Facts:

The appellant, R. Lakshmikantham, and the respondent, Devaraji, were parties to an agreement to sell dated 22.09.2002, specifying a sale price and conditions.

Dispute arose when the respondent allegedly failed to fulfill obligations under the agreement.

The appellant sent registered letters reminding the respondent of the payment and requesting compliance.

The trial court granted specific performance, but the High Court reversed this decision, asserting that time was of essence, and the appellant was not ready and willing.

Issues:

Interpretation of clauses in the agreement related to the sale price, payment, and transfer of title documents.

Determination of whether time was of essence in the agreement.

Assessment of the appellant's readiness and willingness to perform the agreement.

Held:

The High Court's decision was set aside, and the judgments of the lower courts were restored. The Supreme Court held that:

Time was not of essence in the agreement, emphasizing the interplay of clauses 3, 5, and 8.

The registered letters sent by the appellant were deemed served on the respondent, as per legal norms.

The appellant demonstrated readiness and willingness, and the delay in filing the suit was not a valid ground for refusal.

The property value assertion by the High Court was refuted, emphasizing negotiations between the parties.

Citing Mademsetty Satyanarayana case, the Court reiterated that delay cannot be a ground for refusing specific performance if the suit is filed within the statutory limitation period.

Facts:

The appellant sought promotion from Scale III to Scale IV for the year 2014-2015.

Grievance arose due to non-disclosure of entries in the APAR for 2010-11 and 2011-12.

Appellant's gradings in APARs were provided.

Reliance on previous court decisions like Dev Dutt vs. Union of India and Sukhdev Singh vs. Union of India.

Issues:

Whether the non-communication of entries in the APAR for certain years violates established legal principles?

Whether the appellant's grading in the APARs affected the promotion process?

Compliance with Promotion Policy for Officers 2006.

Held:

The Court reaffirmed the principles laid down in Dev Dutt and Sukhdev Singh, emphasizing the necessity to communicate every entry in the ACR within a reasonable period.

The Union of India had issued directives for compliance with these principles, making the respondent duty-bound to follow the court's precedents.

The non-communication of entries for 2010-11 and 2011-12 constituted a legitimate grievance for the appellant.

The Court directed the respondent to communicate the uncommunicated entries, allowing the appellant to submit objections and representations.

The competent authority was instructed to consider the representation fairly and, if necessary, modify the promotion decision for the year 2014-15.

The judgment set aside the High Court's decisions, allowing the appeals in favor of the appellant.

Facts:

A contract dated 07.02.2006 included an arbitration clause referring disputes to three arbitrators.

The contract specified a fee schedule for arbitrators based on a 2004 policy circular of NHAI.

Disputes arose, and arbitration was invoked by the appellant in 2017.

The respondent referred to a 2017 NHAI circular, seeking a change in arbitrators' fees.

Issues:

Dispute over the applicable fee schedule for arbitrators.

Application under Section 14 to terminate arbitrators' mandate based on alleged disregard of the agreement.

Held:

The fee schedule in the 2017 NHAI circular would operate, and arbitrators were entitled to charge fees accordingly, not as per the Fourth Schedule to the Arbitration Act.

The application to terminate the arbitrators' mandate was disingenuous; arbitrators did not become de jure unable to perform functions for following the law laid down by the Delhi High Court.

The change in language of Section 31(8) and Section 31A dealt with costs, not arbitrators' fees. The Fourth Schedule did not directly govern contracts with a pre-agreed fee structure.

Facts: The appellants' appeals were rejected by the Appellate Authority under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, or the 2005 VAT Acts of AP or Telangana. The rejection was based on the appellants' failure to produce proof of payment of admitted tax dues for the relevant assessment year.

Issues: The primary issue revolved around the interpretation of the provisos in Section 19 of the 1957 Act and Section 31 of the AP VAT Act, which imposed conditions related to the limitation period for filing appeals and the requirement to produce proof of tax payment.

Held: 3.1 The first proviso in Section 19 pertains to the limitation period for filing an appeal and the discretion of the Appellate Authority to condone the delay in filing. The second proviso is an independent condition mandating the appellant to produce proof of payment of tax dues, which can be fulfilled until the appeal is considered for the first time.

3.2 The second proviso does not specify a period for tax payment at the time of filing, allowing the appellant to file within the statutory period and deposit the specified tax dues later, but before the appeal is first considered.

3.3 The Appellate Authority has no power to extend the time for depositing specified tax dues. The proviso is not a provision of pre-deposit at the filing stage but requires payment as a prerequisite for considering the appeal on merits or condoning the delay.

3.4 To prevent misuse, the Appellate Authority must consider every appeal for admission or condonation of delay within 30 days from filing, institution, or presentation.

3.5 In cases where the appellant has deposited tax dues before the first consideration, the proviso does not apply as an institutional defect.

3.6 However, if the deposit is made after the rejection of the appeal, it does not fulfill the proviso's requirements, and the appeal stands dismissed.

Decision: The impugned High Court judgment is set aside, and the writ petitions are allowed. The concerned appeals are restored to the Appellate Authority for consideration in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The Government of Maharashtra decided to shift the wholesale market to reduce congestion.

APMC constructed galas/shops, and a committee was appointed to suggest norms for their allotment.

Dispute arose over the lottery-based allotment of Gala No.F-158.

Appellant won the lottery, but respondent No.1 challenged the decision.

High Court ordered allotment to respondent No.2, who filed a writ petition seeking Gala No.F-158.

Issues:

Validity of the decision to conduct a lottery.

Allotment dispute, particularly regarding Gala No.F-158.

Transfer of booking amount from respondent No.2's father.

Eligibility of the appellant, respondent No.2, and other parties as per the Daud Committee norms.

Legality of the Director of Agricultural Marketing's order in favor of respondent No.2.

Held:

Claim of Respondent No.2: The High Court's order in favor of respondent No.2 set aside. Norms fixed by the Daud Committee strictly applied. Transfer of booking amount not permissible. Illegality in favor of an individual cannot be perpetuated. (Para 23, 26, 27-29, 32)

Claim of Appellant: Appellant deemed to marginally fall short of norms. High Court's decision favoring respondent No.2 alone set aside. Appellant, 'GS', and 'RVD' declared eligible for Gala No.F-158. (Para 33, 34)

Claim of 'GSS': High Court's finding that 'GSS' is not eligible set aside. Small gala allotted to 'GSS' considered for eligibility. Eligible to claim large gala. (Para 35, 40)

1.4 M/s 'RVD': High Court's decision against 'RVD' affirmed. Partnership firm not separately eligible. Registration in 2014 without compliance with Daud Committee norms. (Para 41, 47, 48)

1.5 Conclusion: Respondent No.1 and respondent No.2 not eligible for large gala. Appellant, 'GS', and 'RVD' eligible for the allotment. High Court's judgment set aside. (Para 49-51)

1.6 Re-Allotment Process: Instead of a lottery, sealed offers invited. Appellant to vacate Gala No.F-158. Upset value fixed at Rs.55,00,000. Re-allotment based on the highest bid. (Para 52-54)

Facts:

The case involves the construction of a multi-storey building by respondent Nos.4 and 5 after the demolition of an old structure, with approval from the New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC). The construction was halted by NDMC, directing the builders to obtain permission from ASI due to the proximity of the plot to the ancient monument Jantar Mantar. Legal proceedings ensued, including a suit against NDMC and a writ petition for the protection of Jantar Mantar.

Issues:

The alleged violation of the Supreme Court judgment dated 16.1.2012 by the Director General of ASI and others. The subsequent events, including the granting and revocation of renovation permissions, are central to determining compliance with the court's orders.

Held:

On the date of the Supreme Court judgment (16.1.2012), the builders had completed the ground floor plus four upper floors, with finishing work pending. The court had not provided specific directions regarding the existing structure's status.(Para 17)

A later inspection revealed no vertical or horizontal expansion of the building compared to 2003. The building was found habitable in 2018, contrasting with its non-habitability in 2003. NDMC took actions like cancellation of sanction plans and issuance of a show cause notice.(Para 17)

ASI initially granted permission for renovation, subsequently revoked, and later revived it. However, these permissions were for finishing work without structural expansion. (Para 18)

The court refrains from directing the demolition of the existing structure in these proceedings, emphasizing that the pending matters before the High Court must address issues related to permissions, their revocation, and the status of construction.(Para 19)

Decision: The contempt petition is closed as the court found no violation of its orders by the authorities. The court emphasized that the issues related to permissions and the status of construction should be considered in the pending matters before the High Court.

Facts:

The appellant, P. Ramesh, was convicted for the murder of his wife and an offense under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. During the trial, the prosecution sought to adduce the evidence of PW-3 and PW-4, the minor children of the appellant and the deceased. However, the trial judge, based on the children's inability to identify the judge and lawyers, concluded that their testimony was unacceptable, leading to the appellant's conviction. The High Court, finding the trial judge's reasoning erroneous, remanded the case to assess the capacity of the child witnesses.

Issues:

Competency of child witnesses in criminal proceedings.

Appropriate judicial response to the trial judge's erroneous reasoning.

Held:

The High Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, exercised its powers under Section 386 of the CrPC to remand the case. The competency of child witnesses must be objectively assessed, and their evidence recorded in a child-friendly environment. The appellant has the right to cross-examine the witnesses. The decision to remand was justified, considering the erroneous approach of the trial judge, and the interests of justice. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, dismissing the appeal.

FACTS:

The appellant filed applications seeking relief against interference in the working and management of Hamdard Laboratories. Despite a court judgment upholding his appointment as Chief Mutawalli, the respondents allegedly continued to assert joint management. An inadvertent mistake in the previous judgment, using the term 'management' instead of 'banking operations,' was noted.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondents were wrongfully asserting joint management despite the court's judgment.

Clarification of the term 'management' in the previous judgment, with a focus on the resolution dated April 28, 2015.

Apprehension of non-cooperation by respondents in approving payments.

Representation of Hamdard in various criminal proceedings against the appellant.

HELD:

The court acknowledged an inadvertent mistake in the use of the term 'management' and substituted it with 'banking operations.' The resolution dated April 28, 2015, related only to two bank accounts. The court clarified that the restoration of the order was about continuing arrangements related to banking operations voluntarily arrived at.( Paragraphs 9 and 10)

While acknowledging the appellant's apprehension of non-cooperation, the court expressed hope for resolution between the parties in the interest of Hamdard's reputation and charitable work.( Paragraph 11)

Contempt petitions were dismissed in view of the orders passed in the miscellaneous applications.( Paragraph 12)

An additional application seeking direction on representation in criminal proceedings was directed to be addressed in the civil suit, as it was beyond the scope of the appeals.( Paragraph 16)