Facts:

The case involved the State of Uttar Pradesh appealing against the acquittal of the accused (Wasif Haider and others) by the High Court. The accused were initially convicted by the trial court but were later acquitted due to multiple investigative lapses and flaws. The prosecution's case relied heavily on witness testimonies and the identification parade, among other evidence. However, the High Court found contradictions in witness statements, lack of corroboration, and significant investigative deficiencies, leading to the acquittal of the accused.

Issues:

Whether the investigative flaws and lapses in the prosecution's case warranted the acquittal of the accused.

Whether the benefit of doubt should accrue to the accused due to an inefficacious prosecution.

Held:

The Court concurred with the High Court's decision to acquit the accused. The Court highlighted several investigative deficiencies, including the inordinate delay in conducting the Test Identification Parade (TIP), doubts regarding the genuineness of the TIP process, inconsistencies in witness testimonies, contradictions in evidence, and failure to establish charges under relevant sections of the law.

The Court reiterated the presumption of innocence and the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It emphasized that suspicion cannot substitute for proof and held that the benefit of doubt must accrue to the accused due to the inefficacious prosecution and investigative deficiencies. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals by the State of Uttar Pradesh against the acquittal of the accused, affirming the High Court's decision.

Facts:

The case involved charges under Section 436 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) regarding mischief by fire and common intention. Accused no.1, the appellant, challenged the conviction and sentence imposed by the District & Sessions Judge, Chamarajanagar, and upheld by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. The lower courts had found all the accused guilty and imposed various fines and sentences.

Issues:

The reliability of the prosecution's evidence, particularly the testimony of witnesses, given the material contradictions observed in their statements. Additionally, the consideration of documentary evidence provided by the defense was at question.

Held:

The Supreme Court found material contradictions in the oral evidence adduced by the prosecution, and noted the absence of independent witnesses. Despite the interested testimony of PWs-1 to 3, discrepancies existed regarding the identification of the accused, the presence of witnesses at the scene, and the description of the incident. Moreover, documentary evidence provided by the defense was not adequately considered by the appellate court.

The Court held that both the trial court and the High Court had erred in arriving at their conclusions, which were deemed to be based on "perverse findings" and liable to lead to a miscarriage of justice.

As a result, the Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the convictions and sentences imposed on the appellant-accused. The appellant was acquitted of the charges, and any bail bonds furnished by them were discharged. They were also entitled to a refund of any fine amounts deposited.

Facts:

M/S. EMAAR MGF LAND LIMITED was developing an integrated township.

AFTAB SINGH applied for the allotment of a villa within the township.

The Buyer's agreement between the parties contained an arbitration clause for the resolution of disputes under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Despite the arbitration clause, AFTAB SINGH filed a complaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC), bypassing arbitration.

Issues:

Whether consumer disputes are arbitrable, especially in the presence of an arbitration clause in the Buyer's agreement.

Whether the NCDRC was justified in rejecting the application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, filed by M/S. EMAAR MGF LAND LIMITED.

Held:

The Court, in a series of judgments, established that despite the existence of arbitration agreements, proceedings under the Consumer Protection Act should continue. This is because the Act provides a specialized and swift remedy to consumers for defects or deficiencies in goods or services.

The amendments to Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, aimed to limit judicial discretion in refusing arbitration references. However, these amendments did not intend to override special legislations where disputes were considered non-arbitrable.

While the legislative intent behind the amendments to Section 8 was to restrict judicial discretion only to cases where no valid arbitration agreement exists, the special nature of the remedies provided under the Consumer Protection Act warrants the continuation of proceedings despite the presence of an arbitration agreement.

If a party entitled to seek an additional special remedy under a statute does not opt for it and is party to an arbitration agreement, disputes can proceed through arbitration. However, when specific or special remedies are available and opted for by an aggrieved person, judicial authorities can refuse to relegate parties to arbitration.

Decision: The Court upheld the decision of the NCDRC in rejecting the application filed by M/S. EMAAR MGF LAND LIMITED under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The review petitions are dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, a Sepoy in the Indian Army, challenged the decision of a Summary Court Martial, resulting in his dismissal from service and a six-month rigorous imprisonment.

The Summary Court Martial acquitted the appellant of one charge but found him guilty of misconduct on another charge.

The appellant sought legal representation during the trial, which was denied by the Commanding Officer based on a misinterpretation of Regulation 479 of the Army Regulations.

Issues:

Whether the denial of legal representation during a Summary Court Martial constitutes a violation of the principles of natural justice, especially when Rule 129 of the Army Rules allows for such representation.

Held:

The Court held that there was a violation of the principles of natural justice due to the denial of legal representation to the appellant during the Summary Court Martial.

The Court noted that Rule 129 of the Army Rules explicitly allows the accused to have legal representation during the trial, contrary to the misinterpretation of Regulation 479 by the Commanding Officer. The Court emphasized that the word "may" in Rule 129 implies an entitlement to representation, and the denial of this right resulted in prejudice against the appellant.

Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal, and invalidated the decision of the Summary Court Martial. It was clarified that the interference was solely based on the violation of natural justice, and the respondents were free to take further legal steps as per the law.

Facts:

A motion of no-confidence was moved against the appellant by the respondents.

The Tahsildar convened a special meeting of the Gram Panchayat for considering the motion on 14.09.2018.

Out of nine members, only eight were present during the meeting.

One member who voted in favor of the motion was later found disqualified due to not submitting her caste certificate after the election.

The motion was passed with six members voting in favor and two against it.

Issues:

Whether the motion of no-confidence was validly passed considering the calculation of the required majority.

Held:

The court examined the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959, particularly Section 35(3), which required a motion of no confidence to be passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members entitled to sit and vote.

The court rejected the respondent's argument that the majority should be calculated based on the members present and voting, excluding the disqualified member. It emphasized that the calculation should be based on the total number of members entitled to sit and vote, irrespective of their presence at the meeting.

Referring to previous judgments, including State of U.P. v. Pawan Kumar Tiwari, the court reiterated that rounding off fractions was not applicable in this context. It held that the two-thirds majority required for passing the motion had not been achieved, as the fraction of votes could not be rounded off and one vote could not be expressed as a fraction.

Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Addl. Collector and the High Court, and held that the motion of no-confidence was not validly passed against the appellant.

Facts:

M/S. Sanjivani Non-Ferrous Trading Private Limited imported various varieties of Aluminum scrap between August 27, 2013, and December 29, 2014.

The respondent declared the transaction value for customs duty purposes in 843 Bills of Entry.

The Assessing Officer rejected the declared value, leading to reassessment by increasing the assessable value.

Upon challenge in the High Court of Allahabad, the Deputy Commissioner of Customs justified the rejection of the transaction value and enhanced it based on the value of the imported goods and their contents.

The respondent appealed the assessment order to the Commissioner (Appeals), and subsequently to the Customs, Excise, and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal), which allowed the appeals, rejecting the enhancement of assessable value by the Revenue.

Issues:

Whether the Tribunal erred in rejecting the enhancement of assessable value by the Revenue without remanding the case back to the Assessing Officer.

Whether the Assessing Officer properly examined the evidence available with the Department and undertook the necessary exercise regarding price being the sole consideration.

Held:

The Court analyzed Section 14 of the Customs Act, which mandates that the assessable value should ordinarily be based on the price actually paid for the goods. Exceptions exist where the price is not the sole consideration or if the buyers and sellers are related persons. The Court emphasized that the Assessing Officer must provide cogent reasons supported by material to reject the declared transaction value. In the absence of such evidence, the declared value stands. The Tribunal's decision to set aside the order was justified, as was done in similar cases previously. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no merit in the appeals and upheld the Tribunal's decision.

Facts:

The case involved the death of Pravin while he was in police custody at Vajirabad Police Station, Nanded.

The deceased's parents and daughter filed a Criminal Writ Petition alleging that Pravin's death was unnatural.

The High Court directed the State of Maharashtra to pay compensation of Rs. 7 lakhs to the petitioners and recover it from the Investigating Officer-In-charge of the relevant crime.

The Investigating Officer-In-Charge appealed against this direction, disputing liability before it was established.

Issues:

Whether the State should be directed to pay compensation before liability for the crime is established.

Whether the Investigating Officer-In-Charge can be held liable for compensation.

Held:

The Court modified the direction of the High Court and stated that the State would be at liberty to recover the compensation amount from the concerned erring officials once the liability for the crime in question is established. This decision was made in consideration of the pending proceedings to determine liability in connection with Pravin's death. Therefore, the appeal was disposed of in terms of the modified direction.

Facts:

The respondent was appointed as a contract conductor with the appellant corporation (APSRTC).

A departmental inquiry was initiated against the respondent, leading to his termination.

The respondent appealed against the termination and was later granted a fresh appointment.

The respondent approached the High Court seeking continuity of service.

Issues:

Whether the grant of continuity of service to an employee found guilty of misconduct is valid.

Whether the High Court's decision to grant continuity of service was justified.

Held:

Continuity of service cannot be granted to an employee found guilty of misconduct unless the termination order is set aside.

Granting continuity to such an employee would be unjust, as it would place them on the same footing as other contractual employees with a clean record.

The High Court's decision to grant continuity of service was manifestly misconceived.

The seniority of the respondent should be counted from the date of his fresh appointment.

The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the respondent's seniority was to be counted from the date of his fresh appointment. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of in the above terms.

Facts:

The respondent was appointed as a contract conductor by the appellant corporation.

Following a departmental inquiry, the respondent's services were terminated due to misconduct.

The respondent approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The Single Judge of the High Court directed the corporation to reengage the respondent in service and grant continuity of service.

The Division Bench affirmed the Single Judge's order.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to grant continuity of service to the respondent was justified.

Whether the High Court properly considered the individual facts of the case.

Held:

The Court ruled that continuity of service cannot be granted unless the termination order is set aside. It emphasized the importance of ensuring there is no gap in service.

Granting continuity of service to an employee found guilty of misconduct would place them on the same footing as other contractual employees with a clean record.

The Court found that the High Court failed to properly consider the individual facts of the case and erred in issuing a common order for all cases.

As a result, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of both the Division Bench and the Single Judge.