Facts:

The appellants leased their property to the Government, which was requisitioned, derequisitioned, and again requisitioned. The Estate Officer issued an eviction notice under ss. 4(1) and 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Public Premises Act, treating the appellants as unauthorized occupants. The High Court upheld the notice.

Issues:

Whether there is a bona fide dispute on the ownership of the property, and if so, does the Estate Officer have jurisdiction to invoke eviction powers under the Public Premises Act?

Held:

The appellants raised a bona fide dispute on ownership. The Estate Officer lacks jurisdiction to use summary eviction powers when a genuine dispute exists. Union of India admitted the dispute and initially expressed intent to pursue dispossession through a civil suit.

Quashing the resumption notice by the High Court meant Union of India couldn't resort to any summary remedy for eviction. The Civil Court is the proper venue for deciding ownership disputes, not summary proceedings under the Public Premises Act.

The principle of merger doesn't apply as the superior court didn't delve into the merits decided by the subordinate court. The order of the subordinate court holds unless the superior court specifically addresses the merits.

The court referred to Express Newspapers case, holding that A.P. Sen J.'s view is the majority view, binding under Art. 141. The appellants genuinely disputed ownership, and the Estate Officer lacked jurisdiction under the Public Premises Act.

Facts:

Appellants and two others were prosecuted for offenses under Sections 323, 324, 452, 504, and 506 IPC.

Acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate, Mathura, but the State appealed.

Appellate Court convicted appellants, sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment and fines.

Appellants filed a criminal revision before the High Court, which was dismissed ex parte.

Issues:

Validity of High Court's dismissal of the revision without assigning reasons.

Held:

The High Court failed to apply its judicial mind while dismissing the revision, lacking justification for interference. (Para 11)

The expectation was for the High Court to consider factual and legal aspects before passing appropriate orders, which was not fulfilled. (Para 12)

The impugned order lacked reasoning, making it improper for disposal in such manner. (Para 12)

Decision:

The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration of the revision petition within six months. (Para 14)

FACTS:

A First Information Report (FIR) was lodged regarding the fatal assault on the cousin of the Informant on 23.02.1997.

The trial involved 17 accused persons, including the present appellants, charged with offences under various sections of the IPC.

The prosecution witnesses provided inconsistent testimonies, and the appellants were not named in the initial reporting by PW-2.

The Trial Court found all accused guilty, leading to an appeal in the High Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the appellants were named in the initial reporting and subsequent testimonies.

HELD:

The judgement highlights the statements of prosecution witnesses, including PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4, presenting their accounts of the incident.( Para 5)

The Court acknowledges the principle of vicarious liability but emphasizes the need for clarity in establishing a person's membership in an unlawful assembly.( Para 10)

Noting the absence of the appellants storming inside the house, the Court questions the sufficiency of evidence to establish their involvement in the crime.( Para 11)

The Court observes the lack of naming appellants in the FIR by PW-2 and the absence of attributing specific overt acts to them in his subsequent testimony. PW-3 and PW-4 did not name the appellants, raising doubts about their involvement.Considering the factual aspects, the Court concludes that guilt is not established beyond reasonable doubt, granting the benefit of doubt to the appellants.The appeals are allowed, and the appellants are acquitted of all charges. They are to be set at liberty unless required for any other offence. ( Para 12)

Facts:

The appellant challenged the order of the Trial Court seeking to summon certain individuals in a murder case.

The High Court upheld the Trial Court's order.

The Supreme Court is considering the appeal, focusing on the discretionary power under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Issues:

Interpretation and application of Section 319 Cr.P.C.

Whether the individuals in question are the main perpetrators of the crime.

Held:

The provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. are to ensure that the real culprit does not go unpunished. The power is discretionary and requires stronger evidence than mere probability of complicity.

The Trial Court and the High Court failed to consider certain facts, emphasizing the need for re-examination with reference to applicable principles.

The Court allows the appeal in part, setting aside the impugned orders, and restores the applications under Section 319 Cr.P.C. for reconsideration by the Trial Court.

The Court clarifies that it has not pronounced on the merits of the case, and the Trial Court should reconsider the prosecution's prayer uninfluenced by any observation in the judgment.

Facts:

The respondent, a Constable since 1987, faced charges of being inebriated and misbehaving with the public in 2006.

A medical report confirmed intoxication, leading to a charge sheet in 2007.

After a disciplinary inquiry, the officer found the misconduct charge substantiated.

The Superintendent of Police issued an order of dismissal in May 2007.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in converting the dismissal into compulsory retirement based on the respondent's past conduct and years of service?

Held:

The charge against the respondent involved serious misconduct of drunkenness and misbehavior with the public.

The fact of intoxication was duly proved in the medical report.

Considering the gravity of the charges and the respondent's position in the police service, the High Court had no justification to interfere with the dismissal order.

The Division Bench erred in allowing the Special Appeal and converting the dismissal to compulsory retirement.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's decision and maintaining the order of dismissal.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 was engaged as a Gramin Dak Sewak (Extra-Departmental Agent) on a part-time basis in the Postal Department.

Respondent No. 1 voluntarily resigned in 2014, and the resignation was accepted by the Department.

The claim for gratuity was made by Respondent No. 1 under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

The Department contended that Gramin Dak Sewaks are not entitled to ex-gratia gratuity as per the Gramin Dak Sewak (Conduct & Engagement) Rules, 2011.

Issues:

Whether a Gramin Dak Sewak is considered an 'employee' under Section 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, and is entitled to gratuity.

Whether a Gramin Dak Sewak is eligible for gratuity under the Gramin Dak Sewak (Conduct & Engagement) Rules, 2011, upon voluntary resignation.

Held and Decision:

The Gramin Dak Sewaks are not considered 'employees' under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, as per Section 2(e), and are not entitled to gratuity under this Act.

The Gramin Dak Sewak (Conduct & Engagement) Rules, 2011, provide a separate code for the engagement, conduct, and gratuity of Gramin Dak Sewaks.

Rule 6(13) of the 2011 Rules states that no gratuity is payable if a Gramin Dak Sewak quits the agency on their own.

The Order accepting Respondent No. 1's resignation was issued under Rule 6(13), making him disentitled from gratuity under the 2011 Rules.

The High Court's orders were set aside, and the appeals were allowed.

Facts:

The respondent tendered a resignation letter on July 14, 1990, and it was accepted by LIC. Subsequently, the Pension Rules, 1995, came into force more than five years later, affecting the respondent's eligibility for pension benefits. Similar scenarios are presented in cases involving the General Insurance Scheme and Andhra Bank Pension Regulations.

Issues:

The applicability of pension rules, the distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement, and the retrospective application of amended schemes to employees who resigned before the introduction of such schemes.

Held:

Resignation and Pension Rules: The court held that when an employee resigns and the Pension Rules are applicable, the consequence is the forfeiture of service. Applying the Pension Rules retrospectively to the respondent would be contradictory, and the resignation would entail the forfeiture of service, making him ineligible for pensionary benefits (Para 17-19).

General Insurance Scheme: The appellant, having resigned before the conditions for availing benefits were met, was deemed ineligible for the pension scheme introduced in 1996. The court emphasized the importance of fulfilling prerequisites and highlighted the appellant's failure to meet age requirements and other conditions (Para 28-35).

Andhra Bank Pension Regulations: The court observed that the Pension Regulations, 1995, did not consider resignation as a qualifying condition for pensionary benefits. The distinction between resignation and retirement was crucial, and the Regulations did not encompass the concept of resignation for availing benefits (Para 42).

Facts:

The appellant issued seven cheques of Rs. 3 lakhs each in favor of the complainant, which were subsequently dishonored. The Trial Court dismissed the complaints, but the High Court reversed this decision, convicting the appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issues:

The dishonor of the cheques, the presumption under sections 118 and 139, and the appellant's attempt to rebut this presumption.

Held:

The appellate court, while recognizing the general restrictions on upsetting a judgment of acquittal, noted that a different approach is warranted in matters related to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The accused has the burden to establish a probable defense to rebut the presumption, and the appellate court is entitled to examine the evidence to determine if the preponderance favors the accused.

The appellant could not deny his signature on the cheques, and all basic elements of Section 138 and related sections were evident. The Trial Court had drawn the requisite presumption. The onus shifted to the appellant to establish a probable defense.

Despite drawing the presumption under Section 139, the Trial Court questioned the lack of evidence regarding the source of funds for the loan and the examination of relevant witnesses. This approach was inconsistent with legal principles.

The appellant's defense that he had a monetary transaction with another party was not substantiated with adequate evidence. The suggestion that his signatures were on a blank stamp paper was deemed remote and uncertain.

The Trial Court's decision suffered from perversity and a fundamental error of approach. The observations made by the Trial Court were not in conformity with the presumption existing in favor of the complainant under Sections 118 and 139.

The findings of the High Court convicting the appellant under Section 138 were confirmed. Monetary penalties were maintained, but the sentence of imprisonment was modified. The appellant was directed to pay a fine of double the amount of each cheque within two months, with imprisonment for one year in case of default.

Facts:

The High Court allowed the petition filed by respondent Nos. 2 to 17, quashing FIR I-CR No. 67 of 2017 in part, specifically in relation to offences under Sections 392, 395, and 397 IPC. The appellant challenged this decision.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR at a preliminary stage.

Whether the FIR disclosed prima facie allegations of the concerned offences.

Held:

The Division Bench, after hearing both parties, concluded that the High Court erred in allowing the petition and quashing the FIR partly. Instead, the court should have directed the Investigating Officer (IO) to conduct a proper investigation based on the FIR and file a charge sheet accordingly. The FIR had prima facie allegations of the concerned offences, and quashing it prematurely was not justified.

The High Court's order quashing the FIR was based on the belief that even if the prosecution's case was true, the essential elements for offences under Sections 392, 395, and 397 IPC were not established. The High Court should have allowed the investigation to proceed.( Paragraph 7)

The Division Bench found that the High Court erred in entertaining the petition and allowing it in part. No proper investigation by the IO had concluded, and the impugned order intervened prematurely, resulting in quashing the FIR concerning serious offences.( Paragraph 8-9)

The court criticized the High Court's approach, emphasizing that quashing the FIR for more serious offences without allowing proper investigation was improper.( Paragraph 10-11)

The court set aside the impugned order and directed the IO to conduct a full and proper investigation into the allegations made in the original FIR. The IO was to file an additional charge sheet for any other offences found during the investigation within three months.( Paragraph 14)