Facts:

Appellants booked a residential plot with the respondent for a villa in "Cloud-9 Hill Town."

Total consideration for the villa: Rs. 15,65,000/-. Completion time: 30 months.

Consumer complaint filed by appellants against respondent.

District Forum ruled in favor of appellants, directing respondent to deliver the completed villa.

Issues:

Delay of 721 days in filing an appeal by the respondent.

Explanation for the delay: Non-informing advocate and pending complaint against the advocate.

Held:

The High Court erred in condoning the delay without a satisfactory explanation.

Gross negligence on the part of the respondent.

The delay should not have been condoned.

Order condoning delay set aside, and the First Appeal dismissed.

Facts:

The petitioner, a student of Medicine, sought compensation for the loss of an academic year due to the cancellation of MBBS admissions by the first respondent, Kannur Medical College.

Legal proceedings ensued, involving regulatory committees and court interventions.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation for the loss of a valuable year in pursuing studies.

Validity of the withdrawal of complaints made by the petitioner's father.

Held:

The petitioner, having lost a valuable academic year due to the first respondent's actions, is entitled to compensation.

Withdrawal of complaints by the petitioner's father was not voluntary but a result of the urgent need for a refund for the petitioner's admission to another institute.

The Committee's finding that withdrawal was not voluntary supports the petitioner's claim.

The petitioner can pursue her claim before the Committee as per court orders, and the Committee should decide expeditiously within three months.

Decision: The writ petition is disposed of, leaving it open for the petitioner to pursue her claim before the Committee. The Committee is requested to decide within three months.

Facts:

The appellant won an open auction in 1996 for a booth but defaulted on payment terms.

Despite several notices, the appellant failed to make payments as per the allotment conditions.

The booth was resumed by the Haryana Urban Development Authority in 2001.

An appeal in 2011 set aside the resumption order subject to the appellant clearing dues and paying a penalty.

The appellant made a payment of Rs. 7,00,000 but the resumption order was later restored.

The High Court, in 2014, dismissed the writ petition, citing the appellant's non-compliance over 20 years.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, who defaulted on payment terms for the booth allotted in 1996, is entitled to relief?

Held:

The appellant defaulted on payment terms after an initial payment of 25%.

Despite multiple notices, the appellant continued to default on payments over the years.

The appeal filed against the resumption order was dismissed, and subsequent restoration attempts were also unsuccessful.

The executed General Power of Attorney (GPA) was considered an assignment of litigation.

The current estimated value of the booth is stated to be around Rs. 2.14 crores.

The court rejected the appellant's plea for relief under Article 142, as it cannot protect an unscrupulous buyer.

The order of resumption was confirmed, and the appellant was given an opportunity to withdraw the deposited amount with interest, minus unauthorized occupation charges.

The appeal was disposed of, confirming the resumption order. The appellant's deposited amount could be withdrawn by the Haryana Urban Development Authority, with accrued interest towards unauthorized occupation charges. Any surplus would be returned to the appellant with interest. No order as to costs was issued.

Facts:

The appellant, a driver with the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, collided with a railway crossing gate, resulting in damage.

Charged under Section 160(2) of the Railways Act, 1989.

Conviction and sentencing by three successive courts: Magistrate, Appellate Court, and High Court.

Issues:

Legitimacy of the appellant's conviction under Section 160(2) of the Railways Act.

Appropriateness of the six-month jail sentence considering the nature of the offense.

Held:

The three courts below concluded that the appellant committed the offense, and their concurrent finding is binding under Article 136.

No identified perversity or illegality in the concurrent finding, justifying interference.

The appellant's argument against the conviction is deemed unsubstantiated.

The six-month sentence is considered excessive given the absence of harm or injury to individuals and the age of the offense (13 years old).

The sentence is reduced to the period already served by the appellant.

Facts:

The case involves an incident on March 13, 1994, where the appellants, among others, were accused of attacking and ultimately causing the death of the father-in-law of the complainant. The charges were framed under various sections of the Penal Code, including s.141, s.149, s.302, and s.326.

Issues:

The appellants' alleged participation in the unlawful assembly, the common object of the assembly, and their roles in the attack on the deceased.

Held:

The statement of PW1, recorded soon after the incident, supported by PW2 and PW3, detailed the accused's presence and actions. Both trial and high courts found no reason to doubt this account. Discrepancies were attributed to the lapse of time since the occurrence.

The FIR, lodged promptly after the incident by residents (PW2 and PW3), validated PW1's account, and minor discrepancies in recalling accused details did not undermine the prosecution's case.

The "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" maxim was deemed inapplicable in India. The court emphasized that rejecting part of a witness's statement doesn't discredit the entire testimony, especially when the witness is found reliable overall.

Confessional statements (Ex.P.6 and Ex.P.8) were used to recover weapons, and while DW4 suggested a different timeline for injuries, it didn't dispute the core events. The active roles of A-1 and A-2 were proven, with the presence of other accused established by multiple witnesses.

The argument that appellants other than A-1 and A-2 lacked a common object was dismissed. The court held that the evidence showed a collective attack on the deceased due to his role in Panchayat affairs against caste Hindus.

Judicial orders, it was emphasized, are case-specific. The cumulative effect of facts led both courts to conclude that all appellants, as part of an unlawful assembly, shared the common object leading to the deceased's murder.

Facts:

The case involves the termination of services of Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola by Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. A dispute was referred to the Labour Court under Section 4(k) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Issues:

The justification of the termination and the applicability of the notification dated 24.04.1990 under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970.

Held:

The Labour Court, relying on the notification, concluded that the workmen were directly employed by the appellant and ordered reinstatement without backwages.

The appellant contested the review petition, denying any concession made before the Labour Court and asserting the inapplicability of the notification.

The High Court, in the first instance, upheld the Labour Court's decision, considering the workmen's duties identical to regular employees and the alleged contract with the contractor as 'sham.'

The Supreme Court set aside the judgments, finding the Labour Court's decision perverse. The notification, exempting the appellant, was erroneously applied.

The Court emphasized that concessions on mixed questions of fact and law cannot solely determine the case. Gate passes and concessions did not establish a direct relationship between the appellant and the workmen.

The Court held that the extended definition of 'employer' in the Act requires evidence that the work performed by contract labour is ordinarily part of the industry, which was lacking in this case.

The High Court's findings were deemed contrary to the evidence on record, and the contract labour relationship was not proven to be 'sham.'

The Court rejected arguments based on non-compliance with the Labour Court's award and the contractor's minimal profit, emphasizing the need for a factual foundation.

Facts:

Ericsson provided managed services to RCom under an agreement.

Ericsson issued notices for non-payment, leading to negotiations.

A settlement agreement was reached but failed.

Ericsson terminated the agreement and filed for insolvency.

National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) appointed Interim Resolution Professionals.

Supreme Court recorded a settlement for INR 550 crore to be paid by RCom within 120 days.

Undertakings were filed, linking payment to the sale of assets.

Contempt petitions filed due to non-compliance with payment terms.

Issues:

Whether the undertakings made by RCom were in accordance with the Supreme Court's orders.

Whether RCom willfully defaulted on the payment.

Held:

The undertakings clearly state that the INR 550 crore settlement was not linked to the sale of assets. Both undertakings and the NCLAT order contradict any such linkage.

The Supreme Court order recorded that the INR 550 crore payment had to be made by 30.09.2018 without any linkage to the sale of assets. Undertakings given were contrary and conditional upon the sale of assets.

Undertakings were not in accordance with the Supreme Court's order. Attempts to extend time also linked payment to the sale of assets, against the court's direction.

Contempt petitions were filed for non-payment, and subsequent actions indicated an about-turn by RCom to revive insolvency proceedings.

Undertakings were false to the knowledge of RCom. The letter dated 21.01.2019 contradicted RCom's claims of being unable to pay. Willful default by RCom is established.

The Chairman of RCom made incorrect statements in the affidavit, and the undertaking affected the administration of justice. Willful default by RCom is affirmed.

Contempt petition against the Chairman of SBI is dismissed as the transactions with Ericsson and the sale of assets are independent.

RCom is directed to pay INR 453 crore to Ericsson within four weeks in addition to the INR 118 crore already deposited. Failure to comply will result in imprisonment of the Chairmen. A fine of INR 1 crore for each company is imposed, payable to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee, with imprisonment in case of default.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 80-IC of the Income Tax Act, 1961, pertaining to the deduction of profits and gains for specified industrial undertakings in certain states. The appellants, existing units in Himachal Pradesh, set up new industrial units and claimed 100% deduction for the initial five years. After substantial expansion, they sought 100% deduction for an additional five years instead of the prescribed 25%.

Issues:

Whether existing units, after substantial expansion, are entitled to 100% deduction for the next five years under Section 80-IC.

The applicability and interpretation of the term "initial assessment year" within the context of Section 80-IC.

Held:

Sub-section (3) of Section 80-IC provides for a 10-year deduction period, starting with the initial assessment year. This includes 100% deduction for the first five years and 25% for the subsequent five years. The deduction is applicable to manufacturing units in specified states, including Himachal Pradesh.

Sub-section (6) of Section 80-IC imposes a 10-year cap on the maximum period for which the deduction can be allowed to any undertaking or enterpriseThe judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s. Classic Binding Industries, which opined that there cannot be another 'initial assessment year' within a span of 10 years, is deemed erroneous. This view was based on a misinterpretation of Section 80-IB(14), which is materially different from Section 80-IC.

The definition of 'initial assessment year' in Section 80-IC allows for multiple initial assessment years within the 10-year period. The purpose of Section 80-IC is to encourage industrial development in specified states.

Substantial expansion, as defined in Section 80-IC, qualifies as an 'initial assessment year,' justifying 100% deduction. The legislative intent is to promote expansion, generate employment, and enhance industrial growth in challenging states.

Conclusions: (a) The judgment in Classic Binding Industries failed to consider the Section 80-IC definition of 'initial assessment year' and does not lay down correct law. (b) New units in Himachal Pradesh are entitled to 100% deduction for the first five years and 25% for the next five years. (c) Substantial expansion within the 10-year period designates the year of expansion as a new 'initial assessment year,' warranting 100% deduction. (d) The total deduction period is capped at 10 years, regardless of the timing of substantial expansion.

Facts:

Parties entered into separate contracts for the sale of Non-Basmati Parboiled Rice of Thailand origin. The contracts were governed by GAFTA 48, and disputes were to be resolved through Arbitration 125 as per GAFTA 125 in London. The Arbitral Tribunal passed two separate awards. The respondent filed two execution cases under Part-II of the 1996 Act before the High Court for the enforcement of the foreign arbitral awards. The petitioner raised objections regarding the maintainability of the execution case, which were rejected.

Issues:

Whether the objections raised by the petitioner in the earlier round regarding the maintainability of the execution case were valid?

Whether the conduct of the petitioner, including changing the company's name and registered office address, affected the proceedings?

Whether the subject foreign awards were deemed to be decrees and thus enforceable?

Held:

The petitioner's contention that objections were limited to the maintainability of the execution case and not the enforceability of foreign awards is dismissed. The petitioner had the opportunity to raise all available grounds. The High Court had made it clear that the subject foreign awards were deemed to be decrees, implying enforceability. The petitioner's attempts to protract the execution on untenable grounds are rejected.

The grounds regarding maintainability of the execution case could not be considered in isolation from the enforceability of foreign awards. Section 48 does not allow piecemeal consideration, and both aspects must be addressed simultaneously. The petitioner's application is rejected, barred by constructive res judicata.

The petitioner's conduct, including changing the company's name and registered office address, indicates an attempt to overreach the Court. Such actions are criticized, and the special leave petitions are rejected.

The High Court's view on the petitioner's grounds questioning the enforceability of foreign awards is upheld. The limited scope for interference in foreign awards under Section 48 is acknowledged. The attempt to have a re-look at the award is not permissible.

The Arbitral Tribunal considered all aspects, and even if errors occurred, they are matters for correction through appeal under English Law. The Court doesn't express an opinion on the merits. Exemplary costs of Rs. 20,00,000/- are awarded to the respondent. The Registrar (OS), Calcutta High Court is directed to encash FDs and remit the amount to the respondent.