Facts:

The appellant-husband and respondent-wife, after over two decades of marriage, were embroiled in a bitter matrimonial dispute.

The couple jointly owned a flat where they resided with their daughters.

The respondent-wife filed for divorce on grounds of cruelty and sought various reliefs, including the appellant's eviction from the shared household under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Issues:

Whether the order directing the appellant-husband to vacate the matrimonial home warrants interference.

Whether the appellant's rights as a co-owner of the property can outweigh the respondent-wife's allegations of domestic violence.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the arguments presented and the relevant legal provisions, held as follows:

The court affirmed the Family Court's interim order directing the appellant-husband to vacate the shared household, citing Section 19(1)(b) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which empowers the court to take such action upon satisfaction of domestic violence (Paragraph 12).

The court dismissed the appeal and directed the Family Court to expedite the divorce proceedings while emphasizing that no opinion on the merits of the case was expressed. The Family Court shall try and dispose of the case uninfluenced by any observations or findings either in the impugned order or this order. (Paragraph 13).

Facts:

The appellant, Shivashakti Sugars Limited, sought permission to establish a sugar factory.

The High Court held that the respondent, Shree Renuka Sugar Limited (RS), qualified as an existing sugar factory under Clause 6A.

The distance between the appellant's factory and RS was less than 15 kilometers, violating Clause 6A.

The appellant's factory had been operational since 2011.

Various economic factors such as loans, employment, and public purpose were considered.

Issues:

Whether RS qualifies as an existing sugar factory under Clause 6A.

Whether the distance requirement between the appellant's factory and RS was violated.

The economic impact and public interest served by the appellant's factory.

Held:

The court accepted the submission that RS is not an existing sugar factory if it is not in operation at the time of the new sugar mill's application for establishment.

The requirement for an existing sugar mill under Explanation 1 to Clause 6A is to crush for five consecutive years, not just for one season.

The State Government's liquidation order for RS indicates it was not operational, making the distance requirement inapplicable.

The appellant's factory took effective steps for establishment, including obtaining necessary permissions and commencing production within the stipulated time.

RS waived the distance requirement by giving a "no objection" certificate to the appellant, indicating no adverse impact on sugarcane availability.

Economic factors such as investment, loans, employment generation, and public purpose served by the appellant's factory favored its continued operation.

The court emphasized the need for an economic analysis of law, considering the economic impact of decisions alongside statutory provisions.

Article 142 of the Constitution was invoked to uphold the operation of the appellant's factory, considering equitable considerations.

The High Court's directions were set aside, allowing the appellant's factory to continue operations, with certain villages being reallocated.

Facts:

The case involves multiple interlocutory applications and contempt petitions filed by a consortium of banks against debtors and guarantors, seeking recovery of substantial sums of money owed to them. The respondent No. 3, a guarantor, was supposed to receive a sum of US$ 75 million, out of which US $ 40 million was to be paid to the Banks immediately. However, respondent No. 3 failed to disclose his assets as directed by the Supreme Court and violated restraint orders passed by the High Court by transferring US $ 40 million to his children.

Issues:

Whether respondent No. 3 is guilty of contempt of court on two counts.

Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to exercise contempt jurisdiction in the case of contempt of the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court found respondent No. 3 guilty of contempt on two counts. First, for disobeying the Supreme Court's orders by not disclosing full particulars of his assets (Para 28). Second, for violating the express orders of restraint passed by the High Court.

The orders passed by the Supreme Court were clear and unambiguous, and respondent No. 3 was obligated to make complete disclosure of his assets (Para 28). The funds received by respondent No. 3 were subject to restraint orders passed by the High Court, and his actions to transfer the funds to trusts beyond the reach of the court process reflected an intent to evade legal scrutiny.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to exercise contempt jurisdiction even with regard to contempt of the High Court, especially when the orders of the High Court pertain to the same cause. Respondent No. 3 was adequately put on notice, and no prejudice would be caused by the Supreme Court assuming jurisdiction in this matter.

Respondent No. 3 was found to be duty-bound to appear in person in response to the contempt petition, but instead, he sought the recall of the orders issuing notice, which was dismissed by the Court. Consequently, he was directed to appear in person for the contempt proceedings.

As respondent No. 3 failed to file any reply or appear in person, the Court decided to grant him one more opportunity to be heard on the proposed punishment for contempt. Therefore, the matter was adjourned for further hearing.

Decision: The Supreme Court held respondent No. 3 guilty of contempt on two counts and directed him to appear in person for further proceedings on the proposed punishment for contempt.

Facts:

The respondents operated a financial establishment, Global Capital Trading Services, in Madurai, offering high returns on investments.

Numerous depositors lodged complaints alleging that the respondents failed to return deposits after maturity.

A complaint (FIR No. 06/2010) was filed against the respondents under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, along with Section 5 of the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1997.

The State Government issued an order (G.O.) on 24.12.2012, attaching the immovable properties of the respondents under Section 3 of the Act.

Issues:

Whether the State Government's order attaching properties under Section 3 of the Act is valid.

Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the said order.

Held:

The Court examined the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1997, and determined the validity of the State Government's order.

The Court's interpretation of Section 3 of the Act, affirming the government's power to issue ad-interim attachment orders to protect depositors' interests. The Court found no ambiguity in the Act's language and upheld the validity of the government's action.

The Court criticized the High Court's interference with the ad-interim order, stating in paragraph 15 that such interference defeats the purpose of the provision meant to safeguard investors' interests.

In conclusion the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and affirmed the validity of the State Government's order to attach the respondents' properties under Section 3 of the Act.

The appeal was allowed, providing clarity on the State's authority to take action against financial establishments that fail to fulfill their obligations to depositors.

Facts:

The land in question was taken over by the government in 1935 for non-payment of land tax and converted into "bought in" land. Subsequently, it was further converted into "Punjai Tharisu" (Government-owned fallow land) and assigned to third parties in 1958. The respondent claimed to be the sole legal heir to the land and offered to pay the arrears of land tax for its restoration to him. The respondent relied on RSO 45(4) for preferential reassignment.

Issues:

Whether the respondent met the prerequisites for preferential reassignment under RSO 45(4).

Whether the High Court's decree based on the absence of notice issued to the respondent before the 1958 assignment was correct.

Held:

The Revenue Standing Orders outline the general procedure under the Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, for realization of arrears of land revenue. RSO 45, a pivotal provision, mandates specific steps for the government's acquisition of "bought in" land.

The prerequisite for preferential reassignment under RSO 45(4) includes absence of willful default in tax payment, default due to uncontrollable circumstances, and unobjectionable assignment. Non-compliance with these preconditions disqualifies the original owner or their heirs from preference.

The respondent failed to provide evidence satisfying the prerequisites for preferential reassignment under RSO 45(4). His delay in clearing arrears and initiating legal action worked against him.

Compliance with statutory requirements is crucial. Failure to meet these requirements precludes preferential treatment.

The High Court's decree solely based on the absence of notice issued to the respondent before the 1958 assignment was incorrect.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the respondent is not entitled to the restoration of the land. The preference under RSO 45(4) was not applicable due to the respondent's failure to meet the necessary conditions.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute between a father-in-law and daughter-in-law regarding possession of a flat. The father-in-law claimed himself as the licensor and the daughter-in-law as a gratuitous licensee.

Issues:

The entertainability of the daughter-in-law's counter-claim seeking residence in the flat under Section 19 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, before the Small Causes Court.

Held:

The Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, establishes Small Causes Courts as civil courts, and proceedings before them are legal proceedings.

Section 26 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, allows for any relief under Sections 18 to 22 to be sought before a civil court, including the Small Causes Court.

Counter-claims by defendants are permissible under Order VIII, Rule 6A of the Code of Civil Procedure, and such claims can be filed before the Small Causes Court.

The Maharashtra Act 24 of 1984 amended the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act to allow suits between licensors and licensees to be filed before the Small Causes Court.

The non-obstante clause in Section 26(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act overrides contrary provisions, enabling suits between licensors and licensees to be filed before the Small Causes Court.

The purpose of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, is to secure a social purpose, and its provisions should be construed widely. Any claims under the Act should not be denied unless expressly barred.

Refusal to consider the daughter-in-law's counter-claim would amount to denying consideration of the claim as contemplated by Section 26 of the Act, leading to multiplicity of proceedings, which is against the object and purpose of the Act.

Decision: The Court allowed the daughter-in-law's appeal, emphasizing that her counter-claim seeking residence in the flat under the 2005 Act was fully entertainable, and the lower courts erred in refusing to consider it.

Facts:

The Maharashtra Value Added Tax (Levy, Amendment and Validation) Act, 2009, retrospectively amended Section 93(1) of the MVAT Act.

This retrospective amendment was challenged on constitutional grounds, alleging arbitrariness and violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether the retrospective operation of the amended provisions of the MVAT Act is constitutionally valid.

Whether the retrospective amendment amounts to the imposition of a new levy with retrospective effect.

Held:

The legislative intent behind Section 41BB of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, and subsequently Section 93(1) of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002, was to grant proportionate incentives to eligible units (Para 22).

The retrospective amendment of Section 93(1) of the MVAT Act aimed to rectify the executive's error in implementing the legislative intent through administrative circulars instead of statutory rules (Para 29).

The retrospective amendment did not introduce a new levy but sought to make the statutory provision effective from its inception (Para 30).

Decision: The court upheld the retrospective operation of the amended provisions, emphasizing the legislative intent for proportionate incentives and the need to rectify earlier errors in implementation.

Facts:

The case revolves around a complaint filed by the Food Corporation of India (FCI) alleging anti-competitive behavior among certain companies, including the appellants, in relation to tenders for Aluminium Phosphide Tablets (APT) issued by FCI between 2007 and 2009. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) directed an investigation, resulting in a prima facie finding of anti-competitive conduct. The CCI concluded that the appellants violated provisions of Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002, and imposed penalties. The Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) upheld the findings but reduced the penalties.

Issues:

Whether Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 applied to tenders issued prior to its enactment.

Whether the CCI was authorized to investigate tenders not specifically mentioned in the complaint.

Whether the findings of collusive bidding were justified.

Whether penalties should be imposed on total turnover or relevant turnover of the offending company.

Held:

The Court held that Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 applied retroactively to tender processes initiated before its enactment, as long as the anti-competitive conduct persisted beyond the enactment date.

It was determined that the scope of investigation by the Director General (DG) under Section 26(1) was broad enough to cover additional evidence beyond what was specified in the initial complaint or order of investigation.

The Court affirmed the findings of collusive bidding based on evidence of identical pricing across multiple tenders, demonstrating a pattern of anti-competitive behavior.

Regarding penalties, it was clarified that Section 27(b) of the Act did not specify whether penalties should be based on total turnover or relevant turnover. However, adopting relevant turnover as the criteria for penalty imposition was deemed more equitable and in line with the Act's ethos.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 14A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, particularly regarding the deduction of expenses related to earning dividend income on which tax is payable under Section 115-O.

Issues:

Whether Section 14A applies to expenses incurred in earning dividend income subject to tax under Section 115-O.

Whether the Assessing Officer provided sufficient justification to disallow deductions for expenses related to dividend income in the specific case of Assessment Year 2002-2003.

Held:

The court held that Section 14A applies to expenses incurred in earning dividend income on which tax is payable under Section 115-O.

The literal interpretation of Section 14A aligns with the legislative intent to disallow deductions for expenses related to exempted income.

The provisions of Section 10(33) and Section 115-O indicate that dividend income subject to tax under Section 115-O is not included in the total income of the recipient assessee.

Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 14A, introduced in 2006, prescribe a formula for determining expenses related to income not forming part of the total income. The Assessing Officer must be satisfied with the validity of the assessee's claim regarding the absence of expenditure incurred in earning exempted income.

In the specific case of Assessment Year 2002-2003, the Assessing Officer failed to provide adequate reasons to reject the assessee's claim regarding the absence of expenditure incurred to earn dividend income. Therefore, the assessee is entitled to the full benefit of the claim of dividend income without deductions.

Decision: The court set aside the order of the High Court and ruled in favor of the assessee based on the interpretation of Section 14A and the lack of justification for disallowing deductions for expenses related to dividend income.