Facts:

Long-standing rivalry between the wife of the appellant (accused no.3) and the victim-deceased.

Alleged altercation between appellant (accused no.1), his wife (accused no.3), and the victim.

Appellant and associates attacked the victim, resulting in his death.

Trial Court convicted appellant and accused no.2, acquitted accused no.3.

High Court maintained conviction of the appellant but acquitted accused no.2.

Issues:

Doubts regarding the place and manner of occurrence.

Unclear identification of the aggressor and how the altercation started.

Lack of clarity on the presence of the deceased at the appellant's doorstep and the presence of bloodstains.

Credibility of the defense version claiming the deceased assaulted the appellant's wife.

Held:

The prosecution failed to remove doubts about the place and manner of occurrence, the identity of the aggressor, and the start of the altercation.( Para 14)

Even after disbelieving the prosecution's case, the court examines whether the appellant is entitled to acquittal based on the right of private defense.( Para 15)

The likelihood that the incident occurred at the appellant's doorstep is considered, given the hostile terms between the parties and a previous argument.( Para 17)

The court accepts the alternative case that the incident took place without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion, upon a sudden quarrel.( Para 18)

The appellant is convicted under Part-I of Section 304 IPC, extending the benefit of Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC.( Para 20)

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the Director of Horticulture, Odisha (appellant) and Pravat Kumar Dash and others (respondents).

Candidates were selected for training for the post of Gardener, and the training process lacked transparency.

The Tribunal directed the State to consider the applicants for appointment against existing vacant Gardener positions, a decision upheld by the High Court.

Six persons' services were terminated, but the termination was later set aside in 2001.

Issues:

Validity of the training process for the post of Gardener.

Applicability of Orissa Civil Services Rules and Article 311 to the appointment.

Legality of the direction to the State for the appointment of candidates who completed training.

Held:

The selection of candidates for training lacked transparency, and there was no commitment to appoint candidates post-training.Completing training did not automatically confer the right to employment; appointments must be through fair competition.The direction to appoint candidates based on training alone was unjustified.( Para 17)

The order of the Odisha Administrative Tribunal, directing the State to appoint the applicants as Gardeners, exceeded its jurisdiction.The appeals were allowed, and the orders of the High Court and Tribunal were set aside.The OAs filed by the respondents were dismissed.( Para 19)

Facts:

The Indian Banking Personnel Selection (IBPS) issued a Notification on 17.11.2014, inviting applications for various posts, including Agricultural Field Officer.

Private respondents applied for the post with a degree in B.Sc. (Forestry).

The specified qualification in the Notification was a 4-year degree in various disciplines, including "Agro-Forestry."

Private respondents received appointment letters, but later it was found that their qualifications did not meet the specified criteria.

The High Court set aside termination orders, considering B.Sc. (Forestry) as equivalent, citing the absence of a 4-year degree in "Agro-Forestry."

Issues:

Whether the Court can read into or assume qualifications not explicitly mentioned in the recruitment Notification.

Whether a change in qualification midstream is permissible, especially when considering additional qualifications retrospectively.

Whether the Court can provide equivalence for educational qualifications.

Held:

It is not within the Court's purview to assume or read qualifications not specified in the Notification.

Any change in qualification midstream must be through a corrigendum, providing an opportunity for all qualified candidates.

Equivalence of educational qualifications is a technical matter best left to expert bodies.

The Court set aside the High Court's orders, stating that private respondents did not possess the specified qualification at the time of recruitment.

In a specific case, the Court exercised discretion under Article 142 to provide relief to one of the private respondents, directing the Bank of India to offer her appointment based on unique circumstances.

Clarified that the decision should not be applied retroactively to initiate action against officers recruited in similar circumstances in other cases where the employer permitted equivalence.

Facts:

The dispute involves Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. (MTNL), Canara Bank, and its subsidiary CANFINA. The disagreement arises from a transaction where CANFINA subscribed to bonds floated by MTNL, subsequently transferring them to Canara Bank. MTNL canceled the bond allotment, alleging incomplete payment by CANFINA.

Issues:

Existence of a valid arbitration agreement.

Joinder of CANFINA as a party in arbitral proceedings.

Application of the Group of Companies Doctrine.

Held:

Existence of a Valid Arbitration Agreement: The court establishes that a valid arbitration agreement is crucial for the arbitration process, and it can take various forms. Section 7(4)(b) allows deriving an arbitration agreement from different means of communication, including electronic means. The court emphasizes interpreting arbitration agreements based on the parties' intentions rather than technicalities.

Agreement Evidenced by Documents: The agreement between MTNL and Canara Bank to arbitrate disputes is evidenced by documents exchanged and court proceedings. Once a party consents to arbitration, they are estopped from later denying the existence of a written agreement.

Application of Section 7(4)(c): Section 7(4)(c) is cited, stating that an arbitration agreement can be in the form of exchanged statements of claims and defense. The court highlights that documents filed before the arbitrator can constitute evidence of an arbitration agreement if not denied by the other party.

Tri-Partite Agreement: The court concludes that the agreement is essentially a tri-partite agreement between MTNL, Canara Bank, and CANFINA. The dispute's nature requires the involvement of all three parties for effective resolution.

Joinder of CANFINA: The "Group of Companies" doctrine is invoked to join CANFINA in the arbitration proceedings. The court deems CANFINA a necessary and proper party due to the tri-partite nature of the transaction.

Application of Group of Companies Doctrine: The court applies the "Group of Companies" doctrine, considering the tight group structure, organizational links, and financial support among the companies. The doctrine is deemed applicable to enable the arbitral tribunal to decide disputes involving all three parties in one proceeding.

Remittal to Arbitral Tribunal: The court partly allows the appeals and remits the matter to the Sole Arbitrator to continue with the arbitral proceedings, including all three parties.

FACTS:

Lands acquired in 1985, award declared in 1988, and compensation enhanced to Rs. 30/- per square yard by Reference Court.

High Court in 1996 reduced compensation to Rs. 22-20 per square yard.

Petitioners seek parity with Kasna landowners who received Rs. 65/- per square yard in 2016.

Delay of 21 years in filing special leave petitions.

ISSUES:

Condonation of the substantial delay in filing special leave petitions.

Petitioners' entitlement to enhanced compensation and parity.

HELD:

The Court notes the absence of a sufficient cause for the substantial delay of 21 years and an additional delay in refiling the petitions.

Emphasizes the lack of explanation for the delay, stating no grievance was made for about 21 years after the High Court's judgment.

Invokes principles of acquiescence and laches, highlighting the non-existence of a right not exercised for a long time.

Rejects reliance on previous decisions cited by petitioners, emphasizing the unique circumstances and adverse impact on the acquiring body if directed to pay enhanced compensation after a long delay.

Dismisses applications for condonation of delay and consequently dismisses special leave petitions on the ground of limitation.

REFERRED CASES:

Dhiraj Singh vs. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 14 SCC 127

K. Subbarayudu vs. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) reported in (2017) 12 SCC 840

Market Committee, Hodal vs. Krishan Murari reported in (1996) 1 SCC 311

Facts:

M/S Shahi and Associates (Appellant) entered into an agreement on 08.07.1993 with the Superintendent Engineer, Drainage Division, District Gonda, U.P., for civil construction projects.

Disputes arose regarding the rate of payment for additional work under the agreement, leading to arbitration proceedings initiated by the appellant on 11.09.1999.

The sole Arbitrator awarded a sum of Rs. 17,86,339/- to the appellant with interest at 18% p.a. from the date of the award to the date of actual payment.

Respondents challenged the award, and the District Judge upheld the sum awarded but reduced the interest rate to 6% p.a. based on para 7-A of Section 24 of the U.P. Amendment Act.

Issues:

Whether para 7-A of Section 24 of the U.P. Amendment Act, applicable to the repealed Arbitration Act, 1940, can be invoked in arbitration proceedings commenced under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Held:

The Act of 1996 came into force on 22.08.1996, repealing the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Para 7-A of Section 24 of the U.P. Amendment Act, an amendment to the repealed Arbitration Act, has no application to proceedings commenced after the enforcement of the Act of 1996. Section 31(7)(b) of the Act of 1996 mandates 18% p.a. interest on the awarded sum in the absence of specific directions by the Arbitrator.

Decision:The appeal is allowed, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and the District Judge in reducing the interest rate.The interest awarded by the Arbitrator at 18% p.a. in accordance with Section 31(7)(b) of the Act of 1996 is restored.

Facts:

The incident occurred on June 14, 2002, where the appellants (accused No.1, 2, and 4) allegedly threatened the victim over an illicit relationship. The victim's mother (PW-5) raised an alarm during the attack.

Issues:

The credibility of eyewitness testimony, the reliability of expert evidence, the delay in filing the FIR, and the recovery of the weapon (MO-1 dagger).

Held:

While evaluating the evidence, the court emphasized the need to assess the truthfulness of witnesses as a whole. Minor discrepancies, particularly in the statements of PW-5, an illiterate homemaker, were deemed inconsequential to the core of the prosecution's case (Paras 13-15).

The court clarified the role of expert witnesses, asserting that their opinionative evidence is primarily corroborative. Inconsistencies with eyewitness accounts do not necessarily undermine the credibility of the latter (Para 16-18).

The delay in registering the FIR was considered acceptable when satisfactorily explained. The court rejected the argument that the delay cast doubt on the prosecution's case (Paras 20-22).

The recovery of the weapon (MO-1 dagger) based on the disclosure statement of accused No.1 was deemed valid, even when panch witnesses turned hostile. The court relied on the Investigating Officer's evidence to support the recovery (Para 23-26).

Accused No.4 was acquitted due to serious doubts about his presence during the incident, while the convictions of accused No.1 and No.2 were confirmed based on the proper appreciation of evidence (Para 26).

Facts:

The appellant was convicted for causing the death of his wife and injuries to two children by setting them ablaze after pouring kerosene. The incident occurred in the midnight of April 20, 1999, resulting in extensive burn injuries to the deceased.

Issues:

Validity and reliability of the dying declaration made by the deceased.

Alternative defense versions, including the claim of an accidental fall of a lamp.

Examination of burn injuries suffered by the appellant and the two sons.

Held:

The post-mortem report revealed the cause of death as septicemia shock due to extensive burns (92%). The incident occurred on April 20, 1999, and the victim was admitted to the hospital on April 21, 1999.

The medical officer (PW14) certified the fitness of the deceased for giving a dying declaration. Despite severe burn injuries, the victim was found conscious and mentally fit for recording the statement.

The court emphasized that the absence of the deceased's thumb impression was not fatal, given the burn injuries on her hands. The degree of burn did not undermine the credibility of the dying declaration.

The court noted that the continued consciousness of the patient was certified by the medical officer at the foot of the dying declaration. Both PW7 and PW14 corroborated the patient's fitness for making the dying declaration.

Despite the extensive burn, the court emphasized that the patient's consciousness and mental fitness were crucial for the admissibility of the dying declaration.

The court clarified that a dying declaration, if otherwise credible, can be the sole basis for conviction. The casualness in recording the dying declaration was disapproved, but its validity was upheld.

The non-sending of the kerosene can for forensic examination did not cast reasonable doubt, considering the strength of the dying declaration.

The court rejected alternative versions presented by the defense witnesses, including the claim of an accidental fall of a lamp. The appellant's implication was based on the unambiguous words in the dying declaration.

The court concluded that the burn injuries suffered by the appellant and the two sons were reconcilable with the prosecution's version of homicide committed by the appellant. The appellant was implicated by the dying declaration.

Facts:

The respondent No. 2 sought permission to conduct prosecution under Section 302 of the CrPC for offenses under Sections 498A, 406, and 34 IPC.

The Magistrate initially declined permission without providing reasons.

The High Court, upon considering relevant judgments, allowed the respondent No. 2 to prosecute the appellants-accused.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate has the discretion to grant permission to the victim to conduct prosecution.

The role of the Public Prosecutor in criminal proceedings.

The right of the victim to participate in criminal proceedings.

Held:

The Magistrate is not bound to grant permission at mere asking, but the victim has a right to assist the Court in a trial before the Magistrate. The Magistrate may consider the victim's ability to assist the Court and whether the trial involves complexities beyond the victim's handling.( Para 5)

The High Court's order granting permission was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Magistrate. The Magistrate should reconsider whether the complainant should be granted permission to prosecute the offenses under Sections 498A, 406 read with Section 34 IPC.( Para 15)

The appeal is allowed.