent, and damages initially filed before the Small Causes Court. It was later transferred to the Additional District Judge due to the property's value exceeding the Small Causes Court's pecuniary jurisdiction. Subsequently, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court was raised. Defendants did not object to the jurisdiction of the Additional District Judge post-amendment.

Issues:

Whether the Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to decide the suit after the pecuniary jurisdiction amendment.

The interpretation of relevant statutes regarding the jurisdiction of Small Causes Courts and Additional District Judges.

The applicability of Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) regarding objections to jurisdiction.

Held:

The legislative scheme delineates that small cause cases up to the value of Rs. 1 lakh should be taken cognizance by Small Cause Courts presided by Civil Judges, and cases exceeding this value by District Judge or Additional District Judge.

Despite the District Judge or Additional District Judge having unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction, suits up to Rs. 1 lakh should be instituted in Small Cause Courts presided by Civil Judges. The legislative intent and scheme should be followed to avoid confusion and inconsistency.

Following the amendment, the Small Causes Court presided by the District Judge or Additional District Judge lacked jurisdiction to decide suits valued below Rs. 1 lakh.

The proviso to Section 15(2) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, specifies that suits up to Rs. 25,000 (later amended to Rs. 1 lakh) shall be cognizable by Small Causes Courts. The use of the word "cognizable" encompasses the institution, hearing, and decision of a case.

The statement of objects and reasons for the amendment cannot override the express language of the statutory provisions. The amendment aimed to increase pecuniary jurisdiction but does not affect the legislative intent regarding the jurisdiction of Small Cause Courts.

Section 21 of the CPC precludes a party from raising objections to the competence of the court regarding pecuniary limits if not raised earlier, unless it resulted in a failure of justice.

The High Court erred in allowing the Revision without considering Section 21 of the CPC, which aims to avoid retrial of cases on merit based on technical objections.

Decision: Despite lacking jurisdiction post-amendment, no interference was warranted in the judgment of the Additional District Judge due to the application of Section 21 of the CPC.

Facts:

The petitioner, President of the Madhya Pradesh Congress Committee, sought reliefs related to VVPAT verification and the format of draft electoral rolls.

Allegations were made regarding discrepancies in voter lists, including duplicate or fake entries.

The petitioner demanded draft electoral rolls in searchable text format to facilitate scrutiny for errors.

Issues:

Whether the Election Commission is obligated to provide draft electoral rolls in a searchable text format.

Whether VVPAT verification should be conducted at random polling stations.

Held:

The Court interpreted the Election Manual's provision on draft electoral rolls, finding no requirement for them to be in a searchable format.

The decision to provide draft electoral rolls in non-searchable image format was upheld, considering voter privacy and prevention of data mining.

The petitioner's request for VVPAT verification was dismissed, citing previous rulings and the Election Commission's assurances.

The writ petitions were consequently dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which was inserted by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018. The dispute centers on whether this section is retrospective in nature. Additionally, the case delves into the application of the Limitation Act, 1963 to applications filed under Sections 7 and 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Issues:

Whether Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is retrospective.

Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to applications filed under Sections 7 and 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Held:

The Court held that Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 must be construed as retrospective. This is because the section is clarificatory of the law and procedural in nature. Construing it as retrospective is essential to serve its object, as otherwise, applications attempting to resurrect time-barred claims would not be governed by the law of limitation.

Referring to the Insolvency Law Committee Report of March 2018, the Court emphasized that the legislature did not intend to enable creditors to revive claims that had become time-barred. The Code cannot be triggered for debts that were time-barred, as it could lead to absurd consequences, such as the removal of the present Board of Directors of the corporate debtor and potential liquidation. Thus, the expression "debt due" in the Code refers only to debts that are not time-barred.

The Court clarified that the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to applications filed under Sections 7 and 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code from its inception. Article 137 of the Limitation Act is attracted, and the right to sue accrues when a default occurs. Applications filed beyond three years from the date of default are barred under Article 137, except where Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applied to condone the delay.

Decision: The Court remanded the appeals to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) for further proceedings consistent with the interpretation provided in this judgment.