Facts:

The settlement between the employer-Board and the workers stipulated the revision of Dearness Allowance rates twice a year based on the All India Consumer Price Index Numbers. The State Government, facing financial constraints, revised the rates later than the Central Government. The employer-Board adopted the State Government's decision in revising Dearness Allowance rates.

Issues:

The workers' union sought direction to align Dearness Allowance payments with those of Central Government employees, challenging the Board's decision to adopt the State Government's rates.

Held:

The payment of Dearness Allowance was governed by the 1998 Wage Settlement and Board Proceedings BP (FB) No.58. Revisions were in line with State Government decisions, and subsequent settlements reiterated this practice. (Para 1-19)

The union, having agreed to Dearness Allowance alignment with State Government employees, cannot demand a higher rate. The court stressed the employer's dependence on financial ability and the State Government's difficult financial position. (Para 19-28)

The High Court erred in not considering the financial constraints and principles governing wage revisions. The Board's decision to adopt State Government rates was not arbitrary, given the challenging financial situation.(Para 28-31)

The Board did not unilaterally alter the settlement terms. The respondent union cannot selectively challenge parts of the Board's proceedings. The court affirmed the Board's decision to set a cut-off date for revised Dearness Allowance, considering financial constraints. (Para 31-166)

Facts:

The case involved an application for an extension of the period for investigation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The Investigating Officer (IO) filed two applications on the same day – one for the extension of the investigation period and the other under s.43D of the Act, enumerating detailed grounds, signed by the Public Prosecutor. The respondents challenged the order before the High Court, arguing that the Public Prosecutor did not apply his mind, thus failing to fulfill the mandatory requirement of the proviso to s.43D(2)(b).

Issues:

Whether the requirements of the proviso to Section 43D(2)(b) were met in the application for extension of the investigation period.

Held:

The proviso to Section 43D(2)(b) sets out specific requirements for its proper application. These include the inability to complete the investigation within 90 days, a report by the Public Prosecutor indicating progress and reasons for detention, and the satisfaction of the court. The document, in the form of an application under Section 43D, detailed the development and progress in the investigation, meeting the requirements of the proviso. (Para 1)

The grounds for extension included the respondents' alleged involvement in a banned organization, voluminous electronic records, funding investigations, a conspiracy spread across cities, and telephonic interconnections with other accused persons. The material in the document fulfilled the proviso's requirements.( Paras 15-16)

An analysis of the document purporting to be the report of the Public Prosecutor revealed a thorough consideration of the extension request. The Public Prosecutor's signature and changes in the second application indicated an application of mind, satisfying the essential condition for the report.( Para 2)

The second document, as the report of the Public Prosecutor, was filed on the same day as the IO's application, demonstrating the application of mind. The State of Maharashtra was represented through the Assistant Commissioner of Police, and the document clearly outlined the grounds for seeking an extension. (Paras 19, 22)

The first document provided reasons for the extended period, while the second detailed grounds extensively. The public prosecutor scrutinized both documents, showing an application of mind and expanded reasons for the extension. The second document was not a mere reproduction but an analysis of the first.( Paras 36, 37, 39)

Conclusion: The infirmities in the form of the documents did not entitle the respondents to default bail, as there was a substantial application of mind by the Public Prosecutor. The High Court's order was set aside.

Facts:

The complainant alleged that on March 29, 2007, the accused formed an unlawful assembly, trespassed into the complainant's land, cut and removed the wheat crop, and abused the complainant and his family.

Issues:

The trial court acquitted the appellants, finding a dispute over land possession and lack of cogent evidence. The High Court reversed the acquittal, leading to the appeal.

Held:

The Trial Court carefully analyzed the testimony, highlighting discrepancies in the complainant's account and the absence of independent witnesses. It concluded that the offense was not established.

The High Court's judgment lacked an application of mind to the basic facet that it was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. No perversity of approach by the Trial Judge was found. The well-considered findings of the Trial Court were maintained, and the judgment of acquittal was upheld.

Facts:

A suit was filed claiming a sum of Rs. 6,94,63,114 on 10.03.2017. The defendant was served with summons on 14.07.2017. The court allowed a grace period of 120 days for filing a written statement, and an Order 7, Rule 11 application was rejected. A subsequent application sought to rely on recent changes in the Code of Civil Procedure.

Issues:

The interpretation of the amended provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically Order 8, Rules 1 and 10, and whether the consequences of not filing a written statement within the stipulated time frame are mandatory.

Held:

The court, after considering the recent amendments and various precedents, held that the consequences outlined in the amended provisions are indeed mandatory. Beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons, the defendant forfeits the right to file a written statement, and the court has no power to extend this time. The court rejected the argument that inherent powers could be invoked to circumvent these provisions.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, resulting in the removal of the written statement of Defendant No.1 from the record.

Facts:

The Trial Court convicted 11 accused persons under various sections of the IPC, including Sections 148, 302/149, 323/149, and 506/149. The High Court acquitted 8 accused persons under Section 302/149 IPC and upheld the conviction of 3 accused persons under Section 302/34 IPC. During the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court, one of the appellants (No. 1) expired.

Issues:

Validity of the alteration of charges from Section 302/149 IPC to Section 302/34 IPC.

Applicability of Section 149 IPC after the acquittal of 8 co-accused.

Justification for sustaining the conviction of the three appellants.

Held:

Once eight co-accused were acquitted under Section 302/149 IPC, the charge under Section 149 IPC collapsed against the three appellants as there could be no unlawful assembly consisting of less than five accused persons. In other words, the appellants (3 in number) could not be charged with the aid of Section 149 IPC for want of numbers.( Para 55)

The High Court had the jurisdiction to alter the charge from Section 149 IPC to Section 34 IPC, but in the absence of evidence of common intention among the three appellants, their conviction under Section 302/34 IPC is not legally sustainable.( Para 56)

The prosecution did not set up a case that all 11 accused persons shared a common intention under Section 34 IPC. The High Court failed to give any reasons in support of the altered conviction, and the invoking of Section 34 IPC at the appellate stage cannot be upheld.( Paras 62 and 63)

The post-mortem report indicated that both assaults by appellant Nos. 2 and 3 caused simple injuries to the victim, not resulting in her death.( Para 67)

In a case of this nature, where there is a fight between two groups and the State does not pursue the plea of Section 149 IPC against the acquitted eight accused, and no evidence is relied upon for the charge of Section 34 IPC against the three accused, the two appellants are entitled to claim the benefit of entire scenario.( Para 68)

Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 could, at best, be convicted for an offence punishable under Section 324 IPC based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.( Para 69)

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to Rule 24(i-eeee) of the Haryana Liquor License Rules, 1970, which provided for a single L-1BF license for the entire state to deal in imported foreign liquor. The contention was that this rule was ultra vires the powers of the Financial Commissioner under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914.

Issues:

The delegation of powers, specifically whether the Financial Commissioner had the authority to amend the rules regarding the number of licenses for the entire state, a power exclusive to the State Government.

Held:

The State Government, under Section 8 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, has general superintendence and control of Excise Administration. The power to regulate the number of licenses for a local area is exclusively vested in the State Government under Section 58(2)(e).

The delegation of this power by the State Government to the Financial Commissioner is prohibited by Section 13(a). The amendment to Rule 24(i-eeee) by the Financial Commissioner is ultra vires the powers of the latter and is struck down.

The expression "local area" in Section 58(2)(e) implies the power of the State to place restrictions on the number of licenses within a specific local area. The power to regulate the sale of liquor, including the number of licenses, is within the purview of the Financial Commissioner under Section 59.

Rule 24(i-eeee) as amended by the Financial Commissioner is upheld, and the Financial Commissioner has the power to decide the number of licenses for the entire state.

Decision: The Court, by majority, held that Rule 24(i-eeee) as amended by the Financial Commissioner is ultra vires the powers of the Financial Commissioner and is therefore struck down.

Facts:

The Income Tax Department acquired a property under Section 269UD of the Income Tax Act. After the property was auctioned, the highest bidder (respondent) obtained a sale deed. The respondent sought conversion of leasehold rights to freehold rights from Delhi Development Authority (DDA), depositing conversion charges. DDA demanded additional payment for unearned increase, which was contested.

Issues:

Validity of DDA's demand for unearned increase.

Nature of rights transferred through auction.

Interpretation of Sale Deed and auction notice.

Applicability of the principle of merger.

Held:

The auction was based on the market value, and the Income Tax Department had already paid unearned increase. DDA's demand for unearned increase was unwarranted. The High Court rightly rejected DDA's claim.( Para 1 - 12)

The Sale Deed indicated a leasehold residential plot, supported by details in the auction notice. The bid was for leasehold rights, and the terms of the auction were binding.( Para 15 - 19)

Clause 3 of the Sale Deed explained the rights granted and harmonized with Clauses 1 and 2. The auction notice specified leasehold rights, influencing the interpretation of the Sale Deed.( Para 20 - 22)

Considering Section 269UE, Clause 3 of the Sale Deed was in line with the statutory mandate, conveying that all rights were not transferred to the petitioner.( Para 24 - 25)

The principle of merger, being a government grant, wasn't highly relevant. The Sale Deed did not convey all rights, diminishing the impact of the principle of merger.( Para 27)

The petitioner was not entitled to a refund of conversion charges. DDA was directed to process the conversion application for leasehold to freehold rights.( Para 29)

Facts:

The deceased and accused were friends who traveled together.

The deceased was injected with a drug leading to overdose and subsequent death.

Prosecution alleged murder and conspiracy based on circumstantial evidence.

Issues:

Lack of direct eyewitnesses; reliance on circumstantial evidence.

Failure of prosecution to establish a clear motive for murder.

Inconsistencies in medical evidence regarding the cause and time of death.

Allegations of the accused injecting the deceased with the drug.

Held:

The court emphasized the importance of proving each circumstance separately in cases based on circumstantial evidence.

Last seen together: Room No. 203 was hired by all involved, suggesting no premeditated murder plan by the accused.

Medical evidence: The prosecution failed to link the accused to the death, and inconsistencies in medical reports raised doubt.

Motive: Alleged motive of a love triangle not proven, and the introduced motive four years later lacked credibility.

Chandru being a medical student: Inference of his involvement in the crime was unfounded.

Inconsistency in statements: Discrepancies in statements cast doubt on the reliability of the evidence.

Delay in filing the private complaint: Lack of protest during the investigation against the accused raised questions about the credibility of the complainants.

Clean hands doctrine: The complainants did not come to court with clean hands, as the motive was introduced after four years.

FACTS:

On 26.07.1989, the State Government made a reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for resolving disputes.

The appellant did not appear before the Industrial Tribunal and suffered an adverse ex parte award.

The Industrial Tribunal decided the reference ex parte against the appellant.

The Single Judge set aside the award in a writ petition filed by the appellant.

The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the respondent's appeal and set aside the Single Judge's order in the appellant's absence.

The review petition filed by the appellant was dismissed.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellant, having not appeared before the Industrial Tribunal, is entitled to contest the reference on merits.

Whether there was a sufficient cause for the appellant's absence before the Industrial Tribunal.

HELD:

The appellant did not receive an opportunity to contest the reference before the Industrial Tribunal.

The cause shown for the appellant's absence constitutes a sufficient cause, entitling them to claim an opportunity to contest the reference on merits.

The appellant did not appear before the Tribunal from the inception, thus having no opportunity to contest the matter.

Every party has the right to contest the case on merits, and no exception disentitled the appellant.

Substantial justice demands an opportunity for both parties to contest the case on merits.

The appeals are allowed, setting aside the impugned orders and the ex parte award. The case is remanded to the Industrial Tribunal.

The appellant is granted an opportunity to file a written statement, and parties can amend statements, file documents, and present oral evidence.

The Industrial Tribunal is directed to decide the reference within six months from the date of appearance.