Facts:

The appellant was declared a foreigner by a Foreigners' Tribunal, citing discrepancies in the name of his grandfather and the father residing in different villages. The High Court upheld this decision, emphasizing the petitioner's failure to adequately disclose material facts related to his citizenship in the written statement.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's declaration as a foreigner was erroneous. The contention focused on the adequacy of the information provided in the written statement and the reliability of the documents presented.

Held:

Upon thorough examination of documents, the Court noted discrepancies in the spelling of the grandfather's name but emphasized the consistency in the father's name. The Court found it untenable to dispute the identity of Kematullah despite variations in spelling. The appellant successfully established familial identities through various documents.( Para 3)

The Court rejected doubts arising from the father's change of residence to another village, deeming it insufficient to question the established identities. The judgment of the High Court and the Foreigners' Tribunal were set aside, and the appeal was allowed. (Para 4)

Consequently, the appellant was ordered to be released immediately.( Para 5)

Facts:

The writ petitions were filed under Article 32 challenging the procedure for calling candidates for the final examination of Civil Judge (Junior Division).

The contention was that the Rule 5A(3) of the Bihar Civil Service (Judicial Branch) (Recruitment) Rules, 1955, was in violation of the Supreme Court's previous decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan vs. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission, (2008) 17 SCC 703.

Rule 5A(3) limited the candidates for the final written examination to 10% of the total number of candidates who appeared for the preliminary examination.

Issues:

Whether Rule 5A(3) is in violation of the precedent set in Malik Mazhar Sultan?

Whether the limitation of calling only 10% of candidates for the final written examination is arbitrary and unreasonable?

Held:

The Court held that Rule 5A(3) violates the precedent set in Malik Mazhar Sultan, where a specific ratio of 1:10 for calling candidates for the final examination was specified.

The Court found the provision of calling only 10% of candidates for the final examination to be arbitrary and unreasonable, restricting the number of candidates unreasonably.

It was noted that Rule 5A(3) lacked a provision for minimum passing marks in the preliminary examination, and the Court emphasized the need for such criteria.

The Court struck down Rule 5A(3) and directed the concerned authorities to ensure minimum passing marks are fixed for future examinations.

The Court allowed the writ petitions and clarified that it was not addressing other issues as the High Court was considering a proposal for amending the Rules.

Facts:

Respondent No.1 applied for the position of Assistant Teacher in 1985.

Appointed on probation from April 1, 1995.

Approval sought for appointment, delayed process.

Writ petition filed for approval, followed by suspension and termination.

Legal proceedings initiated against the termination order.

Issues:

Maintainability of the writ petition against a private school receiving grant-in-aid.

Legality of the termination order based on insubordination and breach of discipline.

Held:

Examining maintainability, the court referred to Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, emphasizing procedural safeguards for employees, concluding that the writ application is maintainable. Citing precedents, the court rejected the argument against maintainability.

Regarding the termination, the court found the order stigmatic and arbitrary. Emphasizing the lack of approval for termination, it held that the dismissal was illegal and void. Quoting Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, the court highlighted the need for a proper inquiry before punitive actions.

Given the arbitrary nature of the termination, the court dismissed the appeal and allowed reinstatement with full entitlements and back wages.

Facts:

The case revolves around the exclusion of 'Services' under Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule from the legislative and executive domain of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCTD). The challenge pertains to a notification dated May 21, 2015, which addresses the Union Territory cadre, including Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service Personnel. Additionally, the jurisdiction of the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) is also contested, specifically its limitation to investigate offenses committed by employees of the GNCTD.

Issues:

Validity of the exclusion of 'Services' from the legislative and executive domain of the NCTD.

Legality of restricting ACB's jurisdiction to investigate offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Held:

Per A.K. Sikri, J.:

The Court acknowledges the doubtfulness in categorizing All India Services and DANICS Services as State Public Services under Entry 41 of List II. A mechanism is proposed to avoid conflicts, suggesting that transfers and postings of higher officials be handled by the LG, while a Civil Services Board decides on lower-level officers. Similar Boards are recommended for DANICS officers.( Para 1-1.4)

The exclusion of ACB's jurisdiction to investigate offenses of Central Government employees is upheld, emphasizing the broad interpretation of legislative entries. The Court concludes that the impugned notifications restricting ACB's jurisdiction are valid and prevent jurisdictional conflicts. (Para 2)

The Court underscores that Entries 1, 2, and 18 of List II are excluded from the jurisdiction of GNCTD, and control over 'public order' rests with the Central Government. This exclusion is justified to avoid confusion or overlap in controlling and coordinating crucial aspects related to the nation's capital.( Para 3)

The Court asserts that the Notifications dated November 08, 1993, and subsequent modifications are valid, restricting ACB's jurisdiction to investigate Central Government employees and preventing dual investigation.( Para 4)

Per Ashok Bhushan, J. (Partly Dissenting):

The judgment asserts that Entry 41 of List II is not available to the Legislative Assembly of GNCTD, leading to the conclusion that the GNCTD cannot exercise executive power over 'Services.' The decision emphasizes the need for executive powers to be exercised under laws framed by Parliament or delegated powers.( Para 1-5)

The Court affirms the LG's role in issues related to 'Services' under Art.239AA(4) and stresses that the GNCTD can exercise executive powers delegated to it. It argues that the LG, as per Art.239AA(4), shall act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.( Para 6)

The Court discusses the power to appoint a Special Public Prosecutor under s.24, Cr.P.C., and concludes that in respect of Entries 1 and 2 of List III, the GNCTD has legislative competence under Art.239AA.( Para 7)

FACTS:

The appellant was convicted for offenses under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. The Judicial Magistrate awarded specific sentences, but the appellant challenged the order, primarily contesting the lack of specification on whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively.

ISSUES:

The absence of clarity in the Magistrate's order regarding the concurrent or consecutive nature of the sentences imposed under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC.

HELD:

The appellant argued that the Judicial Magistrate erred in not specifying whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively, citing Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Court acknowledged the mandatory requirement under Section 31 and found that the Magistrate indeed erred in not ensuring compliance.

The Court held that in a case where an accused is convicted for multiple offenses in a trial, it is necessary for the Magistrate to specify, under Section 31, whether the sentences for each offense would run concurrently or consecutively.

Recognizing the oversight, the Court modified the order of the Magistrate and directed that the sentences awarded for both Section 279 and Section 304-A IPC would run concurrently.

The Court affirmed the finding of conviction and sentence under both sections, emphasizing that three Courts had previously found the prosecution's case against the appellant valid.

Facts:

Respondent No.1, a limited company, closed its cement factory in Gujarat, leading to a dispute with the appellant Union over unpaid wages.

The Labour Court in Gujarat ruled in favor of the Union, issuing a recovery order.

Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) in Calcutta, where Respondent No.1's registered office is located, ordered the sale of properties for an unpaid loan by Respondent No.1.

Issues:

Whether the Gujarat High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Special Civil Application (SCA) filed by the appellant.

Held:

The Single Judge held that Gujarat High Court has territorial jurisdiction.

The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge's order, stating that no part of the cause of action arose in Gujarat.

The Supreme Court held that Article 226(2) empowers a High Court to entertain a petition if the cause of action arises wholly or in part within its territorial jurisdiction.

The cause of action partially arose in Gujarat, considering the location of the cement factory, the Labour Court's involvement, and the claim regarding outstanding wages.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the Division Bench's order, and restoring the Single Judge's decision that the SCA is maintainable in the Gujarat High Court. The case is remanded to the Single Judge for further proceedings.

Facts:

Appellants were employees under the Kerala Water Authority.

Three pay revisions occurred on 13 February 1990, 24 April 1995, and 19 August 1999.

An intermediate post of Senior Operator was created during the third pay revision, altering the pay scales of Head Operators.

The creation of the intermediate post was challenged in a writ petition, leading to a Single Judge's decision.

Issues:

Legality of creating an intermediate post without amending the Special Rules.

Impact of the abolition of the intermediate post on the pay scales of Head Operators.

Held:

The High Court held that the creation of the intermediate post required a statutory amendment and couldn't be done administratively.

The State Government, complying with the judgment, deleted the post and restored the pay scales of Operators, Head Operators, and Mechanical Superintendents.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, and no costs are awarded. The High Court directed no recoveries to be made.

Facts:

The settlement between the employer-Board and the workers stipulated the revision of Dearness Allowance rates twice a year based on the All India Consumer Price Index Numbers. The State Government, facing financial constraints, revised the rates later than the Central Government. The employer-Board adopted the State Government's decision in revising Dearness Allowance rates.

Issues:

The workers' union sought direction to align Dearness Allowance payments with those of Central Government employees, challenging the Board's decision to adopt the State Government's rates.

Held:

The payment of Dearness Allowance was governed by the 1998 Wage Settlement and Board Proceedings BP (FB) No.58. Revisions were in line with State Government decisions, and subsequent settlements reiterated this practice. (Para 1-19)

The union, having agreed to Dearness Allowance alignment with State Government employees, cannot demand a higher rate. The court stressed the employer's dependence on financial ability and the State Government's difficult financial position. (Para 19-28)

The High Court erred in not considering the financial constraints and principles governing wage revisions. The Board's decision to adopt State Government rates was not arbitrary, given the challenging financial situation.(Para 28-31)

The Board did not unilaterally alter the settlement terms. The respondent union cannot selectively challenge parts of the Board's proceedings. The court affirmed the Board's decision to set a cut-off date for revised Dearness Allowance, considering financial constraints. (Para 31-166)

Facts:

The case involved an application for an extension of the period for investigation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The Investigating Officer (IO) filed two applications on the same day – one for the extension of the investigation period and the other under s.43D of the Act, enumerating detailed grounds, signed by the Public Prosecutor. The respondents challenged the order before the High Court, arguing that the Public Prosecutor did not apply his mind, thus failing to fulfill the mandatory requirement of the proviso to s.43D(2)(b).

Issues:

Whether the requirements of the proviso to Section 43D(2)(b) were met in the application for extension of the investigation period.

Held:

The proviso to Section 43D(2)(b) sets out specific requirements for its proper application. These include the inability to complete the investigation within 90 days, a report by the Public Prosecutor indicating progress and reasons for detention, and the satisfaction of the court. The document, in the form of an application under Section 43D, detailed the development and progress in the investigation, meeting the requirements of the proviso. (Para 1)

The grounds for extension included the respondents' alleged involvement in a banned organization, voluminous electronic records, funding investigations, a conspiracy spread across cities, and telephonic interconnections with other accused persons. The material in the document fulfilled the proviso's requirements.( Paras 15-16)

An analysis of the document purporting to be the report of the Public Prosecutor revealed a thorough consideration of the extension request. The Public Prosecutor's signature and changes in the second application indicated an application of mind, satisfying the essential condition for the report.( Para 2)

The second document, as the report of the Public Prosecutor, was filed on the same day as the IO's application, demonstrating the application of mind. The State of Maharashtra was represented through the Assistant Commissioner of Police, and the document clearly outlined the grounds for seeking an extension. (Paras 19, 22)

The first document provided reasons for the extended period, while the second detailed grounds extensively. The public prosecutor scrutinized both documents, showing an application of mind and expanded reasons for the extension. The second document was not a mere reproduction but an analysis of the first.( Paras 36, 37, 39)

Conclusion: The infirmities in the form of the documents did not entitle the respondents to default bail, as there was a substantial application of mind by the Public Prosecutor. The High Court's order was set aside.