Facts:

Government of Madhya Pradesh issued a policy in 2012 for wind energy.

Tariff Order issued on March 26, 2013, applicable to projects commissioned till March 31, 2016.

Dispute arose on the commissioning date of a wind project between the appellant and respondent.

A new Tariff Order on March 17, 2016, with a different tariff rate for projects commissioned on or after April 1, 2016.

Dispute on the actual commissioning date of the project - appellant claimed April 1, 2016, while the respondent asserted March 31, 2016.

High Court directed the appellant to enter into a PPA based on the earlier tariff order.

Appellant revoked the commissioning certificate, leading to a second set of writ petitions.

Issues:

Determination of the actual commissioning date of the wind project.

Applicability of the tariff order and the subsequent guidelines.

Held:

The Court held that the project was commissioned on April 1, 2016, based on objective data from the State Load Dispatch Centre (SLDC). The respondent is entitled to the tariff under the Tariff Order dated March 17, 2016. The competitive bidding guidelines issued subsequently on December 8, 2017, do not apply to the project. The first respondent is directed to process the PPA application based on the March 17, 2016, Tariff Order from April 1, 2016.

Facts:

Dispute arose from an agreement for the sale of Iron Ore Pellets between the appellant and respondent.

Agreement contained an arbitration clause in Clause 18, specifying Bhubaneswar as the venue for arbitration.

Respondent invoked the arbitration clause, and the appellant contested, challenging the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court.

Issues:

Whether the Madras High Court could exercise jurisdiction under Section 11(6) despite the agreement specifying Bhubaneswar as the venue.

Interpretation of the agreement regarding the "venue" and its impact on jurisdiction.

Held:

The distinction between "Seat" and "Venue" is crucial, and the agreed "venue" has significance in determining jurisdiction.

The absence of words like "exclusive jurisdiction" does not alter the parties' intention to exclude other courts when a specific place is agreed upon.

When parties agree on the "venue" of arbitration, it becomes the "Seat," and the court at that location has exclusive jurisdiction.

The Madras High Court erred in assuming jurisdiction, as only the Orissa High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 11(6) due to the agreed "venue" being Bhubaneswar.

Facts:

Atindra Nath Bhattacharyya, the respondent, faced 16 charges related to financial irregularities while working as Chief Manager of Baghbazar Branch of the State Bank of India.

The inquiry officer found ten charges proved, leading to the imposition of the punishment of removal on January 24, 2003.

Issues:

The Single Bench of the High Court set aside the order of punishment, citing a lack of opportunity for the respondent to show cause regarding the nature and quantum of punishment.

Despite not utilizing the opportunities for a personal hearing, the Division Bench directed the appellant to grant another opportunity to the respondent.

Held:

The Supreme Court found the Division Bench's direction to grant another opportunity not tenable.

Emphasized that once an opportunity had been granted and not availed, the respondent was not entitled to another opportunity on the grounds of compassion.

Serious allegations of financial irregularities played a crucial role in affirming the removal order.

The Court set aside the directions of the Division Bench and allowed the appeal.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged the murder of the complainant's son after a ransom demand, leading to the arrest of the second respondent. The claim for juvenility was based on a matriculation certificate issued by CBSE.

Issues:

The conflicting evidence regarding the second respondent's date of birth. The Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) rejected the claim, while the High Court allowed it, emphasizing the precedence of the matriculation certificate.

Held:

Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act provides the procedure for determining juvenility. Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules establishes a hierarchical ordering for obtaining evidence in the enquiry. The matriculation certificate takes precedence, followed by the date of birth certificate from the first school attended and, if unavailable, the birth certificate from a corporation, municipal authority, or panchayat.( Para 10)

The matriculation certificate's date of birth lacked underlying support, making it unreliable. Contrarily, records from the first school attended, Aadhaar card, and driving license consistently indicated the second respondent's date of birth as 17.12.1995. The High Court's reliance on the matriculation certificate was deemed inappropriate, leading to the conclusion that the second respondent was not entitled to the claim of juvenility as of the date of the alleged incident.( Para 14, 15)

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal by the complainant, maintaining the order passed by the Sessions Judge. The Court concluded that the second respondent was not a juvenile at the time of the alleged incident.

Facts:

An FIR was lodged by Bhola Mohanta, the brother of the deceased, stating that his brother was murdered by the accused Ranjit Haldar along with his nephew and the wife of the deceased. The body was alleged to be concealed in a house, leading to an investigation.

Issues:

Validity of the FIR recorded in Bengali and later translated to Nepali.

Adequacy of evidence, including the absence of a DNA test on the dead body.

Ownership and possession of the house where the dead body was concealed.

Application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act regarding the burden of proof.

Held:

The Court held that the recovery of the dead body concealed under wooden planks, covered by mud and stones, was a strong incriminating circumstance. The absence of a DNA test was deemed irrelevant as the identity of the dead body was established beyond doubt. The prosecution successfully proved facts, invoking Section 106, making it difficult for the accused to provide an explanation. The appellants' failure to disprove the presumption under Section 106 led to the maintenance of their conviction.

Conclusion: Both appeals were dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellants for causing the death of the deceased Netai Mohanta. The Courts below were found to have rightly recorded the conviction, and no error was identified in the judgment that warranted interference.

Facts:

The case involves MSIL, a joint venture between Suzuki Motor Corporation and MSIL, initially known as SPIL.

SPIL filed its return in 2012, and later, a scheme for amalgamation with MSIL was approved.

Assessment proceedings continued in the name of the non-existent entity, SPIL.

Issues:

The validity of assessment proceedings conducted in the name of SPIL post-amalgamation.

Held:

The court emphasized that the income subjected to tax belonged to the erstwhile entity (SPIL) pre-amalgamation.

The approved scheme of amalgamation resulted in the cessation of SPIL, and it could not be considered a person against whom assessment proceedings could be initiated.

Despite the notice issued under section 143(2) and the communication of amalgamation to the assessing officer, proceedings were pursued in the name of SPIL, rendering them void ab initio.

The court referred to Spice Entertainment, where assessments in the name of amalgamated and dissolved companies were deemed null and void, emphasizing it as a substantive illegality.

The doctrine of merger was highlighted, affirming that the amalgamating entity ceases to exist upon amalgamation.

Consistency and certainty in tax litigation were stressed, adopting the principles established in prior cases for AY 2011-12 to the present appeal for AY 2012-13.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the void ab initio nature of assessment proceedings against the non-existent entity (SPIL) and upholding the principles of consistency and certainty in tax matters.

Facts:

Prashanti Medical Services and Research Foundation, a charitable trust, established a Heart Hospital in Ahmedabad.

The foundation applied for approval under Section 35AC of the Income Tax Act for their hospital project, which was approved by the Committee along with 27 other projects.

A notification on December 7, 2015, listed the approved projects.

The foundation received donations in the financial years 2015-16, 2016-17, and 2017-18.

The Finance Act, 2016, introduced sub-section (7) in Section 35AC, disallowing deductions under this section for any assessment year commencing on or after April 1, 2018.

The foundation challenged the constitutional validity of sub-section (7), arguing for prospective application.

Issues:

Constitutional validity of sub-section (7) of Section 35AC.

Applicability of sub-section (7) to projects approved before its insertion.

Whether a plea of promissory estoppel is valid against legislative power in tax matters.

Held:

The Court upheld the High Court's decision, stating that sub-section (7) is prospective in its operation and does not apply retrospectively. The Court emphasized that a plea of promissory estoppel is not available to an assessee against the exercise of legislative power.( Paragraph 18)

The Court clarified that in tax matters, pleas based on equity or hardship are not legally sustainable. The constitutional validity of a taxing provision cannot be struck down on such grounds.( Paragraph 26)

The Court rejected the appellant's request to invoke powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, stating that such powers are not to be invoked once the action is in accordance with the law.( Paragraph 27)

Facts:

The parties, residing in the same village in Haryana, were closely related but involved in several civil and criminal cases against each other.

The deceased girl, about 18 years old, had a broken engagement and faced continuous harassment from accused relatives.

Accused No. 1 addressed the deceased girl as his "wife," contributing to her humiliation, with other accused joining in the harassment.

Issues:

Whether the accused, through continuous acts of humiliation, abetted the suicide of the deceased girl.

Juvenility claim of appellant No. 2.

Held:

Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person. In cases of abetment of suicide, proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement is essential. Mere allegations of harassment are insufficient unless there is evidence that the accused's actions compelled the victim to commit suicide.( Para 15-16)

Continuous taunting and humiliation by the accused, particularly addressing the deceased as his "wife," aimed at destroying her self-esteem, were established. The acts were not isolated but a continuous feature, leading to the deceased's suicide.( Para 20-21)

The accused's intention was to drive the deceased to helplessness and intolerance. The acts and deeds were proximate to the suicide, and the accused intentionally goaded the victim to take her own life.( Para 23-24)

Appellant No. 2 (accused No. 3) is entitled to the benefit of juvenility as per the matriculation certificate, which records his date of birth as "20.04.1980."( Para 10-11)

Facts:

Zorawar Singh owned certain immovable property in New Delhi.

Zorawar Singh executed a Will dated June 16, 1985, and a codicil dated October 21, 1995.

Two suits were filed: one by the respondents claiming declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the Will and codicil, and the other by the appellant claiming natural succession.

Issues:

The applicability of Clause (c) of Section 213(2) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

Whether it is necessary to seek probate or letters of administration in the National Capital Region of Delhi.

Held:

The Act is applicable to Wills and codicils made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains, subject to the jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the High Courts of Madras or Bombay - {clause (a) of Section 57 of the Act}.

It is also applicable to Wills and codicils made outside those territories and limits in relation to immovable property within those territories - Clause (b) of Section 57.

Clause (c) of Section 57 applies to Wills and codicils made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains on or after January 1, 1927, to which provisions are not applied by clauses (a) and (b).

Sub-section (2) of Section 213 of the Act applies only to Wills made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains falling under clauses (a) or (b) of Section 57, making clause (c) inapplicable.

The judgment cites several cases supporting the view that probate is not necessary for Wills made outside Bengal, Madras, or Bombay concerning properties and parties not located in those territories.

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court's order, which accepted an intra-court appeal against the rejection of the plaint based on Section 213, was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, finding no error in the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court.