Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of provisions under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, specifically related to driving licences and the classification of vehicles. The question at hand is whether drivers holding licences for light motor vehicles require additional endorsements to drive transport vehicles within the same class.

Issues:

The interpretation of relevant sections of the Motor Vehicles Act, including Section 2(21), 10(2)(d), and 10(2)(e), as well as related rules and forms.

The key question is whether the insertion of "transport vehicle" in Section 10(2)(e) affects the existing classification of light motor vehicles as transport vehicles.

Held:

The court held that the definition of "light motor vehicle" includes vehicles with gross vehicle weight or unladen weight not exceeding 7500 kgs, encompassing various types of vehicles such as motor cars, road rollers, or tractors.

It was further held that driving licences are issued based on classes of vehicles, not specific types, meaning that a licence for a light motor vehicle includes authorization to drive transport vehicles of that class without requiring additional endorsements.

The court clarified that the 1994 amendment to Section 10(2)(e) did not negate the existing category of light motor vehicles as transport vehicles, emphasizing that the insertion of "transport vehicle" in this section was intended to simplify classification and licensing procedures.

Emphasizing the importance of interpreting statutes in line with legislative intent, the court underscored that courts should not add provisions to statutes beyond what is clearly stated within the law.

Regarding the validity period and forms related to driving licences, the court held that the validity period for licences should be consistent across categories of vehicles .

Finally, the court affirmed that drivers do not need separate endorsements to drive vehicles used for private purposes or for hire or reward if they hold valid licences for the relevant class of vehicle.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras, affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Muttaicose @ Subramani, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The prosecution alleged that the appellant, along with other accused, assaulted several individuals, resulting in the death of Natrajan. The incident stemmed from a dispute over land between the appellant and the deceased.

Issues:

Delay in lodging the FIR.

Credibility of related witnesses.

Existence of motive for the appellant to commit murder.

Held and Decision:

The Supreme Court, after considering the arguments and evidence presented by both parties, held as follows:

Delay in lodging the FIR: The Court rejected the appellant's argument regarding the delay in lodging the FIR. It emphasized established legal principles that mere delay does not invalidate the prosecution's case, especially when a satisfactory explanation for the delay is provided (Paragraph 8).

Credibility of related witnesses: The Court dismissed the contention that witnesses' familial relationship with the informant discredited their testimony. It held that their injuries corroborated their version of events, and their testimony was deemed credible (Paragraph 11).

Existence of motive for the appellant: The Court found that the appellant's armed assault on the deceased, despite no provocation from the latter, indicated the commission of culpable homicide amounting to murder (Paragraph 12).

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 IPC (Paragraph 14).

Facts:

The case involved the custody of a minor daughter who was allegedly removed from the custody of her father in the UK by her mother. The High Court issued a writ for the production of the minor daughter, and the matter was brought before the Supreme Court of India.

Issues:

Whether the custody of the minor with her mother, as opposed to returning her to her native state as per the order of the UK court, is in the best interests of the child.

Whether the order passed by the foreign court renders the custody of the minor unlawful.

Whether the principle of comity of courts should prevail over the welfare of the child.

The role of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of a minor child.

Whether the custody of the minor with her mother is presumed lawful, and under what exceptional circumstances it may be ordered to be taken away.

Held:

The Court held that it is within the jurisdiction of Indian courts to consider the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration, regardless of any pre-existing order of a foreign court. The minor daughter's custody with her mother was deemed to be in her best interests, given her medical condition and familial environment in India. (Para 26, 33, 38-42)

The Court clarified that an order passed by a foreign court directing the mother to produce the child before it does not necessarily render the custody unlawful. The custody of the minor with her mother, being her biological mother, is presumed lawful unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. (Para 30, 31, 32)

The principle of comity of courts cannot override the welfare of the child. The Court emphasized that the welfare of the child is of paramount importance and must be considered above all else. (Para 38-42)

The Court discussed the role of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of a minor child, emphasizing that the principal duty of the court is to ascertain whether the custody of the child is unlawful and whether a change in custody is in the child's best interests. (Para 29, 30)

The Court reiterated that custody of a minor child with the mother is presumed lawful, and only in exceptional situations can custody be ordered to be taken away from the mother. (Para 30)

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, holding that the custody of the minor daughter with her mother is in her best interests. The Court directed that until the minor child attains majority, she should remain in the custody of her mother, with visitation rights granted to the father. The Court also outlined conditions for visitation and interactions between the father and the child. (Para 44, 45)

Facts:

The case arose from a dispute over the renewal of pharmacist registrations by the Chhattisgarh Pharmacy Council following the reorganisation of the Madhya Pradesh Pharmacy Council under the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000.

Issues:

Whether the new State of Chhattisgarh had the authority to constitute a Registration Tribunal under Section 30 of the Pharmacy Act,

Whether it could undertake the renewal of registrations already included in the First Register of pharmacists prepared by the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the First Register prepared by the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh would be deemed as the First Register for the newly formed State of Chhattisgarh based on territorial nexus. Therefore, there was no necessity to open a new First Register or constitute a Registration Tribunal under Section 30 of the Pharmacy Act.

Pharmacists registered in the First Register of the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh could renew their registration in Chhattisgarh under Section 32(2) of the Pharmacy Act, without needing to satisfy the qualifications prescribed by the Education Regulation.

The constitution of the Registration Tribunal by the State of Chhattisgarh and the registrations carried out by it were declared invalid and illegal.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation and application of the Pharmacy Act, 1948, in the context of the formation of the state of Jharkhand from the territory of Bihar. Specifically, it addresses the preparation and recognition of the First Register of pharmacists and the qualifications required for registration under the Act.

Issues:

The court include determining the status of the First Register prepared by Bihar before reorganization in the newly formed state of Jharkhand, the applicability of qualifications for registration under the Pharmacy Act, and the interpretation of provisions of the Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000, regarding the continuity of laws in reorganized states.

Held:

The court recognized the significance of the Pharmacy Act, 1948, in regulating the profession and practice of pharmacy in India, particularly in ensuring minimum standards of professional education for pharmacists (Para 12-13).

It clarified that the qualifications for registration under the Pharmacy Act differed for the preparation of the First Register and subsequent registration, with the latter requiring compliance with Education Regulations (Para 18).

Regarding the status of the First Register in Jharkhand, the court held that it should be deemed as the First Register of Jharkhand to the extent it contains pharmacists native to the territories transferred to Jharkhand (Para 34-35).

The court emphasized the continuity of laws in reorganized states under the Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000, rejecting the principle of a "clean slate" (Para 36-37).

In line with the above findings, the court upheld the decision that there was no need to prepare the First Register again for Jharkhand and directed future registrations to comply strictly with the Pharmacy Act Accordingly this appeal is disposed of. (Para 38-39, 41-42).

Facts:

The case involved an appeal by Sant Lal against an award made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Bhiwani. The MACT held that the driver, although possessing a license for operating light motor vehicles, was not authorized to drive a tractor attached to a goods-carrying trolley, which was categorized as a transport vehicle.

Issues:

Whether a driver with a license for light motor vehicles can legally operate a tractor attached to a goods-carrying trolley without a separate endorsement on their license.

Interpretation of Section 160 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, concerning the validity of a driver's license in relation to the type of vehicle being operated.

Held:

The Court concluded that a driver holding a license for light motor vehicles could legally operate a transport vehicle, including a tractor with a goods-carrying trolley, without needing a separate endorsement. The Court reasoned that the tractor attached to the trolley fell under the category of a light motor vehicle, thus covered by the driver's existing license.

Citing the precedent set in Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., the Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the right of the insurer to recover the amount from the owner. Instead, the liability was deemed joint and several among the owner, driver, and insurer. These appeals have to be allowed.

Facts:

The case pertains to a dispute between TRFLTD. and ENERGO ENGINEERING PROJECTS LTD. (Civil Appeal No. 5306 of 2017) regarding the appointment of an arbitrator under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether a person who becomes ineligible under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, can nominate another person as an arbitrator.

The validity of the procedure followed in appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act.

Held:

The court examined Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which renders a person ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator if they fall under any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule. It was clarified that a person who becomes ineligible under this provision cannot nominate another person as an arbitrator.

Additionally, the court addressed the procedure for appointing an arbitrator. It stated that if an agreement mandates the parties to nominate their respective arbitrators, their authority to nominate cannot be questioned. However, the eligibility of their arbitrator can be challenged based on the norms provided under the Act and its schedules. In this case, where the Managing Director was initially named the sole arbitrator and had the power to nominate another arbitrator, once the Managing Director became ineligible, they could not nominate another arbitrator. It was deemed legally inconceivable for a statutorily ineligible person to nominate an arbitrator.

The court further noted the incorrect procedure followed in appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act. The order appointing the arbitrator was set aside. However, since Clause (c) of the agreement was independent of Clause (d), the arbitration clause survived. Thus, the court retained the authority to appoint an arbitrator, considering all relevant aspects.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, and the matters were remitted to the High Court for further consideration.

Facts:

Defendants 3 and 4 created an equitable mortgage of their property in favor of Defendant No. 1, a bank, for a loan.

The bank filed a suit for recovery of the loan by selling the mortgaged property, which was auctioned.

The plaintiffs, who claimed to have purchased the mortgaged property, filed a suit for redemption of the mortgage.

The trial court decreed the suit, but the decision was reversed on appeal.

Issues:

Whether the right to redeem the mortgage was extinguished due to the foreclosure decree and auction sale.

Whether the plaintiffs, as purchasers of the equity of redemption, had the right to redeem the mortgage.

Held:

The court held that the right to redeem the mortgage can be extinguished by the act of parties or by a court decree, as per the proviso to Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act.

The plaintiffs lost the right to sue for redemption due to the foreclosure decree and auction sale, as there remained no property mortgaged to be redeemed.

The plaintiffs failed to challenge the auction sale or seek redemption before the sale was confirmed, and their right to redemption was extinguished by operation of law.

The court dismissed the appeals, upholding the decision of the High Court.

Facts:

The petitioners filed contempt petitions alleging non-payment of wages/allowances as per the award of the Wage Board by newspaper establishments. The recommendations of the Wage Board were accepted and notified by the Central Government. However, the petitioners challenged these recommendations and notification before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitions challenging the recommendations, thereby affirming the Wage Board's award. Subsequently, the contempt petitions were filed due to alleged non-implementation/partial implementation of the Wage Board award by the newspaper establishments.

Issues: a. Whether the non-implementation/partial implementation of the Wage Board award by newspaper establishments constitutes civil contempt. b. Whether the undertakings given by employees agreeing to be governed by previous wage structures, despite being less favorable, are valid under the law. c. The maintainability of writ petitions under Article 32 seeking interference with transfer/termination.

Held:

The standard of proof required to establish contempt is the same as in criminal proceedings, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt (Para 1.1).

Non-implementation/partial implementation of the Wage Board award by newspaper establishments occurred due to a perceived understanding of the award, which was upheld by the Supreme Court. Such misunderstanding does not constitute willful default to attract civil contempt (Para 1.2).

None of the newspaper establishments are held guilty of contempt. Complaints regarding non-implementation of the Wage Board award should be addressed through mechanisms provided under the relevant act rather than through contempt proceedings (Para 1.3).

The Act is silent on the availability of an option to receive less than what is due to an employee under the Act. Such disputes should be resolved by the fact-finding authority under Section 17 of the Act (Para 2).

The purpose of the 1955 Act is to provide minimum, if not fair, wages to newspaper employees (Para 3).

Writ petitions seeking interference with transfer/termination should be addressed by appropriate authorities under the Act or cognate provisions of law rather than through Article 32 jurisdiction (Para 4).

Decision: The Court dismissed the contempt petitions and directed that complaints regarding non-implementation of the Wage Board award or other grievances should be dealt with in accordance with the mechanisms provided under the relevant act. It also emphasized that disputes regarding undertakings by employees should be resolved through the fact-finding authority under Section 17 of the Act.