Facts:

Lt. Colonel Dharamvir Singh, an officer in the Indian Army, was posted to various locations.

Allegations of breaches of discipline, violations of the Arms Act 1959, and security lapses were made against him.

The respondent filed a Writ Petition challenging the attachment order issued by the Additional Directorate General, Discipline and Vigilance, Adjutant General's Branch, Integrated HQ of the Ministry of Defence.

Issues:

Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition.

Whether the High Court's intervention preempted the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Army.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in exercising jurisdiction in a matter concerning the disciplinary actions of the Army. The respondent was subject to the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, and the High Court's interference was deemed inappropriate and detrimental to maintaining discipline in the Armed Forces. The Court set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and dismissed the Writ Petition.( Paragraphs 11-15)

Facts:

Rajiv Vijayasarathy Ratnam (son of the appellants) and Savitha Seetharam (daughter of the first respondent) married in 2002.

Money dispute arose due to a car accident involving Savitha in 2010.

Allegations of Rs 20 lakhs being transferred to the first respondent's account due to fear of property attachment.

Various legal proceedings ensued, including a civil suit by Rajiv for money recovery.

The first respondent filed a private complaint in 2016, alleging criminal breach of trust and cheating.

Issues:

Whether the allegations in the complaint constitute the ingredients necessary for the offenses under the Penal Code.

Whether the criminal proceeding amounts to an abuse of the process of the court.

Held:

The primary question is whether the High Court erred in rejecting the plea to quash the criminal proceedings.

The court must examine whether the averments in the complaint constitute the necessary ingredients for the alleged offenses under the Penal Code.

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the High Court to quash proceedings to secure the ends of justice.

A complaint can be quashed if, even when taken at face value, it does not prima facie constitute any offense or make out the case against the accused.

Quashing should not be used to stifle legitimate prosecution, and the power must be used sparingly and with caution.

The complaint must contain the basic facts necessary for making out an offense under the Penal Code.

Examining the ingredients of criminal breach of trust (Section 405), cheating (Section 415), and cheating inducing delivery of property (Section 420).

Entrustment is essential for Section 405; the complaint does not show entrustment of property to the appellants.

Dishonest inducement is essential for Section 415; the complaint does not show dishonest inducement by the appellants.

Cheating is an essential ingredient for Section 420; the necessary ingredients are not made out from the face of the complaint.

Referring to precedent (Binod Kumar v State of Bihar), the court emphasizes that the basic essential ingredients of dishonest misappropriation and cheating are missing in the present case.

The suit for recovery of money was filed before the criminal complaint, and the latter was filed after a significant delay.

The court concludes that the complaint constitutes an abuse of the process of the court, attempting to cloak a civil dispute with a criminal nature.

The appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the criminal proceedings are quashed.

Clarification that no opinion has been expressed on the merits of the pending civil suit for the recovery of money.

Facts:

The case involves a custody and guardianship dispute, with emphasis on the confidentiality of the mediation process. Reports of the mediator and counsellor regarding the child's behavior and attitude were in question, particularly their admissibility in court proceedings after the failure of the mediation.

Issues:

The applicability of confidentiality in mediation to court proceedings.

The role of the court in custody and guardianship disputes concerning the best interest of the child.

The validity of the High Court's decision to treat reports of the mediator and counsellor as confidential.

Held:

The court highlighted the distinction between regular adjudicatory processes and mediation, emphasizing the importance of confidentiality in mediation. However, it acknowledged that complete adherence to confidentiality may not be conducive when the court is acting in its role as parens patriae in child welfare matters.

Statements made by parents during mediation were not to be relied upon due to confidentiality, but natural responses from the child to the counsellor were deemed valuable for the court to determine the best interest of the child.

Rule 8(viii) of the Family Courts (Procedure) Rules, 1992, was considered an exception to the norms of confidentiality, allowing reports of the counsellor on the home environment, personalities, and relationships of the parties to assist the court in custody or guardianship issues.

The court concluded that the High Court's exercise of review jurisdiction was not correct, as it acted as if sitting in appeal. The judgment under appeal was restored, setting aside the subsequent judgment.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, emphasizing that to justify the exercise of review jurisdiction, the error must be self-evident. The High Court erred in entertaining the review petition and setting aside the earlier view. The confidentiality aspect in custody and guardianship issues was clarified, upholding the importance of reports by the counsellor in such matters.

Facts:

The appellant, now represented by legal representatives, filed a suit for specific performance of an Agreement to Sell, claiming that the respondent had agreed to sell a property, but the Trial Court's decree was reversed by the First Appellate Court and subsequently by the High Court. The primary ground for dismissal was the appellant's failure to prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract.

Issues:

The plaintiff's continuous readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of the contract, a prerequisite for specific performance under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Held:

The court agrees with the High Court that the specific performance cannot be enforced in favor of the plaintiff due to the lack of proof of continuous readiness and willingness to perform essential contract terms.( Para 13)

Emphasis on the nature of the relief of specific performance as an exercise in equity and the requirements under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.( Para 14)

Despite the 2018 amendment substituting "who fails to aver and prove" with "who fails to prove," the court reiterates the necessity for the plaintiff to prove continuous readiness and willingness.( Para 15)

Referring to precedent, the court underscores that the plaintiff's pleadings and evidence must establish their preparedness and willingness to perform their part of the contract.( Para 16)

Finding no fault in the High Court's conclusion that the plaintiff failed to aver and prove continuous readiness and willingness.( Para 17)

Rejecting the proposition for amendment, the court asserts that the late attempt to improve pleadings at the appellate stage was futile, given the plaintiff's failure to establish readiness and willingness.( Para 18)

The court upholds the High Court's adherence to the provisions of Section 100 CPC and the proviso to sub-section (5), emphasizing that a second appeal should be heard on the question formulated unless strong reasons exist.( Para 19)

FACTS:

Respondent No. 1 issued the 2007 Scheme for coal distribution through e-Auction.

Appellant participated in e-Auction from 2012 to 2015 under the 2007 Scheme.

Disputes arose when Appellant couldn't lift booked coal, leading to forfeiture of the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD).

Appellant invoked the arbitration Clause 11.12 of the 2007 Scheme after failed attempts at resolution.

The High Court rejected the application for appointment of an independent arbitrator, stating sale orders didn't incorporate the arbitration clause.

ISSUES:

Whether the arbitration clause in the 2007 Scheme is incorporated into individual sale orders, and if so, can an arbitrator be appointed to resolve the disputes between the parties?

HELD:

The court acknowledged the principle of incorporation by reference in arbitration jurisprudence. Section 7(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, allows the reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause to constitute a valid arbitration agreement, provided specific conditions are met.( Paragraph 4)

The court held that the sale orders specifically state they would be governed by the guidelines, circulars, office orders, etc., issued by Coal India Limited or Bharat Coking Coal Limited, thereby incorporating the arbitration clause from the 2007 Scheme into the sale orders.( Paragraph 5)

Emphasizing that Clause 7 in the sale orders falls under the 'single contract case,' where the arbitration clause is in a standard form document (2007 Scheme) referenced in individual sale orders, the court clarified that general words of incorporation are sufficient for a 'single contract case.'(Paragraph 5.1)

The court discussed the expansive interpretation of terms like "in relation thereto" in the arbitration clause, indicating its application to all transactions under the 2007 Scheme, including the sale transactions in question.( Paragraph 5.2)

The parties agreed to appoint Mr. Justice Pranab Kumar Chattopadhyay as the Sole Arbitrator, subject to disclosure and declaration as per the Sixth Schedule to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The proceedings were to be conducted in Kolkata.( Paragraph 6)

REFERRED CASES:

Alimenta SA v. National Agriculture Co-op Marketing Federation of India Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 615 : AIR 1987 SC 643 : 84 (2000) DLT 494

Clements v. Devon Country Insurance Committee, [1918] 1 KB 94

Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., 1988 (36) ELT 201 (SC)

Habas Sinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar Isthisal Endustri AS v. Sometal SAL, [2010] EWHC 29 (Comm).

Inox Wind Ltd. v. Thermocables Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 519

M.R. Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd. v. Som Datt Builders Ltd., (2009) 7 SCC 696 : 2009 (3) Arb LR 1 (SC) : 2009 (9) SCALE 298

Macleod Ross and Co. Ltd. v. Compagnie d' Assurances Generales L'Helvetia of St Gall, [1952] 1 All ER 331 : [1952] 1 Lloyd's Rep 12 (CA).)

Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Company and Anr, [1985] 1 SCR 432

SEA 2011 Inc. v. ICT Ltd., [2018] EWHC 520 (Comm)

Sea Trade Maritime Corporation v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Limited, The Athena, [2006] EWHC 2530 (Comm)

Facts:

Criminal appeal against the conviction under various sections of IPC.

Appellant claimed to be a juvenile on the date of the offense.

School certificate submitted by the appellant stated his date of birth as 17.08.1982.

Discrepancy in the date of birth mentioned in the appellant's school certificate and the birth certificate issued by the Municipal Authority.

District and Sessions Judge conducted an inquiry and held that the appellant was not a juvenile on the date of the offense.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was a juvenile on the date of the offense and framing of charges.

Applicability of Juvenile Justice Rules 2007.

Held:

The school certificate should have been accepted as per Rule 12 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007.

However, Rule 2007 was not in force during the date of the offense, and the relevant rules were Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001.

Rule 22(5) of 2001 Rules specifies the procedure for age determination, giving preference to birth certificates, school certificates, or matriculation certificates.

The High Court's order dismissing the applications related to additional evidence on juvenility is set aside.

The High Court is directed to reconsider the question of juvenility based on relevant materials, including documents sought to be submitted by the appellant.

Decision: The order dated 30.01.2015 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court is set aside, and the question of juvenility is remitted to the High Court for reconsideration. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant vessel caused damage to a coal loader during berthing. The dock complex initially placed responsibility on the vessel, but the Master of the vessel denied liability. Subsequently, the Master accepted liability under protest, and the vessel was allowed to sail. A government-appointed Committee, composed of technical experts, found that the accident resulted from dynamic situations and could not assign individual responsibility.

Issues:

Determination of liability for damage caused during berthing.

Validity of the Master's acknowledgment of liability under protest.

Assessment of factors contributing to the accident.

Consideration of the Committee's findings.

Held:

The Committee, appointed by the Government, consisted of technical experts who found that the dynamic situation during the accident precluded assigning individual responsibility. The Committee considered all relevant factors, leading to the trial court's just and correct view, decreeing the suit in favor of the appellant.( Paragraph 19)

The Division Bench of the High Court considered factors such as the delay in obeying instructions to drop the anchor. However, the evidence on this aspect was not clear, and the Committee did not identify delay in anchoring as a contributing factor. The Division Bench erred in taking this factor into account.( Paragraph 22)

Two crucial aspects emerged: non-intimation by the Master about deballasting and the Berthing Master's failure to check the vessel's draft. While other factors were natural or beyond control, these two features were at the core of the matter. The Berthing Master, experienced in navigating vessels, had the duty to check the draft.( Paragraph 23)

The Committee's thorough inquiry concluded that individual responsibility could not be solely attributed to the Master. The assessment of all relevant factors by the Committee, including the failure of the Berthing Master and other contributing factors, supports the trial court's just and correct perspective. The Division Bench's view was erroneous.( Paragraph 24)

Facts:

The petitioners filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, asserting that the delayed appointment of Information Commissioners in the Central Information Commission (CIC) and State Information Commissions (SICs) hampers the functionality of the Right to Information Act. Allegations were made regarding a lack of transparency in the appointment process, prompting the petitioners to seek clear terms and conditions for such appointments.

Issues:

Timely appointment of Information Commissioners.

Lack of transparency in the appointment process.

Need for clear terms and conditions for appointments.

Held:

The right to information is a fundamental right derived from Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution. Transparency is essential for a healthy democracy (Para 10).

The Right to Information Act, 2005, provides a legal framework for citizens to exercise their fundamental right to information, emphasizing good governance (Para 19).

Delays in filling vacancies were acknowledged, and directions were given to fill them promptly. Transparency in the appointment process was affirmed, with a recommendation for wider representation beyond government employees (Para 34-40).

The court emphasized the need for express stipulation of terms and conditions in advertisements and on websites for Information Commissioner appointments (Para 41-42).

Concerns were raised about the pendency of cases and the inadequacy of Information Commissioners in certain States, leading to recommendations for additional appointments (Para 46-63).

Specific directives were issued for the defunct State Information Commission in Andhra Pradesh to be activated promptly (Para 50-51).

Recommendations were made for filling vacancies in various State Information Commissions within specified timelines (Para 54-66).

The Central Government's transparent appointment process was endorsed, and all states were directed to follow suit. Additionally, specific terms and conditions for appointments should be stipulated in advertisements and on websites (Para 67).

FACTS:

The appellant was convicted for offenses under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. The Judicial Magistrate awarded specific sentences, but the appellant challenged the order, primarily contesting the lack of specification on whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively.

ISSUES:

The absence of clarity in the Magistrate's order regarding the concurrent or consecutive nature of the sentences imposed under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC.

HELD:

The appellant argued that the Judicial Magistrate erred in not specifying whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively, citing Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Court acknowledged the mandatory requirement under Section 31 and found that the Magistrate indeed erred in not ensuring compliance.

The Court held that in a case where an accused is convicted for multiple offenses in a trial, it is necessary for the Magistrate to specify, under Section 31, whether the sentences for each offense would run concurrently or consecutively.

Recognizing the oversight, the Court modified the order of the Magistrate and directed that the sentences awarded for both Section 279 and Section 304-A IPC would run concurrently.

The Court affirmed the finding of conviction and sentence under both sections, emphasizing that three Courts had previously found the prosecution's case against the appellant valid.