FACTS:

Respondents had been working through an outsourcing agency since 2010 for the Appellant-Corporation.

They passed ITI and completed National Apprenticeship Certificate in the Appellant-Corporation.

Appellant issued a recruitment notification with an upper age limit of 28 years.

Age relaxation up to 40 years was provided for those directly employed with ITI qualification plus NAC or ITI qualification plus experience of tenure based contract.

ISSUES:

Whether the Respondents, working through an outsourcing agency, were entitled to age relaxation.

The challenge to the rejection of their request for age relaxation.

HELD:

The Single Judge rightly rejected the challenge as it was raised after the application period was over.

The Division Bench's assessment was incorrect; the Respondents, engaged through outsourcing, were not entitled to age relaxation.

The appeal is allowed, the judgment under appeal is set aside, and the Single Judge's order is restored.

Facts:

The case involved a Sirdar who filed an application for Bhumidar rights in respect of three plots, accompanied by a deposit of 20 times the land revenue. Subsequently, a sale deed for these plots was executed the next day.

Issues:

The application for Bhumidar rights was rejected for two plots, leading to a revision application by the Sirdar. The subsequent grant of Bhumidar Sanad in respect of one plot, post the Sirdar's demise, triggered legal proceedings initiated by the purchaser based on the sale deed.

Held:

Under Section 134 read with Section 137, a Sirdar could obtain Bhumidhari Sanad after depositing 20 times the land revenue and making an application. Sections 130 and 131 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, were substituted by U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977.

Section 73(1) of the U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977, stated that all proceedings for acquiring bhumidhari rights under sections 134 and 135, pending on or before 28.01.1977, shall abate. The Sirdar's revision, pending against the rejection of Bhumidhari Sanad, abated by virtue of the ordinance. Section 73(2) required a refund of the deposited amount in case of abatement.

By statutory provision, Section 73 abated all pending applications and proceedings. The benefit of the provision applied to Sirdars as of the date when the ordinance was enforced. As the Sirdar was already deceased on 28.01.1977, his legal heirs couldn't avail the benefits of the ordinance to validate the sale deed for two plots.

Conclusion: The High Court erred in allowing the writ petition and decreeing the suit based on the retrospective benefits of Ordinance No.1 of 1977.

Facts:

The appeal challenges the order dated 08.02.2019, passed by NCLAT, setting aside the NCLT's order dated 10.10.2018 and directing the admission of the application against the appellant under Section 7, IBC.

Appellant contends a violation of audi alteram partem, asserting that no notice was served as required by NCLAT Rules, specifically Rule 48.

Respondent No. 1 argues that an advance copy of the appeal paper book was sent to the appellant, indicating an intent to challenge the NCLT's order.

Issues:

Whether the NCLAT proceedings violated the appellant's right to be heard and adhered to the procedural rules, especially Rule 48 of the NCLAT Rules.

Held:

The NCLAT, despite issuing notice on the appeal, failed to comply with Rule 48, which mandates service of notice along with the appeal papers on the other party.

Rule 52 necessitates the record of service details in the order sheet, which is not reflected in the materials presented.

The appellant's right to be heard, a fundamental principle of natural justice, has been violated.

The NCLAT order is set aside, and the matter is remanded back to the NCLAT for fresh consideration, emphasizing adherence to procedural rules.

The appellant and respondents are directed to approach the NCLAT for early listing on March 13, 2019, without the need for fresh notice to the appellant.

The court refrains from expressing any opinion on the case's merits, leaving it to the NCLAT's independent adjudication.

The appeal stands disposed of

Facts:

The case involved the delayed payment of Commuted Value of Pension (CVP) to an employee who received provisional pension during the pendency of a vigilance/disciplinary case. The employee applied for CVP more than three years after retirement, seeking interest from the date of retirement.

Issues:

Whether the employee was entitled to interest on the CVP due to the delayed payment and the acceptance of provisional pension.

Held:

The court held that there is no provision in the Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981, contemplating the payment of interest on delayed CVP. The Office Memorandum dated 05.10.1999 did not explicitly preclude interest but did not mandate it either. (Para 20)

Pension is a legal and fundamental right, and interest can be ordered for belated pension payments. CVP is linked to pension and is a part of the employee's right to receive pension. Commutation is optional and governed by specific rules. (Paras 21, 22, and 23)

Rule 13(3) of Commutation Rules allows an employee to apply for CVP within three months of retirement. In the present case, the employee could not apply under Rule 13(1) as he was receiving provisional pension. However, he was not precluded from applying under Rule 13(3). (Paras 29 and 30)

The employee applied for CVP on 01.11.2012, seeking commutation without a medical examination, showing his retirement date as 31.07.2008. CVP was sanctioned in December 2012 based on this application. (Para 37)

Three situations were identified: immediate pension finalization, provisional pension with commutation, and provisional pension during disciplinary proceedings. The applicant fell into the third category, precluding commutation during provisional pension under Rule 4 of Commutation Rules. (Para 35)

The court emphasized the legal rights conferred by Rule 13(3) and the necessity to apply within the prescribed time. Interest cannot be claimed from the date of retirement in cases falling under Rule 13(1). (Para 45)

The applicant failed to make an application within three months of retirement, which would have been under Rule 13(3). Acceptance of provisional pension under Rule 69 precluded him from applying under Rule 13(1), and interest from the date of retirement was not warranted. (Para 46)

Facts:

The age of superannuation was initially raised from 58 to 60 years by a Government Order on 05.08.2015.

A subsequent Resolution dated 18.06.2016 kept this decision in abeyance.

A Government Order on 28.06.2016 addressed issues related to the interregnum period or gap period for re-inducted employees.

Government Order on 27.06.2017 gave in-principle approval for the enhanced retirement age.

Government Order on 08.08.2017 amended the previous order, stating its retrospective effect from 02.06.2014.

Supreme Court, on 09.08.2017, ordered protection for employees superannuating after 02.06.2014, up to 60 years.

Issues:

The interpretation of "consequential benefits" and whether it included back wages for the period not actively worked.

Held:

The amendment to Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment Act occurred post the bifurcation, addressing the situation of employees allocated to the new State.

The policy decision on 05.08.2015 was kept in abeyance, and subsequent orders dealt with the interregnum period for re-inducted employees. The Government Order on 08.08.2017 modified the earlier decision, making it retrospective from 02.06.2014 but did not alter the principles regarding the interregnum period.

The benefits emanated from policy documents, and the extent of benefits was outlined in those government-issued instruments.

Mere expression "consequential benefits" doesn't entitle employees to more than what was contemplated in the policy documents.

Decision: The contempt petitions were dismissed. The court found no violation of the Supreme Court's orders, stating that employees were entitled to benefits as per the policy documents, but not for the period they had not actively worked.

Referred:

B. Prabhakar Rao and ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1985 (Supp) SCC 432

D.S. Nakara vs. Union of India - (1983) 1 SCC 305

G. Rama Mohan Rao and Anr. vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. etc., 2017(3)ALT 1; 2017(6) ALD 103; (2017) 11 LLJ 535 AP

Sureshchandra Singh and others v. Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. and others, (2004) 1 SCC 592

Facts:

The appellant filed a civil suit in the High Court at Calcutta seeking a declaration, damages, and injunction. The respondents raised a plea of territorial jurisdiction, arguing that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in revoking the leave granted to the appellant based on the respondents' plea of territorial jurisdiction.

Held:

The respondents did not file a written statement but instead raised the plea of territorial jurisdiction through an application for revocation of leave.

The Court emphasized that the issue of territorial jurisdiction is a mixed question of law and fact, and such matters should be raised in the written statement as part of the defense.

The Court referred to the precedent set in Secretary of State v. Golabrai Paliram and Indian Mineral & Chemicals Co. v. Deutsche Bank, asserting that questions of difficulty and importance should not be dealt with by revoking leave but should be part of the written statement.

The Court held that the respondents should be allowed to raise the plea of territorial jurisdiction in the written statement to enable a thorough examination of the issue on its merits.

The application for revocation of leave was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Single Judge for a fresh decision on the issue in accordance with law.

The Court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the controversy but directed the Single Judge to decide the issue strictly in accordance with the law.

FACTS:

Birla Institute of Technology (BIT) is the appellant.

The State of Jharkhand and others are respondents.

The appeal involves the entitlement of teachers to gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

The court initially relied on the decision in Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association, allowing the appeal.

Later, the court realized that the Parliament had amended the definition of "employee" in the Payment of Gratuity Act in response to the Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association case.

The amendment had retrospective effect from 03.04.1997.

ISSUES:

Whether teachers are entitled to gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act.

The impact of the amendment made by Act No. 47 of 2009 on the Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association case.

HELD:

The court acknowledged the error in its initial judgment due to not considering the amendment to the Payment of Gratuity Act.

The amendment widened the definition of "employee," including teachers, with retrospective effect from 03.04.1997.

The reliance on Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association by the appellant was misplaced in light of the amendment.

The court recalled its previous order and restored the appeal for disposal on its merits.

Pendency of a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of Act No. 47 of 2009 does not affect the right of teachers to claim gratuity.

DECISION: The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was directed to pay costs to the teacher.

REFERRED CASES:

Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association vs. Administrative Officer and Others (2004) 1 SCC 755

Facts:

The case pertains to the succession of an interest in agricultural lands in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The matter involves the application of Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and the relevance of the deleted Section 4(2) in the context of devolution of tenancy rights concerning agricultural holdings.

Issues:

Applicability of Section 22 to agricultural land in Himachal Pradesh.

Impact of the deletion of Section 4(2) on the applicability of Section 22.

Whether devolution of tenancy rights in agricultural holdings is exempt from Section 22.

Held:

The court notes that there is no conflicting State legislation in Himachal Pradesh regarding succession to agricultural lands. Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act exclusively occupies this field in the state, and the High Court was correct in affirming its applicability to agricultural lands.

The court observes that, before its deletion, Section 4(2) of the Act explicitly exempted the applicability of the Act in cases of devolution of tenancy rights concerning agricultural holdings. The High Court's conclusion on the inapplicability of Section 22 in such cases was accurate. However, the deletion of Section 4(2) removes this exception, making Section 22 universally applicable.

The court explores the exclusive competence of State legislatures over matters related to land, land tenures, etc. It emphasizes that the preferential rights under Section 22 are linked to the principles of succession. Three illustrations are provided to clarify scenarios involving joint purchase, joint purchase by siblings, and inherited agricultural holdings.

The court delves into the historical context, stating that preferential rights were introduced to prevent outsiders from easily acquiring family properties. This objective supports the conferment of preferential rights upon heirs under Section 22, even in the case of agricultural land.

The court conclusively affirms that the preferential right under Section 22 applies to heirs of Hindus, even when the property in question is agricultural land. The High Court's decision upholding the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge is validated.