Facts:

Dispute arose between Navnirman Development Consultants (I) Pvt. Ltd. (appellant) and Divisional Commissioner and President District Sports Complex Executive Committee (respondent) regarding non-payment of bills for construction of a sports complex.

Appellant invoked the arbitration clause in the agreement.

Despite demand, respondent failed to constitute the Arbitral Tribunal, leading appellant to approach the High Court for appointment.

Arbitral Tribunal passed an award in favor of the appellant, later modified by the District Judge on respondent's challenge.

Appellant's appeal to the High Court was dismissed, leading to filing of review petition and subsequent appeals to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Proper analysis and reasoning lacking in the High Court's decision.

Appeal dismissed in absence of both parties.

Failure to record reasoned findings and provide opportunity for appellant to explain non-appearance.

Appropriate procedural remedies not considered.

Held:

The Supreme Court found procedural irregularities in the High Court's decision, emphasizing the lack of reasoned findings and the dismissal of the appeal in the absence of both parties. The Court noted the failure to consider appropriate procedural remedies and directed the case to be remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits.( Paragraph 10-18)

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals in part, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the case to the High Court for fresh consideration. The Court stressed the importance of providing reasoned findings and observing procedural fairness in appellate proceedings.( Paragraph 22-23)

FACTS:

The Assam State Electricity Board (Appellant) entered into a contract with Buildworth Pvt Ltd (Respondent) for the supply and installation of a circulating Water Piping System.

Several claims were raised by the respondent during the arbitration proceedings, including price variation, idling charges, compensation for extended stay, and interest.

The arbitrator awarded a sum to the respondent for idling charges, escalation, and interest for a specified period.

The Board challenged the award, arguing against the award of price escalation and idling charges due to alleged delays caused by the respondent.

The High Court upheld the award on merits but set aside the award of interest for a specific period.

ISSUES:

Whether the arbitrator erred in awarding price escalation and idling charges.

Whether interest could be awarded for the pre-reference period and pendente lite under the Arbitration Act, 1940.

HELD:

The arbitrator's decision to award price escalation and idling charges was upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court found that the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract provisions and consideration of relevant evidence were within his jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court affirmed the arbitrator's authority to award interest for the pre-reference period, contrary to the High Court's ruling. It held that Section 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 did not preclude the arbitrator from awarding interest prior to the decree.

Accordingly, the appeal filed by the claimant was allowed, and the appeal filed by the Board was dismissed. The claimant was entitled to interest on the sum awarded from a specified date until payment or realization, with the rate modified to 12% per annum.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal filed by Roger Shashoua against Mukesh Sharma before the Supreme Court of India. The dispute pertained to matters governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

The Court was to determine the precedential value and interpretation of the ratio decidendi in judicial decisions, particularly in the context of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Held:

The Court emphasized the importance of understanding the precedential value and the principle of ratio decidendi in judicial decisions. The Court highlighted the necessity to carefully deliberate on the judgment, considering the facts presented, the context of legal questions, and the law as pronounced. It was clarified that the judgment should be examined in its entirety, and any principles laid down therein should be considered in light of the specific issues under consideration in the case.

Furthermore, the Court cautioned against selectively extracting information from a judgment and emphasized the importance of focusing on what has been explicitly decided rather than attempting to deduce implications through a syllogistic process.

Facts:

The case pertains to the introduction of service tax on chit funds effective from June 1, 2007, as per the provisions of the Finance Act, 2007.

Issues:

Whether chit fund activities can be classified as cash management or fund management.

Interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Finance Act, 2007, in relation to chit funds.

Held:

The Court discusses the concept of cash management, emphasizing its role in optimizing cash as an asset. It concludes that chit fund activities do not constitute cash management as traditionally understood in business contexts.

Similarly, the Court analyzes whether chit funds can be considered a form of fund management. It determines that chit fund operations do not align with the conventional understanding of fund management.

Therefore, the chit fund business is deemed not covered by the relevant provisions of the Finance Act, 2007, for the purpose of service tax.

Decision: The Court dismisses the appeals, affirming its decision that chit fund businesses are not subject to service tax under the relevant provisions of the Finance Act, 2007.

Facts:

The Central Government imposed anti-dumping duty on certain goods imported from specified countries, including cold-rolled flat products of stainless steel of certain specifications.

A mid-term review was initiated, leading to the issuance of a notification specifying tolerance limits for the width of the subject goods.

The respondents imported goods with a width between 1250 mm to 1300 mm and contended that they were not liable to pay anti-dumping duty as per the original notification.

Issues:

Whether the anti-dumping duty is applicable to stainless steel products with a width between 1250 mm to 1280 mm under the amended notification?

Whether the goods, which were not cleared and were re-exported, are liable for anti-dumping duty?

Held:

The Court held that the anti-dumping duty is applicable to stainless steel products with a width between 1251 mm to 1280 mm as per the amended notification. The tolerance levels specified in the notification are to be considered, and hence, goods falling within the specified width range are liable for the duty. The Court allowed the appeal filed by the Revenue, setting aside the decision of the CESTAT (Para. 6).

Civil Appeal Nos. 2407-2408 of 2014 In the case where goods were not cleared and were re-exported, the Court held that the question of payment of anti-dumping duty does not arise. Therefore, the CESTAT rightly dismissed the appeal of the respondents in such cases (Para. 7).

Facts:

The respondent purchased the suit premises from a person who received them as a gift from the original owner. The tenant, in possession of the premises, contested the respondent's title, questioning the validity of the gift deed and the original owner's title.

Issues:

Whether the possession transfer through the gift deed was valid.

Whether the challenge to the validity of the sale deed and mutation entry was sustainable.

Whether the procedural requirements regarding substantial question of law in second appeals were met.

Held:

The court finds that constructive possession of the suit premises was transferred to the donee through the gift deed, considering the impracticality of physically handing over possession due to the tenant's occupancy.

The challenge to the validity of the sale deed and mutation entry was not sustainable, as they were not contested by the tenant, and previous judgments had upheld the validity of the gift deed.

The court determines that there was substantial compliance with the procedural requirements regarding substantial question of law in second appeals, as the appellants had not challenged previous orders allowing amendments to the appeal memo.

Decision: Upholding the respondent's entitlement to the decree of eviction based on the validity of the title and ownership of the property.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to a notification issued by the Central Government, amending provisions of the NDPS Act. The appellants argue that the Act does not empower the Central Government to vary the parameters for quantification of drugs, and the impugned notification undermines the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of E. Micheal Raj v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, (2008) 5 SCC 161.

On the other hand, the respondents argue that the Central Government is empowered under Sections 76 and 77 of the NDPS Act to issue such notifications. They justify the notification by stating that determining the purity of seized drugs would burden forensic laboratories, so the notification defines quantity in terms of the total quantity of preparation containing the specified drug.

Issues:

Whether the impugned notification is ultra vires the NDPS Act.

Whether the notification alters the parameters for constituting an offense and awarding punishment.

Whether the Act permits the Central Government to resort to such dispensation.

Held:

The Supreme Court decides to refer the matter to a larger bench for an authoritative pronouncement. It poses several questions for consideration by the larger bench, including whether the decision in E. Micheal Raj (supra) requires reconsideration, whether the impugned notification redefines parameters for constituting an offense and awarding punishment, and whether the Act permits such a dispensation. The court directs the registry to place the matter before the Chief Justice of India for appropriate directions to constitute a larger bench.

The decision to refer the matter to a larger bench is based on the significance of the legal and policy questions raised by the case. The court acknowledges that the issues have far-reaching implications and require a comprehensive examination by a larger bench.

Facts:

The appellants sought to quash criminal proceedings against them, arguing that the spare sample was sent for analysis to the Central Insecticides Laboratory (CIL) without any prior institution of proceedings.

Issues:

The validity of the criminal proceedings under the Insecticides Act, particularly concerning the reliance on reports from the Central Insecticides Laboratory (CIL) without prior institution of proceedings.

Held:

The report of the Central Insecticides Laboratory (CIL) is deemed conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein, as per Section 24(4) of the Insecticides Act. If the complaint is based on the CIL report, the accused cannot challenge it.

The procedures under the Insecticides Act outline the obligations of the Insecticide Inspector and the rights of the person from whom the sample was taken. The person from whom the sample was collected has the right to contest the report of the Insecticide Analyst within the specified time.

If a criminal complaint is initiated based on the report of the State Insecticide Analyst, the accused can request the concerned Magistrate to send the third sample for testing or analysis to the CIL. However, if the complaint is also based on the report of the CIL, the accused cannot challenge it.

The Insecticide Inspector has the duty to promptly send the sample to the CIL upon being notified about the report given by the State Insecticide Analyst. The Inspector can either send the third sample to the CIL for testing or analysis or launch a criminal prosecution.

Decision: The High Court correctly dismissed the petition to quash the criminal proceedings against the appellants concerning a misbranded insecticide.

Facts:

The appellants filed an eviction petition against the respondents under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, claiming personal necessity. The respondents, tenants of the premises, opposed the petition. During the proceedings, the respondents sought to amend their written statement to dispute the appellants' ownership of the premises, alleging that they were mere attorneys of Smt. Raj Nanda, the sole proprietor.

Issues:

Whether the respondents can dispute the appellants' title to the premises.

Whether the respondents' plea for amendment of the written statement is justified.

Held:

The Court held that the respondents, being tenants in possession, were estopped from denying their landlord's title to the premises under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The principle of estoppel arising from the contract of tenancy prohibits a tenant from questioning the landlord's title during the tenancy. The Court also emphasized that the respondents' failure to specifically deny the appellants' ownership in their written statement amounted to an admission.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the High Court's decision to allow the amendment to the written statement was unjustified. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's order, reinstating the Rent Controller's order. No costs were awarded.