Facts:

The appellant was convicted for the rape and murder of a 3-year-old girl. Both the conviction and the capital punishment were confirmed by the High Court. The appeals filed by the appellant before the Supreme Court were dismissed. Subsequently, the review petitions were also dismissed, but later restored following a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The appropriateness of capital punishment in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the consideration of reform and rehabilitation possibilities of the convict, the significance of DNA evidence, and the relevance of the appellant's prior criminal history.

Held:

The Court observed that while it's generally not advisable to award capital punishment in cases based solely on circumstantial evidence, there's no absolute rule against it. However, exceptional circumstances warranting the death penalty must be present.

The probability of the convict being reformed and rehabilitated into society must be earnestly considered before awarding the death penalty. The prosecution has the burden of proving, through evidence, that the convict cannot be reformed or rehabilitated.

The Court emphasized the importance of DNA evidence in criminal cases and criticized the prosecution for not producing DNA evidence in the trial. The failure to produce such evidence was deemed detrimental to the prosecution's case.

Mere pendency of criminal cases against a convict cannot be a factor in sentencing, as it violates the presumption of innocence. The past adverse conduct of the convict should not be considered for determining the sentence.

Decision: In this particular case, the Court found errors in the trial court's consideration of evidence and sentencing. The prosecution's failure to produce DNA evidence and the consideration of pending cases against the appellant were among the reasons for commuting the death sentence. However, the appellant was not to be released from custody for the rest of his normal life.

Facts:

The appellant, M. A. Antony @ Antappan, was convicted by the Sessions Court for the murder of six members of a single family. The Trial Judge sentenced him to death, a decision upheld by the High Court. The appellant's appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed, leading to the filing of a Review Petition.

Issues:

Whether socio-economic circumstances should be considered in awarding a sentence, particularly in cases of capital punishment.

Held:

The Court held that socio-economic factors should indeed be taken into account while deciding between life imprisonment and the death penalty. These factors include the accessibility of justice and remedies for the poor and needy. Additionally, the quality of legal representation, especially for disadvantaged individuals, was highlighted as an area needing attention.

In the present case, the convict's socio-economic background was considered significant. He worked as a casual driver and was striving to find employment abroad. Financial constraints drove him to desperate measures, culminating in the tragic events of the crime.

The Court emphasized the need to eschew considerations of public opinion or collective conscience when sentencing, as these factors may not accurately reflect the circumstances of the case.

Furthermore, the probability of the convict's reform, rehabilitation, and social reintegration into society should be considered. In this case, there was no evidence to support the notion that the convict was a hardened criminal.

Decision: Taking into account the socio-economic condition of the convict and other relevant factors, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal by an employees' union against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan.

The High Court refused to transfer winding-up proceedings pending before it to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and set aside an order of the NCLT admitting a financial creditor's petition under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC).

The proceedings originated from the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SIC Act), and involved various petitions and writs filed by labor unions and creditors.

Issues:

The jurisdictional conflict between the High Court and the NCLT in dealing with winding-up proceedings initiated under the SIC Act and Section 7 applications under the IBC.

The interpretation of relevant provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 and the Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 was also in question.

Held:

The Supreme Court interpreted Rule 5(2) of the Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 and clarified that proceedings under Section 20 of the SIC Act were to be dealt with by the High Court until a party filed an application for transfer to the NCLT post the amendment date.

The Court affirmed the NCLT's jurisdiction to admit a Section 7 application under the IBC, citing Section 238 of the IBC, which gives precedence to the provisions of the IBC over other laws.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment. It directed that the NCLT proceedings should continue from the stage they were left off. The company petition pending before the High Court could not proceed further due to Section 238 of the IBC.

Facts:

The appellant purchased a building that was previously leased to the respondent.

Dispute arose due to default in lease payments.

Legal proceedings initiated by the appellant for recovery of possession and other reliefs.

Respondent filed an application for rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of CPC.

Issues:

Whether the West Bengal Tenancy Act, 1997 or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies to the dispute.

Validity of the rejection of plaint application filed by the respondent.

Held:

The Court disposed of the appeals directing the trial court to frame the issue relating to the maintainability of the suit and the applicability of the enactments mentioned (West Bengal Tenancy Act, 1997 and Transfer of Property Act, 1882) as a preliminary issue. The trial court was instructed to decide this issue expeditiously, preferably within six months from the date of communication of the judgment.

In conclusion, the Court did not provide a final decision on the applicability of the legal enactments but directed the trial court to address this issue promptly as a preliminary matter.

Facts:

Ramlakhan Tripathi, a deceased railway employee, had a second marriage during the existence of his first marriage.

His son from the second marriage, V.R. Tripathi, applied for compassionate appointment upon his father's death, but the application was rejected by the Railway Authorities.

The respondent moved to the Central Administrative Tribunal, which ruled in his favor. The Union of India and the Railway Authorities then filed writ proceedings before the Bombay High Court, which upheld the decision of the Tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the circular of the Railway Board, which denied compassionate appointment to children born from a second marriage of a deceased employee, was consistent with constitutional principles.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized that compassionate appointment is aimed at alleviating the financial hardship faced by the family of a deceased employee and is not merely based on parentage or descent.

The court analyzed Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which legitimizes children born from void marriages, and held that excluding such legitimate children from compassionate appointment violated constitutional principles of equality and fairness.

The court rejected the argument that denying compassionate appointment to children from a second marriage is a legitimate policy to discourage bigamy, stating that such exclusion is arbitrary and unconstitutional.

The court also criticized the Railway Board for reissuing the circular denying compassionate appointment despite a previous court ruling against it.

The court dismissed the appeal, directing the authorities to consider the application for compassionate appointment within three months.

Facts:

Respondents were engaged on a casual basis by the Headquarters, Army Training Command (ARTRAC), Shimla.

They were terminated from service in 2003 and challenged the termination before the Central Administrative Tribunal.

The Tribunal directed their reinstatement as 'civil cooks', which was affirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether employees of regimental canteens fall under the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal.

Validity of the reinstatement order by the Tribunal.

Held:

The Court held that employees of regimental canteens are not government servants nor are they engaged in connection with a civil post under the Union. Therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim under Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

The Court set aside the Tribunal's order and directed dismissal of the Original Applications filed before the Tribunal. However, it clarified that the continuance of the respondent-workmen would depend upon the authorities at the regimental canteens, suggesting they consider the long years of service put in by the respondents sympathetically.

Facts:

The case involved a comprehensive examination of the legal provisions concerning the protection of the identity of victims of sexual offenses, particularly women and children, under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).

Issues:

The interpretation and application of relevant sections of the IPC and the POCSO Act regarding the disclosure of victims' identities, the responsibilities of law enforcement agencies and the media, and the establishment of safeguards to prevent public disclosure of victims' identities.

Held:

The court elucidated the provisions of Section 228A of the IPC, emphasizing that any person making known the identity of a victim of specified sexual offenses commits a criminal offense, punishable by law. It further clarified that even the publication of related court proceedings without the court's permission constitutes an offense, with exceptions for printing or publishing court judgments.

The court interpreted the phrase "matter which may make known the identity of the person" under Section 228A IPC, emphasizing that it encompasses not only the victim's name but also any information that could lead to the victim's identification. This interpretation aims to protect victims from societal discrimination and harassment.

Exceptions under Section 228A(2) IPC were discussed, particularly for police officials recording victim identities during investigations. However, such information should not be made public or disclosed to the media. FIRs related to specified sexual offenses should not be put in the public domain.

It was clarified that Section 228A(2)(c) IPC, which deals with minors, no longer applies due to the enactment of the POCSO Act, which specifically addresses minors' protection.

The court highlighted the absence of designated social welfare institutions or organizations authorized to receive victim identity disclosures from next of kin, emphasizing the need for sensitivity and caution in handling such cases.

It was emphasized that even with next of kin authorization, disclosure of victim identity should only occur with permission from the competent authority, considering the victim's best interests.

The court outlined exceptional circumstances where victim identity disclosure may be necessary, such as in cases involving unidentified deceased victims. However, such disclosures should be minimal and sensitive to the victim's dignity.

The court discussed the restrictions on reporting court proceedings under Section 228A and Section 327(2) CrPC, emphasizing the confidentiality of in-camera proceedings to protect victims' identities.

The judgment emphasized that court judgments should avoid indicating the victim's name to prevent inadvertent disclosure.

Procedures for victims filing appeals were outlined, emphasizing the confidentiality of victim identities throughout the appellate process.

The court examined the provisions of the POCSO Act, emphasizing the stringent measures in place to protect child victims' identities.

The obligation of the media to prevent disclosure of child victim identities was emphasized, with violations constituting offenses under the POCSO Act.

The court extended protections to deceased victims, emphasizing the dignity owed to them even after death.

The court endorsed the directives of the Calcutta High Court regarding POCSO Act implementation, particularly regarding victim identity protection.

The establishment of child-friendly courts and one-stop centers for victims' support was encouraged, promoting a sensitive and supportive approach to handling cases of sexual offenses against women and children.

Decision: The court issued comprehensive directives to safeguard the identities of victims of sexual offenses, outlining stringent measures for law enforcement agencies, media, and judicial authorities to prevent public disclosure of victim identities.

Facts:The appeal was filed against the final judgment and order passed by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition No. 115 of 1999. The matter was sub judice and pending before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, in a case titled CBI vs. Nemi Chand Jain and others, relating to alleged offenses under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and FCRA.

Issues:

The appeal pertained to the applicability of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act 1976 (FCRA) to the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court declined to examine the issue of FCRA applicability at the initial stage of the proceedings. It emphasized that the issue could be properly decided only after the prosecution presented evidence and material against the appellant. Therefore, the Court directed the concerned Magistrate to proceed with the trial and dispose of the case within one year from the date of the order.

The Court refrained from recording any finding on the submissions made by the respondent's counsel in their written submissions. The appeal was disposed of with these observations.

Facts:

M/S. Sanjivani Non-Ferrous Trading Private Limited imported various varieties of Aluminum scrap between August 27, 2013, and December 29, 2014.

The respondent declared the transaction value for customs duty purposes in 843 Bills of Entry.

The Assessing Officer rejected the declared value, leading to reassessment by increasing the assessable value.

Upon challenge in the High Court of Allahabad, the Deputy Commissioner of Customs justified the rejection of the transaction value and enhanced it based on the value of the imported goods and their contents.

The respondent appealed the assessment order to the Commissioner (Appeals), and subsequently to the Customs, Excise, and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal), which allowed the appeals, rejecting the enhancement of assessable value by the Revenue.

Issues:

Whether the Tribunal erred in rejecting the enhancement of assessable value by the Revenue without remanding the case back to the Assessing Officer.

Whether the Assessing Officer properly examined the evidence available with the Department and undertook the necessary exercise regarding price being the sole consideration.

Held:

The Court analyzed Section 14 of the Customs Act, which mandates that the assessable value should ordinarily be based on the price actually paid for the goods. Exceptions exist where the price is not the sole consideration or if the buyers and sellers are related persons. The Court emphasized that the Assessing Officer must provide cogent reasons supported by material to reject the declared transaction value. In the absence of such evidence, the declared value stands. The Tribunal's decision to set aside the order was justified, as was done in similar cases previously. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no merit in the appeals and upheld the Tribunal's decision.